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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the financialisation of housing associations, with the aim of 
connecting the abstract and distant processes of property finance to how these are 
materialised in the practices of social housing provision. In doing so, a major objective 
is to show that financialisation is not an automatic process, operating as a rigid 
structural logic, but has rather necessitated an ongoing and active process of 
governance within the housing association sector. I argue that a fundamental 
component of this long-term process since the 1980s has been a re-imagining of 
associations as entrepreneurial, risk-taking enterprises. Governing financial risk has 
been a fundamental element of the conversion of associations into an asset class, with 
the need to safeguard social housing assets a major priority for the regulator.  
A key finding of this research is that as housing associations have undergone 
neoliberalisation, the powers of the regulator have been progressively eroded as 
lenders have emerged as a major interest group within the social housing sector. The 
financial crisis and austerity have deepened these trends, with austerity policies 
driving associations to commercialise their development programmes in order to 
protect their income streams. This in turn is driving financialisation within the sector as 
providers come to treat their land and housing as a pure financial asset, though 
development activity at scale still remains concentrated among a minority of large, 
London-based providers.   
This thesis has nonetheless found financialisation to be a contradictory process, with 
major risks building up within the sector as part of the commercialisation agenda and 
serious consequences for tenants as access to social housing becomes more 
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restricted. The systematic transfer by the regulatory system of risk downward from 
lenders, to providers, to tenants, is therefore a crucial means by which financialisation 
has been maintained in the aftermath of the financial crisis.    
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Part One 
 
Introduction to urban financialisation  
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Chapter one – introduction: austerity and financialisation 
 
“We’re all in this together”  
– David Cameron, address to Conservative Party conference, 2009. 
 
1.0. Social housing within an austerity context 
This thesis was written and researched in the years in which austerity measures first 
imposed by David Cameron’s government (2010 – 2016) began to take effect. The 
global financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 and state-backed rescues of financial institutions 
brought condemnation for “greedy” banks but failed to bring a crisis of neoliberal 
practice, with governments continuing to favour market discipline as the basis for 
social and economic reforms (Crouch 2011; Aalbers 2013). In the case of the UK, so-
called austerity measures following the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government (2010 – 2015) took the form of tight fiscal retrenchment, with 
proponents arguing for its necessity in order to bring down rising government deficits 
in the recessionary aftermath of the financial crisis (Blyth 2013). Despite promises of 
an export-led recovery GDP growth failed to rebound to expected levels, causing the 
government in its 2017 Budget to extend its timescale for reducing the “structural” 
deficit to beyond 20121/22, compared to an initially planned 2015/16 (Emmerson 
2017). The burden of imposed spending cuts nevertheless fell disproportionately onto 
poor and vulnerable groups in society, making it easy to dismiss Cameron’s urge for 
unity in this chapter’s epigraph as a hollow attempt by an incoming government to 
build support for a deeply regressive policy programme (MacLeavy 2011).  
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As noted by several researchers however, underlying this alleged economic necessity 
was an ideologically conservative narrative of social crisis, depicting an atomised 
society unable to earn the rewards of globalisation due to an erosion of mutual trust 
and responsibility caused by the pursuit of self-interest and an over-interventionist 
state (Finlayson 2011; Norman 2010). Cameron’s appeal to national solidarity can 
therefore be read as an attempt to mobilise consent through a narrative of “virtuous 
necessity”, in which current sacrifices will ultimately bring a superior moral future, 
where work discipline and self-control would be rewarded (Clarke and Newman 2012). 
Budgetary retrenchment and cuts to welfare programmes thus became social 
engineering, designed to create a society in which individuals took responsibility for 
themselves and one another without claiming rights from the public. Although the state 
was cast as a malign influence in this narrative, the welfare state was still seen to have 
a disciplinary role to play, imposing work expectations and conditionality on people in 
need of government benefits as part of distinguishing between the ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ poor (Kerr, Byrne, and Foster 2011).  
The practical manifestations of austerity such as funding cuts, withdrawn universal 
entitlements and the opening up of public services to for-profit providers are not 
themselves new, forming part of an ongoing process of neoliberalisation since the 
economic crisis of the 1970s in which market relations have been progressively 
extended through greater areas of social life (Whitfield 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002). 
Recent austerity measures have gone well beyond previous rounds of spending cuts, 
with fiscal retrenchment providing fresh opportunities for public services to be 
privatised and outsourced (Peck 2012; Taylor-Gooby 2012). Austerity’s impact on 
housing has been particularly severe, exacerbating already pronounced urban 
inequalities. From 2010, homelessness statistics rose amid deep welfare cuts and 
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overall reductions in key housing support streams, reversing a period of decline in 
officially recognised homelessness since 2002 from record high levels during the 
1980s and 1990s (Fitzpatrick et al. 2017).  Camps housing homeless people sprang 
up on the streets of several city centres, even as new investment entered real estate 
markets (Salford Star 2015). Weak wage growth and a recovery premised on “flexible” 
yet precarious employment (Green and Lavery 2015) combined with an ongoing 
property boom that outlived the financial crisis to press millions into a growing yet 
insecure private rented sector in a process concentrated in London, but spreading out 
to other central urban areas (Dorling 2014).  
Housing has become a flashpoint of political contestation in response, as rents and 
house prices continued to race above wages despite a climate of economic 
precariousness, cuts to welfare services and an ongoing policy-led erosion of social 
housing since the 1980s (Edwards 2015). In comparison to campaigns over tenure 
such as Defend Council Housing in the 2000s (Watt 2009), these often took the form 
of struggles against displacement, featuring high profile groups such as “Focus E15” 
campaign by homeless mothers in gentrifying areas of the capital, alongside numerous 
estate-based campaigns against demolition and redevelopment (Lees 2014; 
Hodkinson and Essen 2015; Watt 2016). Although involving relatively small numbers 
of people, housing activist networks also organised around conditions in the private 
rented sector, with the most foremost of these again based in London but increasingly 
spreading to cities such as Bristol, Manchester and Sheffield.   
This introductory chapter sets out a contextual overview of housing associations, 
providing a brief history of their development and more recent changes undergone by 
the sector since the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis and post-2010 austerity policies, and 
the implications these have for the potential for financialisation in the sector. I then set 
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out a summary of the key themes and research questions of the thesis, and an 
overview of its primary findings in order to show how this research contributes to the 
wider literature. The chapter concludes with a review of the structure of the thesis itself 
and a summary of the contents of its chapters, before moving on in the next chapter 
in which I show the methodological basis for putting my research questions into 
practice.  
1.1. English housing associations  
This thesis analyses the extent to which neoliberalisation and, from 2010, austerity 
policies enacted in the aftermath of the financial crisis, have enabled financialisation 
to be further embedded within English housing associations. Housing associations are 
independent yet regulated entities that have become the dominant social housing 
providers since the 1980s. Private finance has played a major role in shaping the 
sector since the Housing Act 1988 formalised the private borrowing of associations, 
driving initial rounds of consolidation and commercialisation in the early 1990s (Pryke 
and Whitehead 1993), while the need to provide assurance to lenders has become a 
structural factor in the sector’s regulatory governance (McDermont 2007). These 
social landlords offer a rich case study for this work due to their hybrid characteristics: 
they are independent social landlords who act as property managers and often 
developers in their own right, while also being welfare providers of subsidised housing 
that are crucial for fulfilling public policy goals such as homelessness rehousing 
(Cowan and McDermont 2006). Although banks largely scaled back their lending to 
the sector with the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, associations have been able to 
maintain their access to capital through institutional investors in the bond markets such 
as pension funds and insurance companies, raising the question of what new relations 
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between providers and lenders are being created and the extent to which this is 
reshaping the sector. 
Housing associations currently form a diverse sector of over 1,500 providers1.  They 
range in size from small and specialist organisations to large and increasingly 
commercial developer landlords, managing many tens of thousands of properties. 
Over 95% of the sector’s stock is concentrated among roughly 300 providers, each of 
whom owns over 1,000 homes, and these comprise the major focus of policy attention 
and regulatory oversight (Homes and Communities Agency 2017a, 1). Associations 
do not distribute profits to shareholders, but do operate in order to generate surpluses 
and are exposed to the risks of development, facing financial losses if a development 
project fails. They also issue private sector assured tenancies, although of a much 
more secure form than the assured shorthold tenancies available in the private rented 
sector (Hughes and Lowe 1995). Although 85% of the sector’s income still derives 
from “general needs” social housing lets, the standard provision and tenancy for 
people in social housing, since the 1980s many associations have also built low cost 
products for owner-occupation such as shared ownership (Homes and Communities 
Agency 2014a, 6). The last ten years have seen increasing commercial diversification 
among the larger providers into market sale and rent, alongside the development of 
other areas such as care accommodation and student housing.  Larger providers have 
been able to exploit their assets in order to become prominent developers, in addition 
to their functions as social landlords (Heywood 2016).  
                                                          
1 The current statutory designation for housing associations under the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 is 
to label them as “private registered providers”, reflecting the ability since the Housing Act 2004 for for-profit 
entities to enter social housing provision. Prior to this, associations were deemed “registered social landlords” 
under the Housing Act 1996. As the number of for-profit companies that have registered with the regulator in 
order to become providers of social housing has so far been minimal, this thesis uses the term housing 
association and registered provider (or “provider”) interchangeably throughout the text. 
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As a sector, housing associations have a long history of charitable housing provision 
dating back to philanthropists, social reformers and voluntary movements of the 19th 
Century. For much of the 20th Century these were small and marginal landlords, 
categorised as private bodies and primarily serving specialist needs within the market 
(Malpass 2000). Their modern development has nonetheless been heavily shaped by 
their relationship with government policy as mediated by the regulator, with a formal 
comprehensive framework first established under the Housing Corporation as a non-
departmental government body through the Housing Act 1974 (McDermont 2007)2. 
Combining the role of both funder and regulator until its abolition in 2008, associations 
would become officially registered providers eligible for funding for roles such as urban 
redevelopment in exchange for accepting regulatory requirements, including the 
surrender of powers over disposing of their assets without first gaining consent. The 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 initially split the Corporation’s roles into two 
bodies, with the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) originally covering funding 
and the Tenant Services Authority (TSA) responsible for regulation. The incoming 
Coalition government in 2010 announced the abolition of the TSA however, with its 
functions incorporated into a separate “regulatory committee” within the HCA from 
2012 (Homes and Communities Agency 2012). The government also announced in a 
re-separation of regulatory functions into a new agency in late 2016, splitting 
regulatory functions into a new body called the Social Housing Regulator in January 
2018, and rebranding the HCA as “Homes England”3. 
                                                          
2 The Housing Corporation was initially established one decade earlier in 1964, in order to fund certain types of 
cost-rent and other societies prior to its role being expanded through the Housing Act 1974 (McDermont 
2010). 
3 As this most recent reorganisation occurred after the time period analysed in my thesis, the implications of 
this lie beyond this piece of research. 
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Prominent voices within the sector are keen to project an image of commercial acumen 
as a means to providing charitable housing, with representative bodies such as the 
National Housing Federation (NHF) operating promotional campaigns under slogans 
such as “In Business for Neighbourhoods”. The role of the state has nonetheless been 
vital for the sector’s growth, as acknowledged by NHF head David Orr in his 
presentation of the sector as “the most successful public-private partnership in the 
history of our economy” (Ebrahimi 2015). Housing associations are still largely not-for-
profit entities that do not distribute returns to shareholders (Pawson and Mullins 2010). 
Many larger associations are nevertheless increasingly commercially diversified since 
the financial crisis, developing houses for market sale and rent and expanding into 
other areas such as student and care accommodation, alongside more longstanding 
products such as low cost home ownership where ownership of a property is split 
between an association and a tenant (Heywood 2016). Private finance has been 
essential infrastructure for this process, enabling associations to lever in capital for 
development and refurbishment in exchange for long term interest repayments, 
creating an intertwined relationship in which private debt is necessary for achieving 
public policy goals while social policy acts as a source of accumulation for private 
entities (Dowling 2017).  
Housing associations have been deeply shaped by the neoliberalisation of public 
housing within the UK, which since the 1980s has transitioned from a “mass” council 
housing model owned and operated by local government authorities, to an increasingly 
residualised mixed economy of provision dominated by housing associations (Harloe 
1995). The 20th Century saw a major de-commodification of housing through the end 
of private rented housing as a mass tenure and the establishment of a comprehensive 
public housing system in the aftermath of both world wars, followed by an equally 
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transformative re-commodification as much of this stock was privatised from the 1980s 
(Lowe 2011). Subsidised housing originally took the form of council housing, mass 
public housing owned and operated by local government authorities and 
accommodating 31% of the population at its 1978 peak (Malpass and Murie 1994). 
For a core capitalist economy this represented a major socialisation of housing, 
although council housing has often been characterised as the “wobbly pillar” of the 
welfare state (Torgersen 1987) due to its limited universal provision as a tenure for the 
working class, and one which began to undergo “residualisation” in the post-war 
decades as more privileged workers began to enter owner occupation (Harloe 1995). 
The privatisation of council housing formed the leading edge of neoliberal reforms 
imposed under Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979 – 1990), which 
entrenched residualisation within social housing, as much of the highest quality stock 
was sold to tenants at a generous discount via the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme (Forrest and 
Murie 1988).  
Direct privatisation was accompanied by a complex set of spending and borrowing 
restrictions preventing local authorities from replacing lost stock that have since been 
maintained under successive Labour and Conservative governments, leading to the 
“eclipse” of local government as a direct provider of housing (Cole and Furbey 1994). 
Although council housing still accounts for 7% of stock within England, with relatively 
high remaining concentrations in some cities, including London and Manchester, 
housing associations since the 1980s have been the primary conduit for what has 
come to be known as ‘social’ housing. The Housing Act enabled the entry of private 
finance into the socially rented sector, associations have since raised £60bn in debt, 
compared to £40bn in government grants (Homes and Communities Agency 2017a, 
7). The entry of private finance was a hugely significant moment of neoliberalisation, 
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encouraging rounds of commercial consolidation within the sector as providers faced 
new requirements to manage their assets as collateral and secure more debt (Pryke 
and Whitehead 1993). The sector’s growth has also benefitted from Large Scale 
Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) policies underpinned by private borrowing that have 
transferred council stock directly to new or established associations (Pawson and 
Mullins 2010). Beginning as a local authority initiative in the 1980s using general 
powers under the Housing Act 1985 to sell housing stock, and increasingly formally 
adopted by central government in the 1990s, by 2013 up to 43% of association stock 
was held by LSVT companies (Homes and Communities Agency 2014a, 5).  
1.2. Housing associations and financialisation: a new asset class? 
Although private companies have been able to register as social housing providers 
with the regulator since 2004, associations still largely operate on a not-for-profit basis 
despite some holding joint ventures for commercial development arms (Manzi and 
Morrison 2017). This has led prominent academics within housing studies to caution 
against a simple labelling of providers as private companies in all but name, pointing 
to the fact that the surpluses they generate are retained within the organisation rather 
than distributed to shareholders (Pawson and Mullins 2010). Critics, however, counter 
that this re-commodification of social housing stock through housing associations 
forms part of a historical process of privatisation, creating future potential for larger 
and more commercial providers to deregister from the regulator altogether and float 
themselves on the stock market, converting them in the long term from social landlords 
to fully commercial property companies (Ginsburg 2005).  
This thesis seeks to contribute to these debates over the future direction of social 
housing in the UK through analysing the extent to which associations may be 
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undergoing not just commercialisation, but financialisation. Although largely still 
operated on a not-for-profit basis and with many legally incorporated as charities, 
many housing associations are large commercial property companies in their own 
right, holding substantial assets and making sophisticated use of financial securities 
such as bonds and derivatives. To the extent that associations are reconfiguring 
themselves as developers and diversifying into areas such as market sale or rent, this 
also raises the question over the extent to which providers are coming to treat their 
land and housing stock as assets whose value should be maximised.  
In doing so, associations could become incorporated into wider tends of 
“financialisation” (Lapavitsas 2013), a process in which land and housing have 
become increasingly central assets for speculation over the past four decades of 
neoliberal political economy (Rutland 2010; McNally 2009). With a small but growing 
literature investigating the phenomenon since the turn of the millennium (Froud et al. 
2000; Stockhammer 2004; Langley 2006), the years since the 2007 – 2009 financial 
crisis have seen growing academic attention paid toward the transformation of housing 
into a profitable asset (Aalbers 2016). The run-up to the crisis saw the notorious 
expansion of demand by global investors for securitised mortgage assets, with the 
expansion of credit due to off-balance sheet financing provoking a major property 
bubble in multiple national contexts, including the UK (Aalbers 2008; Sassen 2009; 
Fernandez and Aalbers 2016). These connections between housing, urban space and 
transnational capital flows were mediated by relatively traditional owner occupation 
markets in the run-up to the crisis. The past ten years however have seen institutional 
investors expressing growing interest in taking advantage of weaknesses in the 
mortgage market to target residential rented housing as a new profitable asset class 
(D. Fields and Uffer 2016; Beswick et al. 2016). Recent years have also seen 
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institutional investors begin piloting investment models in the UK directly aimed at the 
provision of affordable housing, raising the prospect of opening a new frontier of 
accumulation within the UK’s re-commodified social housing sector (Apps 2016; Cross 
2016). 
Though this equity investment has so far been marginal, the growing commercial 
orientation of larger housing associations raises two-fold question of the extent to 
which providers themselves are becoming financialised in terms of treating their land 
and housing as assets, and the extent to which risks are building up within the social 
housing sector that may create entry points for direct institutional investment. Recent 
years have seen growing interest within the financialisation literature into social 
housing, analysing commercialised development models (Smyth 2018; Byrne and 
Norris 2017), more complex financial models such as bond issuance (Wainwright and 
Manville 2017), and the risks of financial instruments such as derivatives (Aalbers, 
Loon, and Fernandez 2017). As indicated above, commercialisation within the housing 
association sector has also attracted attention, with Manzi and Morrison (2017) 
warning of the potential for growing risks that may drive permanent changes through 
the sector, to the detriment of tenants as they face weaker security of tenure and more 
commercially-oriented landlords.  
My thesis contributes significantly to these debates through an in-depth and historically 
grounded analysis of the financialisation of English housing associations. A key 
contribution of this research is that it connects debates within different disciplinary 
silos, bringing to bear the insights of socio-legal geography onto how private financial 
interests are territorialised within social housing, a crucial issue given the nature of the 
tenure as a regulated sector (Blomley 2003a; Blandy and Sibley 2010; Cowan and 
McDermont 2008). Analysing financialisation as a form of governance, particularly with 
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regards to the control of risk (Bryan and Rafferty 2014b), in this thesis I adopt a 
qualitative approach grounded in critical urban political economy combined with socio-
legal geography to analyse how financialisation has functioned as a form of 
governance in the sector.  
In particular, I argue that the construction of housing associations as an asset class 
has required an active and ongoing mediation through legal and regulatory 
frameworks, including the “private regulation” (Scott 2002) given by professional 
financial services providers, to attempt to represent and align associations as risk-
taking, entrepreneurial organisations. Crucially, I argue that this has involved a 
rescaling of reasonability for managing risk onto the level of the individual provider, 
further embedding drives toward providers acting as commercial providers. The costs 
of this process have the potential to be passed down in turn onto housing association 
tenants, who are likely to face more exclusionary lettings policies and the increased 
exposure of their landlords to the risks of speculative urban development, potentially 
placing their homes at risk. There are nonetheless contradictions and nuances within 
this process, with the need for housing associations to ensure a stable tenant base in 
the context of welfare cuts leading them to put resources into gaining knowledge of 
their tenants in order to prevent rent arrears before they occur. Throughout this thesis 
I argue that financialisation should be considered an inherently political project, rather 
than a technical process of increasing housing supply, contributing to the literature by 
providing an in-depth analysis of how financialisation has been enabled to continue in 
the aftermath of the crisis through legal and regulatory regimes systematically 
transferring responsibility for risk management down from lenders, to providers, to 
tenants. 
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An additional significant contribution of this research is that it advances an analysis of 
financialisation as a spatial and urban process (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 
2011), showing how the enactment of financialisation through commercial 
development models is contributing to an ongoing expulsion of social and affordable 
housing from central urban areas. As such, I argue that financialisation represents a 
form of “accumulation through dispossession” (Harvey 2007a), adopting a Marxist 
analysis to demonstrate how the restructuring of associations as a profitable asset 
class is leading to weakened security for low income urban inhabitants. As such, I 
advance recent academic calls for concern over the erosion of the “social goals” of 
associations (Manzi and Morrison 2017), by showing the need to adopt an explicit 
conception of spatial justice and the right to the city (Lefebvre 1991) in attempts to 
conceive of the harms of financialisation. 
Finally, my research also contributes to important debates within the literature that 
have sought to clarify the nature of financialisation, in particular the need to specify 
both the limits of the phenomena, to prevent its theoretical degeneration into a circular 
concept that explains both everything and nothing (Christophers 2015), and the need 
to analyse the practices through which financialisation is achieved (Ouma 2016). As 
already shown, my research contributes to the latter through an analysis of 
financialisation as a form of governance, in particular how social housing legal and 
regulatory frameworks are being reconfigured to control and distribute risk. My 
research contributes to the former by analysing financialisation as a spatially and 
temporally bounded process, advancing the theorisation developed by Montgomerie 
and Büdenbender (Montgomerie and Büdenbender 2015) in an analysis of the 
limitations of asset-based welfare in homeownership, to showing the limitations of 
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financialisation as a sustainable strategy for social housing (cf Smyth 2018 on the 
limits to commercial development).  
Specifically I argue that the post-crisis era, perhaps surprisingly, has been a relatively 
benign economic period for housing associations. Although banks scaled back long-
term lending to the sector due to the increased costs of their own funding, associations 
have been able to continue their access to long-dated debt through the bond markets, 
in particular issuing bonds to pension funds and insurance companies who are 
attracted by long-term, stable assets such as social housing that have implicit 
guarantees of state protection. Ultra-low interest rates due to unconventional central 
bank policies have kept down borrowing costs, enabling the surpluses made by 
providers to rise. Although welfare cuts have placed pressure on tenants, these have 
not yet had a significant impact on the rental streams of providers. In addition, 
continued rising land values due to ongoing real estate speculation in areas such as 
central London has given some associations the opportunity to sell assets and raise 
the revenues to develop at scale.  
This favourable conjuncture (Engelen et al. 2010) for associations has both 
geographic and temporal limits however, dependent on a concentrated speculative 
urban land boom and subject to conditions such as low interest rates that are highly 
unlikely to persist over the long term. If risks crystallise, for example through an interest 
rate rise or market downturn, then providers with exposure to commercial development 
could begin entering financial difficulty. The sector since the crisis has already seen at 
least one such incident in the case of Cosmopolitan Housing Group, a Merseyside-
based association that nearly collapsed following an over-ambitious expansion into 
student housing, creating serious liabilities against its social housing assets and 
necessitating a major regulatory intervention (Underwood, Kane, and Appleby 2014). 
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Similar events could see new rounds of merger and consolidation in the sector, as 
larger providers effectively takeover the assets of smaller social landlords, producing 
a more commercialised sector. Alternately, losses within social housing could 
potentially open up the potential for new forms of equity investor referred to above to 
buy their way in to the sector, opening up new frontiers of accumulation through 
dispossession in social housing.  
Given the potential consequences for the security of social housing, the dynamic 
processes and outcomes of financialisation are therefore an urgent area of study, 
which my thesis contributes to by offering an in-depth analysis of the risks that are 
being built up through the financialisation agenda, and the consequences for social 
housing providers and tenants. In the remainder of the chapter I now give a contextual 
overview of the impacts of austerity policies for the sector, and their relevance for 
financialisation, before turning to my research questions and summary of the thesis.  
1.3. Housing associations under austerity urbanism 
Tendencies toward commercialisation within housing associations have faced 
renewed pressure under austerity, as associations have come under pressure to 
secure commercial funding while tenants have experienced renewed assaults on their 
legal tenancy rights and their entitlement to be securely housed. Social housing has 
been a major site of government reform in this process. Influential reports in 
conservative-linked think tanks such as Policy Exchange have explicitly argued for 
eroding security within social housing, arguing that its security of tenure plays a causal 
role in generating unemployment and economic inactivity through undermining 
incentives to find work (Morton 2010). Such an assertion is dubious given the long 
process of residualisation in the sector and an allocations system governing access 
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based on defined needs, including on the grounds of sickness and disability, but recent 
years have nonetheless seen extensive attacks on legal protections for security of 
tenure, and tenant incomes themselves through social security cuts. Cuts to housing 
benefit for example have included caps on maximum rents for each property size, 
reductions in shared room rates for people under 35, and maximum rents being set at 
the 30th rather than the 50th percentile of local rents, reducing the affordability of areas 
for claimants. Incapacity benefits have been replaced by a new “Employment Support 
Allowance” with more stringent criteria and mandatory retesting, in addition to cuts to 
child benefit and tax credits used by people on low incomes (Beatty and Fothergill 
2014, 66).  
These have had a serious and disproportionate impact on social housing tenants of 
below retirement age, many of whom are disabled or reliant on out of work benefits 
(Beatty and Fothergill 2014). Direct cuts to housing benefit used to subsidise rents 
have included a reduction in entitlements for people in social housing deemed to be in 
“under-occupation” due to possessing one or more spare bedrooms, a controversial 
measure politically dubbed the “bedroom tax” by opponents and critics (Carr and 
Cowan 2015). As shown below in Figure 1.1, this has come as part of a rapid 
succession of reforms and policy changes to the sector under austerity, cumulatively 
driving social housing into a more precarious and commercialised system of provision. 
  
30 
 
Figure 1.1. Key post-financial crisis regulatory and policy events 
Year Event Impact 
 
2007 – 
2009 
 
Global financial crisis. Banks scale back lending to the sector. Housing developments 
come under commercial pressure. Gordon Brown government 
launches National Affordable Housing Programme 2008 – 2011. 
 
2008 
 
Ujima housing association 
undergoes bankruptcy. 
 
First major insolvency in housing association sector. Stock 
merged with L&Q after regulatory intervention. 
2009 
 
Sanctuary housing 
association issues bond. 
Return to the capital markets by housing associations. 
 
 
2010 Election of Conservative-
led Coalition government.  
 
Beginning of “austerity” policies. 
2011 Localism Act 2011 Introduction of Affordable Rent tenure. 
Ability to grant “flexible tenancies” with a minimum secure period 
of two years. 
 
2012 Welfare Reform Act 2012 “Bedroom tax” introduced among range of welfare cuts that 
undermine social housing tenant incomes. 
 
2012 TSA abolished. Affordable 
rent introduced. 
TSA regulatory functions subsumed into HCA “Regulation 
Committee”. Introduction of new regulatory framework in which 
tenant protections are downgraded and subject to a “serious 
detriment” test before the regulator can intervene. 
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Development subsidies targeted toward “Affordable Rent” product 
with rents able to be charged at up to 80% market rate. 
 
2013  
 
Cosmopolitan housing 
association nearly 
collapses. 
 
Collapse due to failed investments in student housing. Regulatory 
concern over ability of associations to manage risks. 
 
2013 
 
Major rounds of welfare 
cuts implemented. 
 
Future potential for increased rent arrears. 
2015 New regulatory standards 
announced. 
 
Introduction of requirements for stress testing and asset and 
liability registers. 
2015 
 
Re-election of 
Conservatives with 
working majority. 
 
Announcement of Right to Buy expansion, regulatory 
liberalisation, imposition of mandatory rent cut of  1% between 
2016 – 2020. ONS reclassifies debt as public sector. 
 
2016 Housing and Planning Act 
2016. 
Deregulation of housing association consents regime, basis laid 
to enforce local authorities to sell-off “high value” council housing.  
 
2016 
 
EU referendum. UK votes to leave EU, David Cameron resigns and is replaced by 
Theresa May as Prime Minister. 
 
2017 
 
Snap general election in 
June. 
Conservatives lose majority but continue as minority government.  
 
 
Early research on the impact of such welfare cuts indicated the potential for driving 
lasting changes in the relation between providers and tenants, with social landlords 
taking a harsher stance on ensuring rents were paid on time (Power et al. 2014). Caps 
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on the total annual benefits receivable by a household, initially set in 2010 at £26,000 
for a family and £18,200 for a single person without children, acted as a de facto cut 
in housing benefit for people with large families or living in high rent areas, with further 
reductions in 2016 predicted by a government impact assessment to push the impact 
out beyond London and affect 88,000 people (Kennedy et al. 2016). Although 
predictions of mass arrears within social housing that affect the income streams of 
housing associations themselves have not yet materialised, a cause for concern in the 
sector is the planned rolling of existing benefits into a single “Universal Credit” which, 
unlike housing benefit, will be paid directly to the tenant rather than the landlord  
Kennedy, Keen, and Wilson 2017). If fully implemented this has the potential to 
undermine rental streams if tenants with minimal disposable income cut back on rent 
to manage debts or other expenditure, with media reports indicating fears among local 
authorities and housing associations over widespread arrears and payment delays  
(Butler and Holmes 2017).  
Weakened certainty over rental streams has been accompanied by a simultaneous 
and concerted rolling back of tenure security. The Localism Act 2011 has removed the 
statutory underpinnings for so-called “lifetime” assured tenancies by ending the 
requirement that social housing providers grant the most secure form of tenancy 
possible (Parkin and Wilson 2016). As part of this process the government also 
created a new form of “affordable rent” tenure, under which tenants had similar rights 
of security but could be charged at up to 80% of market rent, intended to shift the basis 
of housing association finance from grant subsidies to the rental streams of tenants 
(Wilson and Bate 2015). The use of these new powers has been uneven, with 
associations often still preferring to issue assured tenancies after a probation period, 
but within a wider context of higher risks and pressure to source commercial income 
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there is now scope for fundamental changes to the sector in the form of greater 
marketisation and greater insecurity for social housing tenants (Hodkinson and 
Robbins 2013). The future direction of these policies has recently become much more 
subject to uncertainty in the aftermath of the 2015 general election however, with the 
next section providing a brief summary of recent developments before the chapter 
moves on to my research questions and the structure of this thesis. 
1.4. From austerity to the 2015 general election and its aftermath 
The unexpected re-election of Prime Minister David Cameron with a full governing 
majority in 2015, as opposed to the continuation of a hung Parliament with no overall 
control, enabled the Conservatives to ditch their previous coalition agreement with the 
Liberal Democrats. This paved the way for a far more aggressive pursuit of a home 
ownership agenda in housing policy. Political attention that year zeroed in on a pre-
election Tory manifesto pledge to extend the right to buy to all social tenants living in 
housing associations, enabling them to purchase their homes at a discount. Although 
the government would compensate associations for their lost stock, with the stated 
intention that this would promote new housebuilding investment, this would be funded 
by a forced sell-off of council housing located in “high value” areas, while critics warned 
the policy would decimate the stable asset base of providers that enables them to 
borrow to develop (Wilson and Barton 2017). With replacement stock likely to be built 
in areas with cheaper land values, the right to buy extension and the council housing 
sell-off together would be likely to drive the further peripheralization of social housing 
as central urban areas become ever more unaffordable. This would be a major 
disruption for the sector if it were to be implemented, though the uncertain impacts of 
the policy at the time of writing means that it lies mostly outside the scope of my thesis.   
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The announcement of the policy during the 2015 election provoked open 
condemnation from the National Housing Federation (NHF) and other prominent 
voices within the sector (Orr 2015). Conservative victory was followed by media 
reports in both the liberal-leaning Channel 4 News and the Conservative-linked 
magazine The Spectator that were highly critical of housing associations on the 
grounds that they were failing to build sufficient housing (Ebrahimi 2015; Clark 2015). 
Following the election in the autumn of 2015, the ONS also temporarily reclassified 
housing association debt as belonging on the public books due to a review of the 
strength of regulatory powers in the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, leading to a 
major series of deregulatory powers over stock and board management in the Housing 
and Planning Act 2016. This came alongside veiled threats by the then-chancellor 
George Osborne that the Treasury was considering privatising its stake in its historical 
holdings of housing association grant by selling it to investors at a discount, who might 
then demand repayments at interest by the sector, a proposal soon dropped but which 
would dramatically increase the sector’s costs (Giles and Allen 2015). Additional 
measures in the Act also undercut the provision of new social housing through the 
planning system, enabling so-called Starter Homes built by developers for a 20% 
discount to be used to fulfil affordable housing requirements, adding to a general 
watering down of planning obligation powers that could be exercised by local 
authorities (Cromarty 2017). Collectively, these measures represented “class war 
Conservatism” (Hodkinson and Robbins 2013), threatening to erode the ongoing 
provision of social housing in the UK in favour of attempts to revive an expansion of 
home ownership that had stalled since 2003 (Heywood 2011), well before the financial 
crisis. 
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Perhaps the most damaging measure for the finances of housing associations was the 
imposition of a mandatory annual 1% rent cut from 2016 -2020 for housing providers 
through the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, intended to bring down housing 
benefit costs but with extremely high costs to the sector’s revenue base (Homes and 
Communities Agency 2017b). Subsequent events have thrown the future of this 
neoliberal policy agenda into question, however, while placing this moment of 
Conservative ascendency into doubt. Despite vocal initial protests against the Right to 
Buy expansion, the housing association sector ultimately acquiesced to a voluntary 
agreement to implement the policy in late 2015 brokered by the NHF, including the 
pledge to organise development programmes so as to promote a home ownership 
agenda (National Housing Federation 2015). Initial pilot trials have revealed serious 
implementation issues however, for example the ability of tenants to access mortgage 
finance, leading to speculation that the policy would ultimately be quietly ditched (Cole 
et al. 2017). The referendum vote for the UK to leave the EU in June 2016 led to the 
immediate resignation of Cameron and Osborne and the elevation of the less 
economically liberal Theresa May to the premiership, resulting in a partial restoration 
of lost capital grant funding for social rented housing. In October 2017 the government 
also quietly announced the restoration of the ability of housing associations to raise 
rents above inflation according to a formula of 1% plus the Consumer Price Index from 
2020 to 2025, easing the pressure on the sector’s finances (Apps 2017). 
May went on to lose the Conservatives’ governing majority in a snap election in 2017, 
intended to strengthen her hand with Eurosceptic MPs prior to EU negotiations but 
resulting in another hung Parliament and raising the future prospect of a Corbyn-led 
Labour government that may attempt social democratic measures rolling back at least 
some of the past four decades of neoliberal housing policy. June 2017 also saw the 
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horrific disaster of an out of control fire in Grenfell Tower, a high rise social housing 
block in North Kensington, killing at least 68 people. This raised public criticism over 
the potential role played in the blaze by long-term neglect, profiteering, and a contempt 
by authorities for social housing residents who are disproportionately working class 
and people of colour (Foster 2017). Speculation on whether this leads to a political 
reassessment of housing in the UK is beyond the scope of this thesis, with future years 
subject to considerable uncertainty and issues such as exit from the EU, the return of 
far-right political movements, and ongoing economic malaise likely exacerbating social 
tensions that have come to the fore in the past decade.  
Given this context, the potential for financialisation to drive further exclusions and 
dispossessions within English housing associations is an urgent area for study. I now 
turn to set out my research questions for investigating this process, and how my thesis 
is structured in answering these questions.  
1.5. Research questions and thesis structure 
In exploring the issues covered in this chapter, my research is focused on three related 
questions: 
1. To what extent does financialisation entail a new form of governance in 
housing associations? What are the features of this governance? 
2. To what extent have housing associations adopted financialisation? Are 
there any bounds or limits on this process? 
3. What are the likely risks this process generates, and how are housing 
associations and the regulatory framework adapting to these risks?  
37 
 
In exploring answers to these questions, my thesis is structured into four parts. The 
first part consists of this introductory overview and my methodology chapter, setting 
out the context of my research and my strategy for pursuing my research questions. 
Part Two of the thesis, incorporating Chapters 3 to 4, is grounded in my theoretical 
analysis of financialisation, setting out an analysis of the concept itself, before turning 
to analyse how financialisation operates through the production of space via the 
urbanisation of capital within the built environment. I also analyse the definitions and 
characteristics of social housing within this section of the thesis, drawing on critical 
socio-legal geography to probe how the sector has been treated within a historical 
context of neoliberalisation since the 1980s. In Part Three of my thesis covering 
Chapters 6 to 9, I analyse the findings of my fieldwork data, combining in-depth 
qualitative interviews with social housing stakeholders and an extensive documentary 
analysis of financial industry, regulatory and social housing sector reports. In doing so, 
I successively unravel the key features of the power of lenders within the regulatory 
system, the turn to the capital markets and institutional investors, the impact of 
austerity on development programmes, and the risks generated by this process. The 
final section of the thesis concludes by drawing the threads of my argument together, 
demonstrating how I have answered my above three research questions through each 
of the chapters, and considering the implications for social housing policy in the future.  
To summarise each chapter, in Chapter 2 I first justify the epistemological foundations 
of my methodological approach, arguing for a theorisation of research as a practical 
activity aimed at knowledge production, always already embedded within social power 
relations. As such, all research is political, and I explicitly adopt a critical stance toward 
financialisation. In the second section I provide a brief definition of the key term of my 
thesis, financialisation. In the third section I set out my research design and how this 
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applies to my exploration of my three primary research questions. In the fourth section 
I provide a brief overview of Manchester, as a limited case study for practitioners 
interviewed in this research. The fifth section reflects of the research process itself, 
and how this has influenced my aims, goals, and research questions.  
In Chapter 3, the first chapter of Part Two of this thesis, I explore the theorisation and 
history of financialisation within the academic literature as part of deriving my own 
theoretical approach. In the first section I examine the broad schools of thought which 
have analysed financialisation, and the methodological implications of these 
approaches. In the second section I analyse the political economy of financialisation, 
paying specific attention to Marxist and post-Keynesian schools of thought, while 
advocating a Marxist framework. The third section analyses Marxist analyses in more 
detail, including how the institutional structure of the financial sector is changing with 
respect to housing. In the fourth section I consider the contributions of cultural political 
economy to the financialisation literature, while in the fifth section I argue for my own 
approach that combines a historical materialist analysis with an examination of 
financialisation within social housing, while the sixth section specifically considers the 
financialisation of housing. 
In Chapter 4, I analyse financialisation as a situated, urban process, and how it relates 
to the wider neoliberalisation of cities over the past 40 years. In the first section I 
theoretically analyse neoliberalism as a concept, including attempts by human 
geographers to nuance an analysis of neoliberalism and show how it is vulnerable to 
contestation and disruption. In the second section I analyse the contributions of 
Marxist political economy to a theorisation of urbanisation, focusing in particular on the 
contributions of the geographer David Harvey, including his analysis of the re-
commodification of urban space as a process of “accumulation through dispossession” 
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(Harvey 2007a). In the third section I analyse how critical scholars have analysed this 
in relation to displacement in housing, while the fourth section brings financialisation 
into the debate, analysing how capitalist urbanisation creates crisis tendencies in the 
production of the built environment. In the fifth section I analyse the contribution of 
legal geography to this analysis, showing how property rights are territorialised in the 
urban landscape, and its relevance to an analysis of social housing.  
In Chapter 5 I turn to the question of social housing specifically, analysing how housing 
studies and critical socio-legal studies have analysed changes to housing 
associations. The first section critiques the housing studies literature, in particular the 
“hybridity” framework used in the literature. The second section analyses the historical 
development of associations, arguing that the hybridity literature pays insufficient 
attention to political economy and the role of lenders in structuring social housing. In 
the third and fourth sections I examine the historical development of the concept of 
social housing in relation to the erosion of public housing and the development of a 
mixed economy of welfare state provision. The fifth section examines how this has 
introduced economic rationalities as a technology of governance of social housing, 
while the sixth and seventh sections analyse how risk itself should be conceptualised 
as a key concept within an analysis of financialisation and neoliberal urbanism. 
In the sixth chapter I begin Part Three of this thesis, drawing on original fieldwork data 
and an extensive documentary review to analyse how the housing association sector 
is undergoing transformation. In the first section I analyse the core features of the 
development of the post-Housing Act 1988 regulatory regime in the run-up to the 
financial crisis. In the second section I argue that a key feature of this model has been 
the transfer of the risks of speculative development to associations and the removal 
of uncertainty for lenders, for example through the collateral system governing the 
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secured borrowing of housing providers. In the third section I examine the power 
relations this creates between lenders, providers, tenants and the regulator, adopting 
the concept of territorialisation (McDermont 2007; D. Fields 2015) to examine how 
financial sector actors have been able to establish property claims on urban space, for 
example through forms of valuation used by the sector.  
In the seventh chapter I analyse the impact of the financial crisis and the turn to 
institutional investment by associations. The first section examines the immediate 
impact of the crisis for the financial model used by housing associations, analysing the 
withdrawal of banks from long term lending and the turn toward the bond markets by 
associations. In the second section I show how associations have taken advantage of 
the capital markets to restructure existing debt, for example through refinancing 
restrictive loan covenants on their bank debt. In the third section I analyse how 
associations have used this flexibility, for example through small-scale derivatives 
trading. In the fourth section I tackle the question of institutional investment, arguing 
that the financial sector has so far struggled to develop a profitable model that can be 
scaled up within housing. The fifth section finds that investors seeking higher returns 
have nonetheless begun to enter the affordable housing market, with troubling 
implications for the ability of associations to be able to adequately negotiate such 
deals.  
In Chapter 8, I turn to analyse commercial development within the housing association 
sector. In the first section I analyse the affordable rent model, arguing that this is likely 
to drive further marketisation through the sector. In the second section I analyse 
commercial diversification within the sector, arguing that this has been done to 
compensate for lost grant levels, in particular through an expansion of shared 
ownership and market sale housing. In the third section I theorise this as a form of 
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financialisation within the sector, with associations motivated to treat their land and 
housing as pure financial assets. In the fourth section I argue this is unlikely to lead to 
more affordable housing, due to the need of providers to protect their profit margins in 
development. In the fifth section I analyse this as a form of dispossession, paying 
specific impact to the impact of deregulatory measures in the Housing and Planning 
Act 2016. In the sixth section I explore nuances in how this has been interpreted within 
the sector, while the seventh section conducts an analysis of the specific urban 
features of housing association financialisation with respect to the regional English city 
of Manchester. 
In Chapter 9, I analyse the risks generated by financialisation. In the first section I find 
evidence of growing risks within the development models used by associations. In the 
second section I analyse the case of Cosmopolitan Housing Group, arguing this raises 
severe questions about risks in the sector. In the third section, I explore the regulatory 
response to these risks. The fourth section examines in particular the establishment 
of a court-appointed administration system in the event a provider defaults, arguing 
that this reflects a weakening of the influence of the regulator over lenders. In the fifth 
section I analyse how this regime privileges creditors, while in the sixth I explore the 
likely consequences for tenants. Building on the urban analysis in Chapter 8, the 
seventh section explores how these risks are mediated by Manchester housing 
practitioners in order to examine financialisation’s emerging risks.  
Chapter 10 is my conclusion, bringing together the different aspects of my analysis. In 
the first section I reflect on my research methodology, and how this has enabled me 
to answer my research questions. In the second section I consider my first research 
question, arguing that financialisation has operated through rescaling the risks of 
social housing finance on to providers and their tenants. In the third section I explore 
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my answer to my second research question, arguing that housing association 
financialisation should be analysed as a bounded process and not a sustainable 
solution to the housing association sector. In the fourth section I consider my third 
research question, in an analysis of these risks and how they are likely to be governed 
within the housing association sector. The fifth section brings together my theoretical 
contributions, while the sixth section concludes the thesis by briefly reflecting on the 
implications of my research findings for the future development of housing 
associations.  
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Chapter Two - Methodology 
2.0. Introduction 
Financialisation is often presented as an abstract, disembodied process operating at 
a remove from cities, housing, and daily life. This thesis has been researched and 
written as a process of knowledge production aimed at overcoming this notion of 
“distance” (Clapp 2014), making more visible the relations and processes by which 
finance is reshaping English social housing providers within an urban context. 
Between 2013 and 2017 I conducted a qualitative study of housing association 
finance, analysing the extent to which changes to the sector’s lending, legal and 
regulatory frameworks and development activity were shaping the priorities and 
operations of housing providers. In doing so I used methods including semi-structured 
interviews of elites shaping social housing policy, a documentary analysis of numerous 
reports emanating from the social housing sector, real estate and financial industries, 
solicitors firms, government reports and regulatory documents, and interviews with 
housing practitioners in the northern English city of Manchester. Though this research 
is not a case study, in that Manchester does not form the unit of analysis, the city was 
deliberately chosen so as to generate data as to how these processes are operating 
in a spatial context outside the capital of London, in order to capture the geographic 
variation by which these processes manifest. 
My central motivation in this research is a concern with a critique of the presentation 
by some figures within the social housing sector of financialisation as a means of 
meeting the ‘social goals’ of housing associations, namely through enabling increased 
supply at a time of cuts to government development subsidies. Rather than assuming 
that this is a technical process of removing imbalances between supply and demand, 
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this research examines how financialisation has been historically constructed as a 
form of governance for the sector, the risks that commercialisation has created, and 
the consequences of the attempts by associations and the regulatory framework to 
control these risks. While this research focuses on housing associations, its key 
contribution is concerned with bringing together analyses of social housing within 
different sub-fields of housing studies, human geography, and socio-legal research, in 
order to show how post-crisis financialisation has relied on insulating lenders from 
heightened levels of risk and uncertainty in the years following the 2007 – 2009 
financial crisis. It is therefore hoped that its relevance goes beyond social housing 
researchers to those interested in how finance and neoliberal urbanism interact to 
shape cities, in order to aid attempts to construct political alternatives to the class and 
other social inequalities this generates.  
In doing so, this research situates itself within the broader field of critical human 
geography, though drawing on the sub-field of socio-legal geography as a crucial 
method for analysing the regulatory frameworks that distinguish social housing from 
other tenures. Social housing is not synonymous with housing associations, and a key 
finding of this research is the extent to which some providers are reconfiguring their 
priorities toward commercial development and other market-oriented services. I 
nonetheless refer to social housing in the text to emphasise the degree of direct 
government intervention and subsidy within associations in comparison to the private 
market, which directly shapes their operations through their stock management, tenant 
demographics and borrowing capacity. As a piece of knowledge production situated 
in the critical social sciences, this research is explicitly grounded in epistemological 
critiques of theorisations of knowledge that present it as the impartial discovery of 
hidden realities by a disinterested observer (Harding 1987; Haraway 1988; Allen 
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2009). Instead, it aims to de-naturalise neoliberal conventions, such as the 
governance of urban space by market forces, in order to show their predication on 
unequal power relations between lenders, providers and tenants (Andrews 2002).  
As a piece of research made possible by the institutional structures of a PhD, with 
supervision, training, and a community of fellow researchers that have developed my 
capacity as a researcher, this study has been shaped by the conventions, procedures 
and practices of its academic setting. To that extent, it uses traditionally-sanctioned 
qualitative methods of academic knowledge production, while recognising the 
inherently situated nature and limitations of any presentation of the world that is 
restricted to one set of causal narratives and explicitly adopting an orientation toward 
emancipatory political ends. The unavoidably political nature of knowledge production 
means that this methodology chapter will therefore begin with a brief discussion of its 
epistemological foundations, before explaining how these have shaped both the 
development of my methodological framework, and the methods I have used to 
analyse financialisation within housing associations. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I draw on 
epistemological developments grounded in the critical social sciences for adopting a 
view of research as a process of practical knowledge production, inherently embedded 
within social power relations. Although this does not mean that methodological rigour 
is not an essential part of research, it also means that researchers have an ethical 
duty to be clear about the political nature of their research aims, methods and goals. 
In the second section I give a brief definition of the key term used throughout this 
thesis, namely financialisation, while the third section sets out my research design and 
key questions. The fourth section details the key research methods that I have used. 
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The fifth section reflects on the process of research itself and how it influenced my 
aims, questions and scope of analysis, before the chapter concludes.  
2.1. Knowledge production within housing and urban research 
For at least the past five decades, the field of human geography has been subject to 
calls for academics to address their research toward the problems of radical social 
change. From key texts such as David Harvey’s 1974 Social Justice and the City 
(2009) and the 1969 founding of the left journal Antipode, to the poststructuralist 
challenge to reclaim subaltern identifies in the 1980s (Blomley 2006), “critical 
geography” has become an established sub-field in its own right. This has been so 
even as universities have undergone successive rounds of neoliberalisation on an 
institutional level, leading to questions as how to counteract separations between 
scholarship and activism (Chatterton 2006; Pickerill, Chatterton, and Hodkinson 
2010). As part of these intellectual movements, feminists and other thinkers have 
critiqued the basis of research within academia, challenging positivist conceptions of 
the (ideally) disinterested researcher as a discoverer of pre-existing, objective facts 
about a social world describable by one set of narratives and meanings (McDowell 
1992; Harding and Norberg 2005). These raise important questions in respect to the 
power relations involved in the production of any research, which this first section shall 
now consider. 
In her feminist analysis of social science research, Harding (1987) sets out a three-
fold distinction between epistemology, in the sense of the grounds of knowledge, 
methodology, a theory and analysis of how research should proceed, and method, the 
tools of inquiry. In doing so, she questions the positivist emphasis on method as the 
arbiter of valid knowledge, in which hypotheses are tested against data to confirm or 
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invalidate a generalisable theory. Within this framework, although the ‘bias’ of the 
researcher may be conceded as inevitable, it is nonetheless a variable that ideally 
should be eliminated as far as possible from a research design. For Harding, this 
emphasis on method neglects the power relations implied between the observer and 
observed however, ignoring the hidden assumptions as to who is the agent of 
knowledge given the dominance of masculine, white, and ruling class perspectives 
and interests in society (Ibid., 3). Crucially for Harding, a researcher can never be an 
abstract and disembodied entity, but is rather always a “real, historical individual”, 
whose experiences and identity will always shape which questions are asked, and 
which are not asked (Ibid., 9).  
The aim of this critique is not to conclude that any and all research is therefore 
relativist, or that the consistency and integrity of methods, data analysis and 
argumentation are pointless. Instead, as argued by Haraway (1988), it should be 
stressed that research is a practical activity in which the production of knowledge 
inherently affects the world through the creation of concepts and rhetorics that are 
used as a guide to action. In doing so, the researcher is never innocent of the existing 
relations of power and domination that inhere in society, making research at all stages 
of formulation, data collection, analysis and presentation a deeply political process. A 
critical task is therefore for researchers to be open about their goals, acknowledge the 
partiality of the forms of knowledge they produce, including who it is produced for, 
while also recognising the political responsibility to contest forms of knowledge that 
reproduce injustice and oppression in the world as part of their method of 
representation. The discursive construction of a house owned by a housing 
association as a financial asset, for example, suggests the need for associated 
practices of monitoring, valuation and control that may override its other uses, such as 
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the home of a tenant, in the process of upholding the private property relations through 
which it is defined (Blomley 2011).  
These epistemological issues have been reflected within housing studies by a debate 
that cuts to the heart of questions of power and knowledge in research. Drawing on a 
critical assessment of the role played by academics in devising the Housing Market 
Renewal (HMR) programme, a controversial policy that involved the intentional 
demolition of working class homes, Allen (2009) has argued that researchers in 
housing studies have made fallacious claims to the superiority of their own knowledge 
production over and above that of people’s lived experience. For Allen, this is a 
problem that goes beyond the need identified by Kemeny (1992) for housing 
researchers to consider the grounds of their knowledge in devising research questions 
independently of those demanded by policymakers. Rather, he suggests that both 
empiricist and more theoretically-minded researchers are complicit in a process of 
“symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1992) due to academics adopting a scientistic discourse 
that rhetorically invokes an objective distance between ‘scientific’ observers and the 
studied observed, erasing the power relations in which academic researchers are 
themselves embedded4. This unjustifiably problematises the actual practices and 
ways in which people inhabit housing, demanding explanatory criteria on working class 
and other housing inhabitants that would make no sense against the terms by which 
they live their own lives (Allen 2009, 66).  
                                                          
4 Within this argument, the distinctiveness of academic discourse lies in its literary qualities as a form of 
rhetoric capable of motivating action in the world, articulated so that it is intelligible in terms of elite-led 
discourses of knowledge production. Or, as put by the political economist Joan Robinson in another 
disciplinary context: “The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to 
economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists” (Robinson 1955). 
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As with the feminist critiques of the situated nature of research above, this is especially 
problematic given the intertwined nature of housing research with neoliberal policy 
agendas that, in Allen’s argument, are complicit in processes of dispossession and 
urban inequality to the benefit of the powerful, and to the detriment of the working class 
(for a response, see Flint 2011). A full consideration of the complicity of urban 
neoliberalism in these processes will be given in Part Two of this thesis. What is 
relevant here are the methodological implications for housing research. For Allen, the 
conclusion to draw is not that research is a pointless activity, but that researchers must 
drop claims to scientific superiority over lived experience, instead seeking to 
“understand that, and how, ‘scientific’ knowledge of the urban serves the power, 
domination and exploitation of some social groups over other social groups” (Allen 
2011, 95). The solution is for academics to explicitly view themselves as engaging in 
political practice through research, and to seek to make it the basis of an open dialogue 
with others in attempting to change the sources of oppression that are mediated 
through housing (Allen 2016).  
This conclusion is a challenge to this research project however, which seeks to 
produce knowledge of a phenomenon, financialisaton, that could be construed as 
laying claim to theorising and problematising housing without reference to how social 
housing tenants experience, reflect on, or create counter-narratives to the process (cf 
D. Fields 2015). While acknowledging this as a limitation of the present research, I 
would argue that this still has value as a piece of militant inquiry (Halvorsen 2015) 
intended as a contribution toward a more progressive urban and housing politics. 
Firstly, ideas developed through academia still carry power and social weight in policy 
terms that can still be useful to political struggles (Mitchell 2004), while as put by 
Pickerill et al (2010, 263) a “critical distance” can be useful in bringing out particular 
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readings of events that may otherwise remain submerged, though this should be 
considered as part of an ongoing dialogue. Second, as argued by Clapp (2014) in the 
context of food politics, financialisation involves an abstraction and distancing from the 
provision of commodities from which it extracts value. As suggested by Fields (2017), 
within housing financialisation this operates both on the level of the physical distance 
between internationally-mobile capitalist firms and those living in the houses they profit 
from, and through the dispersal of responsibility among various middlemen, 
intermediaries and local and national actors, disrupting accountability. An important 
goal for my research is therefore to make visible these precise connections (Clapp 
2014), the ease of which is greatly enabled by the resources, training and technical 
capacity academia brings.  
Finally, it should be stated at the outset that throughout the thesis I adopt a Marxist 
problematic, ultimately analysing financialisation as a form of accumulation through 
dispossession as theorised by David Harvey (2005, 2007a), though mediated through 
several forms of abstraction, not least legal and regulatory frameworks that have 
attempted to mould associations as risk-taking, entrepreneurial enterprises. This 
raises the potential objection that historical materialism exhibits many of the negative 
features described above of scientistic abstraction, downgrading lived experience in 
favour of a deterministic theory that unveils hidden truths that are otherwise obscured 
by false consciousness. In response, with Andrews (2002), I would maintain that a key 
Marxist insight is in how social relations, such as commodity production, become 
normalised through our everyday practice so that they appear natural and unchanging, 
obscuring their historical origins. The key critical task is therefore not to uncover 
hidden realities underneath illusory forms, but precisely to de-familiarise and 
historicise those forms that would otherwise seem commonplace or inevitable. As this 
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thesis will show for example, the treatment of housing associations as an asset class 
is far from natural or a result of the retreat of the state, but an ongoing process of 
governance mediated by legal and regulatory frameworks, which far from an 
inevitability should be considered a high risk and precarious achievement.  
2.2. Defining the key term of this research: financialisation  
The previous section reviewed the major epistemological issues raised by this 
research, arguing in favour of the need to adopt a situated approach with the goal of 
making visible the abstract connections between financialisation and social housing. 
This section now turns to the methodological question of how I apply these 
considerations to the research design of this thesis, beginning with an analytical 
definition of the key concept I use to analyse housing associations: financialisation. A 
full analysis of the concept and its history will be carried out in chapter 3 of this thesis, 
in order to critique academic usages of the concept. This section instead summarises 
the key methodological implications of how I use the term, so as to inform my research 
design with which I analyse the phenomenon within housing associations.   
At a methodological level, financialisation has been studied through three broad 
approaches within academia. The first draws on political economy, chiefly through 
Marxist and post-Keynesian analysis, to investigate financialisation as a long-term 
structural transformation within capitalism, resulting in structural changes in capitalist 
accumulation and the relations between workers, households, and financial and non-
financial enterprises, generally concurring on negative effects for inequality and 
economic volatility (Epstein 2005; Lapavitsas 2013; Fine 2013). The second “Critical 
Social Accountancy” school is largely connected to research teams associated with 
Julie Froud and Karel Williams at the University of Manchester, which draws on a 
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broad range of cultural economy and post-Keynesian scholarship to provide in-depth 
analysis of corporate restructuring and welfare state transformation (Froud et al. 2000, 
2006). Sceptical over the identification of structural epochs, these draw on a more 
cultural political economy approach that analyses the discursive construction of 
economic categories to examine financialisation in terms of the channelling of 
corporate and household savings into speculative activity (Froud et al. 2006). This 
comprises an economic ‘frame’ that leads to successive meso-level ‘conjectures’ 
lasting between 5-7 years, in which profitable strategies attain a level of coherence 
before fragmenting and giving rise to new conjunctures (Engelen et al. 2010). Whereas 
financialisation for political economists comprises a regime of accumulation that has 
persisted throughout the neoliberal era with origins in the 1970s, the critical social 
accountancy school is more wary of ascribing a logic to capitalism as a whole, though 
an ambiguity remains in this analysis over the extent to which financialisation may be 
caused by bad or self-interested policy choices by elites, or dynamics internal to 
capitalist development.  
The third methodological framework draws on governmentality methodologies in 
sociology to analyse financialisation as it transforms daily life, including the production 
of disciplined investor-subjects able to navigate and responsibly manage the risks and 
opportunities of investment (Martin 2002; Goede 2004; Langley 2008). Allied work in 
science and technology studies has also investigated the performative aspect of 
technical financial models and investor behaviour, acting to provide a broader 
sociology of financial markets (Cetina and Preda 2004; Mackenzie 2008). Much of this 
work has taken a highly sceptical view of the existence of knowable macro-structures 
such as the “economy”, preferring instead to talk of situated processes of 
“economisation” as constructed through technologies such as econometric models 
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(Çalışkan and Callon 2009). Critics have argued however that an approach that views 
the economy as constructed through knowledge practices nonetheless struggles when 
attempting to account for the limits of knowledge with respect to finance, such as the 
failure of political, financial and technocratic elites to predict the financial crisis of 2007 
– 2009 (Bryan et al. 2012). 
The contested nature of financialisation within academia means that deriving a 
theoretical definition of the concept forms a key part of my overall analysis, with Part 
Two of this thesis, comprised of Chapters Three to Five, aimed at deriving a working 
definition to feed into my empirical research in Part Three. Briefly summarising, in 
Chapter Three, I analyse financialisation as a governmental logic of power that 
reshapes subjectivities and daily life, an approach which has been explored through a 
Marxian framework by Bryan et al (2009). These argue that class relations have been 
transformed under financialisation through the incorporation into financial circuits of 
credit and debt of the reproduction of labour power, introducing the need to take into 
account a competitive calculus driven by the need to secure returns to financial capital. 
For these writers financialisation has therefore led to a qualitative change in how 
society reproduces itself, characterised not just by an increase in the size of the 
financial sector (Epstein 2005), but the extension of financial metrics and logics into 
other areas of social life through a broader process of commodification, with risks 
passed downward from financial firms and onto households (Bryan and Rafferty 
2014b). While a Marxist approach provides significant explanatory power, I argue that 
for financialisation to occur it must be mediated through governance techniques that 
attempt to reshape associations as entrepreneurial organisations, a process that a 
qualitative methodology is well-equipped to analyse given its in-depth focus on 
meanings and narratives deployed by social actors (Maxwell 2012).  
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In methodological terms, this thesis aims to contribute to these academic debates on 
financialisation through a qualitative analysis of how it is enacted via the governance 
of housing associations. Using the definition by Bryan and Rafferty (2014a) of 
financialisation as the spread of financial calculus and logics into daily life, I argue that 
post-2008 austerity has the potential to drive a qualitatively new shift in the 
financialisation of housing associations through a fundamental transformation in 
relations between social landlords and their tenants. In opening up tenants to greater 
threat of arrears while deepening the reliance by associations on commercial income, 
my key hypothesis is that austerity has the potential to drive housing associations into 
treating their land and housing as financial assets, extracting value from the urban 
landscape and orientating themselves toward speculative development. This in turn 
has the potential to recalibrate associations as an asset class with respect to lenders 
however, with social landlords taking on much greater levels of risk at the likely cost 
of their credit ratings, with a key objective of this research therefore being to explore 
how these risks are mediated and distributed between lenders, providers, and tenants.  
The financialisation of housing associations is also likely to produce new housing 
geographies likely to reshape the security and availability of social housing within the 
urban landscape. Chapter 4 of this thesis therefore explicitly analyses the urban 
aspects of financialisation in order to develop a theoretical approach that can 
adequately explore these processes. Given the crucial role played by legal and 
regulatory frameworks in the governance of social housing, I also theoretically analyse 
the intersection between law and geography, drawing in particular on the work of Nick 
Blomley (2011) to analyse how private property regimes are enacted in and through 
the control of space. In order to explore these in relation to risk and social housing 
specifically, Chapter 5 analyses the housing studies literature specifically in order to 
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develop a socio-legal approach capable of capturing these changes to social housing 
governance. Part Two of my thesis is therefore a crucial component of the research 
as a whole, providing me with the conceptual tools to analyse financialisation within 
social housing. The next section turns to focus on my research design and key 
questions, showing how I put this research into practice. 
2.3. Research design and key questions 
As this research analysis financialisation as a mode of governance for housing 
associations, I have chosen a qualitative methodology for my research design in order 
to examine the nuances in the extent to which providers are being encouraged to act 
as risk-taking enterprises that treat their land and housing as pure financial assets. 
While qualitative methods lack the ability of a quantitative study to produce 
generalisable data, their strength lies in an in depth exploration of nuance, reasons 
and justification given by social actors (Maxwell 2012), providing me with a strong 
basis to explore how associations have been represented and governed as an asset 
class. To explore this, my research questions as shown in the previous chapter focus 
on the key areas of governance, risk, and the extent to which financialisation is a 
bounded or limited process. As summarised in Figure 2.1 below, my primary methods 
in answering these questions are a combination of semi-structured face to face 
interviews with both elites and housing practitioners, the development of a theoretical 
framework for analysing this data, and documentary analysis of relevant government, 
financial and social housing sector reports.  
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Figure 2.1. Research questions and methods 
Research question 
 
Methods 
1. To what extent does financialisation 
entail a new form of governance in 
housing associations? What are the 
features of this governance? 
 
Theoretical analysis of 
financialisation, urban studies and 
housing literature. 
 
Documentary analysis of “grey 
literature” (Regulatory and social 
housing sector documents, 
financial reports). 
 
Semi structured elite interviews 
with social housing policy 
stakeholders. 
 
2. To what extent have housing 
associations adopted 
financialisation? Are there any 
bounds or limits on this process? 
 
Theoretical analysis of 
financialisation, urban studies and 
housing literature. 
 
Documentary analysis of “grey 
literature” (Regulatory and social 
housing sector documents, 
financial reports). 
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Semi structured elite interviews 
with social housing policy 
stakeholders. 
 
Semi structured interviews with 
housing practitioners 
(neighbourhood managers). 
 
 
3. What are the likely risks this 
process generates, and how are 
housing associations adapting to 
these risks?  
 
Theoretical analysis of 
financialisation, urban studies and 
housing literature. 
 
Documentary analysis of “grey 
literature” (Regulatory and social 
housing sector documents, 
financial reports). 
 
Semi structured interviews with 
social housing policy stakeholders. 
 
Semi structured interviews with 
housing practitioners. 
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In formulating my research questions, my approach has been to use the “iterative” 
strategy advocated by Maxwell (2012), which takes a flexible rather than linear 
approach in which the purposes, conceptual context, data gathering methods and the 
validity of arguments have been in constant dialogue with one another throughout the 
research. Rather than sticking to an initial problematic, the questions explored through 
this thesis have therefore evolved as my exploration of the relevant conceptual issues 
and new empirical revelations through data gathering have shaped my understanding 
of financialisation in social housing. This is reflected in terms of the presentation of my 
findings and arguments within this thesis, with Part Two exploring the necessary 
conceptual issues surrounding financialisation in the context of neoliberal urbanism, 
and Part Three analysing the empirical findings I have uncovered in order to construct 
my argument about how this process is generating risks throughout the sector. As a 
key objective throughout was to develop a nuanced understanding of the historical 
development of housing association finance throughout the neoliberal era so as to be 
able to better contextualise contemporary events, I have focused throughout primarily 
on a time period spanning from the late 1980s up to the current year at the time of 
writing, 2017 and 2018. 
The accounts offered by my research participants through their interviews played a 
major role in shaping my research questions, enabling an ongoing dialogue between 
my argument and the data which could be checked in order to confirm or disconfirm 
the “validity” of the preconceptions and assumptions within my own arguments which 
I brought to the study. While it could be objected that these are merely “subjective” 
accounts of financialisation, lacking the objectivity of ‘hard’ data, I am clear throughout 
the research that these perspectives are useful in illuminating the nuance and tensions 
by which narratives of financialisation and social housing are discursively constructed. 
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There are nonetheless legitimate concerns about the factual reliability of any actor’s 
empirical claims about financialisation, particularly within elite interviews where 
participants are likely to have vested interests in portraying their organisations or 
activities in a positive light; or conversely may wish to present the behaviour of other 
organisations in a negative fashion. To guard against misrepresentations I have 
therefore cross-checked claims made by participants with other interviewees and 
documentary evidence, in order to highlight key points of convergence or divergence 
in the accounts they give of financialisation.  
The operational context for housing associations has undergone rapid and complex 
changes over the past decade, closely linked to processes that originate at a remove 
from social housing policy, such as the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 and the so-called 
austerity agenda originated from 2010 onward under the Conservative Prime Minister 
David Cameron (2010 – 2016). It also soon became evident from my initial literature 
review that financialisation has been a process closely shaped by private sector actors 
in addition to social housing providers themselves, including lenders and investors, 
academics and non-government organisations involved in shaping housing policy, and 
providers of professional business services. The latter include solicitors, accountants, 
consultants working for organisations that provide specialist financial advice, and 
valuers who assess the financial value of real estate according to set industry 
standards. A key strategy of my research design was to construct a broad sample of 
interviewees across these different areas, in order to better capture how the 
environment of housing associations is undergoing significant changes, the full 
impacts of which are likely only to be felt over the long-term.  
As part of the above stand of elite interviews, I also included representatives from 
organisations involved in shaping social housing policy, and senior officials within 
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social housing providers at the board and executive level. Direct representatives of 
social landlords at the level of senior management are limited in this study however, 
with the inclusion of one chair of governors and one chief executive. This creates a 
potential limitation of this research study, with housing researchers such as Guis 
(2008) arguing for the need to select a sample of similarly-sized organisations so as 
to consistently analyse variations in organisational strategy that do not just reflect the 
diverse nature of the social housing sector. Alternately, an additional strategy for 
analysing organisational change could have been for me to act as a participant-
observer within one or two housing associations, which would have enabled the 
opportunity to gather in depth data as to how these changes are mediated by housing 
practitioners directly. Although both of these are valid alternate paths, the emphasis 
on policy analysis and how financialisation has been shaped by actors external to the 
social housing sector itself has meant that my focus has been on gathering data on 
the changing environment of housing associations, rather than restricting my analysis 
to the operational decisions of providers. Though this represents a strategic trade-off, 
given the practical limitations of fieldwork in any one research project, avenues for 
future exploration could include the extent to which the policy trends I identify in my 
findings are nuanced by a focused organisational study. 
An exclusive focus on elite-led discourses is nonetheless a limitation, given the thrust 
of my research questions in analysing financialisation as a means of governance. 
Furthermore, as I argue in Part Two of this thesis, in particular Chapter 4, housing 
financialisation should be seen as an urban process, structured by the capture of 
ground rents (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011; Gotham 2009). As such, how 
financialisation is geographically enacted is likely to be co-constituted in and through 
the particular urban contexts within which it is territorialised. To mitigate this limitation, 
61 
 
while analysing the geographical nuances of financialisation, my research design 
includes a second strand of interviews with social housing practitioners and local 
policymakers in Manchester, a major regional city located in the north of England. 
Though the thesis as a whole is not a case study, selecting Manchester for this 
secondary strand of research nuances the primary analysis of housing association 
financialisation by exploring how these trends are materialised within a specific urban 
context. The analysis of the urban geographies of financialisation is pertinent to social 
housing research, with my documentary analysis at the initial stage of research design 
revealing that housing associations formed a highly diverse sector, with financialised 
activity particularly concentrated among larger, London and South-East based 
providers. As such, the inclusion of the Manchester data enables the thesis to explore 
the extent to which financialisation is occurring in an urban context outside of London, 
including ways in which this may differ from the “global city” status of the capital’s 
housing market (Sassen 2001), providing additional geographic nuance to the main 
analysis of the post-crisis financialisation of English housing associations that is the 
focus of this thesis. 
Manchester provides a particularly interesting example because its size and regional 
weight enables it to attract a certain level of international corporate real estate 
investment such as the partnership in 2013 between Manchester City Council with the 
Abu Dhabi United Group, while still exhibiting high levels of de-industrialisation and a 
weak jobs base characteristic of other regional cities. A major regional city with a 
population of over 500,000 within its municipal boundaries, situated within the larger 
Greater Manchester conurbation of just over 2,700,000 people, Manchester is one of 
the largest cities in the UK outside of London (Nomis 2013). Since the 1990s the 
central urban core, including Manchester city centre, Salford Quays to the West, and 
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Ancoats and Manchester City Football Club’s Etihad stadium to the East, has seen 
extensive re-development and in-migration. Although private housing output collapsed 
with the onset of the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, the resumption of construction activity 
from 2014 has seen new institutional investors attracted into the city centre’s private 
rental market, prompting concern over the financialisation of this speculative market 
(Silver 2018).  
The city’s growth, as measured by standard regional metrics such as Gross Value 
Added (GVA), has been praised by policymakers and official academic reviews led by 
the mainstream urban economist Ed Glaeser (Manchester Independent Economic 
Review 2009). Reflecting this, the city-region has been chosen as the site of a 
devolution of powers over housing, transport and planning and the creation of a new 
position of an elected Mayor covering the Greater Manchester Combined Authority 
(GMCA)’s ten local authorities (HM Treasury 2014). Manchester’s Labour Party-
dominated local government has worked closely with successive Labour and 
Conservative governments in developing market-oriented regeneration projects since 
the 1980s, being held up as a model of urban reform (Peck and Ward 2010). Analysis 
of initial emerging trends in Manchester therefore complements the main analysis of 
housing association financialisation, by providing additional data on how this operates 
in an urban context outside of the high volumes of real estate investment attracted to 
London by its “world city” status (Massey 2007).  
Both funding levels and direct mayoral powers are nonetheless limited, constricting 
autonomy in practice from dominant policy agendas (Deas 2014). Academic 
researchers have also highlighted the striking long inequality of the city-region’s 
growth, with chronically high long-term levels of economic inactivity and poverty found 
within Manchester itself, its neighbour city of Salford, and deindustrialised former mill 
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town boroughs in the north of the conurbation such as Rochdale or Oldham (Peck and 
Ward 2010; Hincks 2015; Lupton, Rafferty, and Hughes 2016). Manchester has also 
been significantly affected by high levels of cuts to welfare, local services, and other 
public spending since the onset of austerity policies since 2010, outweighing in 
monetary terms extra funding due to devolutionary “city deals” (Etherington and Jones 
2017). As a result, contemporary Manchester is characterised by austerity urbanism 
(Peck 2012), in addition to housing financialisation in its city centre belt of apartment 
blocks, creating the potential to drive housing associations to seek new sources of 
income in ways that may differ from that of London. 
Though Manchester is not the focus of this thesis, in selecting the city alongside the 
“primary” elite interview research strand, the aim of this secondary strand of data was 
to nuance the main analysis of housing association financialisation as an urban 
process. To this end, a small sample of interviewees was selected from senior 
managers within the local authority and connected regeneration agencies, as well as 
interviews with housing association and local authority practitioners engaged in 
neighbourhood management within the city. The majority of the Manchester data 
analysis takes place within Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, drawing out initial trends in post-
crisis housing association financialisation that were emerging during the contemporary 
time period of the PhD research. In doing so, this builds on the analysis of the key 
characteristics of the lending regime in Chapter 6, the changing financial context of 
providers in Chapter 7, and the analysis of commercial development and financial risk 
in chapters 8 and 9 respectively. In analysing housing associations in an austerity 
context, Chapter 8 focuses on the drivers of financialisation among providers as they 
seek out new sources of income under national austerity policies, with the Manchester 
data providing additional data as to emerging trends in a particular urban context. 
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Concluding the data section of the thesis, Chapter 9 explores the risks generated by 
financialisation and the regulatory response, including an examination of how these 
processes are materialised with respect to tenants by housing practitioners in 
Manchester. In doing so, this analysis of initial trends as to how financialisation is 
enacted on the ground enables better insight into the uneven spatial development of 
financialisation, complementing the primary analysis of national-level policy changes, 
and providing additional geographical nuance to the primary analysis of housing 
associations within the post-crisis context of the years following the 2007 – 2009 
financial crash. 
2.4. Research methods 
In answering my research questions my data is organised into two primary strands; 
the first relating to how social housing is perceived and represented under 
financialisation by key individuals and organisations shaping national policy. The first 
strand of my thesis draws on original data collected through 15 semi-structured 
pseudonymised elite interviews averaging around one hour in length with social 
housing policy stakeholders selected according to their organisation’s institutional role 
in relation to shaping the social housing sector. This sample includes individuals from 
the private sector alongside people working in social housing or at a central 
government level, including social housing senior officers and board members, 
auditors, valuers, financial consultants, investment fund executives, legal advisors, 
practitioner and social housing sector representative bodies, local government officials 
and senior policymakers. A full range of the interview respondents in strand one is 
summarised in Figure 2.2 below on page 66, although identifies and specific 
organisations have been pseudonymised as far as possible in order to protect the 
identities of participants. Interviews were analysed for common and divergent themes 
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grouped around perceptions of social housing and its role by different stakeholders, 
analysed for how subjects characterised major historical developments according to 
their discursive representations of the aims and purpose of the sector. These were 
further analysed according to themes of how participants viewed the risks and 
uncertainties generated through the financialisation of housing associations, who bore 
these risks, and how these were discursively legitimated and justified.  
In order to identify potential participants, guide data gathering questions, and cross-
reference the accuracy and veracity of interviewee responses, this strand was 
complimented by a documentary analysis of academic, practitioner and other reports 
relating to major issues related to housing association financialisation. Themes 
included development models, financial analysis including the credit ratings of 
providers, housing market reports, the regulation of the sector, welfare reform, legal 
changes to tenancy and housing management, and policy reports. These were 
sourced from a wide range of organisations, including the government and regulatory 
bodies, reports generated from within the social housing sector, including 
representative bodies such as the National Federation of Housing (NFH) and the 
Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH), charity and think tank-produced policy reports, 
media reports and real estate and financial industry documents. These were also 
bolstered by corporate documents for associations such as annual reports, 
prospectuses for bond issues, and sets of accounts for specific firms sourced from the 
government-run Companies House database, used in order to access data directly as 
to more technical elements of social housing finance such as their use of collateral. 
This enabled me to build up an in-depth knowledge of how changes to housing 
association finance fit into broader changes within the sector, strengthening my 
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capacity to identify interview respondents and develop appropriate questions for my 
interviews. 
Figure 2.2. “Strand one” elite interview sample 
Role 
 
Area of expertise Date of interview 
Housing consultant 
 
Housing market/social 
housing finance  
 
Spring 2015 
Policy officer A 
 
Social housing policy Spring 2015 
Policy officer B 
 
Social housing policy Spring 2015 
Property market 
consultant 
 
Housing market/social 
housing finance 
Spring 2015 
Real estate valuer 
 
Housing market/social 
housing finance 
 
Spring 2015 
Housing association chair 
 
Housing association 
development and 
governance 
 
Spring 2015 
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Housing association chief 
executive 
 
Housing association 
development and 
governance 
 
Autumn 2015 
Solicitor 
 
Social housing finance 
and regulation 
 
Spring 2015 
Senior housing 
policymaker 
 
Social housing finance 
and regulation 
 
Summer 2015 
Financial consultant Social housing finance 
and regulation 
 
Winter 2016 
Auditors A and B (joint 
interview) 
 
Housing association 
development and 
governance 
 
Spring 2016 
Investment fund manager 
 
Housing market/social 
housing finance  
 
Spring 2016 
 
In identifying prospective interview participants, I used this initial documentary analysis 
to generate an analysis of key organisations and individuals related to social housing 
finance. Organisations were selected according to their relevance to social housing 
finance, with individuals identified through criteria such as their organisational 
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relevance. Contact was initially made via email, sourced either through publicly 
available contact data or through a direct approach to the organisation. Emails 
included a briefing note stating the aims, goals and a summary of the research, 
including details of its ethical criteria. The sample was constructed to give a broad 
rather than deep range of the organisations concerned, while also targeting 
respondents such as investment fund managers who, although necessarily hard to 
reach due to their position, have an unrivalled knowledge of the issues surrounding 
financialisation explored through this thesis. Practical limits to the response rate given 
the prominence of potential respondents have led to limitations in some areas, 
however, such as an absence of interviewees directly employed within the 
construction or bank lending industries. To overcome this limitation, in addition to my 
documentary analysis in these areas I also interviewed consultants with previous 
connections to bank lending, helping me to build a historical picture of the development 
of social housing finance since the 1980s.  
Regulatory documents I have drawn from include quarterly risk analyses and an 
annual set of the collated global accounts of providers produced by the sector’s 
successive regulators in the form of the Housing Corporation, the TSA, and the HCA. 
These include financial data as to the performance of associations and the extent to 
which providers are engaged in commercial development activity, enabling the 
generation of data as to changing debt levels, interest payments and surpluses since 
the mid-2000s that could provide a quantitative context to the main qualitative analysis 
of this thesis. This enabled interviews with participants to be triangulated and cross-
checked with recorded financial evidence, providing a level of verification for my 
findings across more than one source of data collection, strengthening my findings 
beyond reliance on the interviews alone. Trade press outlets such as Social Housing 
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Magazine also collate data as to public bond issues over £100m, enabling some 
quantitative evidence to be compiled as to the access of housing associations to 
capital market finance which, although limited on its own, can be usefully compared 
with the interview data to provide more robust evidence for the conclusions of the 
thesis. As such, my conclusions have been able to compare the narratives constructed 
around housing association financialisation with available financial data, contributing 
to a better understanding of the likely future risks that may be generated throughout 
the sector.  
The second strand included five semi structured one hour interviews with housing 
practitioners in associations operating in Manchester, alongside local policymakers in 
working in housing and regeneration, in order to gain a more grounded perception of 
how the risks and uncertainties in the elite interview strand of fieldwork are perceived 
and materialised at an urban scale. As shown in Figure 2.3 below, these took place 
within Manchester, speaking both to senior officers at a municipal level, and 
practitioners working in and around an area in the south of the city, with all lasting 
between one and two hours in length. Although this sample is small, the aim of this 
strand of research was to produce in-depth contextual data as to the variation of 
financialisation within an area, rather than to produce a representative account, 
justifying the small sample size (Mason 2002). The two respondents at a senior level 
were identified through documentary analysis of relevant local authority reports and 
contacted via email. Practitioner respondents were contacted via a snowball sample, 
with initial contacts asked to recommend colleagues who would be willing to participate 
in the study. In order to mitigate the limitations of this method in that it produces a 
sample based on just one professional network, I made independent contact with a 
chair of a residents’ association on a neighbouring social housing estate in order to 
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broaden the sample size. In order to gain a sense of the context by which housing 
association neighbourhood management was being affected by “austerity” cuts to local 
authority housing services, I additionally interviewed a local authority neighbourhood 
services manager, in order to better generate data on the broader housing context of 
Manchester. 
Figure 2.3. “Strand two” Manchester interview profile 
Role 
 
Theme Date of interview 
Senior Greater 
Manchester regeneration 
official 
 
Regeneration and social 
housing strategy 
Spring 2015 
Manchester City Council 
senior official  
Housing, regeneration 
and welfare strategy 
Spring 2016 
Manchester – based 
housing association 
neighbourhood manager 
A and B (joint interview) 
 
Welfare, tenant 
management and 
allocations 
 
Autumn 2015 
Manchester-based 
housing association 
neighbourhood manager 
C 
 
Welfare, tenant 
management and 
allocations 
 
Winter 2016 
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Local authority 
neighbourhood manager 
 
Welfare, tenant 
management and 
allocations 
 
Winter 2016 
 
2.5. Reflections on the process of data analysis 
The majority of interviews in both strands took place face to face at a place of the 
respondents’ choosing, most often a workplace or a public space such as a café, 
though one interview with a housing consultant was conducted by phone. All 
interviewees were given an information sheet detailing the aims and purposes of the 
research prior to them providing written consent in accordance with University of 
Sheffield ethical procedures. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, with 
recorded data stored in a secure location accessible only by myself and my 
Department, and identifying details removed from completed transcriptions. 
A documentary analysis was carried out prior to the interviews to identify initial key 
“themes” of the thesis, such as welfare reform, urban regeneration, and financial 
services industry practices. These were then used to select an initial tranche of 
potential interviewees in the strand one fieldwork phase in order to gain a broad-based 
understanding of the key features of housing association finance and its relation to the 
broader changes undergone by the sector. Once recorded and transcribed, these were 
then coded on an ongoing basis, with the analysis used to refine and shape the initial 
selection of themes while opening up new avenues of inquiry. These findings were 
then used to identify subsequent participants, enabling a more focused and in-depth 
approach to later interviews, increasing my effectiveness in probing for questions and 
72 
 
entering into discussions with participants. Data from both strands were coded 
according to fields such as attitudes to risk, commercialised development, how tenants 
were represented, and the production of new housing geographies, for example the 
peripheralization of social housing under financialisation. Documents were produced 
on an ongoing basis through this period in order to serve as a research diary, guiding 
the development of my key themes and research questions.  
This staggered interview process, in which initial findings, coding themes and research 
questions were shaped in dialogue with one another throughout the research process, 
worked effectively in being able to explore fine-grained detail, particularly by the later 
interviews in the Winter and Spring of 2016. One downside to this process however 
was that it quickly become apparent that my initial understanding of social housing 
finance and policy had been too broad, with analysis of the initial batch of elite 
interviews at the end of the fieldwork process revealing potential avenues for 
questioning that could have been opened up if my knowledge had been stronger at 
the time. While to an extent this is an avoidable part of the research process, it 
suggests the need in future research designs to ensure that research questions are 
more narrowly defined at the beginning of the process, and key interviewees are left 
to the very end, so as to maximise the opportunity for data collection.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has set out my overall research design and strategy for this thesis as a 
process of knowledge production. In doing so, I have adopted an epistemological 
framework informed by feminist and other strands of critical human geography that 
affirms knowledge production as a practical activity, in which research is never 
conducted from a neutral or disembodied standpoint, but is always embedded in 
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existing historical power relations. This does not mean that all research is therefore 
relativist, but that researchers have an ethical duty to be clear about the nature and 
responsibilities of knowledge production as an inherently political process. As a result, 
I have explicitly adopted as the driving political goal in this research the need to make 
visible the abstract and “distant” connections that financialisation creates between 
investment decisions and the provision of social housing. A key part of this thesis is 
therefore the need to derive an adequate theoretical framework for understanding the 
social underpinnings by which financialisation operates, which is carried out in the 
following Part Two of this thesis.  
The empirical part of this thesis in Part Three focuses on putting this framing to work 
as housing associations are reshaped into an asset class, examining financialisation 
as a form of representing and governing social landlords with the aim of ensuring that 
capital can flow throughout the urban landscape. To do so I have adopted a primarily 
qualitative research design split into two stands, with the first focusing on elite 
interviews with social housing stakeholders, and a smaller, secondary strand 
organised around an analysis of how trends identified in the primary strand are 
materialised within an urban context. This research design also includes a 
documentary analysis of relevant literature produced by the social housing sector, the 
financial services and real estate industries, and regulatory bodies, that enables 
findings from my interview data to be triangulated and verified, enabling more robust 
findings to be developed. Although findings from qualitative methods are more difficult 
to generalise than those based on quantitative methods, I have used an approach 
based on semi-structured interviews on the grounds that this provides a way of in-
depth analysis and exploration of the social underpinnings of financialisation. In doing 
so, key trends and treatments of risk produced through the financialisation agenda can 
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be identified throughout the thesis, and be used to inform future research agendas 
aimed at promoting a more progressive social housing policy.  
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Part Two 
 
Historical and theoretical analysis 
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Chapter Three: Theorising financialisation 
3.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to develop my analytical framework for one of the primary 
concepts used within this thesis: financialisation. Since the late 1980s, housing 
associations have made increasing use of private finance to fund their developments 
and other projects. As commercialisation has become more common in the sector, 
levels of debt have increased, and use of complex financial instruments such as 
derivatives to manage treasury functions has risen. After banks scaled back lending 
in the wake of the financial crisis, associations increasingly turned to the bond markets 
for new sources of debt, a move made all the more necessary by simultaneous 
government reductions in funding under “austerity” (Heywood 2016).  
The financialisation literature provides a useful set of conceptual tools for 
understanding the relationship between housing associations and financial market 
processes (Wainwright and Manville 2017; Aalbers 2016). However, the term 
‘financialisation’ is not without its pitfalls, as critics warn that unreflective use posits it 
as both a cause and an effect of  the socio-economic processes it purports to analyse 
(Christophers 2015). To ensure nuance, this chapter aims at a broad analysis of the 
term in the wider academic literature beyond housing, focusing on its use within both 
political economic analysis and cultural political economy. I focus in particular on the 
respective strengths of Marxist approaches, Foucauldian-inspired investigations into 
the financialisation of daily life, and cultural economy and social studies of science 
perspectives , particularly those grounded in the “new materialism” such as Actor 
Network Theory (ANT). My aim in doing so is to produce a critical series of insights 
into the ways in which financialisation both results from, and is reproduced by, wider 
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social and economic processes. While advocating a Marxist approach, I argue that 
these cultural political economy frameworks have much to contribute by calling 
attention to the social practices and operations that must be enacted in order for 
financialisation to be successful, for example in shaping and governing social housing 
providers such as housing associations into a new asset class.  
In its broadest sense, ‘finance’ can be defined as the range of methods through which 
funds are obtained and deployed to support profit-making activities and to establish 
claims on future streams of income (Lapavitsas 2013, 108). Over the past 20 years, 
‘financialisation’ has largely displaced earlier 1990s accounts of ‘globalisation’, 
perhaps because its description of a series of transformations within capitalism since 
the crisis of the 1970s is consonant with an account of the neoliberal spread of pro-
market reforms over the same period. Although not directly focusing on the term 
‘financialisation’ itself, Arrighi’s 1994 work, The Long Twentieth Century, influentially 
identified recurrent cycles of financialisation in the history of capitalist state building 
(Arrighi 2009). Explicit academic analyses of financialisation followed, with Froud et al 
(2000) using a special issue of Economy and Society to explore shareholder value as 
a legitimating discourse for financial engineering, and its effects in terms of an increase 
in returns for shareholders and senior management. In the same issue, Boyer (2000) 
explored the shift from a mid-20th century Fordist style of capitalism centred on mass 
consumption and a series of (racialized and patriarchal) industrial compromises 
between capital and skilled labour, towards an emergent finance-led growth regime, 
characterised by global finance, diffused asset ownership, wage repression, and the 
use of monetary policy to govern asset bubbles. 
The empirical events of the subsequent 17 years have cemented the analytical utility  
of financialisation, as a major speculative bubble in real estate and other assets grew 
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across multiple national contexts from the late 1990s, culminating in a historic financial 
crisis in 2007 – 2009, and subsequent slump in core economies in Europe and North 
America that only recently appears to be in remission (McNally 2009). The term 
focuses attention on the ways in which the growing dominance of financial sector 
interests is reshaping other areas of social life, leading to research insights in fields as 
disparate as political and cultural economy, sociology, human geography, and even 
anthropology, where it has supplemented a long-standing interest in money and debt 
relations (2008). The financialisation of housing has become a major topic of study 
within this literature in the past ten years, with the crash revealing intimate links 
between urban and suburban housing and globally-mobile capital flows. Housing has 
been a key object of speculative investment under financialisation, with the regulated 
and standardised nature of mortgage finance with its easily accessible collateral in the 
forms of bricks and mortar seeing it become a much sought-after asset class for 
securitisation techniques in the run up to the financial crisis (2009; 2008). Private 
equity firms and institutional investors such as pension funds are increasingly 
interested in the returns on residential housing in countries such as the US, Ireland, 
Spain, Greece, though despite rising interest in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
and other vehicles, this form of corporate landlordism has not yet occurred at scale in 
the UK (Byrne 2016; D. Fields 2015; Beswick et al. 2016). 
The remainder of the chapter explores how these changes have been theorised in 
more depth, looking particularly at accounts that integrate Marxist analyses of political 
economy with discursive approaches to financialisation as a social process that 
operates through the scale of daily life. In the first section, I examine the broad 
methodological schools of thought that have been used to analyse financialisation, 
examining its theorisation by the Regulation School as a structure of accumulation, 
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and later attempts to complicate this account with a more discursive, sociological 
analysis. The second section then examines the political economy of financialisation 
more closely, contrasting post-Keynesian and Marxist accounts and arguing in favour 
of the latter. The third section focuses on Marxist approaches in more detail, in 
particular the structural analysis of Costas Lapavitsas (2013) and the exploration  by 
Bayliss et al (2017) of the ways in which financialisation reshapes the provision of 
goods such as housing. In the fourth and fifth sections, I argue for my own approach, 
which integrates a Marxist analysis with an approach that is attentive to the effects of 
financialisation on daily life, a methodological hybrid that allows the effects of financial 
structures on the daily lives and practices of tenants to be captured and explored. The 
sixth section situates this in light of recent research into the financialisation of housing 
in and urban context, while the final section concludes. 
3.1 Methodological approaches to financialisation 
As with the term ‘neoliberalism’, defining financialisation has become a difficult as the 
word’s ubiquity spreads to an ever-wider range of contexts. A broad and contested 
term, it has been used to cover a highly varied set of phenomena, including structural 
transformations in capitalist accumulation, the reorganisation of corporate strategies, 
and the social implications of shareholder capitalism for everyday life. Most definitions 
within the literature centre on the notion that financial sector institutions, practices, and 
discourses are becoming more powerful and more dominant in society; Epstein 
(2006), for example, defines the term as a reference to “the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies” (Ibid., 3). Others, however, prefer a more 
specific definition, focusing on the extent to which financial transactions (by both 
financial and non-financial entities) are becoming the dominant source of profit: 
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Krippner (2005) describes financialisation as “a pattern of accumulation in which 
profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production” (Ibid., 174) while Fine (2010, 2013) characterises it as an 
historical situation in which “economic activity in general has become subject to the 
logic and imperatives of interest bearing capital” (Fine 2010, 99). Drawing on Marxist 
political economy, both authors contrast a financialised capitalism where profits are 
increasingly appropriated through the circulation of claims on money, to a capitalism 
where profits are oriented toward productive expansion. Attempting to unite definitions, 
Aalbers (2015) depicts financialisation as “the increasing dominance of financial 
actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at various scales, resulting 
in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), 
states and households” (Ibid., 214). This definition is deliberately ambiguous as to 
whether financialisation is an explanatory variable or an outcome, with the intention of 
enabling broad and flexible use.  
It is possible to group research into financialisation into three rough schools. The first 
treats it as a structural transformation in accumulation, as capital markets reconstruct 
relations between business corporations and financial intermediaries, with far-
reaching consequences for daily life. This view is often heavily influenced by the Italian 
political economist Giovanni Arrighi (2009), whose work draws on the longue durée 
histories of the French Annales School to argue that there have been four major cycles 
of financial expansion in capitalism’s 500-year old history. In this view, capitalism has 
a dominant geographical centre, which shifts over time thanks to a series of crises in 
productive capitalism. These bring increased state rivalry, and the export of capital via 
financial investment in new rising powers, shifting the capitalist core through history, 
from early modern Italian city states, to the United Dutch Provinces, the British Empire 
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and, most recently, the United States-led globalised economy. In this school of 
thought, the period following the economic crisis of the 1970s has seen the US dollar 
act as a world currency, underpinned by government fiat, its value maintained by the 
continued willingness of countries with an export surplus to finance US deficits in 
preference to maintaining a metallic standard such as gold (McNally 2009). The 
necessity of the dollar for trade, combined with effective though informal barriers to 
foreign capital investment in key domestic US markets, forced new industrial centres 
in East Asia to maintain access to dollars and to prevent currency appreciation by 
purchasing US government debt, reversing the direction of previous cycles of the 
export of capital (Arrighi 2009; see also Gowan 1999; Harvey 2005). 
Arrighi’s theorisation, grounded in world systems theory, has received criticism from 
some Marxists for focusing its explanatory framework on commercial trade over the 
accumulation of capital (Lapavitsas 2013, 19). Nonetheless, it has been influential in 
characterising financialisation as a distinctive structural pattern of accumulation within 
capitalism. Approaches drawing from the neo-Marxist regulation school have built on 
this insight, seeking to investigate the institutional regularities that provide a measure 
of stability and coherence to distinct phases of capitalist accumulation (Lipietz 1985; 
Jessop 1988; Tickell and Peck 1992). For regulation theorists, the breakdown of 
Fordist-Keynesian class compromises and nationally-based industrial 
conglomerations had led to a new loosely defined “post Fordism”, characterised by 
flexible labour markets and internationalised production chains, and enabled by 
technological advances in transport and computerised technologies (Jessop 1988). 
Finance has played a major role in the development of this system, as international 
capital markets become increasingly effective at disciplining governments, as the use 
of credit and asset ownership in areas such as pensions and homeownership 
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becomes an increasingly important source of subsidy for middle class living standards, 
and as central banks attempt to manage asset bubbles through monetary policy 
(Aglietta 2000; Aglietta and Breton 2001). Although such a “finance-led” (Boyer 2000) 
or “finance dominated” (Stockhammer 2008) accumulation regime was not intended 
to act as a comprehensive explanation of all modern capitalist processes, regulation 
theorists began to explore financialisation as a structuring feature of neoliberal 
capitalism. While regulation theorists of the early 2000s readily acknowledged the 
historical volatility of financial markets (Aglietta and Breton 2001), they were attracted 
to the idea that financial institutions themselves could play a governing role in 
capitalism, with credit rating agencies and institutional investors, for example, acting 
as a benchmarking system for key asset classes (Aglietta 2008). 
The second broad approach to financialisation is the critical social accountancy 
school, associated with figures such as Julie Froud and Karel Williams (Froud et al. 
2000; Erturk et al. 2008). Influenced by cultural political economy approaches that 
seek to analyse the role of discourse in producing economy activity (Amin and Thrift 
2008), work in this school examines the narratives of corporate restructuring while 
engaging in a forensic examination of cash flows and accounts (Froud et al. 2006). 
Understanding discourse as a form of representational practice that constitutes as well 
as reflects economic objects, critical social accountancy examines the performative 
role of rhetorics such as shareholder value in redistributing wealth from labour to 
capital, while remaining attentive to the way in which such discourses are open to 
failure and unintended consequences (Froud et al. 2006, 72). Taking a sceptical view 
of financialisation as a macro-level structure that determines economic behaviour, 
these writers instead argue for a temporally-sensitive conceptualisation of 
financialisation as a non-determinist form of “coupon pool capitalism” (Froud, Johal, 
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and Williams 2002), fed by the pooling of middle class savings in capital markets, 
investment of which enables the emergence of a new ‘working rich’ of financial 
intermediaries. Coupon pool capitalism moves through meso-level conjunctures, each 
lasting around four to seven years, in which stability is temporarily achieved, before 
disintegrating into new conjunctures, though these may fail to realise their promised 
goals (Engelen, Konings, and Fernandez 2010). Financialisation is here 
conceptualised as a spatially and temporarily bounded utopian project associated with 
“Anglo-American capitalism” (Montgomerie 2006), yet one that is also deeply fallible 
and subject to crisis (Engelen et al. 2012).  
The third approach draws on sociological frameworks and focuses on the 
financialisation of daily life (Martin 2002), particularly on the ways in which money and 
debt relations reshape everyday experiences. Often sharing a governmentality 
approach, these theorists examine finance as a disciplinary power that acts in self-
contradictory ways, for example producing disciplined savers who are simultaneously 
risk-taking investors able to buy and trade assets through financial markets (Goede 
2004; Langley 2008). Overlapping with this first group in theoretical inclination, though 
not necessarily in subject matter, are researchers from social studies of finance, who 
have brought sociological perspectives to the workings of financial markets (Cetina 
and Preda 2004). Although they rarely adopt the term financialisation, these 
researchers have often investigated the performative effects of technical financial 
discourses, for example the ways in which mathematical models aimed at the 
discovery of market values played an active and independent role in shaping those 
values through their effects on investor behaviour (Mackenzie 2008). Financialisation, 
within this paradigm, is not an abstract unfolding logic that acts upon the world, but a 
hybrid of financial and non-financial social relations. 
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Financialisation’s breadth, however, has also led to questions as to whether the term 
itself possesses analytical traction in examining how finance operates, as opposed to 
producing a descriptive catalogue of its perceived effects (Michell et al. 2014). The 
proliferation of definitions of the term has brought criticism from Christophers (2015), 
who argues that critical focus has remained too exclusively on the impacts of finance, 
at the expense of uncovering the practices, structures, agents and processes that 
underpin financial transactions and enable them to occur (cf Poovey 2015; Ouma 
2015). Given the increased presence of credit and debt relations at wider levels of 
economic and social activity, failure to distinguish between the causes of 
financialisaton and its effects risks the reification of the latter as a causal force, 
wherever it happens to be found (Bayliss, Fine, and Robertson 2017). Further, a failure 
to historicise financialisation within capitalist development can produce the impression 
that this mode of capitalism is an aberration from an underlying and stable ‘real’ 
capitalism, despite the historical prevalence of crisis, speculation and the use of 
financial securities as key avenues for the accumulation of profits (Kindleberger 2001).  
While acknowledging the need for a sophisticated theoretical and temporal framework 
for financialisation, others have defended the continuing use of the term on the 
grounds that it allows an exploration of the extent to which current financial processes 
can represent genuinely new developments within capitalism (Fairbairn 2015; Murphy 
2015). This is particularly important given the expansion of financial relations into 
broad areas of social reproduction, such as social housing, with impacts on daily life 
(Martin, Rafferty, and Bryan 2008). With these concerns in mind, the next section turns 
to examine the theorisation of financialisation within political economy, in order to 
establish a historically-grounded understanding of the extent to which financialisation 
represents a historically new phase of capitalist accumulation.    
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3.2 Financialisation and financial crisis within political economy 
Since the 1960s, mainstream economists have analysed finance in terms of the 
rational calculation by preference-maximising agents of investment options within 
markets. In particular, this model has been used to investigate the role of capital 
markets as institutions for the buying and selling of financial securities capable of 
establishing claims on future income flows, either in the form of equity (such as shares) 
or debt instruments (such as bonds). Within this paradigm, research was shaped by 
the “efficient market hypothesis” (Malkiel and Fama 1970) in which the price of 
securities could, in principle, incorporate all known information. Theoretically, the 
market was capable of greater calculative power than any single social actor such as 
a state planning board, given perfect information and rational behaviour, making 
capital markets an effective mechanism to discipline inefficient management (Jensen 
1993). From within such a perspective, financial engineering through “securitisation” 
techniques (the bundling together of different assets into a single income stream that 
can then be re-sold) is argued to have a rational basis, enabling the creation of liquidity 
out of illiquid assets, such as a mortgages. These can then be easily traded, without 
altering overall price levels, allowing markets to function more effectively. This does 
not mean that orthodox academic economists are committed to the idea that markets 
function perfectly in reality: the “information theoretic” approach of Joseph Stiglitz 
(2000), for example, argues that markets are structured by the unequal knowledge of 
participants. Behavioural economics, too, has given rise to more empirically-oriented 
investigations of market behaviour (especially in the wake of the financial crisis), 
though these tend to diagnose dysfunctional episodes, like crisis, as a market failure 
rather than as a necessary part of how capitalist markets function (Christophers, 
Leyshon, and Mann 2017).  
86 
 
Within the financialisation literature, the presumption of market rationality has been 
subject to criticism from more heterodox angles of approach, particularly post-
Keynesian, institutionalist, and Marxist schools of economics. Influenced by long-
standing Marxist and liberal critiques of the rise of modern corporate organisation and 
its implications for the global economy, and an awareness of the recurrence of 
financial panics throughout capitalism’s existence (Kindleberger 2001), these schools 
of thought take a longer view of financialisation, and allow greater priority to the social 
and historical power relations under which capitalist economies function. They are 
influenced by earlier twentieth century work, such as the writings of the Edwardian 
socialist, Hilferding (2007), who argued that “finance capital” (an amalgamation of 
banking and industrial interests) was a cause of inter-imperialist rivalry in the years 
before the First World War, and the work of the liberal Keynes, who criticised the 
emergence of a class of rentiers extracting speculative returns rather engaging in than 
productive investment (Keynes 2010).  
In doing so, both post-Keynesians and Marxists have analysed financialisation as part 
of a structural transformation of capitalism since the 1970s. They identify it with a 
number of consequences: a relative slowdown in productivity and productive 
investment (Glyn 2007), depressed growth, volatile economic activity, heightened 
inequality and the entrenchment of new vested interests and class power into 
contemporary capitalism. Post-Keynesians such as Stockhammer (2004) have argued 
that financialisation is a causal factor in driving under-investment, since shareholder 
profits are favoured over the long-term development of firms, while Crotty (2005) has 
linked rising inequality to lower aggregate demand and pressure on investors to find 
higher returns. Both build on Keynesian insights that future uncertainty and shortfalls 
in aggregate demand (due to consumers tending not to spend all their incomes) lead 
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to fluctuating investment and sustained involuntary unemployment under laissez-faire 
capitalism, to the benefit of owners of scarce capital (Keynes 2010). 
Although not directly related to post-Keynesian theorisations of rentier interests, 
debates on financialisation have also been influenced by the “financial instability 
hypothesis” of Hyman Minsky (2008), in which credit becomes systematically 
extended to riskier business prospects over periods of prosperity. This can then 
amplify destabilising tendencies in a market downturn, as firms sell assets for cash in 
order to cover liabilities and repay debts, risking a “debt deflation” spiral (Fisher 2016) 
in which capital is devalued and credit becomes restricted. This creates potential 
conditions for mass insolvency and generalised recession. Liquidity within this 
framework can contribute to instability through enabling speculative booms and busts 
that are divorced, in contrast to orthodox economics, from the rational calculation of 
underlying price fundamentals. 
Within countries such as the UK, the expansion of consumer credit is often believed 
to have played a macroeconomic role at the national scale in maintaining consumer 
demand, with homeowners able to borrow against expected capital gains on their 
housing assets in a form of “privatised Keynesianism” (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; 
Crouch 2009). This effect is unstable, however, and financialisation has arguably also 
enabled speculative asset bubbles in which prices are inflated based on the 
expectation of future price rises, increasing volatility due to the risk of price crashes, 
while concentrating wealth into the hands of existing asset owners (Epstein 2006). The 
ability of housing to act as a store of asset wealth has increased academic interest in 
the extent to which home ownership can form the basis of an “asset based welfare” 
model, substituting for state provision in areas such as pensions (Kemeny 2005; 
Finlayson 2009; Lowe 2011). However, such a view potentially fails to recognise the 
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bounded, crisis-ridden nature of financialisation.  Rising household debt, in the context 
of wage stagnation and market volatility, means that asset-based welfare looks to be 
an increasingly precarious strategy, and one that fails to deal with entrenched 
inequalities within the housing market (Montgomerie and Büdenbender 2015). For 
these theorists, the political implication is that financialisation cannot be a solution, so 
that policy reform is therefore required to restrict financial speculation and provide 
state support for productive investment, while structural reforms promote the interests 
of labour to build a more equitable and democratic capitalism (Crotty 2009; Crotty and 
Epstein 2009). 
Accounts of financialisation that draw on post-Keynesian political economy highlight  
the negative systemic impacts of rentier dominance, whereas the focus within 
orthodox economics remains on calculative and rational investment decisions by 
agents operating within a market. In focusing on power relations within capitalism, the 
former school has affinities with Marxian approaches to financialisation, which attempt 
to provide a systematic account of the structural shifts within the accumulation of profit 
under the dominance of financial sector interests. However, whereas post-Keynesians 
view financialisation and slowdowns in growth as the product of rentier dominance, 
accounts grounded within orthodox Marxist economics have often diagnosed the 
expansion of financial accumulation as the result of an underlying slump in productive 
capitalism that began in the early 1970s, ending the decades of high growth following 
the end of the Second World War. The next section examines these analyses of 
financialisation, arguing that they can provide valuable insights into the relationship 
between finance capital and broader socio-economic shifts within capitalist 
accumulation. 
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3.3. Marxist approaches to financialisation: from M to M’ 
In attempting to provide an explanatory account of capitalist transformation, much 
Marxist theory has linked financialisation with underlying crises of productive 
accumulation. For Marxists, capitalism is analysed as a structured but contradictory 
set of social relations in which commodities are produced, exchanged, and distributed. 
The exploitation of labour produces surplus value for capitalists, which is then 
circulated through different branches of the economy. Within this analysis, finance 
forms part of the circulation of capital, with sums of money advanced for a return on 
interest acting to redistribute surplus value, and thereby appropriate a profit, without 
participating directly in the creation of that surplus value through production 
(Lapavitsas 2013, 4; see also Fine 2013). A major influence in Marxist accounts of 
financialisation has been the “monopoly capital” analysis of Baran and Sweezy (2009) 
associated with the socialist periodical Monthly Review. In their view, stagnation in 
production led to an intensified emphasis on financial activity in the hope of earning a 
return (Foster and Magdoff 2009). Similarly, the economic historian Robert Brenner 
(2006) has argued that a general overcapacity, leading to declining profitability in 
productive capital, underlay both low production and the availability of cheap credit up 
to the financial crisis. In contrast, Kliman (2011) has reinterpreted Marx’s theory of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, to argue that a production crisis has existed since 
the 1970s. Rather than financialisation itself being viewed as the cause of productive 
slowdown, it becomes a response to crisis in capitalist accumulation, as capital seeks 
new avenues for profit.   
Theories of economic crisis within Marxism are highly controversial and heavily 
contested, forming a vast literature that is impossible to review here (Shaikh 1978; 
Fine and Harris 1979; Harvey 2007; Fine and Saad-Filho, 2010b; Heinrich 2012). In 
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brief summary, the tendency to draw a direct causal link between a slowdown in 
productive growth and a boom in finance has been criticised by writers such as 
Lapavitsas (2013), who argue that financialisation must be understood in terms of a 
complex set of mediations between the financial sector, including non-financial firms 
and households, rather than as a simpler reflection of changes within production. 
Factors such as productivity growth, changes in the labour force, new international 
divisions of labour, the rise of the dollar as world money, global capital flows, and 
technological advances in communications and micro-electronics all play a role in 
various versions of this narrative. What is especially relevant to this thesis, however, 
is that a theoretical framework for financialisation that captures its crisis-laden side 
must specify the institutional features of the current period of financial growth, and how 
these relate to a wider commodification of, and reliance on, finance for the provision 
of goods such as housing. 
In specifying institutional features of contemporary financialisation, Lapavitsas argues 
that banks have come to play a significantly new role in relation to the wider economy, 
compared to the integration of banking and industrial interests observed by figures 
such as Hilferding (2007) in the early 20th Century. Throughout the twentieth century, 
multinational corporations became increasingly independent of banks for credit, 
funding themselves either through retained profits or externally through capital 
markets. Successive rounds of corporate stock buyouts thus led to financial trading 
becoming a growing source of income (Lapavitsas 2011, 620). Reflecting this, banks 
have increasingly sought new sources of income from household lending and deals in 
the open financial markets, earning fees and commissions through financial services 
and through trading in instruments such as derivatives used to govern exposure to 
economic risks. They have also turned toward providing consumer finance, as states 
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have withdrawn from areas of collective welfare provision, earning profits both from 
greater household borrowing and from handling household asset ownership in areas 
such as home ownership and  workplace pensions (Lapavitsas and Powell 2013). 
Financialisation, in this view, does not just reflect overaccumulation within production, 
but a systematic change in the behaviour of both households and financial and non-
financial firms, with the result that financial markets and institutions have a growing 
structural role in economic activity. For Lapavitsas, the centrality of household debt 
and savings in areas such as pensions or housing has been of such defining 
importance for financialisation that it is possible to argue for a “financial expropriation 
thesis”, in which households have become systematically important as a source of 
profit for a financial sector that is increasingly autonomous from productive growth 
(Lapavitsas 2009).  
This formulation has been disputed on Marxist grounds by Fine (2010a), who has 
argued that an analysis that depicts financialisation as a usurious deduction from 
wages neglects to study the ways in which finance restructures the provision of goods 
(such as housing) that are necessary for the reproduction of labour power. Advocating 
an alternative framework, Fine has argued that financialisation should be not be 
conflated with the presence of debt and credit relations as such, distinguishing a sum 
of money lent out to further consumption, such as a car purchase, from “interest 
bearing capital”, money advanced as capital in order to expand accumulation and earn 
a return on investment (Fine 2013). In Fine’s definition, financialisation should be 
strictly limited to the accumulation of interest-bearing capital and its intensive and 
extensive attachment to production, as it is only this which represents a change in the 
form of capitalist production. “Intensive” refers here to the proliferation of existing 
financial markets, while “extensive” refers to the extension of financialisation into new 
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domains (Bayliss, Fine, and Robertson 2017, 358). A mortgage to buy a house would 
therefore not count as financialisation, but the securitisation of a mortgage through its 
aggregation into a new financial asset that could be sold on to investors would count. 
This would provide a coherent framework for distinguishing the historically ubiquitous 
presence of mortgage markets in home ownership from the pre-financial crisis 
phenomena of securitised mortgages being traded among investors as a distinct asset 
class, taking on a fundamentally new role at the core of global capital markets. 
In analysing how financialisation acts to transform the provision of goods, such as 
housing, that are a vital means of shelter and social reproduction, it is first necessary 
to understand how Marxists analyse the position of labour within the circulation of 
capital. An analysis of capital in general is a necessary prerequisite for understanding 
financialised capital in particular, and what may be new about the contemporary era. 
Within Marxist political economy, the circuit of capital for an individual capitalist begins 
when money, M, is used as a universal equivalent to purchase means of production 
and labour power in order to produce commodities, C, that can be sold for a surplus 
value. If all goes well for the capitalist, they gain a return on their investment, M’, which 
can either be consumed, ending that particular individual circuit, or reinvested back 
into production. This process of commodity production for the sake of realising surplus 
value should be distinguished from barter for consumption, where commodities are 
exchanged for money so that equivalent commodities can be bought to satisfy a need, 
which can depicted as a single cycle of C-M-C. Rather, the investment of capital with 
the intention of earning a profit can be depicted as a circuit, M-C-M’, in which the use-
value of commodities, the qualitative means by which they satisfy a need, becomes 
subordinated to the needs of maximising surplus value that can be extracted through 
commodity production. Money’s ability to function as a universal equivalent rendering 
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anything as potentially exchangeable makes the accumulation of capital potentially 
limitless at this highly abstract level of analysis5, though Marxists argue that more 
complex analysis of capitalism reveals internal and external contradictions that pose 
limits to accumulation and lead to social, ecological and geographic crisis (Harvey 
2007a; Fine 2006). 
Within this idealised circuit, the worker appears as someone who sells their labour 
power, their capacity to work, to the capitalist as owner of the means of production in 
exchange for a wage. Crucially for Marx, this was an inherently exploitative transaction 
due to the distinction between labour and labour power, and their relation to the 
production of the value of commodities. In Marxist theory, value is a social relation, 
measured by the socially abstract necessary labour time required to produce a 
commodity, determined at the competitive level of the economy as a whole (as 
opposed to the value of any individual commodity being the particular, concrete 
labours that went into its specific production)6. Labour’s role as the measure of value 
in Marx’s theory meant that capitalist production was inherently exploitative, because 
the source of a capitalist’s profits were ultimately located in the unpaid surplus value 
of commodities produced by workers over and above the value of their wages they 
received in return. This was so even if workers are paid the fair value of what it costs 
to reproduce their labour, because what they sell is not the product of their labours but 
                                                          
5 How money should be conceptualised within Marxist theory, including how it relates to other schools of 
economic and anthropological thought, is a complex area. For a sense of the debates within Marxist political 
economy see Lapavitsas (1994, 2003, 2013), while Keen (2003) theorises Marx’s approach to money from a 
post-Keynesian perspective. For a lively anthropological treatment of the relation between money, debt and 
the state through history, see Graeber (2013). 
6 For Marx, value as socially abstract labour time is historically specific to capitalism and its separation of 
producers from the means of production that forces workers to sell their labour power to survive, rather than 
being a universal feature of all human societies. The literature on Marx’s political economy is vast, often 
polemical and extremely controversial, with comprehensive summaries and reconstructions found in Harvey 
(2007a), Saad-Filho (2007), Fine and Saad-Filho (2010), Kliman (2011), Weeks (1981), Fine and Harris (1979). 
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labour power, their capacity to work and create value for capitalists. For Marx, although 
capitalism superficially appears to be defined by free exchange, appearing as “a very 
Eden of the innate rights of man [sic]…the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, 
Property and Bentham” (Marx 1976, 280), in reality it is a form of production that relies 
on the class dominance of workers by capitalists for its own survival. In addition to 
capitalism being a form of class society, within this theory it can also be seen as an 
inherently monetary form of production, with commodities produced in accordance 
with the need by capital to extract surplus value rather than the production of goods 
and services that meet human needs.  
As such, it should be stressed that financialised and productive capitalism share 
common features. Both are inherently monetary, with capital taking the form of flows 
of value that undergoes a metamorphosis through sums of money, labour power and 
materials, and commodities sold on to realise surplus value. For both, this is an 
exploitative process in which the production of commodities is driven by the need to 
extract surplus value, rather than the provision of goods and services that meet human 
needs. Interest bearing capital, in this framework, is the advancing of a sum of money 
as credit by a “money capitalist” prior to M-C at the onset of the circuit, with the owner 
of this money earning a profit following the valorisation of C-M’ through the return of 
their principal loan advance and an interest payment, financed through the expansion 
of production it enabled. Interest-bearing capital also has the capacity to become 
“fictitious capital” when it is itself traded as a commodity, so-called not because it is 
less ‘real’ than capital tied up in physical production, but because its price can fluctuate 
autonomously of the actual claim on future earnings it represents. The accumulation 
of interest-bearing capital is therefore a redistribution of surplus value from ‘productive’ 
to ‘money’ capitalists, though how this restructures production in practice is likely to 
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vary according to the material processes of commodity production and cannot be 
predicted in advance.  
In adopting a restricted definition of financialisation as the accumulation of interest-
bearing capital, Bayliss et al (2017) also argue that commodification and monetary 
calculation are necessary but not sufficient criteria, while also claiming that its 
influence can be exerted through non-economic means. In rendering social objects 
exchangeable, financialisation nonetheless depends on commodification and the 
extension of market relations through its direct reliance on commodity production or 
the “commodity form”, with the latter meaning a stream of payments that can be 
securitised even if no direct production takes place (Ibid., 359). Financialisation’s 
effects, in this view, are also experienced through “commodity calculation”, meaning 
the monetary forms of assessment that are used even where no exchange takes 
place, such as cost-benefit calculations (Ibid., 360). Commodification appears as an 
inherently cultural process, reliant on the discursive construction of subjectivities and 
practices of social reproduction that underpin financialisation, such as attitudes toward 
home ownership as the ‘natural’ tenure in the case of housing, which are in turn 
embedded in material practices that structure the constraints under which agents 
operate (Jessop and Sum 2001).  
This strict definition of financialisation as the intensive and extensive accumulation of 
interest-bearing capital is an attractive one, linking it to systemic changes within 
capitalism while helping to avoid conflations with the presence of finance as such. The 
emphasis on analysing the situated context in which financialisation occurs also helps 
avoid the circular definition of financialisation as being both an explanation and a 
description of the social and economic processes it is supposed to conceptually 
illuminate. This is a useful approach, and one I adopt within this thesis as a first 
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approximation to analysing financialisation, On its own however, this rather formalist 
description also insufficient for an empirical analysis of financialisation, lacking an 
explanation of how it is that interest-bearing capital circulates or attaches itself to social 
and economic processes, suggesting the need for a further conceptual refinement. 
To investigate this empirical question, Fine therefore argues in favour of  adopting a 
“systems of provision” approach (Fine and Leopold 2002), which analyses how the 
consumption of a commodity is shaped by the agents and institutional structures of its 
production. In the case of the UK housing market, for example, Robertson (2017) 
argues credit expansion from the late 1990s led to house price inflation rather than 
increased supply because of the combination of a restrictive planning system and a 
speculative housebuilding industry able to restrict output to maximise profits. The 
intended methodological advantage of this is therefore to treat financialisation as a 
bounded entity, distinguishing the accumulation of interest-bearing capital from a 
commodity’s conditions of production so that financialisation is not implicitly assumed 
to be the sole causal agent in any given social process (Bayliss, Fine, and Robertson 
2017). There are still limits to this methodological approach that suggest the need for 
a further analysis, however. While financialisation in this view is enabled through 
cultural practices such as those shaping the consumption of commodities, 
financialisation itself is seen as operating at a distance from these processes of 
economic or social reproduction (Fine 2017). This characterisation leaves the question 
of the extent to which the particular systems of provision can theoretically go beyond 
a technical description of the systems of supply for a particular product, however, or if 
there is any sense in which these in turn can act to shape the operations of finance 
itself. Although a systems of provision approach would show how financialisation 
operates within particular contexts, the financialisation of social housing would be 
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something that is done to housing associations, with agency theoretically displaced to 
the structural level at which capital operates. 
This is questionable however, as the financialisation of a housing association would 
likely not just involve the ‘economic’ practices of lending and investment, but would 
also need to function as a form of governance reshaping the practices and depictions 
of housing associations in the process of converting them into an asset class. This 
conceptual distancing of financialisation from embedded social practices has been 
challenged by the next school of thought this chapter analyses, cultural political 
economy approaches that seek to analyse how these processes are reshaped at the 
scale of daily life.  
3.4 Cultural political economy and the challenge of the “new materialism” 
In focusing on practices that underpin commodification and enable it to take place, a 
Marxist approach to financialisation has some points of convergence with cultural 
economy research: both examine the sociological construction of markets and 
economic practices, though within very difference methodological frameworks (Cetina 
and Preda 2004; Mackenzie 2008). Cultural economy aims to analyse markets as a 
performative phenomenon, that is, constructed by discourses that actively bring their 
object into social existence rather than naturalistically describing it, though proponents 
also argue that performative utterances can break down or produce unanticipated 
effects (Butler 2010). This approach has often utilised Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
and allied assemblage methodologies that collapse distinctions between structure and 
agency, arguing that the latter is the emergent outcome of relational networks of 
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human and non-human actants (Latour 2007)7. Loosely grouped together under the 
philosophical heading of the “new materialism”, these schools of thought share a 
problematic aimed at rejecting dualisms between the natural and the social world, 
stressing the active rather than passive role played by material technologies and non-
human natures, emphasising instead a “flat” ontology in which any entity could be 
recognised as possessing agency (Coole and Frost 2010; Connolly 2013). While 
sharing a common antihumanism and philosophical scepticism with earlier 
poststructuralist intellectual movements, drawing in particular on thinkers such as 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, as argued by Choat (2017), the new materialism 
is distinguished by a much closer engagement with the natural sciences, as part of a 
general attempted erosion of disciplinary boundaries.  
Cultural economy is by no means limited to approaches that draw on or agree with the 
philosophical premises of the new materialism, or of assemblage approaches more 
generally (cf Erturk et al. 2008). I nonetheless focus on these in this section, in order 
to respond to the challenge they lay out for the Marxist analysis of capitalism forming 
a specific, structural form of production. Taking a sceptical view of the existence of 
economic structures, as opposed to knowledges and practices that result in processes 
of “economisation”, these researchers argue that no single factor should be privileged 
as a causal force structuring an emergent network (Çalışkan and Callon 2009; Collinge 
2006). Within the financialisation literature, this has led writers sympathetic to this 
approach, such as Langley (2006), or from a Foucauldian perspective, Garcia-
Lamarca and Kaika (2016), to argue against situating explanations for phenomena 
such as mortgage securitisation within ‘big picture’ concepts such as speculative 
                                                          
7 Not all writers using an assemblage approach would necessarily advocate new materialist philosophy. In what 
follows, “new materialist” is used to describe the philosophical framework, whereas “assemblage” is used to 
refer to the wider methodology. 
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investment. Instead, these theorists advocate a methodology that traces the networks 
of practices enabling housing financialisation to take place. As a result, proponents 
argue that structures such as the economy or a financial system should be viewed as 
an outcome of relational processes rather than as causal factors in their own right. 
This logic has led some ANT theorists, such as Michel Callon, to assert that capitalism 
itself is an “invention of anti-capitalists” who have sought to name and give coherence 
to what they oppose (quoted in Barry and Slater 2002, 297). Such an interpretation 
would directly contradict Marxist theorisations of capitalism as reproducing itself 
through distinct and historically situated economic categories such as value, 
exchange-value, and capital itself (Fine 2003).  
Although many pure ANT theorists would argue that each network is qualitatively 
unique, others have suggested that Marxism and ANT are capable of reconciliation if 
the processes that constitute different networks can be identified as possessing a 
common logic, thus enabling the generalisation of systemic capitalist features (Castree 
2002). Within the financialisation literature, a comparable argument has been made 
by Ouma (2016), who advocates for an “operations of capital” approach (Mezzadra 
and Neilson 2015), which examines the construction of financial assets as a specific 
and contested accomplishment, yet is attentive to wider capitalist processes and 
outcomes. From a Marxian standpoint, this wider scholarly interest in the performativity 
of markets and commodification has also been reflected in calls by Christophers 
(2014) for political economy to examine the practices through which markets are 
socially constructed by material and discursive practices. Studies grounded within 
cultural political economy have provided valuable empirical and methodological 
insights into financialisation, paralleling the allied use of assemblage approaches 
within urban studies to investigate areas such as dwelling and city space, housing 
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struggles, urban political ecology and networked infrastructures (Kaika 2005; 
Swyngedouw 2006; McFarlane 2011b, 2011a; Watt 2016). In addition, the insistence 
by Langley (2006), Ouma (2016), and others on the need to view financialisation as 
an outcome to be explained rather than as a causal factor in its own right is a valuable 
insight. This enables the potentially more empowering insight into the financialisation 
of entities such as social housing providers as a high-risk achievement that has to be 
constantly re-made and re-enacted, rather than operating as a top-down, a-social 
logic.  
Assemblage approaches have provoked criticism from more structuralist urban 
theorists, however, who have voiced scepticism over the extent to which these 
methodological and empirical insights are compatible with the privileging of networks, 
flows, and processes over political economic categories such as class, rent, 
exploitation or indeed capital and labour at an ontological level (Brenner, Madden, and 
Wachsmuth 2011). This thesis shares such scepticism. While it may indeed be an 
intellectually trite manoeuvre to lay the blame for all bad things at capitalism’s door, or 
disempowering to perceive the economy as a kind of mechanical and a-social 
structure, the conceptualisation of agency as irreducibly dispersed among a multiplicity 
of actants is also problematic. Taken to its conclusion, this logic would remove the 
ability to establish criteria to assess which causal actants were more significant than 
others in any given context, as well as to analyse structural factors they may be 
embedded in, a process that does not require the identification of a cause that is 
ontologically superior to the others (Choat 2017, 13). An analysis capable of 
accounting for structure is important to retain because although careful attention 
should be paid to the mutability of power relations, the longevity of capitalist social 
relations strongly suggests the need for a conceptual architecture that can account for 
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the historically differentiated endurance of some social categories over others 
(Söderberg and Netzén 2010). Although a conceptualisation of social housing 
financialisation as an outcome opens up important avenues for analysing the social 
preconditions that achieve it, this does not justify a theoretical silence as to how these 
processes may cohere into wider patterns of class inequality, displacement and crisis 
within contemporary urbanism.  
New materialists could argue in response that this does not avoid the problem of the 
reification of any one object as a top-down determinant of all others and hence 
stripping the world of its agency and contingency, a problem Marxism in particular is 
argued to be prone (Latour 1993). The classic example would be the model of an 
economic base consisting of forces and relations of production that determines a 
social infrastructure, with agency residing in a structure teleologically progressing 
toward communism, dismissing the independent validity of struggles against 
oppressions such as those based on gender and race8. 
Such a ‘topographical’ model, as opposed to the flat ontology advocated by new 
materialists, does not necessarily reflect how social structures are conceived of within 
historical materialism, however. As argued by Choat (2017), a key premise of 
Marxism’s view of materialism is not that the objective world is mechanically inert until 
acted upon by the forces of production, but that objects are produced under historically 
specific social and material relations that condition labour’s social form (Ibid., 11). The 
properties of an object take on different meanings as its social form changes, with a 
central project of historical materialism being to denaturalise these forms and showing 
                                                          
8 For two feminist critiques of the failure of orthodox Marxism to take seriously the plurality of struggle, see 
the responses of Deutsche (1991) and Massey (1991) to Harvey (1991). The classic statement of a 
technologically determinist base/superstructure model from within analytical Marxism has been given by 
Cohen (1978). For a Marxist critique of this determinism, see Williams (1973). 
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how they are the outcome of structural relations that undergo historical change. 
Although these structures originate through material practices that operate prior or 
anterior to thought, such as commodity exchange by private, individual producers 
under capitalism, these practices are the product of irreducibly social forms, such as 
those that naturalise and de-historicise the commodity form. Rather than entailing a 
form of economic or technological determinism, this means that the specific categories 
of production must themselves be explicitly theorised and historicised (Rekret and 
Choat 2016, 289). Failure to do so risks naturalising the conditions under which social 
forms appear to take on agency, and thus failing to account for why these persist or 
may be subject to change.  
As such, a recognition of capitalist social structures is still productive when these are 
taken as the starting rather than the end point for analysis, guiding an inquiry into what 
are the preconditions for phenomena such as financialisation, and what effects these 
may have. In the case of my specific thesis topic, I therefore analyse the 
financialisation of housing associations as a process in which they have to be actively 
and discursively shaped as an asset class. In other words, as suggested by Ouma 
(2016), to investigate financialisation we must explore what comes between M and M’ 
in the circulation of capital, without losing sight of how these embedded practices 
cohere into wider patterns that are reshaping our access to housing as part of the 
accumulation of interest-bearing capital.  
Rather than the circulation of capital occurring as an automatic process, I therefore 
argue in this thesis that social housing providers have has to be governed and 
represented in elite discourses as specifically entrepreneurial organisations, a high-
risk and uncertain enterprise that has had to be mediated by regulatory and legal 
frameworks to shield lenders from the costs of failure. In doing so, my methodology 
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also heeds recent calls to examine the geographic aspects of financialisation, and will 
trace financial relations that extend from the savings of families in middle class 
suburbs via intermediaries such as pension funds to invest in the gentrification-led 
restructuring of central urban areas (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011). In doing 
so, I also show how financialisation operates not only through structural processes of 
crisis and speculation in the urban landscape, but also technologies of governance 
that enable organisations such as housing associations, which historically have acted 
as welfare providers, to be reformed into acting as functional capitalists. The next 
section therefore turn to analyse this process in housing, analysing in particular how 
this operates as part of a production of urban space that shapes access to housing. 
3.5. Financialisation and the production of urban space  
Housing has been a key site for financialisation, acting as a major conduit for wealth 
through its ability to tap into national savings and capture ground rent in the urban 
landscape, while also becoming popular with investors as a regulated asset class with 
standardised valuation techniques and collateral that could be easily recovered in the 
event of default (Aalbers and Christophers 2014; Fernandez and Aalbers 2016; Bryan 
and Rafferty 2014b). From the late 1990s, urban land became a major asset bubble 
in many countries, leading to housing booms and price inflation within countries with 
developed mortgage markets such as the US, UK, Ireland, and Spain (Fernandez and 
Aalbers 2016). Transforming land and housing into a profitable asset class for 
investors, most notoriously through speculation in so-called subprime mortgage 
assets, ultimately triggered the financial crisis of 2008 (Aalbers 2008). While it has 
been an uneven process, the financialisation of housing continued past the financial 
crisis, with increasing investor interest in rental housing and the targeting by investors 
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of depreciated housing assets in the aftermath of the crash of 2007 - 2009 (D. Fields 
2015; Beswick et al. 2016). 
The dramatic ways in which finance can reshape the production of urban space was 
illustrated by the 2007-09 financial crisis and its aftermath. The culmination of a series 
of speculative asset bubbles and regional crises since the late 1980s (McNally 2009), 
the credit freeze and near-collapse of several major institutions triggered by 
speculative trades founded on “sub-prime” mortgages highlighted the integration of 
place-based housing markets into global capital (Newman 2009). The crisis revealed 
the extent to which how housing was being treated as an asset class to facilitate the 
operation of financial markets (Aalbers 2008), with implications for the reshaping of 
quotidian spaces, such as suburbia (Langley 2006), as well as geographies of race 
and class (Wyly et al. 2006). 
Reviving critical interest from the 1990s into the production of real estate (Haila 2006; 
Beauregard 1994; Coakley 1994), academics have paid renewed attention to the ways 
in which financialisation is intervening in the production of urban space through 
investment and institutional reforms to land-use planning (Rutland 2010; Coq-Huelva 
2013; Kaika and Ruggiero 2015). These impacts have not been homogenous, but a 
contradictory and variegated process, in which financialisation has both shaped and 
connected differing places, while changing its form to suit the geographies in which it 
is embedded (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011). In a context where cities are 
becoming key infrastructural nodes for capital, as well as major sites of accumulation 
in their own right (Brenner and Theodore 2002), financialisation has become a 
profoundly urban process. 
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Unsurprisingly, given the legacy of the financial crisis, the links between debt, 
homeownership, and volatility within financial institutions has been a major area of 
study for this literature. This ranges over the restructuring of legal and regulatory 
frameworks to enable mortgage securitisation (Wainwright 2009), comparative 
research into financial and housing markets within differing national contexts 
(Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Fernandez and Aalbers 2016), credit-scoring and 
discrimination (Hall 2012), and housing’s role within political economy (Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014). Fragility in mortgage markets following the crash has also led to 
a further wave of research exploring how the aftermath of the crisis has established 
new power relations in the urban landscape. These include work that is attentive to 
the limits of mortgage financialisation, particularly the ways in which the housing 
bubble led to a one-off transfer of wealth through housing assets that is unlikely to be 
repeated (Montgomerie and Büdenbender 2015), and research on the strategies used 
by private equity companies to purchase “distressed assets” for rent, following market 
collapse (D. Fields and Uffer 2016). Opposition to financialisation by urban community 
groups (D. Fields 2015), and the growing interest amongst different types of corporate 
entity in transnational landlordism are other avenues of recent work (Beswick et al. 
2016).  
To the extent that housing associations undergo financialisation under austerity, this 
is a process that can have serious consequences for tenants. Reliance on speculative 
developments to raise income can subject associations to the need to make a 
competitive return, reducing the resources used for social housing provision (O’Neill 
2013), while a more commercial approach to risk could result in more exclusionary 
lettings policies to screen out tenants who may pose a threat of rent arrears. My thesis 
is therefore able to contribute to this second wave of housing research by exploring 
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the limits and contingencies of financialisation, while still situating it within broader 
political economic processes of urban displacement and dispossession within the 
social housing landscapes of cities. However, this thesis seeks to combine a focus on 
the impacts financialisation at wider scales with an approach that focuses on the 
implications of the spread of financial calculus into the operations of associations as 
they are reshaped into an asset class for investors. In the following section I therefore 
develop a framework for analysing how financialisation operates as a governmentality, 
so as to be able to capture how the disciplinary and power-laden impacts of post-2010 
austerity are reshaping the social housing sector.  
3.6. Housing, social reproduction, and the financialisation of daily life 
As the site of the domestic sphere, housing plays a particular structural role in enabling 
social reproduction, defined here as the unwaged and often gendered range of mental, 
physical, and emotional labours by which we are materially and symbolically 
reproduced within a given society (Dalla Costa and James 1972; Federici 2017). 
Social reproduction, as understood in this thesis, has a twofold nature, in that it 
involves the reproduction of both ourselves as human beings, and also the socio-
economic order more generally (Dowling and Harvie 2014). Under capitalism, for 
example, labour power has to be reproduced in order for it to be employed by capital, 
a process that relies not just on the wage but on the social relations that educate a 
workforce and provide it with housing and care, including unwaged domestic labours 
within the household such as cooking, cleaning, and childcare.  
Under financialisation however, the home has become increasingly integrated into 
circuits of capital as housing has become a key global asset class. Public housing 
systems have undergone erosion and re-commodification under four decades of 
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neoliberal reform, while the provision of housing has become more closely integrated 
into global capital flows. Prior to the financial crisis, securitised mortgage assets were 
highly sought after by investors (Sassen 2009), while the years since the crisis have 
seen new corporate landlords emerge to take advantage of distressed housing assets 
in the wake of recession in countries such as the US, Ireland and Spain (Beswick et 
al. 2016). The resulting arrangements are precarious, and leave capital vulnerable to 
the possibility that labour may be unable to provide such returns, given the possibility 
of mass defaults and a financial crisis. The need to provide a competitive return to 
lenders is further intensified through advances in mathematics and computing, which 
enable techniques such as derivatives and securitisation to be used to disaggregate 
and trade risks, for example by purchasing insurance against a mortgagor default 
(Bryan, Martin, and Rafferty 2009).  
While neoliberal thinkers have argued that labour is thereby transformed into just 
another form of (human) capital (Shiller 2004), Bryan et al (2009) contend that this 
process of risk calculating and trading places households at a systematic 
disadvantage, because workers under capitalism cannot be separated from the labour 
power by which they reproduce themselves, which limits their ability to trade 
exposures to risk. For instance, a worker cannot easily sell their house without buying 
or renting a new one, or divest themselves of their job without selling their labour 
elsewhere. Passing responsibility for managing the risks of financialisaton downward  
onto households entails a new need for workers to manage that risk, and so introduces 
financial calculus and practices into the daily life of the unpaid labour by which 
households socially reproduce themselves as labour power (Bryan, Martin, and 
Rafferty 2009; García-Lamarca and Kaika 2016). By extending financial logics and 
calculus into the home in order to secure a return on investment, financialisation 
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therefore has the potential to enact new enclosures at the scale of daily life, 
incorporating social reproduction into wider circuits of capitalist accumulation (Martin 
2002; Bryan, Martin, and Rafferty 2009).  
The dual nature of social reproduction, in which we reproduce both ourselves as 
humans and labour power as a resource for capital, implies that there are wide-ranging 
political implications to the way in which housing is presented, whether as an 
independent, privatised good, or as a physical mediator of collective and power-laden 
processes by which we reproduce ourselves and are reproduced. The tensions 
created by the financialisation of housing become particularly intense in the case of 
social housing. Dwindling state grants have made it necessary for housing 
associations to depend on private lenders and investors for funds; a new type of 
outsourcing and levering in of private capital into the sector. Social landlords must now 
increasingly act as commercial organisations, while at the same time remaining reliant 
on government support, and these contrasting and competing logics have led to them 
becoming increasingly adept at calculating and managing financial risk in exchange 
for earning a return (Bryan and Rafferty 2014b; Dowling and Harvie 2014).   
One consequence of this, as this thesis argues, has been that housing associations 
have also become ever more complicit in the production of new risk-reducing power 
relations with tenants, via, for example weakened tenure security, restrictive 
allocations policies, and greater powers over eviction (Manzi and Morrison 2017). New 
and disciplinary regimes of social reproduction have therefore been developed to 
reduce risk exposure, impacting on the social and subjective relation between landlord 
and tenant as austerity drives new waves of dispossession through the sector. While 
the urban characteristics of financialisation strongly suggest the need to explicitly 
theorise how housing associations are being reshaped as an asset class for lenders 
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and investors, this is also a process that requires a restructuring of the governance 
and priorities of associations from welfare providers to entities that are capable of 
generating a return. Rather than a linear process, the financialisation of housing 
associations should therefore be conceived as requiring a constant process of 
reshaping and remaking housing, and as such may be considered to be a risky and 
provisional accomplishment, potentially vulnerable to contestation and frustration.  
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed the history and academic usage of financialisation as 
a concept, using this to set out the groundwork for a theoretical framework for 
analysing changes to housing associations in England. In doing so, I have set out my 
response to the challenge by Christophers (2015) for researchers to avoid unreflective 
use of the term, lest it risks becoming a reified and circular concept that can neither 
explain nor describe the social and economic processes by which finance interacts 
within non-financial entities. At first approximation, I have adopted a broadly Marxist 
approach within this thesis, based on the theoretical analysis by Fine (2013) of 
financialisation as the intensive and extensive accumulation of interest-bearing capital. 
I have chosen this approach due to the strength of Marxist political economy in 
developing generalisations about the development of capitalism that focus on the 
historical and social underpinnings of the structural forms adopted by socio-economic 
processes, analysing how economic categories are open to change rather than being 
abstract and immutable. A relatively tight definition as the accumulation of interest-
bearing capital has the advantage of providing a clearer set of criteria for analysing 
financialisation as part of a restructuring of capital, helping avoid the trap of circular 
reasoning that associates it with the mere presence of finance as such.  
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I have also argued that this can only be a first approximation of financialisation, 
however, as on its own this definition too does not explain how it is that capital 
circulates. A focus on describing the systems of provision under which housing or 
other goods are produced (Bayliss, Fine, and Robertson 2017) would still appear to 
leave interest bearing capital itself somewhat unexplored as a force that acts on 
production, rather than its circulation being an outcome that itself has to be produced. 
Cultural political economy approaches hold an advantage in this regard, given their 
emphasis on the discursive construction of socio-economic entities that enable a 
closer examination of how financialisation may operate as a form of governance, for 
example the reshaping of housing association aims and priorities as they become an 
asset class. The collapse of structure and agency by these approaches, in particular 
those influenced by philosophies loosely grouped under the label of the new 
materialism, is also problematic as they lack the ability of historical materialism to 
examine both change and the longevity of the historical social forms under which 
phenomena such as financialisation occurs. This is politically problematic, as despite 
a theoretical privileging of change, agency, and the fluctuation of material and 
conceptual categories by approaches such as Actor Network Theory, these risk 
naturalising capitalist social formations while being unable to explain how these may 
be subject to change.  
My own theoretical framework for analysing financialisation therefore explicitly adopts 
a historical materialist approach, while also recognising the insights from cultural 
political economy into how financialisation operates through a reconstruction of 
governance at the scale of life. Although financialisation of social housing providers 
operates through the circulation of capital, through the built environment, alongside 
Ouma (2016) I have advocated the need to get between M and M’, analysing 
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financialisation as a provisional achievement that operates as a reconstruction of 
governance. In particular, I have advocated analysing how financialisation operates 
through the lens of the changing power relations that shape social reproduction and 
the governance of risk, including how financialisation is enabled through the costs of 
this process being passed downward from lenders, to providers, and on to tenants. 
This is a deeply political process, demonstrating the need to analyse how legal and 
regulatory frameworks have mediated financialisation while assigning costs, benefits 
and liabilities across different social actors.  
As argued in Chapter 2, this justifies the adoption of a methodological approach in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis that analyses how elite and practitioner discourses 
represent associations as an asset class for finance. Financialisation has also been 
argued to be a profoundly spatial process (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011), 
requiring the production of new geographies of housing in the process of securing 
accumulation. In the next chapter of this thesis I therefore now turn to analyse how 
cities have been reshaped by financialisation under policies guided by the reforms of 
urban neoliberalism over the past 40 years, drawing on the work of the geographer 
David Harvey (2007a) in particular to argue that this is giving rise to new forms of 
dispossession in the aftermath of the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis. 
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Chapter Four: Neoliberal urbanism and the treatment of 
land as a “pure financial asset” 
4.0. Introduction 
The term ‘neoliberalism’ is contested and controversial, but is generally used to refer 
to recent rounds of spatial and social restructuring since the 1970s, in which market-
led institutions have displaced direct state planning in the organisation of economic 
life (Brown 2015; Harvey 2007b; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2004). The phenomenon 
can be observed at a global scale, with the creation of new international divisions of 
labour, the spread of production supply chains across national state borders, and 
trans-national legal and regulatory frameworks easing the passage of global capital 
flows (McNally 2009). Moreover, neoliberalism is often used to refer to a hegemonic 
consensus amongst governments since the 1980s on the merits of free market 
policies, such as privatisation of state enterprises, balanced government budgets, 
trade liberalisation and a strong defence of property rights, as codified in totemic 
schema such as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1993).   
Within this context, economic geographers have argued that cities have gained new 
importance as sites of economic governance and connective nodes within these 
processes, undermining the importance of regionally-focused former industrial 
heartlands such as the American mid-west, northern China, or the north of England 
(French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011). However, cities have simultaneously come 
under greater pressure to compete in order to attract investment capital through both 
the rolling back of public services, and a rolling out of neoliberal reforms to embed 
market institutions (Sassen 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002). Cutbacks to welfare 
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services, labour market retraining, and increased conditionality in social security 
benefits, have combined with the unlocking of urban land for profitable investment 
through powers of eminent domain, subsidies for development, and the erosion of 
public housing (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Weber 2002). Rather than flattening 
differences between places, this has been a crisis-ridden and variegated process of 
creative destruction, dependent on specific urban historical contexts and producing 
divergent and path dependent outcomes whose outcomes have been deeply shaped 
by previous institutional choices (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010).  
The financialisation of housing plays a deep and complex role in this temporal and 
spatial process of neoliberalisation, and particularly on the commodification of urban 
space. This chapter reviews the literature on the spatial ramifications of the 
neoliberalisation of housing. It begins with an analysis of the complex debates over 
the definition and scale of neoliberalism itself, examining both structuralist and non-
structuralist approaches, before advocating an understanding of neoliberalisation as 
a “variegated” phenomenon (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010).  A second section 
then reviews the work of the Marxist geographer, David Harvey, whose theorisation of 
the urbanisation of capital has had a foundational influence on critical urban 
geography. It will explore his argument that urbanisation unlocks investment potential 
in an attempt to resolve underlying capitalist crisis tendencies, with the recapitalisation 
of urban space and the displacement of low income communities under neoliberalism 
acting as a vital source of “accumulation through dispossession” (Harvey 2005). 
Following this, a third section explores the ways in which critical scholars have 
examined these processes in relation to housing, including the analysis of 
displacement. The fourth section then brings financialisation back into the analysis, 
investigating the mediation of crisis tendencies through urban space, before a final 
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section examines contributions from legal geography about the use of legal and 
regulatory frameworks to shape social housing.  
4.1. Methodological approaches to neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is a difficult term to pin down. In wider discourse it is sometimes 
associated with a pure pursuit of market logic. However, not only do few political 
parties or movements self-identify as neoliberal, but few governments – even in the 
US or the UK – adhere to a pure market-orientated logic. The multi-trillion dollar state-
bailout of financial institutions in 2008 illustrates this, as do the persistent deficits run 
by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the 1980s (Blyth 2013), and the extent 
of government intervention and guidance in the UK housing market over decades. 
Critics have disputed the extent to which neoliberalism could be said to be dominant 
in light of such discrepancies, with Whitehead (2012) pointing out that few 
contemporary academic economists would adhere, in practice, to beliefs in the 
existence of perfectly efficient free markets, or in the inevitable failure of any kind of 
government intervention. If neoliberalism is understood in terms of such an extreme 
policy stance, it would seem difficult to ascertain its relevance for analysis beyond 
perhaps a rhetorical denunciation of certain policies.   
The historical foundations of neoliberalism are equally disputed. Canonical neoliberal 
writers, like Milton Friedman, have portrayed neoliberalism as the revival of a classical 
liberal advocacy of commerce and trade, initially espoused by thinkers such as Adam 
Smith (Friedman 2002). Critical analyses of neoliberalism, by contrast, have argued 
that it is a more modern response to the failure by liberal institutions to prevent the rise 
of state planning in the 1930s, as advocated by movements of both the political left 
and fascist right (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). For this second group, neoliberalism’s 
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conceptual core lies in an epistemological scepticism toward the possibility of 
collective social knowledge, illustrated by figures such as Hayek (1996), argued that 
state planning could never capture the irreducibly private, tacit knowledge of economic 
actors. In such a view, market solutions do not simply produce superior economic 
results, but are, in fact, the only mechanisms capable of calculating the interaction of 
competing individual claims and goals. The public sector cannot represent collective 
values such as the public interest or public accountability, but remains just one more 
(monopolistic) institution. For writers such as Mirowski and Plehwe (2009), then, 
neoliberalism constitutes a process of state reform, in response to the mass politics of 
the mid-20th century, in which the market becomes the ideal model on which all other 
social institutions should be based.  
In academic research, as Larner (2003) suggests, there are three main definitions of 
neoliberalism. It can be treated as a hegemonic ideology, as a policy project aimed at 
state reform, or as a mode of governmentality in which power centres on a  calculating 
individual subject. Each conceptualisation has implications for the extent to which 
neoliberalism can be considered as either an idealistic project, or a contingent process 
dependent upon local contexts for its enactment and contestation.  
The view that neoliberalism is a hegemonic ideology covers a surprisingly broad range 
of positions. Writers drawing on cultural theory have analysed neoliberalism in terms 
of its ability to unsettle stable identities that may previously have acted as grounds for 
class solidarity: Dean (2008) draws on Lacan to explore neoliberalism’s structuring of 
atomised social desire, while Hall (2011) has argued for its ability to deepen class 
inequality by creating social hegemony. Meanwhile, in sharp contrast to the classical 
view of liberalism as a protection for the individual against overbearing governments, 
sociologists influenced by Pierre Bourdieu (1992) argue that it constitutes an 
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ideologically-laden process through which the state gains legitimacy by enacting 
punitive measures against marginalised social others excluded from mainstream 
society (Wacquant 2012; Tyler 2013). From a political economy angle, writers have 
argued that it acts as a hegemonic class ideology, propagated through think tanks and 
backed by elite academic and policy networks operating through international 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Saad-Filho and 
Johnston 2004). Marxist writers also see it as an imposition designed to reverse the 
gains made by 20th Century labour and national independence movements following 
decolonisation (Harvey 2005), although many are quick to note that neoliberalism’s 
global ubiquity means that it never exists in “pure” form, but is instead always 
articulated within particular local contexts (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2004). 
There is an overlap between the first and second conceptualisations of neoliberalism. 
Work from post-regulation social theorists on neoliberalism as a process of state 
reform has suggested that it constitutes not merely a “rolling back” of the welfare state, 
but the “rolling out” of new institutional forms that provide coherence and longevity, 
stabilising the volatilities caused by marketization (Peck and Tickell 2002). This is 
consonant with a school of academics in human geography, who have focused on 
neoliberalism as a policy project: Brenner and Theodore (Brenner and Theodore 
2002), for example, argue that it constitutes a creative-destructive process of path-
dependent institutional reform. Roll back measures, such as the privatisation of public 
housing and the erosion of local public services, are partnered with roll-out measures, 
including the privatisation and policing of public space, the use of public-private 
partnerships to deliver services and social housing, and gentrification-led restructuring 
of inner urban areas for middle class settlement and consumption (Ibid.). Within this 
policy-oriented framework, the longevity of neoliberalism partly lies in its ability to 
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dominate the response to crises caused by past rounds of neoliberalisation, 
capitalising on events such as recession, deindustrialisation, or financial crisis to 
promote market reforms. Neoliberalism thus appears as the hegemonic, necessary 
enabler of economic growth, prosperity, and political stability.  
Such a view leaves little room for contingency, which partly explains the third 
methodological approach to neoliberalism: treating it as a mode of governmentality 
(Larner 2003; Hoffman, DeHart, and Collier 2006; Ong 2006). Drawing on the work of 
the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1984), in particular his lectures on The Birth 
of Biopolitics, thinkers in this school adopt a post-structuralist framework to analyse 
how social entities are discursively constructed to make them both thinkable and 
governable through particular operations of power (Rose 1996). Here, power is 
understood not as a capacity held by pre-existing individuals or groups, but as a 
relational outcome of the ways in which technologies of governmentality discursively 
represent social entities and render them amenable to calculation and control. The 
process is spatial in nature: power never exists in a pure form, abstracted from its 
reach through particular geographic manifestations (Allen 2003), and never operates 
according to just one logic. Instead, potentially contradictory discursive 
representations coexist: for example, subjects in liberal societies can be represented 
as market consumers in one discourse, and as individual citizens within a political 
community within another.  
Neoliberalism, within this view, acts as a particular form of governmentality in which 
the self is reconstituted as a calculative, entrepreneurial entity, for example through 
the representation in housing policy of social tenants as resilient, self-reliant choosers 
of their housing outcomes (Hart 2004; Dean 2008). Importantly, however, other 
representations and other types of power relation coexist with this, so that outcomes 
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are contingent, and resistance possible (Castree 2006). Research conducted within a 
governmentality framework is, however, often critical of attempts to identify an 
underlying structure in how neoliberalism reshapes the world, with writers such as 
Collier (2012) arguing this would be universalising, would deprioritise the local, and 
would incorrectly attribute agency to neoliberalism itself as an independent logic that 
unfolds across the entire social world.  
Perhaps partly as a result of this approach, over the last decade, there has been a 
move to recognise the temporally and geographically variegated nature of 
neoliberalism (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010). Markets are increasingly seen as 
divergent and crisis-ridden, working across multiple spaces (Peck and Tickell 2002), 
with significant differences between national contexts and cities in the global South, 
where welfare state provision was often basic prior to the 1970s, and contexts in the 
global north, where the roll back of comprehensive state provision in social housing 
formed the leading edge of change (Peck and Tickell 2002). It is still possible, however, 
for critics like Collier (2012) to object that this attention to varied contexts is superficial 
and “builds on an old Marxist manoeuvre that aims to show how economic conditions, 
state formations and ideologies are wrapped up in a common project – however 
flexible, polymorphous or cunning that project is” (Ibid., 194). Others make the 
opposite point: that an insistence on localised manifestations of neoliberalism 
downplays the extent to which its tenets and practices are hegemonic, circulating 
through elite policy networks and often imposed in a very real top-down manner 
(Hackworth and Moriah 2006).  
A route out of this conceptual tension is suggested by debates within post-structuralist 
feminism, where authors have focused on resistance to neoliberalism in the sphere of 
daily life. Drawing on Sedgwick (2003), Gibson-Graham (2008) warns against the 
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potentially disempowering implications of interpreting neoliberalism through a “strong 
theory” lens as an explanatory variable, since treating it as a causal logic that is 
unrolled across the social world closes down alternate futures and routes for 
contestation that may exist in the present. Instead, neoliberalism can be viewed 
through a “weak theory” lens that is descriptively oriented and limited in its predictive 
capacity, allowing it to be seen as a precarious outcome of power relations that can 
be contested or disrupted by practices within people’s everyday lives. The local here 
is not small and inward-looking, but “open” to the wider world in a way that allows it to 
interface with dominant forms of capitalist power (Massey 2005).  
As I argued in the discussion of Marxism and the new materialism in the previous 
chapter, while capitalist structures should be viewed as conditioning and giving 
meaning to social forms, these are still relations that have to be constantly remade, 
and therefore should be taken as the starting point rather than the end point for 
analysis. This thesis therefore views neoliberalism in terms of a variegated process of 
capitalist restructuring, but seeks to suggest that these present opportunities for 
resistance at a local level. Within social housing research, such a view of neoliberalism 
has been used to analyse how legal mechanisms and contractual requirements within 
public-private partnerships (such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) have been 
vulnerable to disruption and delays that open up opportunities for tenant involvement 
and the winning of concessions (Hodkinson 2011a). Although taken at an individual 
level such challenges may not overthrow the system, they open up an “Achilles heel” 
(Ibid., 379) that leaves such capitalist strategies vulnerable to contestation, while 
allowing breathing space to working class and other subaltern movements operating 
across multiple struggles to co-ordinate and build opportunities for creating new 
political realities. 
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One advantage of this way of picturing neoliberalism as a process resting on social 
relations that have to be constantly made, and therefore are open to disruption and 
being un-made, is that it can readily be combined with the analysis of the 
financialisation of daily life discussed in the previous chapter, allowing an exploration 
of the ways in which social relations underpin financialisation. For social housing to be 
opened up to profitable activity, housing associations have to be transformed into 
organisations that can act as entrepreneurial, risk-taking enterprises, with disciplinary 
effects on tenants, but these open multiple possibilities for resistance at a local level. 
However, it is first necessary to understand, in more depth, how and why social 
housing has become a vehicle for the investment of private capital. In order to do this, 
I will turn to the work of David Harvey, whose work links spatial patterns of capitalist 
accumulation with attempts to manage capitalist crises.   
4.2. The treatment of land as a “pure financial asset” 
The way that markets treat land as an inherently scarce commodity, the supply of 
which is effectively fixed, has long been a subject of interest in the social sciences. 
Drawing on the work of the classical economist Ricardo (2004), who investigated the 
differential rents that could be extracted from agricultural land of varying productivity, 
neoclassical economists like Alonso (1964), Muth (1972), Mills (1967) and Rosen 
(1974) developed models in which residential land prices were treated as the reflection 
of consumer preferences over the use of space. According to their theories, which 
ground neoclassical approaches to housing, under conditions of free competition and 
clearly defined private property rights, house prices could be mathematically 
represented in terms of supply and demand under the constraints of available land 
and travel times within an urban area. However, as Whitehead (2012) points out in her 
review of this literature, housing is an expensive, long-term asset, unaffordable to most 
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people without credit, and its price is shaped by land scarcity, financial volatility, 
inelastic supply, cultural signifiers and other market imperfections. These factors lead 
to high transaction costs (Coase 1937) and make it unlikely that markets will produce 
efficient outcomes.  For the majority of contemporary housing economists, the 
consequence is that policy intervention will be needed in order to achieve more 
equitable outcomes (Whitehead 2012). Housing failures, such as boom and bust 
cycles, shortages and overcrowding, here become a symptom of market failure, and 
a result of the real world failing to live up to utopian expectations. 
Marxist critiques of these theories have focused on how capitalism goes beyond the 
spatial distribution of resources according to supply and demand: the requirement that 
the build environment should yield a profit creates the potential for crisis where these 
conditions cannot be met. Building on earlier research by Lefebvre (1991) into the 
production of space, the geographer David Harvey has reconstructed the value theory 
of Karl Marx (1976) to link urbanisation, wider processes of capitalist accumulation, 
and social crisis in a manner that draws attention to the intersections between financial 
and land markets (Harvey 2007a). Within Marxist theory, a commodity is an object 
produced for exchange, the value of which is measured by the socially necessary 
abstract labour time required to produce it. This does not mean the actual length of 
time required to produce any given commodity, but the share of collective social labour 
that a commodity represents, within a capitalist society where qualitatively different 
labours can be made quantitatively commensurable through their integration into a 
wider system of commodity production (Marx 1976, 129). However, such a formulation 
makes the theoretical price of land problematic within value theory: unlike most 
commodities, it does not usually require human labour to produce. Harvey resolves 
this issue by arguing that the price of land derives not from its current use, but on 
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entitlements to the capitalisation of future rents that can be extracted from its highest 
and best (profitable) use (Harvey 2007a, 367). This forward-looking orientation 
towards the most profitable exploitation of future labour also provides landlords with a 
‘rational’ social role in facilitating the efficient allocation of capital, an interesting 
contrast to economists such as Ricardo who viewed landlords as an ultimately 
parasitic feudal holdover (Ibid., 230). 
The co-ordinating role played by rent, as an income stream connected to an asset 
whose value could be separated from its current use, leads Harvey to the idea that 
there are deep structural affinities between finance and real estate. The pooling of 
capital by finance is usually necessary for the production of the built environment, 
given the large sunk investment costs (long turnover times and high exposure to risk) 
(Gotham 2009). In addition to this, Harvey argued that under capitalist social relations, 
land ownership would have a tendency to be treated as a “pure financial asset” 
(Harvey 2007a, 267), with paper claims to the future rents of land accorded a functional 
equivalence to financial securities such as stocks or bonds. These claims on future 
cash flows represent “fictitious capital” in Marxist terminology: they are nominal values, 
derived from discounted future payments, that can fluctuate independently of the 
actual sum of money used to purchase a financial asset (Lapavitsas 2013, 29). Here, 
the word “fictitious” does not mean that this capital is illusionary compared to an 
underlying ‘real’ economy of non-monetary values, but that its circulation through 
exchange opens up a gap through which claims to future earnings can circulate free 
from the capital tied up in production from which it extracts value (Harvey 2007a, 267). 
Fictitious capital must be distinguished from loanable capital (sums of money lent out 
for interest), though it can represent the prices paid for entitlements to those interest 
streams (Ibid., 29). Trades in fictitious capital can provide a useful function for 
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investors attempting to discover where their own capital can be allocated most 
efficiently, but the separation of exchange from use can also amplify speculative 
bubbles, as rising asset values become detached from any underlying profitable 
activity (Ibid., 267). 
A central axiom of Marxist theory is that capital must circulate to reproduce itself: a 
sum of value is invested in production, which (if successful) returns the original sum, 
plus a valorised increment of surplus value that forms the basis of profit. Drawing on 
a reading of the three volumes of Marx’s Capital (1976), Harvey argues that capitalism 
produces a tendency toward overaccumulation of capital, relative to opportunities for 
its profitable employment. The result is surplus capital, in forms such as unsold goods, 
unused capacity, idle cash balances, and surplus labour  in the form of unemployment 
(Harvey 2007a, 196). Ultimately, this makes the system prone to crises, which act to 
devalue overaccumulated capital, enabling surviving capitalists to acquire spare 
assets at knock-down rates. The need to find profitable outlets for these surpluses 
may then lead to a combination of their temporal displacement through investment in 
long term projects, and their spatial displacement in the opening up of new markets 
and the production of new spaces for capital accumulation through means such as the 
creation or remodelling of new built environments (Harvey 1978).  
Attending to the circulation of capital through the built environment enabled Harvey to 
connect urbanisation to these crisis tendencies within capitalist accumulation. His key 
theoretical texts, The Limits to Capital and The New Imperialism, distinguish between 
a primary circuit of capital (a single production cycle, accounting for the labour and 
raw materials used); a secondary circuit of production (which includes fixed capital 
that lasts more than one cycle and provides longer-term infrastructure for the primary 
circuit, e.g. transport and reusable machinery); and a tertiary circuit of capital that 
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encompasses scientific and technological innovation as well as social reproduction 
(Harvey 1978, 108). Importantly for this thesis, housing forms part of the secondary 
circuit, as the part of the built environment that is available for consumption (Ibid., 107). 
For Harvey, economic crises can be deferred by being passed from one circuit to the 
next as surpluses of capital accumulated in the primary circuit are invested (via state 
expenditure and financial markets) into the secondary circuit, for example the canal 
and railway booms of the 19th Century, or the mass suburbanisation that followed the 
Second World War (Ibid., 127). Contradictions within capitalist accumulation mean that 
crises are displaced rather than resolved this way, as the circuits act as “irrational 
rationalisers” for the system as a whole (Ibid., 112), cheapening capital costs through 
the destruction of existing value and the launching of new cycles of accumulation. 
Crisis and disinvestment in housing, in this view, is not the result of market dysfunction, 
but a structural necessity of capitalist accumulation. 
4.3. Neoliberalism and “accumulation through dispossession” 
For Harvey, then, internal contradictions within capitalist accumulation are displaced 
through the different circuits of capital. This also entails capitalism’s expansion into 
new business and new geographical areas, through what he describes as a series of 
“spatio-temporal fixes” (Harvey 2007a, 2005). Under the neoliberal era that began in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Harvey argues, new opportunities for profit were sought by 
unlocking investments that had previously been closed off to global capital (Harvey 
2007b). Examples include exploitation of common resources among the agricultural 
communities in the global south, or private investment into services formerly offered 
under the welfare state services in the global north. Finance, for Harvey, is central to 
this process, since it enables capital to move quickly from one opportunity to the next, 
and also acts as a disciplinary force on living standards via the threat of capital flight 
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(Harvey 2005). In terms of social housing, Harvey’s thesis has clear implications: the 
breakup of welfare services in countries such as the UK since the 1970s, including the 
re-commodification and residualisation of social housing, could be interpreted as a 
form of class warfare, with public housing assets unlocked for the market as part of a 
strategy of renewed accumulation.  
While Harvey does not refer to financialisation directly, he does make it clear that “the 
credit system” plays a fundamental role in this process, enabling accumulation to be 
co-ordinated across uneven capitalist development by reallocating capital to more 
efficient uses. This allows production and consumption needs to be balanced, for 
example through loans from areas with surpluses of capital to those with deficits 
(Harvey 2005). Yet this merely displaces rather than resolves underlying crisis 
tendencies, since overaccumulated productive capital actually enables speculative 
activity that amplifies the impact of crises once they finally hit. Furthermore, for Harvey 
the failure of successive waves of spatio-temporal fixes to restore long-term 
profitability since the 1970s have given rise to ever-proliferating forms of what he terms 
“accumulation through dispossession” (Harvey 2005). Drawing on Rosa Luxemburg’s 
reworking of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation in which resources lying outside 
circuits of capitalist production are forcibly appropriated by capital, Harvey suggests 
that the net result is new forms of enclosure, including but not limited to the 
establishment of private property rights over previously non-commodified resources 
(such as traditional land rights in agrarian societies), copyrights over intellectual 
properties, military adventurism and the neoliberal privatisation of former public assets 
and welfare services (Harvey 2005).    
Harvey’s theories have been criticised within Marxist scholarship for over-emphasising 
dispossession as a solution to capitalist crisis (Fine 2006), and for downplaying 
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ongoing and everyday struggles to move outside capitalist social relations (Angelis 
2006; Hodkinson 2012). Within the context of housing association financialisation, 
Harvey’s framework nonetheless has rich potential, allowing a sophisticated analysis 
of the ways in which financial accumulation, urbanisation, and the privatisation of 
social housing assets combine to produce geographies of dispossession that can be 
analysed through this research. Its value to this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, Harvey’s 
framework calls for greater attentiveness to the role played by space in the ongoing 
reproduction of capitalist power relations (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011).  In 
particular, it allows connections to be made between financial investors and social 
housing systems in very different places, as middle class savers are linked to social 
housing via intermediary funds based in financial centres such as London or New York 
(García-Lamarca and Kaika 2016; Fernandez and Aalbers 2016). Secondly, and 
related to these considerations, Harvey’s concept of the urbanisation of capital opens 
up questions about the role of the legal and regulatory frameworks governing planning 
and the use of housing in this process, including government policy initiatives, welfare 
regimes subsidising housing, and interest group networks of developers, planners, 
valuers, auditors, solicitors and others (Gotham 2009). I shall return to this second 
point later in the chapter, after further exploring the relationship between urbanism and 
neoliberalism. 
The structural role of land as a pure financial asset also implies different forms that 
financialisation can take with respect to housing. Housing can be valued as a 
speculative asset for analytically distinct reasons to its ability to capture ground rent, 
such as standardised lending and valuation practices and the legally protected 
physical ease with which creditors can repossess collateral in the event of default 
(Fernandez and Aalbers 2016). This is reflected in the form undertaken by 
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financialisation prior to the financial crisis, in which the main object of accumulation 
was the securitisation and trading in bonds aggregated from mortgage payments, with 
these deals providing opportunities for the further creation of financial instruments 
such as derivatives to profit from these trades (Sassen 2009). This was mediated by 
relatively traditional real estate institutions such as property developers, mortgage 
originators and home ownership (Aalbers 2008). The “post crisis” context of low 
growth, low interest rates and fiscal tightening has provided new opportunities for 
investors to capture the ground rent of housing through corporate expansion into direct 
ownership of residential rented real estate and thereby capture the profits that can be 
extracted through treating land as a pure financial asset (Beswick et al, 2016). This 
has also been aided by technological advances that increase the ease by which profits 
can be extracted from the traditionally tight margins of the private rented sector (D. 
Fields 2017). Harvey’s treatment therefore provides a way of connecting globally 
mobile capital to local urban housing markets, and of understanding the array of 
emergent new strategies for accumulation in the area of housing, such as the spread 
of corporate landlords and complex financial tools such as securitisation or derivatives. 
This ability of land to act as a pure financial asset has implications for how we analyse 
changes to housing associations under austerity. Many social housing estates are 
strategically located in central urban areas such as London that could provide 
opportunities for profitable speculation if they could be integrated into circuits of capital 
accumulation. As I will argue in the following chapter, the growth of more commercial 
practices by associations could therefore have the result of drawing them into treating 
their land and housing assets as a pure financial asset, and therefore leading housing 
providers themselves to undergo financialisation. To better analyse this process and 
the consequences it may have for tenants, the next section therefore turns to consider 
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the urban studies literature as it has explored existing dynamics of displacement and 
dispossession under urban neoliberalisation, to better establish the extent to which 
financialisation may represent a new phase of this process. 
4.4. Class, displacement, and gentrification 
In terms of housing, over the past 30 years critical urban scholarship has increasingly 
focused on the relation between neoliberal urbanism, and the question of the extent 
to which displacement and dispossession are becoming more common housing 
experiences. In particular, these issues have influenced debates over whether 
gentrification, as part of a wider process of neoliberal urbanism, contributes to issues 
such as displacement (Lees 2010). Neil Smith’s (1979) “rent gap” account of 
gentrification and displacement famously suggested that processes of neighbourhood 
disinvestment and displacement in contemporary cities were not the result of market 
failure, but rather the structural product of land and housing markets themselves. For 
Smith, neoclassical approaches that assumed consumer sovereignty in the 
organisation of urban space according to laws of supply and demand were deeply 
flawed, because they took for granted the social conditions under which the built 
environment was produced.  
Orthodox economics argued that private ownership within an idealised capitalist city 
gives the price of a piece of real estate in two components: the value of a property 
itself, accounting for depreciation and maintenance, and the ground rent of the land it 
occupies as a claim made by landowners on its use (Smith, 1979, 543). However, 
Smith suggested that the second of these, the ground rent, could be seen as a dual 
entity: alongside the actual level of ground rent that could be capitalised through sale 
in the present was the potential ground rent that could be realised if land was put to 
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its highest and best use in future. As neighbourhoods changed and adjoining business 
districts expanded, a gap could open up between actual and potential ground rents in 
inner urban areas, allowing landlords to cash in. The precondition of this, however, 
was the ejection of working class residents and the reconstruction of the 
neighbourhoods for a newer middle class clientele (Ibid., 546). Displacement was, in 
this view, not the product of dysfunctional market forces, but the result of markets that 
were operating all too well.  
Smith has also been influential in theorising how gentrification has become a central 
process within neoliberal urbanism, extending his thesis on the rent gap to argue that 
gentrification-led restructuring became an increasingly generalised global urban 
strategy in the 1980s and 1990s (Smith 2002). Gentrification, in this view, was neither 
a spontaneous operation of the market, nor the product of the choice of individual 
consumers, but a policy-led process in which central and local governments took an 
active role in freeing land for development by commercial and other developer 
interests. Smith identified an explicit wave of such policy interventions in the 1990s as 
a “third wave” of gentrification, distinct from the small-scale and sporadic “first wave” 
observed by Ruth Glass (1964) in the 1960s, and a “second wave” of gentrification 
during the late 1970s and 1980s in cities such as New York, as middle class 
bohemians moved into and began to renovate neighbourhoods where property values 
had collapsed (Hackworth and Smith 2001). The third wave was characterised by the 
amalgamation of state and corporate interests working within cities in both the global 
north and global south, with investors including both local real estate developers and 
multinational capital interests. The simultaneous growth of new industries, industrial 
automation and service sector employment contributed to a new paradigm in which 
real estate development became a centrepiece of economic redevelopment, creating 
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new spaces of production and consumption as financial interests were attracted by 
rising land values (Smith 2002). While the phenomenon operated differently across 
different geographical contexts, gentrification nonetheless appeared to be a wider 
class process in which urban space was made safe for middle class interests at the 
cost of working class displacement, with previous social compromises revised by 
neoliberal reforms (Smith 1996). 
However, a major area of academic debate has emerged over the precise sense in 
which gentrification is a class process, and the relation of its class element to wider 
social and economic transformations. For some (Hamnett 2003, 2009; T. Butler and 
Hamnett 2009), gentrification was the result of deindustrialisation and class 
decomposition, in which an expanding middle class replaced a working class that was 
undergoing a long-term decline within urban areas fuelled by the expansion of white-
collar jobs in the service sector. An alternate body of scholarship challenged this view, 
on the grounds that its view of social changes was overly linear and evolutionary, and 
that it downplayed the role of urban contestation and struggle, neglected the often 
highly detrimental impacts of gentrification-induced displacement on affected 
communities, and mistook an empirical decline in traditionally-defined manual 
occupations for a disappearance of class as such (Slater 2006, 2009; Watt 2008, 
2013; Davidson 2008). Moreover, following Marcuse (1985), displacement within this 
scholarship was seen as caused not just through direct or indirect ‘economic’ pressure 
(rent rises, evictions, or demolitions), but also through “displacement pressure” as 
neighbourhoods were altered, and consumption patterns changed to fit a range of 
middle class lifestyles, removing community networks and support services.  
While my thesis does not focus on gentrification as such, this literature’s analysis of 
displacement is nonetheless relevant to my study of social housing for the connections 
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it suggests between class, capitalist urbanisation, and housing. This thesis shares with 
the gentrification literature a sense that housing insecurity is created by wider 
processes of capitalist urbanisation, not merely imbalances between supply and 
demand. In particular, the treatment of land as an asset plays an active role in the 
exacerbation of unequal class relations, particularly in times of wider social inequality 
and stagnant incomes. By de-commodifying land, public housing can therefore act as 
a “buffer” that interrupts the flow of capital across urban spaces, limiting gentrification 
and other displacement pressures (Watt 2008, 2013). Yet housing associations are 
increasingly expected by policymakers to engage within commercialised activity in 
order to generate income as public grants are withdrawn, and the introduction of 
private capital is fundamentally connected to new expectations of profitability. This can 
fuel the growing unaffordability for low income communities of central urban areas, 
particularly should associations be forced to sell or divest centrally-located assets in 
order to redevelop in more peripheral locations.  Effectively, such a set of pressures 
could fundamentally alter the spatial availability of social housing. Further, a more 
commercialised housing association sector may alter its renting practices, to exclude 
tenants who may pose a danger to their financial security of associations, for example 
those who risk falling into rent arrears. The financialisation of housing therefore 
represents an economic shift involving new class relations and a reconstruction of 
space within the built environment (Weber 2002; Rutland 2010; French, Leyshon, and 
Wainwright 2011). 
4.5. The financialisation of housing in an urban context 
As previously stated, real estate development exposes the circulation of capital to 
considerable sunk costs long turnover times, as money invested in land and the built 
environment is usually tied up for considerable periods before it can be returned to the 
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investor as a profit. Harvey (2007a) and other Marxist geographers influenced by 
Lefebvre (1991) have suggested that this acts as a powerful spatial and temporal 
barrier to accumulation, and that it leaves investment in the built environment 
particularly vulnerable to devaluation in the event of an economic crisis or revolution 
in productive capacity (Peck and Ward 2010). There are therefore major social 
incentives to reducing investment barriers through means such as the concentration 
of liquid capital into financial systems that can pool risk and that specialise in judging 
investment opportunities so that capital can quickly be switched to its most efficient 
use (Harvey 2007a). 
Rephrasing this in Marxist terminology, capitalist urbanism in its pure form requires 
that the use values of a house or an apartment block, fixed to their particular spatial 
contexts, must be converted into liquid exchange values that can be produced and 
traded for the purposes of profitable accumulation (Haila 1988). For Smith (2008), this 
dynamic is geographically manifested as a process of uneven development in which 
barriers to investment and commodification are broken down, while at the same time 
urban space is subjected to a hierarchical differentiation in order to fit the requirements 
of accumulation. Class struggle for Smith is inherent to this process, with antagonisms 
between labour and capital both shaping and shaped by this uneven production of 
space. 
An influential strategy among researchers working on financialisation has been to 
analyse how this contradictory attempt to extract liquidity from spatial fixity operates in 
a context where real estate and housing markets have become more tightly integrated 
into global capital flows (Gotham 2009; Aalbers 2016). In itself, the deployment of land 
for the purposes of accumulation is nothing new. Friedrich Engels attempted to 
theorise the relation between housing shortages, gentrification, and speculative land 
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ownership in his essay The Housing Question (Engels 1872). Institutional investors, 
such as twentieth-century pension funds, have often seen land as an opportunity; 
either as a lending proposition offering relatively secure collateral, as bricks and mortar 
are difficult to spirit away, or as an investment opportunity in its own right to hedge 
against inflation, since land prices tend to rise (Massey and Catalano 1978). How this 
occurs for Massey and Catalano is not straightforward however, with financial 
accumulation able to take the form of either lending strategies, such as the bond 
markets, or direct ownership of land, as in corporate landlordism. The enormous scale 
of land investment and the concentrations of capital involved under contemporary 
capitalism have therefore raised questions over the extent to which financialisation 
represents a new phenomenon: have financial markets simply subsumed real estate 
markets in treating land as an object of accumulation or even a pure financial asset 
(Gotham 2009; Rutland 2010; D. Fields 2017)?  
It is possible to argue that the quantitative increase in scale and capital investment 
has led to a qualitative shift, in which finance no longer merely facilitates real estate 
development, but the production of the built environment is instead directed toward 
providing secure income streams that can be used as the raw material for financial 
securities (Newman 2009). As I have argued in Chapter 3, this is not a process that 
operates according to an abstract capital ‘logic’, but one mediated by urban politics, 
socio-legal regulatory frameworks such as the planning system, and other existing 
historical and spatial patterns of land use, since the protection of investor interests 
against uncertainty often involves the formation of specific coalitions of interest with 
particular local governments and property interests (Gotham 2009). The conversion of 
land into a pure financial asset is not a smooth process, however, and conflicts over 
the uses of space provide opportunities for activists and displaced communities to form 
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their own counter-coalitions in an attempt to create a different future for a particular 
space (D. Fields 2015).  
As this might suggest, legal and regulatory frameworks play a major role in enabling 
financial investment. They both establish what can and cannot be owned, and order 
and regularise the channels for capital investment with techniques such as value 
appraisal, default contingencies, and privately mandated contractual agreements 
(Knuth and Potts 2016). Although both financialisation and neoliberalisation have been 
popularly associated with deregulation and the removal of legal protections, as Aalbers 
(2017) points out, the proliferation of regulatory frameworks aimed at securing and 
protecting investor interests has also played a role. As Nick Blomley has suggested 
(Blomley 2003a), the establishment of private property interests in land require not just 
physical enforcement but also regimes of categorisation and representation that both 
identify boundaries and naturalise the social relations that govern ownership of spatial 
resources. The next section of these chapter explores these further, while also arguing 
that this is a process that is open to disruption or contestation, with cases such as 
gentrification and displacement providing an example of the encounter between very 
different conceptions of the uses of urban space. 
4.6. Critical legal geography as a method for analysing social housing 
financialisation 
Legal frameworks and the institution of reliable private property relations have long 
been essential for the growth of financial infrastructure. A financial asset, such as a 
bond agreement or a bank loan, is an intangible object relatively free from physical 
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constraints9. Instead, its construction is largely dependent on legal frameworks that 
make it recognisable and exchangeable as a commodity bearing value. Within recent 
financialisation literature, increasing attention has been paid to the role of legal 
frameworks in mediating financial accumulation, moving away from simplistic 
assumptions that law and regulation either constrain or liberate commercial activity in 
order to examine the law’s role in actively shaping and constructing markets (Knuth 
and Potts 2016; Kay 2016). These institutional factors have a strong influence in 
constructing the nature of assets for investors: for example, housing has appeal as an 
asset not just because land is scarce and can act as a store of value, but because a 
host of well-recognised valuation practices and standardised institutional frameworks 
exist for generating reliable income streams from it (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016). 
Such practices, however, have a legal and regulatory geography of their own: 
Wainwright (2009) has found that mortgage securitisation required extensive 
reworking to be translated from a US to a UK context, even following the extensive 
liberalisation of financial services after the “big bang” of 1986 (Wainwright and Manville 
2017). 
An analysis of the role of these frameworks is particularly important for housing 
associations, given the extent to which the sector has been structured through law and 
regulation. Requirements such as rent levels, allocations, stock management and 
tenant services, for example, have hitherto and to a large extent been governed 
through the regulatory system, rather than being explicitly set out in primary legislation 
(Cowan 2011). A major attraction of the sector for lenders has been the stability and 
                                                          
9 It should be noted that this is a relative but not absolute distinction. Even in an era where most cash is 
electronic, money and financial trades are not purely immaterial but also rely on physical IT infrastructures 
alongside more traditional notes and coins. Conversely, all commodities, whatever their material status, are 
the product of social relations that construct their meaning as an object that can be exchanged. 
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implicit guarantees of government support offered through this system, which offers 
regular rental payments backed up by housing benefit and significantly minimises the 
risk of lending (Heywood 2016). The power of regulators to set regimes defining norms 
and policy is also shaped by the geographies of the property relations and urban land 
markets in which housing associations are situated (Stewart 1994). These affect not 
only the value of stock and capacity of an association to develop the housing needs 
of local populations, but also the practices of tenants themselves in how they navigate 
their housing circumstances within an area.  
Research into financialisation that recognises the co-constitutive social interrelations 
between law and space as moments of broader power relations is a growing area 
(Blandy and Sibley 2010). In contrast to legal positivist conceptions of law as a formal 
and internally coherent set of rules that can be objectively analysed and implemented, 
this literature draws instead on critical approaches that theorise law as an 
indeterminate discourse that is dependent on its enation by social agents in order to 
gain meaning (Kennedy 1986; Rose and Valverde 1998). However, although law holds 
a unique power to create and define meanings backed up by state violence, it is not 
necessarily a simple instrument of the powerful, since the discursive need for legal 
actors to portray the law as coherent and non-arbitrary provides opportunities for 
subaltern and working class groups to use the law to contest and resist existing power 
relations (Bourdieu 1992). 
Drawing on these insights, within the legal geography literature law is increasingly 
understood not as an imposition of power over an inert, pre-existing spatial surface, 
but as always “worlded”, in the sense that it assigns symbolic meanings to social 
entities whose particular spatial aspects reflect how power can be brought to bear on 
their governance (Delaney 2011). Such a conceptualisation draws on the work of de 
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Souza Santos (1987), who analogised law to a map in which legal categories are 
cartographically projected on to social entities in ways that depend on the decisions of 
the mapmaker. Different choices about how to draw the map give rise to “interlegality”, 
where heterogenous legal orders can mutually co-exist without necessarily coming 
into conflict: for example the commercial laws of contract governing a mortgage 
secured on a rented house can coexist with legal housing tenure rights governing the 
occupant’s right to dwell in that house (Valverde 2009). As argued below this implies 
that a change to the legal frameworks regulating a particular area can have significant 
implications: with the financialisation of housing associations, the introduction of a 
need to secure a return to lenders has altered the governance of the sector, while 
weakening the rights of tenants over their homes. 
This understanding of law as a historical social construct has been accompanied since 
the 1990s by a critical analysis of how space also shapes social processes, requiring 
power relations to be actualised in necessarily particular ways across different 
geographical contexts (Soja 2011; Allen 2003; Massey 2005). While broadly post-
structuralist in orientation, these writers share some concerns with the materialist 
geographies of writers such as Lefebvre (1991) and Harvey  (2009) about the extent 
to which the concept of abstract space allows place to be seen as subject to individual, 
bounded ownership within capitalist relations. As all these authors point out, absolute, 
Newtonian space does not exclude other social uses of space, such as the relative 
spaces defined by the position of two or more objects to one another, or the transport 
links within and between cities (Harvey 2009). 
A paradigmatic writer in exploring the co-constitutive relations between law and space 
is Nicholas Blomley, whose work explores the geographies produced by regimes of 
private and other forms of property (Blomley 2003a, 2011). Drawing on 
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conceptualisations of private property as the state-backed right to exclude others from 
a resource (Rose 1999), Blomley’s work shows how the enactment of private property 
rights territorialises power relations. A “topographical” space results, understood as an 
abstract set of co-ordinates that can be read and monitored by an individual, 
externalised owner (Blomley 2011). This treatment of ownership as the relation of an 
individual subject to an external object, rather than as a form of social relations 
between people, is not a pre-given fact of reality, but a relation that has to be 
accomplished and continually maintained through enactments that identify and 
demarcate space, and even violently exclude others from its use (Blomley 2003a). As 
part of the process, existing property relations come to obscure alternative forms of 
ownership and property, operating to alternative and more explicitly relational criteria, 
such as the uses and narratives people produce while inhabiting a place such as a 
social housing estate (Blomley 2003b, 2003a). 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how finance becomes spatialised as part of a process of 
urbanisation, drawing in particular on the Marxist geographic political economy of 
David Harvey (2007a) and the critical literature on relations between cities, 
neoliberalisation, and displacement. In analysing these processes, I have argued that 
financialisation can be usefully related to urbanisation through the tendency for land 
to become treated as a pure financial asset, with its particular use values becoming 
dominated by exchange value and the needs of capital accumulation. Over the past 
40 years, these processes have gained increasing importance as cities have 
undergone a wider re-commodification of urban space under neoliberalisation and the 
erosion of social housing. This has involved not just the withdrawal of the state in 
favour of abstract free markets, but an active and ongoing process of state rollout of 
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commodified relations and institutional forms that promote and foster markets. The 
imposition of neoliberalisation has also involved the enforcement of new class 
relations through urban space as capital investment has returned to cities, risking the 
gentrification and displacement of low income and working class populations who 
might endanger the circulation of capital through the built environment in a process of 
what Harvey has called “accumulation through dispossession” (Harvey 2005). 
Analogously to the discussion of financialisation in the previous chapter, 
neoliberalisation has been theorised here not as a determinist and inevitable social 
structure, but as an ongoing and contradictory process of neoliberalisation whose 
impacts and effects are variegated. As such, neoliberalisation should within this view 
be used as a starting point rather than a conclusion for analysis, resting on power 
relations such as class and other social hierarchies that are territorialised through the 
urban landscape. When analysing these in relation to financialisation, the crisis 
tendencies generated through the needs of capitalist accumulation and the extraction 
of liquidity from the fixity of residential real estate (Gotham 2009) also requires 
significant mediation by a number of institutional actors such as local governments, 
planners, auditors, regulators, valuers, solicitors and others. Housing financialisation 
in other words is not an automatic process, but one that has to be actively made by 
the state, providers, tenants, lenders, and other actors. The financialisation of daily life 
theorised in the previous chapter can therefore be usefully integrated into an analysis 
of the neoliberalisation of social housing as an ongoing and contradictory process, 
open to potential contestation and interruption. 
Conceptualising how legal and regulatory frameworks shape financialisation is 
particularly relevant for social housing, with the tenure distinguished from private 
housing by the extent and form of regulatory frameworks that shape its governance 
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and use (Cowan and McDermont 2006). The following chapter will therefore conclude 
the second part of this thesis by developing a theoretical framework examining these 
issues in the context of the shift to private finance within housing associations. In doing 
so, I will explore the extent to which this has resulted in an increased insecurity for 
tenants, due to the creation of a need for associations to satisfy lenders while fulfilling 
their debt obligations. A major regulatory priority throughout the era of private finance 
since the late 1980s has therefore been to ensure the stability of the sector, with 
austerity measures and greater commercialisation since 2010 having the potential to 
produce a far more risky operating context for associations. The next chapter will 
therefore also focus on the governance of risk within housing associations, and the 
extent to which changing frameworks for managing these have the potential to lead to 
a qualitatively new trajectory in the sector’s financialisation.  
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Chapter five – social housing financialisation and the 
governance of ‘risk’ 
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter finalises the development of my theoretical framework developed 
throughout Part Two of this thesis by turning explicitly toward the question of the 
financialisation of housing associations, examining in particular the regulatory 
governance of associations as private, risk-taking enterprises as the sector has 
undergone neoliberalisation. Housing associations have been deeply shaped by their 
relation to successive governments, moving from a marginal tenure constituted by 
philanthropic, voluntary and other providers in the 19th and early to mid-20th Centuries, 
to becoming organisations explicitly used to fulfil government policy agendas from the 
1970s onward. Since the eclipse of council housing with privatisation through the right 
to buy in the 1980s and ensuing de-municipalisation strategies (Forrest and Murie 
1988; Cole and Furbey 1994), they have become the major conduit for new social 
housing, albeit within an overall picture of residualisation (Harloe 1995). Private 
finance has been fundamental in underpinning this process, enabling associations to 
develop even as grant funding has been steadily reduced and levering in capital as 
the public sector withdraws. This has been done both through associations developing 
on their own account, and through the direct transfer of council housing to new or 
independent housing companies since the 1980s.  
In analysing this process, a key strategy adopted by the housing studies literature has 
been to analyse these changes within a “hybridity” framework, exploring tensions 
between social and commercial goals of providers, including their incorporation into 
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government policy agendas. While agreeing with the need to avoid falling into a binary 
trap of associations as either public or private entities, I argue for the need to recognise 
that the circulation of capital through housing in cases such as financialisation is a 
deeply social process. Furthermore, I argue the meaning of ‘social’ in social housing 
should not be taken for granted, drawing on Cowan and McDermont (2008) to argue 
that this label has been adopted at a time when the signifier ‘public’ housing has been 
eroded as social housing providers have been expected to take on market attributes 
as risk-taking entrepreneurs. Uncritical analysis of the tensions between social and 
commercial goals that does not historicise these categories may then reify the image 
of providers as independent social enterprises, naturalising market forces in the 
sector.  
As an alternative, I develop a framework in this chapter for analysing the role law and 
regulatory frameworks play in meditating financialisation through the construction of 
associations as risk-taking enterprises. This is crucial with respect to the shift to private 
finance in associations that has explicitly involved the adoption of development risk by 
associations, suggesting that the role of the regulator is less to minimise risk than to 
ensure that providers can take on risk without unduly threatening social housing stock. 
In particular I draw on Veitch (2007) to argue that this has been a process in which 
law and regulation have attempted to responsibilise associations into acting as 
competent financial subjects, able to navigate risky property markets while rationally 
calculating the costs and benefits of their development activity. In doing so however, 
the systemic risks of the property market have become obscured, with legal 
techniques such as the protection of the right of lenders to repossess the stock of an 
insolvent housing provider shielding financial actors from responsibility for speculative 
urban land markets that may increase housing insecurity. As a result, the risks of 
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financialisation are thereby passed from lenders to providers, to tenants, with the 
redistribution of this risk economy a major factor in enabling financialisation to continue 
within a post-crisis context of heightened uncertainty.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The first section reviews the 
analysis of these changes within the housing studies literature, in particular the 
“hybridity” framework used to explore tensions between what are presented as 
commercial and social goals. The second section analyses the historical context of 
housing associations, arguing that the division between social and commercial goals 
adopted by the hybridity literature should take a more explicit account of the role of the 
state and lenders in the emergence of housing associations as a major tenure. While 
agreeing for the need for nuance in recognising that associations are not purely 
commercial actors and that social relations matter, I argue that this organisational 
focus neglects the urban power relations and processes of dispossession that have 
been theorised as a fundamental element of financialisation. This process has created 
risks whose management is likely to lead to further exclusions from social housing. In 
defining an alternate theoretical framework to hybridity, the third and fourth sections 
directly examines the definition of social housing, drawing in particular on the analysis 
by Cowan and McDermont (2008) on the spread of economic rationalities and the 
need to manage risks through the sector, updating their analysis for the contemporary 
‘post crisis’ context. The fifth section analyses the development of the regulatory 
framework since the 1980s, while the sixth and seventh turn to how risk itself should 
be conceptualised as a mode of social housing governance in a context of 
financialisation and neoliberal urbanism. The final section concludes. 
144 
 
5.1. “Hybridity” within housing studies 
As shown in the introduction to this thesis, housing associations have undergone 
greater levels of commercialisation since the 1980s. As post-2010 austerity policies 
have further cut back on funding and weakened tenant protections, this era of “minimal 
subsidy, low security and high risk” has led mainstream housing studies to focus on 
the concept of “hybridity” in order to explore how competing institutional logics may 
shape organisations. In analysing these tensions, the concept of “hybridity” has 
become an increasingly popular heuristic, analysing how associations combine 
aspects of private property companies, public welfare providers, and charitable and 
“community” provision (Blessing 2012; Mullins, Czischke, and Bortel 2012). Drawing 
on critiques of public-private distinctions in organisation theory (Perry and Rainey 
1988), these tend to portray housing associations as shaped by tensions between 
market, state, and “community” values (Brandsen, Donk, and Putters 2005). With 
markets in this view defined by exchange and the state by coercion, community or the 
‘social’ is argued to represent an ethic of “care for others on a voluntary basis, directed 
at a more or less defined and exclusive ‘other’” (Ibid., 751). Housing associations in 
this strand of research have therefore often been portrayed as organisations existing 
in the tension of these competing institutional logics, having to balance commercial 
requirements with meeting housing needs that are not fulfilled by the commercial 
market (Kickert 2001; Pawson 2006; Czischke 2009; Mullins, Czischke, and Bortel 
2012; Sacranie 2012).  
Questions over potential tensions in the ability of housing associations to maintain 
their “social goals” have become more pertinent as the level of commercialisation has 
risen in the sector, with researchers questioning the extent to which “commercial” 
requirements and “social” values of social housing providers may conflict as funding 
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levels are reduced across not-for-profit providers in multiple national contexts (Bratt 
2012; Blessing 2015; Milligan et al. 2015). Many associations are also substantial 
property companies and landlords in their own right, with assets far in excess of most 
other charities and a long-term historical relationship with large scale finance and 
investment (Wainwright and Manville 2017). As such, associations are complex 
organisations with contradictory priorities and histories, operating within an overall 
context of a greater extension of market relationships into welfare state activity, with 
some arguing that the sector is in danger of having its social role undermined by 
commercialisation (Manzi and Morrison 2017). Such pressures also have the potential 
for confirming long-held concerns among critical researchers that the sector is 
undergoing a long-term, iterative process of “privatisation” (Ginsburg 2005), where 
larger providers are likely to adopt more explicitly commercial goals over time, 
although within the variegated context of a still diverse sector. 
Most recently, austerity measures imposed since 2010 have severely reduced grant 
levels, cut social security benefits to tenants, and liberalised regulatory frameworks for 
social housing providers. At the same time, low interest rates and inflated land values 
have enabled many larger associations, particularly those based in London and the 
South East, to capitalise on their assets and expand their commercial arms. 
Researchers to date who have explored how this era of “minimal subsidy, low security, 
and high risk” is shaping associations, including the tension between “social” and 
“commercial” goals (Manzi and Morrison, 2017). For Manzi and Morrison, these 
tensions are creating a dilemma for English associations that for some is likely to 
undermine attempts at fulfilling social goals, although the risks of commercialisation 
may well leave associations vulnerable to failures that may require future state bailouts 
and intervention if attempts to navigate commercialisation go awry (Ibid., 16). Taking 
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a more optimistic view, Tang et al (2017) argue the relatively low fixed rates of interest 
associations have been able to access in this period, by borrowing from bond markets, 
provides some scope for “socially sustainable” financing (Ibid., 422). Finally, drawing 
explicitly on the financialisation literature, Wainwright and Manville (2017) have argued 
that the shift to bond markets in an overall context of commercialisation has entailed 
new power relations within the sector, as associations attempt to restructure their 
activities to strengthen their access to credit, again hindering attempts to create “social 
value”. Researchers within a hybridity framework rightfully stress the need for nuance 
and attention to organisational and strategic diversity in approaching the housing 
association sector, rather than sweeping assertions that social landlords are 
homogenously commercial entities (Morrison 2013).  
Some writers within this literature have challenged research that examines 
associations through the lens of neoliberalisation or privatisation however, arguing that 
these two frameworks represent a “bipolar view of the state and market” (Mullins and 
Jones 2015, 262) that fails to recognise how social relations nuance and complicate 
these processes. In answering this charge, it could be argued that the depiction of 
neoliberalism here replicates the assumption that the state and market are opposed 
spheres, a view that fails to historicise the social relations that underpin how the state 
itself is used to create and maintain markets. Advocates of adopting a more critical 
framework within housing studies for example have explicitly argued that 
neoliberalisation and commodification is not a deterministic process, but “something 
that is made and can thus be un-made by human beings” (Hodkinson, Watt, and 
Mooney 2013, 12 emphasis original). As argued in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
phenomena such as financialisation and commodification also have inherently cultural 
aspects, such as the bonds of trust between creditor and debtor and the necessity of 
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financial subjects to adopt a certain attitude of ‘responsibility’ toward debt repayment 
and a calculative attitude toward prospective investments (Martin 2002; Goede 2004). 
Such an attitude is inherently social and deeply normative, suggesting value 
judgements between responsibility to lenders and competing claims by other parties, 
such as tenants. Furthermore, there is a certain obscurity in this literature as to 
whether ‘social’ and ‘commercial’ goals are necessarily opposed, or if one can be used 
as a means to the other. Many commercial developments within housing associations 
for example are justified according to the claim that profits can be used to cross-
subsidise new social housing. 
In addition, there is also the question over the extent to which categories such as 
‘social’, ‘market’, and ‘state’ can themselves be historicised. Although many 
proponents of hybridity emphasise the need to examine housing within its historical 
and policy context (Brandsen, Donk, and Putters 2005), there is still the need to 
consider whether the meaning of these categories themselves and their significance 
are subject to change. Before exploring these questions however, I first turn to 
historicise the growth of the housing association sector throughout the neoliberal 
period, analysing its relation to the previously mass council housing model, in order to 
bring out the central role in the relation between the state and private finance that has 
enabled the creation of a mixed economy of social housing.  
5.2. The creation of a mixed social housing economy: from the 1970s to the eve 
of the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis 
The Housing Act 1974 was a major piece of legislation in the development of the 
contemporary housing association sector, setting out a comprehensive regulatory 
framework under the governance of the Housing Corporation, a non-departmental 
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government body which had been founded a decade earlier to fund certain types of 
housing societies (McDermont 2010). While intermittent discussions between 
associations and the government over a formal framework for the sector had been 
ongoing since at least the inter-war years (Malpass 2000), this was a major step in the 
sector’s use by the government as an explicit tool of housing and urban policy. Under 
the new system, housing associations would become officially registered providers 
with the regulator, becoming eligible for funding based on grants and cheap 
government loans, on condition of accepting its regulatory governance and 
surrendering the right to sell or otherwise dispose of social housing stock without first 
receiving prior regulatory consent (Ibid). Importantly, risk for associations was 
effectively minimised under this regime, with grants paid on completion of a project 
rather than at the beginning, meaning that the government would absorb any extra or 
unexpected costs and delays (Hughes and Lowe 1995). The ability of housing 
associations to act as an alternate conduit for public housing policy was a central 
feature of this regime, with local authorities increasingly discredited within central 
government as direct providers of social housing, as successive administrations 
sought to cut back on spending through the crisis years of the 1970s (McDermont 
2010). 
With the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979 – 1991), the 
roll-back of council housing and the de-municipalisation of local authority provision 
through the 1980s led to explorations of how to introduce private finance into the 
sector. In doing so, the government’s intention, as set out in the 1987 white paper 
introducing the shift to private finance, was introduce market discipline into the sector, 
while the Treasury was additionally keen to avoid the debts of housing investment 
from appearing directly on the government’s official balance sheets (Cowan and 
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McDermont 2006). These policy intentions were ultimately formalised by the Housing 
Act 1988, a landmark piece of legislation that enabled the shift to private finance, 
enabling associations to borrow while transferring risks onto associations through a 
new funding regime that put greater weight on the income associations could obtain 
through rents, and the creation of new, private sector tenancies. Under the new 
funding regime set by the 1988 Act and operated by the Housing Corporation, 
associations would compete for project grants that would now be paid at the beginning 
of a development rather than at the end, ensuring that extra costs would have to be 
made up out of the association’s own reserves or the rents of its tenants (Hughes and 
Lowe 1995). Whereas before grants had covered up to 90% of the cost of a scheme, 
subsidies under the new regime were initially cut to roughly 75% before falling to 50% 
by the mid-1990s, inducing associations to borrow in order to finance the difference 
(Ibid., 188). Private finance was therefore essential to the development of this new 
system, with a key role for the regulator being to mediate the interests of lenders, 
providers, and tenants within the new framework. 
While associations were expected to place greater emphasis on meeting costs from 
their own resources, the 1988 Act also lifted association rents out of statutory “Fair 
Rent” rent controls, while creating new tenancies for association tenants, similar to 
those in the private rented sector. It did this through establishing a new “Assured 
Tenancy” for new tenants, bearing fewer statutory rights of security than the previous 
“Secure Tenancies” that had been introduced through the Housing Act 1980, and 
which are still used for council tenants. One difference between the two for example 
is that landlords with tenants under an Assured Tenancy can apply for mandatory 
“Ground 8” eviction orders for tenants more than eight weeks in arrears, with a judge 
holding no official discretion as to whether or not to grant a possession order if the 
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relevant criteria apply (Cowan 2011). Assured Tenancies do nonetheless hold far 
greater rights for tenants than the Assured Shorthold Tenancies used in the private 
rented sector, with the latter giving tenants no statutory protection against no fault 
evictions following two months’ notice at the end of a tenancy period. Weakened 
security for tenants was therefore a fundamental component of this system, as 
associations began to be treated as commercial organisations that needed to make a 
profit in order to remain viable, even though profits are not distributed to shareholders. 
Rents quickly rose under this new funding regime as costs were passed on to tenants, 
with an overall average increase of 81% for new lettings in the first two years of the 
system, rising to 104% for newly built houses (Hughes and Lowe 1995, 194). Much of 
this increase was still accounted for by state subsidy through rising levels of housing 
benefit, although Hughes and Lowe still expressed concern over the potential that the 
discretionary incomes of tenants would be squeezed. The adoption of a funding 
regime based on combined public grants and private finance also drove greater 
competitiveness between associations and rounds of consolidation throughout the 
sector, as associations merged in order to better maximise the use of their assets, 
while finance directors took on new importance in organisational management (Pryke 
and Whitehead 1993). The result of the rent increases was to spark a new debate 
about “affordability” within the sector, led by the National Federation of Housing 
Associations as the sector’s representative body and leading to the establishment of 
an ongoing Continuous Recording (CORE) system to monitor rents and lettings 
(Cowan and McDermont 2006, 93). As rents among providers began to diverge 
however, a degree of rent control via the regulatory framework was nonetheless re-
established in 2001 through “convergence” policies that limited increases to an above-
inflation formula rate, intended to ensure social rents become consistent across 
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different social landlords in the same area in the long-term (Wilson 2017a). Greater 
commercialisation has therefore occurred within a social housing system that has 
remained one deeply shaped by regulation and its relation to the state, with the 
government actively setting the framework for rents and affordability of provision.  
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Figure 5.1. Permanent dwellings completed by tenure, United Kingdom 1949 - 
2015 
 
Source: DCLG Live Table 241: permanent dwellings completed, by tenure, United 
Kingdom, historical calendar year series. After Barker, 2004. 
As shown in the widely-reproduced graph in Figure 5.1 above, the new mixed public-
private funding regime saw an expansion of new housebuilding by housing 
associations in the early 1990s. This later declined until rising again in the aftermath 
of the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, as the government of Gordon Brown (2007 – 2010) 
in New Labour’s final years in office released additional development subsidies 
through the National Affordable Homes Programme 2008 – 2011 (Housing 
Corporation 2007a). Yet although new housing output rose under this system, with the 
exception of the 1990s and early 2010s, it was not an order of magnitude greater than 
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that of the more public-orientated funding system of the 1970s, while the total output 
of associations remained far below that of local authorities during the post-war 
decades. The demise of public funding for new social housing as the Fordist-
Keynesian welfare state compromise was broken has therefore not led to an 
expansion of private housebuilding under neoliberalism to compensate for this lost 
supply. Associations have made only a small contribution to total output in absolute 
terms, though the use of public funding has also meant that the sector’s development 
activity has functioned in a counter cyclical fashion, becoming relatively more 
important to the development industry as a whole in times of market collapse such as 
the early 1990s and late 2000s.  
As Figure 5.2 below demonstrates, the decline of council housing has also been 
associated with an expansion of the housing association sector. As social housing 
underwent increasing residualisation with the privatisations of the 1980s, accelerating 
a process that had already begun in the post-war years with the growth of owner-
occupation (Harloe 1995), provision of the tenure underwent increasing fragmentation 
with the introduction of stock transfers and public-private partnerships such as the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Although these began under the Conservatives, it was 
under New Labour (1997 – 2010) that these policies were widely rolled out, 
fundamentally transforming the sector’s ownership (Pawson and Mullins 2010). While 
stock transfer of council housing to associations began on the initiative of local 
government officials themselves in the late 1980s, the diversification and de-
municipalisation of social housing often came through strings attached to central 
government policies, for example through measures such as the Estates Renewal 
Challenge Fund (1996 – 2000) and most significantly the Decent Homes Programme. 
The latter consisted of a major project of refurbishment and repairs for aging social 
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housing stock after years of dis-investment under the Conservatives, accounting for 
£22bn in spending by 2009 and initially intended to operate from 2000 – 2010 (National 
Audit Office 2010, 6), though completion of the programme has experienced severe 
delays, with an additional £1.6bn allocated between 2011 and 2015 (Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2015). A major portion of the sector’s growth has 
therefore come directly from the de-municipalisation of council housing, in addition to 
providers developing on their own account.  
Figure 5.2. Dwelling Stock percentage by tenure, England, 1971 – 2016 
 
Source: DCLG Dwelling Stock by Tenure, England, DCLG Live Table 104.  
Under the programme, local authorities were not able to access additional spending 
unless they took one of three options to relinquish control over their housing stock, the 
first option being stock transfer. The second was the formation of an Arm’s-Length 
Management Organisation (ALMO), owned but not run by a local authority. The third 
was the formation of a PFI agreement to deliver housing, in which stock was 
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contracted out to be run by a private bank-led consortium for long-term periods of up 
to 25 years, raising controversial questions over accountability and value for money 
(Hodkinson 2011b). No fourth option for continuing local authority management was 
offered, causing the policy to be labelled a “Trojan horse” for de-municipalisation by 
MPs in the Department for Communities and Local Government Select Committee 
(ODPM 2004). Toward the end of New Labour’s term in office (1997 – 2010) in the 
late 2000s, traditional council housing had declined to just 24% of all social housing 
provision in 2008, with the remainder split between ALMOs, stock transfers, and 
“traditional” housing associations. By way of comparison, council housing has 
accounted for 92% of all social housing provision in 1981, in the early years of the 
neoliberal period under Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 – 1991 Conservative premiership 
(Pawson and Mullins 2010, 5). Contemporary social housing has therefore undergone 
deeper changes than a privatisation of state assets through policies such as the Right 
to Buy, with associations operating within a complex quasi-commercial patchwork in 
which the state has played a major and active role through the funding and regulatory 
system.  
The expansion of housing associations throughout the neoliberal era has therefore 
been a process that has been dependent on the transfer of state assets and the 
development of a lending regime based on private finance. While “hybridity” has been 
used to analyse possible tensions within the sector’s respective orientations toward 
the state, the market, and ‘social’ goals, the intertwined nature history of the sector’s 
growth suggests a need to analyse the extent to which the meaning of these terms 
may have changed throughout the neoliberal period. This issue will now be analysed 
in the next section, asking the question of what may be distinctive about the social 
goals of housing associations within this neoliberalised context.  
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5.3. Defining “social housing” within its historical context 
Providing a clear definition for the social goals of social housing given the fragmented 
nature of the tenure, particularly in light of increasing commercial diversification among 
associations, is a complex question. Use of the term to describe low cost housing 
provided by housing associations and local authorities gained traction in the 1990s 
among practitioners, academics, and eventually policymakers, though the latter 
preferred to refer to associations as part of the “independent” sector in the late 1980s 
to distinguish it from public provision (Cowan and McDermont 2006). Although used 
to distinguish it as a tenure from owner occupation or the private rented sector, with 
social housing combining distinct forms of ownership, regulation and security, it is 
perhaps surprisingly difficult to provide social housing with a clear analytical definition 
given its diversity and fragmentation. This is particularly so given the ongoing yet 
ambiguous relation of housing associations to the state, with the social landlords 
privately owned yet subsidised, regulated, and vital for conducting public policy 
functions such as homelessness rehousing (Cowan and McDermont 2008).  
One early attempt was offered by Harloe (1993), for whom social housing could be 
defined as having three characteristics. First, the price at which it is provided is not 
primarily determined by profit; second, it is allocated according to a definition of need 
rather than simply the ability to pay; and finally that it is subject to extensive 
government control that has increased over time (Harloe 1993, 3; cited in Cowan and 
McDermont 2006, 3). Each of these distinguishing features have nonetheless been 
subject to critique by Cowan and McDermont (2006, 2008), who have argued that the 
term social housing is riddled with a constitutive obscurity given its origins in the 
fragmentation of public housing and its interrelation with the housing system as a 
whole. A definition of social housing as non-profit-making is highly questionable, for 
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example. Although housing associations do not distribute profits, they still operate with 
the intent of making a ‘surplus’, the size of which determines their freedom to repay 
debts or reinvest new housing. In broader terms than simple provision, social housing 
policy also heavily relies in practice on the private rented sector to meet goals such as 
homelessness rehousing, without which the system as a whole could not function 
given overall social housing shortages. Housing benefit payments additionally ensure 
that many more people on low incomes can afford to live in particular areas than they 
could otherwise.  
Cowan and McDermont further argue that the concept of ‘need’ as applied to housing 
is also obscure and subject to historical change, concealing broader social and moral 
judgements. Victorian reformers for example distinguished between the deserving and 
undeserving poor, while social housing provision has through its history been shot 
through by discrimination based on race, gender, and other social hierarchies. In 
addition, contemporary politicians often inveigh against the racialized figure of the 
immigrant, or the attitudes toward work or ‘contribution’ of social housing tenants 
(Cowan and McDermont 2008). As such, ‘need’ can be used as a normative criteria to 
exclude as much as include people considered to deserve social housing, particularly 
given rising demand for the tenure amid widespread shortages and insecurity. In 
regard to the criteria of government control, housing associations are subject to 
extensive regulatory frameworks that are organised separately to the private market. 
Neither private renting or owner occupation operate according to textbook free market 
criteria however, subject to their own complex regimes of supply subsidies, 
government assistance to homeowners through measures such as Help to Buy 
(Wilson 2017b) or housing benefit for private renters, as mentioned above. Social 
housing regulation nonetheless is extensive, even under neoliberalism, and has 
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attempted to shape the behaviour and attitudes to responsibility of providers as much 
as tenants.  
For Cowan and McDermont (2006) then, the inherently normative criteria lurking within 
the concept of need and the blurred boundaries between social housing and the 
private sector in terms of profit making and regulation means that the tenure does not 
have an internally coherent meaning of its own. Rather, it can only be made discursive 
sense of in terms of a specific historical development – a Foucauldian genealogy – 
that has constructed it as part of a wider set of power-laden relations and technologies 
of governance that enable certain behaviours and activities. When it comes to social 
housing specifically, this entails that the question itself of how the term ‘social’ can be 
defined only makes sense at the historical moment when practices that could be 
deemed social – such as the original motivations for providing low-cost housing – are 
being defined in opposition to other rationalities. The need to define social housing as 
‘social’, for example, becomes a contested issue precisely when the concept of ‘public’ 
housing, previously the legitimating rationale for government interventions, has 
become eroded by another, the need to depict associations through a discursively 
economic rationality in the form of a “private, risk-taking enterprise” (Cowan and 
McDermont 2008, 175). As providers have been reshaped as more entrepreneurial 
organisations, this raises questions as to the extent to which the social goals of 
associations are taking on new meanings in an urban context dominated by 
neoliberalisation and financialisation. As analysed in the next section, this has the 
potential to lead to a radically changed sector in comparison to previous examples of 
commercial activity in its history.  
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5.4. Social housing within a neoliberal context 
Ongoing tensions between social aims and commercialisation within social housing 
can be seen through the ways housing associations have been legally categorised 
throughout their history, according to the assumption of a clear distinction, at least in 
principle between public and private spheres that is dominant within the legal 
profession. Housing associations have engaged in profit-making activity well before 
the 1980s, with the Guinness Trust part-funding its charitable activities in the 1950s 
through investments in stocks and shares (Cowan and McDermont 2006, 47). This 
practice created tension over an already ambiguous charitable status of many 
associations however, prompting a court challenge by the Trust’s rivals in the local 
authority sector over their favourable tax treatment. In Guinness Trust v West Ham 
Borough Council [1958] 1 WLR 541 the Trust nonetheless eventually won, with the 
Court of Appeal ruling that profit was simply a means for the Trust, and not its 
charitable objective. As local authorities lost support for their dominance as direct 
providers of socialised housing by the 1970s, amid the scandals of the poor or isolated 
quality of some new estates, and the sector’s gradual residualisation as wealthier 
workers began entering home ownership, larger associations began to emphasise 
their quality as organisations vital for carrying out public policy. While still stressing 
their “voluntary” role, in the sense of independent professional expertise rather than 
unpaid activity, at this point in time associations could be unproblematically ruled as 
public bodies in cases such as Peabody Housing Association v Green (1978 P&CR 
644), without being treated in practice as though they were part of the government 
(Cowan and McDermont 2006, 49). The importance placed upon the question of 
whether associations are private entities has therefore varied throughout their history, 
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with the boundary between the state and associations being a permeable one as the 
focus of housing policy changed throughout the post-war decades. 
The expansion of the housing association sector since the late 1980s has operated 
under a very different context however, with associations simultaneously operating as 
quasi-private entities able to access private finance, while also being entities in receipt 
of state subsidy that are deeply intertwined with the operation of social housing policy. 
The de-municipalisation of council housing for example has meant that housing 
associations are essential for fulfilling public policy goals such as homelessness 
rehousing, while regulators have had to balance increasing commercialisation within 
the sector with the need to safeguard invested public grants (McDermont 2007). In 
other words, the term social housing adopts significance precisely within a context of 
a mixed and quasi-commercial economy of welfare provision. This raises questions 
however over whether social housing only gains its current significance within a 
context of neoliberalisation, with neoliberalism understood not as an expansion of free 
markets, but as the institutional reform of the state and other areas of social activity 
along market lines, within which the possibility of public, collective action is 
ontologically delegitimised (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). As such, the use of the term 
‘social’ housing is therefore intertwined with the neoliberalisation of the welfare state, 
not because housing associations act as purely self-serving commercial concerns, but 
because it only gains meaning in a context where there is the “recognition that there 
is little distinctive left in the public realm” that cannot be delivered by alternate 
providers (Cowan and McDermont 2008, 175).  
To re-iterate and clarify this argument, alternatives to state provision such as charity 
or community action are, of course, not in themselves neoliberal. Nor is this an 
argument that housing associations are only concerned with commercial objectives, 
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or that how associations conceive of, view and pursue their objectives at an 
organisational and practitioner level does not matter for their actions. What is bound 
up with neoliberalisation however is the specific economic rationality that has been 
used as a tool of governance within the sector, in the sense that the organisational 
form of associations in an era of commercialisation and private finance has required 
their reconstruction along the lines of a “private risk-taking enterprise” (Cowan and 
McDermont 2008, 175). To manage their risks, such enterprises must act as though 
they have clear boundaries and responsibilities if they are to ensure that they meet 
their bottom line and maintain their solvency as market actors. Fulfilling this goal 
however creates a policy space both for forms of regulation that attempt to 
responsibilise associations as individual, competitive enterprises, in addition to 
creating a power relation in which the interests of lenders have to be satisfied if the 
sector’s access to private finance is to continue. 
The creation of this power relation between lenders and associations and a more 
neoliberalised form of governance for the sector does not altogether remove spaces 
for formal public accountability within the sector. Within case law, the litigation of R 
(Weaver) v. London & Quadrant HT (Div Ct); [2010] 1 WLR 363 (CA), where a 
possession for rent arrears was challenged on human rights law, resulted in the 
significant legal decision that associations are to be considered as hybrid public 
entities in so far as they exercise public functions in relation to their housing 
management. Though the full implications of this decision are still legally unclear and 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it has left associations potentially open to challenge 
under the Human Rights Act. Although the tenant’s challenge to the eviction process 
for a starter tenancy failed in West Kent Housing Association v Scott [2012] EWCA 
Civ 276, the court acknowledged that it was “just about arguable”.  The rights of 
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housing associations to mandatory eviction on grounds of rent arrears is yet to be fully 
tested (Cowan 2011, 130). Recalling the discussion of legal geography in chapter 
three of this thesis, this example does however suggest that law is not just a tool of 
the state or neoliberalism, and can therefore be studied as an active discourse that 
mediates the processes by which financialisation takes place. 
5.5. Risk and the regulatory framework for housing associations 
This analysis is particularly relevant for the development of the regulatory framework 
for housing associations, which has seen not only the introduction of “new public 
management” systems emphasising competition and quantified targets, but also 
competitive bidding regimes operated through the subsidy system and a greater role 
for audit and ongoing monitoring. Although the development of this system has often 
phrased by policymakers in terms of greater freedoms for providers, critics have 
nonetheless argued this could be better depicted as a form of “centralised 
decentralisation” (Hoggett 1996) due to ongoing government control of subsidy and 
regulatory targets and priorities. Tools of audit and self-regulation have become more 
important as a means to governing the sector, providing standardisable numerical 
metrics that have been a key technology of governance as the regulator has moved 
from a more prescriptive system based on policy circulars setting out accepted 
practices, to a “risk based” system based on self-assessment and ongoing monitoring 
(Cowan and McDermont 2006, 110). Given the importance for the state in 
underpinning the ability of housing associations to function as borrowers, 
understanding the development of this system as a means of governance is important 
for an analysis of how financialisation has been embedded within housing 
associations, in addition to how it might develop at a time where the government is 
withdrawing support for subsidy under austerity. 
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Neoliberal reform to service delivery has been a major component of this “centralised 
decentralisation”. Since the 1980s both council housing and housing associations 
have seen the direct promotion of competition-simulating targets and metrics, with 
competitive bidding models and the imposition of “new public management” service 
mechanisms through the sector from the 1980s, widening to incorporate metrics 
intended to measure social outcomes under New Labour under policies such as “Best 
Value” (Mullins 1997; B. Walker and Murie 2004). Many associations in the 1990s also 
adopted organisational techniques poached from the private sector such as call 
centres and internal management restructures, placing new skills requirements on 
their boards (Walker and Smith 1999; Collier 2005). Such quasi-market approaches 
have also extended to tenants themselves through “choice based lettings” systems 
grounded in virtual currencies in order to ‘bid’ on available properties, receiving priority 
according to graded preference bands depending on their circumstances and defined 
needs, although others have questioned how meaningful such ‘choice’ is given chronic 
housing shortages (Carr et al. 2010). Policymakers and some housing researchers 
have argued that such measures have the potential to provide clearly defined 
benchmarks to drive up standards, or at least reshape associations into focusing on 
providing better customer service in comparison to often bureaucratic council housing 
provision (Pawson and Mullins 2010). Others have warned however that such reforms 
can undermine the professional autonomy of housing officers while encouraging 
“managerialism” and the manipulation of outcomes to meet set targets without 
necessarily improving services (Walker 2001; McKee 2009).  
In analysing this, McDermont (2007) has theorised the development of the governance 
of housing associations as a form of “regulatory space”, in which territories of 
regulation are actively constructed and defined between regulator and regulatees and 
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other stakeholders, though not on an equal basis. In this analogy, law such as that 
defined by the Housing Act 1988 performs as a ‘map’ that defines a territory of 
governance (Santos 1987), identifying lenders, providers, regulators, tenancies, 
subsidy powers, and the demarcation of organisations as either public or private sector 
for legal purposes. These actors then attempt to shape one another’s’ behaviour 
through this territory. The production and maintenance of the common security of a 
territory of regulation can come at the cost of excluding others who might undermine 
or trouble that space, such as housing association tenants who enter into arrears and 
undermine the cash flows of social landlords, and hence the continuation of the system 
as a whole. 
For Cowan and McDermont (2006), money has played a powerful role within this 
system through enabling governance-at-a-distance between associations and the 
regulatory body acting in its capacity as a funder. The subsidy regime in which 
associations must conduct projects according to set criteria can also be seen as a two-
way relationship involving a degree of mutual interest between both parties, rather 
than a one-way process in which one side mechanically determines the other, creating 
a shared set of priorities between the two (Cowan and McDermont 2006, 85). In 
lending to an association, a lender must gain reassurance that it will be paid back by 
attempting to ensure a reasonable flow of funds, while also enacting some form of 
monitoring process in order to ascertain the borrower’s actions and ensure it is acting 
in a financially ‘responsible’ manner, correctly judging the available risks and returns 
in order to ensure continued streams of payments (Langley 2008). These are 
unavoidably social relations, indicating that financialisation cannot be studied as a 
process limited to a-social definition of the ‘market’ alone. 
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While the analysis of the ‘social’ in social housing as a form of governmentality is useful 
for understanding change within the sector, financialisation raises questions over what 
new forms of expertise, modes of thinking and “arenas of government” (Cowan and 
McDermont 2008, 176) are being produced that may be reshaping the goals of 
associations. While associations have in the past engaged in private investment to 
fund charitable aims, the scale of contemporary financialisation and its ability to 
network global capital interests with localised sites of housing makes it imperative to 
investigate the extent to which this is enacting new power relations within the sector 
between lenders, providers, and tenants. This is particularly complex given the 
government’s ongoing use of associations to meet public policy goals, generating 
potential conflicts between the need to maintain stability in the sector and policy 
desires for it to take on greater risks as it becomes more commercialised. Although 
this issue is similar to that of the tension between social and commercial goals 
explored in the hybridity literature, the framework pursued here also suggests the 
value of situating the analysis within specific theorisations of financialisation. As 
argued in the third chapter of this thesis, this should not be considered a purely 
‘economic’ process devoid of social relations, but one which relies on social forms and 
governmentalities of daily life that shape how these relations are capable of being 
reproduced (Martin 2002). This suggests the need to update the analysis of Cowan 
and McDermont, in order to account for a financialised context in which providers are 
encouraged to treat their land and housing as pure financial assets. 
It should be stressed that the social nature of these issues also raises serious 
problems for the hybridity literature, in which social and commercial logics are 
represented as opposing poles of attraction (Blessing 2015; Milligan et al. 2015). 
Rather, as argued throughout Part Two of this thesis, ‘economic’ categories are 
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inherently social forms, subject to historical change. As suggested by Aalbers and 
Christophers (2014), while political economy is central to an analysis of housing in that 
it acts as a medium for the circulation of capital through the built environment, capital 
is a fundamentally social relation. This implies the need to interrogate the extent to 
which social goals could be complicit within financialisation, for example reifying the 
image of housing associations as social enterprises to the extent this obscures other 
questions, such as public accountability. 
Furthermore, the question over the extent to which providers are undergoing 
financialisation raises the issue as to whether this necessitates a redistribution of 
exposure to risk, a process in which non-commercial actors such as tenants are at a 
systematic disadvantage due to their reduced ability to pass on risks to others (Bryan, 
Martin, and Rafferty 2009). As argued in chapter three of this thesis, this is occurring 
within the context of a specifically urban process of displacement and dispossession, 
with greater levels of commercialisation within the housing association sector raising 
questions of the extent to which associations may be pulled in as active participants 
in an ongoing process of “accumulation through dispossession” in the urban landscape 
(Harvey 2005). This raises the question however of the implications of the 2007 – 2009 
financial crisis and austerity for how associations adopt and manage risks, with the 
remainder of this chapter setting out an updated framework for analysing these risks 
within a post-crisis context. 
5.6. Governing risk and uncertainty in the post-1988 private finance model 
The neoliberal erosion of public services since the 1980s have been accompanied by 
a rolling out of new institutional forms that incorporate commodified forms of service 
delivery, such as voucher systems, new public management targets, auditing and 
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contractual outsourcing to private and not-for-profit providers in addition to direct 
privatisations (Whitfield 2001). Private finance has played a fundamental role within 
these changed forms of provision, enabling private capital to be levered in upfront to 
fund the service in exchange for a long-term stream of debt repayments, whose 
reliability can be particularly valuable for institutional investors such as pension funds 
and insurance companies with long-term annuities to pay out (Bowman et al. 2015). 
This use of private finance to fund services however has the potential to create a “co-
imbrication between the state and finance” (Dowling 2017, 295), where the state relies 
on the financial sector to achieve social policy goals while financial actors use the state 
as a means for profitable accumulation. As such, rather than minimising the role of the 
state, continued access to finance can often require extensive legal and regulatory 
frameworks governing the use and operation of outsourced services in order to ensure 
that their continued operation is able to be compatible with opportunities for profitable 
activity (O’Neill 2013).  
While governments can usually borrow at cheaper rates than the private sector, a key 
defence of outsourcing has rested on the claim that the introduction of market forces 
instils greater discipline and efficiency compared to supposedly sclerotic state 
provision, resulting in better services for a lower cost (Kerr 1998). This assertion has 
been critiqued by Froud (2003) however, who in a critique of the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) has argued this argument rests on a conceptual conflation between risk 
and uncertainty. Drawing on a longstanding separation of the two within economic 
theory (Keynes 2010), for Froud, risk should be considered a quantifiable probability 
of an adverse circumstance, capable of being materialised by businesses and other 
organisations through practices such as cost-benefit analysis. Uncertainty by contrast 
is a more qualitative property, used to describe the radical unknowability of future 
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events that cannot be predicted through probabilistic means. This distinction becomes 
important in the design of contracts and legal frameworks governing privatisation and 
outsourcing, because the state usually has a much greater capacity to respond to the 
contingencies and uncertainties of chance future events than any one single private 
organisation (Froud 2003, 589). Businesses for example must have some means of 
assessing the likely results of their actions if they are to be able to have any hope of 
long-term survival and protection of their bottom lines. In practice, favourable 
agreements for private sector interests are also often written into such contracts in 
cases such as PFI agreements, given the greater access to legal resources large 
businesses have in comparison to often underfunded public agencies (Hodkinson 
2011b).  
Writers such as Beck (1992) and others have critiqued the idea that risk is a pre-social 
category that can be scientifically identified and demarcated by individual actors, 
independently from the systemic risks produced by the interactions between these 
actors. For Froud however, what counts is less the uncertainties within the actual 
scientific accuracy of prediction of risk, and more that collective standards for risk 
calculation can be materialised through practices and discourses that structure the 
behaviour of economic actors (Froud 2003, 572). As such, although the design of 
privatisation and outsourcing projects usually explicitly attempt to identify risks that 
can be transferred from the public to the private sector, such projects will also function 
to remove uncertainty for private sector partners in order to clearly demarcate activities 
through which they can pursue the chance to make profits. Contracts and other legal 
frameworks will therefore often seek to minimise uncertainties for private sector 
partners through contracts and other legal frameworks. In turn however, rather than 
simply transferring risk to the state in a zero-sum game, this also creates risk for the 
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public sector through closing down its policy space by locking service delivery into 
project designs and contractual agreements that insulate providers from future 
contingencies. This then exposes the state to the risks of being unable to respond to 
service failures, through being bound to past agreements as part of ensuring that 
private and quasi-private providers are able to deliver services on a profitable basis. 
This governance of risk and uncertainty through the use of law can be seen in the shift 
to the use of private finance by associations. Although associations were and still 
remain largely not-for-profit entities, providers were nonetheless able to borrow at 
relatively cheap rates in comparison to private companies because of the minimal risk 
they were perceived to offer to lenders, due in significant part to their nature as 
government-backed, quasi-public sector entities (Heywood 2016). This has created 
the issue for the regulator of how to maintain the stability of associations and guard 
against a provider becoming insolvent and defaulting on its loans, an incident that 
would have major consequences for both the sector and its tenants. When housing 
associations borrow, they do so by securing their loans against their asset base. This 
can include social housing stock, alongside other assets such as land holdings or 
commercial property (Ibid). If an association defaulted on a loan that was secured on 
social housing stock, then legally it would be possible for that stock to be repossessed 
by the lender and placing its status as social housing in jeopardy. Such an incident 
has not yet occurred, but if it were to do so it would be a nightmare scenario for the 
regulator, risking serious consequences for tenants, the public grants invested in the 
stock, and the sector’s credit ratings as a whole. While these consequences would be 
likely to be serious enough to prompt government intervention to prevent any losses 
of social housing stock, this in itself would likely to increase the sector’s perceived risk 
for lenders due to putting the sector’s reputation for safety into question (Ibid).  
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Although a creditor enforcing their security against an association remains a 
hypothetical scenario, the ability to do so is still an important point of leverage, as the 
ability to take possession of the housing stock used as collateral removes uncertainty 
for lenders that they may not be able to recover any losses if a borrower defaults. 
Attempts by the New Labour government in its first term to bring down housing benefit 
expenditure for example were scuppered after pressure from lenders on the grounds 
it threatened the stability of their income streams (Kemp 2000). A revealing example 
of this was given in the first years of the lending regime under John Major’s 
Conservative government (1991 – 1997). A draft clause in the Bill of what would go on 
to become the Housing Act 1996 attempted to limit lenders’ ability to take control of 
assets by granting the Housing Corporation powers to appoint a manager in the event 
of default and transfer assets without the prior consent of lenders. In response lenders 
enacted a capital strike, with the law firm Allen & Overy circulating a briefing note 
entitled Housing Bill – Secured Lending Under Threat and bond markets used at the 
time suspended while the uncertainty introduced by the Bill was ongoing (Whitehead 
and Williams 2009, 8). The government eventually backed down, highlighting the 
seriousness with which the right to take possession of collateral is taken by lenders. 
As a result, the need to ensure lenders are satisfied has been a major priority for the 
regulator, resulting in a framework where the governance of associations has become 
more dependent on private sector entities in order to ensure that housing associations 
can become component enough to navigate through market forces. The next section 
analyses the extent to which law and regulation play a role in shaping new, 
financialised subjectivities capable of participating in more marketized activities.  
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5.7. Risk and “de-centred” regulation: governing financial subjects 
Risk has become a major concept in the social sciences, with regulatory theorists 
exploring the management and control of risk through means such as audit and 
ongoing examination (Power 1997; O’Malley 2004). A significant influence in this 
respect has been the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, whose book Risk Society 
argued that the individual was being socialised as the basic unit of governance in 
contemporary society. Arguing along similar lines to the governmentality approaches 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, this was not a liberation of the individual from 
institutional control, but rather the individual subject being the outcome of institutional 
processes of ongoing monitoring, education, retraining and consumption systems that 
shape the individual as a rational, private actor (Beck 1992, 130). For Beck, this 
process nonetheless undermines the actual capacity for people to shape the social 
world, as the individual produced in this way rests on social forces that the individual 
has no control over and must align itself toward in order to survive. The diffuse and 
atomised nature of Beck’s world lends itself to a form of “organised irresponsibility”, as 
collective harms are systemically produced, such as climate change, the responsibility 
for which cannot be laid at the door of any one specific actor. The need to navigate 
the risks of this world then becomes paramount for individual subjects, given their 
inability to alter the social contexts they operate within.  
Such an atomised society within this analysis would lead to the downgrading of class 
as a salient category in explaining the social world, arguing that the diffuse yet 
existential nature of contemporary risks such as ecological catastrophe or financial 
crisis erase class distinctions. Critics have countered however that the distribution of 
the effects of social disaster are heavily political, and stratified according to class and 
other divisions that lead such risks to intensify social inequalities rather than 
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supersede them (Curran 2015)10. These insights into risk, responsibility and harm 
have been developed within socio-legal studies by Veitch (2007), who has used the 
concept of organised irresponsibility in particular to examine how legal and regulatory 
frameworks structure and assign responsibilities for social harms. Within Veitch’s 
argument, legal and regulatory frameworks have gained a greater importance in 
assigning risks and harms to specific individuals as society has undergone a process 
of “juridification”, that is, the use of law as a dispute resolution tool as alternate dispute 
resolution mechanisms have broken down (Veitch 2007, 84). As indicated by Knuth 
and Potts (2016), this expanding  role for law is a highly relevant process for the 
analysis of financialisation and the creation of rights to and claims over property. 
These regimes of contract and private property have become  a more prominent 
means of governance within neoliberal society compared to the corporatist 
organisation of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism, with a greater explicit role for state-led 
economic planning as negotiated by governments, corporations, and in a junior albeit 
significant role, industrial trade unions. 
Although this creates formalised divisions of labour for responsibility and liability 
however, the intervention of legal systems can also be used to depoliticise and 
disappear responsibility and accountability. A corporation for example would not be 
liable for specific responsibility for the production of social harms such as climate 
change, despite its ongoing culpability for the production of environmental harms 
through its everyday, legal activities (Veitch 2007, 117). This argument is relevant to 
the analysis of housing association financialisation, as the shift to private finance has 
                                                          
10 Marxist, feminist, postcolonial and many other critical theories have made related arguments, 
though through different frameworks, about the isolated, sovereign individual being an artefact of 
modern, liberal capitalist society, with the production of such an idealised subject resting on the 
constitutive oppression of racialized, gendered, and proletarianized others. 
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necessitated the acceptance of a degree of risk by social landlords in conducting 
operations such as housing development. As argued in chapter four however, these 
individual development form part of a collective production of the systematic risks of 
commercial real estate development through a contradictory process of capitalist 
urbanisation that leaves the property market vulnerable to speculation, uneven 
development, and cycles of volatility (Harvey 2007a; Gotham 2009). As urban land 
has become a lucrative object for profitable speculation, the ability to trade claims to 
property investments and loan payments on financial markets exacerbated volatile 
property booms throughout the 2000s (Gotham 2006), creating systemic risks that 
culminated in the collective social harm of the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis. Liabilities 
for this systemic process can remain focused on the individualised relation between 
creditor and borrower however, as highlighted by the focus on irresponsibility in sub-
prime lending in the dominant political responses to the crash (Sassen 2009). 
Moreover, this individuation of responsibility also conceals a systemic asymmetry of 
power between creditor and borrower, for example the lender’s ability to seek legal 
redress through the repossession of loan collateral in the event of default. 
As governments have moved toward a greater emphasis on market relations and the 
to achieve policy goals, academic analysis of regulation has shifted from an 
understanding of it as a town down, hierarchical model of state instruction, to a more 
de-centred model in which governments seek to internalise norms and procedures 
through self-regulation (Black 2001). In emphasising proceduralisation through 
processes such as audit, best practice, and ongoing self-assessment, private actors 
also gain new importance in embedding and shaping regulatory norms through the 
specialist expertise required by professional business service providers such as 
solicitors, accountants, financial analysts, valuers and others (Scott 2002). The 
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intertwined characteristics of regulation and the private actors necessary to ensure it 
is followed means that regulation operates in the “shadow of the law”, with law and its 
ability to enforce and encode behaviour governing at a distance rather than through 
direct instruction (Rose and Valverde 1998). 
Although the control of risk has become a major object of governance, the policy aim 
of associations taking on the risks of development through the subsidy system 
operated by the regulator has meant that risks cannot be eliminated, but must instead 
be responsibly managed according to ‘rational’ evaluations of risk and reward. If 
associations are to continue to access private finance without a provider failing and 
bringing the entire funding model into question, financialisation has therefore required 
that associations be reshaped into behaving as better capitalists, able to soberly 
calculate the costs and benefits of taking on levels of risk that will acceptably contribute 
toward policy goals. In other words, if financialisation is to function effectively in 
ensuring that capital is able to circulate through the built environment, then rather than 
being an automatic process it must also be capable of functioning as a governmentality 
shaping the social attitudes and norms at work within the sector (Martin 2002).  
5.8. Conclusion 
Building on the analysis of financialisation and neoliberal urbanisation throughout Part 
Two of the thesis, in this chapter I have developed a theoretical framework through 
which the need to govern risk has been analysed as a core component of the 
regulation of housing associations. It should be stressed that the governance of risk 
must not be conflated with a need to minimise risk by the regulator, however. Rather, 
the transference of some measure of risk to housing providers throughout the post-
1980s neoliberal period has become a fundamental component of the sector’s 
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operational practice, with the use of private finance meaning that associations have 
been explicitly expected to take on development risk as a means of building new 
houses. Rather, regulation has sought to reshape housing associations along the lines 
of entrepreneurial, risk-taking enterprises capable of rationally adapting themselves to 
the market, although this has operated within a broader policy framework of 
“centralised decentralisation” in which a remarkable degree of central control has been 
maintained over the sector. 
In addition to government control, the shift toward private finance has also led to 
growing influence of lenders in the regulatory framework. In the governance of this 
framework, law has played a vital role in mediating the relation between providers, the 
regulator and lenders through the need to insulate the latter from uncertainty if they 
are to continue lending. A key legal element of this has been the use of social housing 
stock as collateral by housing associations for loans, giving a lender the legal ability 
to repossess assets in the event of a provider becoming insolvent and defaulting on 
its loans. Importantly, this creates a risk for both the government and tenants, in that 
the public funds invested in social housing may be lost, and with it the homes of social 
housing tenants. Lenders have actively defended this ability against attempted 
infringement by the government, undertaking a capital strike in order to successfully 
pressure the government into removing mooted protections for social housing stock in 
the event of default in what would become the Housing Act 1996. The regulatory 
framework should therefore not be conceptualised as a top-down mechanism of state 
diktat, but a “de-centred” (Black 2001) process in which lenders and private sector 
actors such as financial consultants, solicitors, valuers and auditors have assumed 
increasing important. This theoretical finding is fundamental to my analysis in Part 
Three of my thesis, where a key question is how financialisation in a post-crisis, 
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austerity context is reshaping these relations between lenders, providers, the regulator 
and tenants, with potentially serious consequences for the risks passed downward to 
people living in social housing.  
Finally, the theoretical considerations analysed in this chapter suggest the need to 
complicate approaches within housing studies literature, often drawing on a “hybridity” 
framework, which analyse these changes as a form of tension between commercial 
and social goals (Kickert 2001; Pawson 2006; Czischke 2009; Mullins, Czischke, and 
Bortel 2012; Sacranie 2012; Manzi and Morrison 2017). The social nature of housing 
associations should not be taken as a historically unchanging category, but one that 
has assumed importance as the public accountability of housing associations has 
been downgraded as associations have been encouraged to act as risk-taking 
enterprises throughout the neoliberal period (Cowan and McDermont 2008). This is 
furthermore a process in which the political economy of housing under financialisation 
has been of central importance, with the circulation of capital through housing 
operating not as an a-social process, but one in which capital itself such be seen as a 
social relation (Aalbers and Christophers, 2014). The ‘social’ goals of associations 
should therefore not be viewed of as a residual after taking into account state and 
market directives, but as fundamentally intertwined with the development of providers 
as more entrepreneurial, risk-taking enterprises. The analysis by Cowan and 
McDermont of associations as risk-taking enterprises should nonetheless be seen as 
in need of updating in a post-crisis context in which associations are faced with much 
greater uncertainty, as well as heightened risk. As I will now show in Part Three of this 
thesis, this is an issue of growing importance within the sector, as providers have been 
further drawn in to processes of financialisation within the context of neoliberal 
urbanism. 
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Part Three 
 
Accumulation and dispossession in the 
financialisation of housing associations  
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Chapter six – Constructing a “financial terrain”: the 
regulatory governance of associations from the Housing 
Act 1988 to the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis 
 
6.0 Introduction 
As argued throughout Part Two of this thesis, welfare states have undergone major 
changes over the past 40 years as part of a wider process of neoliberalisation. The 
rolling back of welfare services from the 1980s has been accompanied by a rolling out 
of new institutional forms that incorporate commodified forms of service delivery, such 
as voucher systems, new public management targets, auditing and contractual 
outsourcing to private and not-for-profit providers in addition to direct privatisations (D. 
Whitfield 2001). Private finance has played a fundamental role within these changed 
forms of provision, enabling private capital to be levered in upfront to fund the service 
in exchange for a long-term stream of debt repayments (Bowman et al. 2015). This 
use of private finance to fund services however has the potential to create a “co-
imbrication between the state and finance” (Dowling 2017, 295), where the state relies 
on the financial sector to achieve social policy goals while financial actors use the state 
as a means for profitable accumulation. As such, rather than minimising the role of the 
state, continued access to finance can often require extensive legal and regulatory 
frameworks governing the use and operation of outsourced services in order to ensure 
that their continued operation is able to be compatible with opportunities for profitable 
activity (O’Neill 2013).  
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This chapter explores these dynamics through an empirically-grounded analysis of the 
fundamental components of the lending regime for housing associations established 
by the Housing Act 1988 as explored in Chapter 5. My primary aim in this chapter is 
to analyse the power relations created by this regime, in particular between lenders, 
providers, tenants and the regulator, as it operated from the late 1980s up to the 
financial crisis. This will provide a strong, historically-grounded basis for the analysis 
of housing association financialisation within the post-crisis context explored in 
subsequent data chapters of this thesis. In doing so, a key objective in this chapter is 
to demonstrate how a major priority of the regulator throughout this period has been 
inextricably linked with the need to insulate lenders from uncertainty through regulation 
and a weakening of tenant security. Within this chapter, I argue that a fundamental 
component of this has been through the use of housing association stock as collateral, 
necessitating the construction of a financial “terrain” (Gotham 2009; D. Fields 2015) in 
which collateral assets can be identified and valued within the urban landscape. In 
doing so, the mapping and governance of stock as an asset means that this financial 
terrain intersects with the “regulatory space” for the housing association sector’s 
governance (McDermont 2007), contributing to the literature by demonstrating the 
usefulness of a dialogue between the housing financialisation literature and socio-
legal geography.  
An additional objective is to analyse these dynamics through the sector’s changing 
regulatory governance as associations underwent commercialisation in the years from 
the 1980s to the financial crisis. Building on Chapter 5 of this thesis, I argue that the 
“obscurity” over the sector’s aims and norms identified by Cowan and McDermont 
(2008) can be seen at work, with the right of creditors to take possession of social 
housing stock in duress shaping the need to satisfy lenders into a major regulatory 
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requirement. I argue however that in addition to aims and norms, the competing policy 
trilemma for the government in satisfying lenders, safeguarding social housing stock, 
and expecting associations to take on risk, has led to the government acting as an 
implicit guarantor of the sector’s debts. This can only be an implicit guarantee 
however, due to likely consequences of an explicit guarantee leading to the 
categorisation of housing association debt as public sector debt, moving billions back 
onto the government’s balance sheet. Key elements of the power relation between the 
government and lenders cannot therefore be subject to formal accountability, an issue 
that will take on more significance in the analysis in chapter 9 of the growing risks 
experienced by the sector. 
In exploring the development of this system of private finance, this chapter draws on 
empirical data gathered through the course of this thesis. One major source of this has 
been my documentary analysis of the housing association sector, including regulatory 
reports gathered from the sector’s regulatory bodies. As discussed in previous 
chapters, regulatory functions for the sector was initially governed by the Housing 
Corporation (HC) from 1974 – 2008, then temporarily overseen by the short-lived 
Tenant Services Authority (TSA) before its 2012 abolition and replacement by a 
“regulation committee” within the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA). This 
chapter also selects from the elite interviews with key social housing stakeholders 
during fieldwork in the spring and summer of 2015. Participants quoted here include 
two financial consultants to the sector, both of whom have in the past worked for the 
lenders’ association the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) in a professional 
capacity, a solicitor advising the sector, a policymaker involved in setting regulation, 
and a policy officer for an organisation related to the sector.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The first section explores the 
key factors in the liberalisation of the regulatory regime under the commercialisation 
of the sector from the late 1980s to the financial crisis. I argue that this model has 
rested on the need to transfer risk to associations while removing uncertainty for 
lenders, while also encouraging providers to act as more competent and 
entrepreneurial risk-takers. In the second section I then analyse key features of the 
model, in particular the use of assets as lending collateral by housing associations, 
and how this has generated new sources of obscurity and blurred accountability in the 
sector’s governance, while boosting the power of lenders. The third section examines 
the power relations created between lenders, providers and tenants, in particular 
focusing on the “financial terrain” constructed by the collateral system and its key 
means of valuation, including the consequences and points of potential intervention 
for tenants in the event of crisis. 
6.1. Commercialisation and regulatory liberalisation: from the Housing Act 1988  
to the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis 
In this section I examine the rise of a more commercialised housing association sector, 
bringing together an analysis of the legal and regulatory frameworks applicable to 
housing associations with a focus on their regulation and governance. In doing so, I 
focus on the foundations of this model as it developed from the Housing Act 1988 to 
the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009. As shown in chapter 5, this time period was 
characterised by a steady de-municipalisation of council housing as the dominant form 
of social housing tenure, with stock transfer in particular swelling the growth in the 
housing association sector (Pawson and Mullins 2010). As grant levels for social 
housing also fell from the early 1990s, the mechanisms used to provide new social 
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and affordable housing steadily came to be more reliant upon the market in the period 
up to the financial crisis. The planning system for example played a major role in 
delivering new social and affordable housing for example, with associations able to 
purchase stock at below-market cost from developers through mandated “section 106” 
planning gain agreements negotiated under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 
between developers and local authorities as part of securing planning permission. The 
latter has been a major source of new supply that has contributed just under a half of 
new provision in the past two decades, albeit concentrated in areas of rising land 
values such as the South East of England (Brownill et al. 2015). This acted as a major 
conduit for new social housing, though the reliance on commercial developers meant 
that new homes built would reflect existing concentrations of economic activity in a UK 
characterised by deepening regional inequality.  
The shift toward a more commercial social housing sector was also reflected in 
changes within the development programmes of associations, particularly among 
larger associations based in areas of rising land values such as London and the South 
East of England (Heywood 2016). A major component of this was the rise of low cost 
home ownership products such as shared ownership and shared equity, in which 
providers and tenants will jointly own a house, with the occupant paying rent on the 
association’s share but having the opportunity to purchase the whole house 
themselves over time through a process known as “staircasing” (Cowan, Carr, and 
Wallace 2015). An additional new feature throughout the 2000s in particular was the 
growth in development for “keyworker” housing, aimed at alleviating a growing 
problem of housing unaffordability for public sector workers, indicating the extent to 
which social housing policy was shifting toward directly alleviating the needs of would-
be homeowners (Raco 2008). This reflects the issue identified by Cowan and 
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McDermont (2008) in the previous chapter of a growing economic rationality within 
social housing policy, with a shift in emphasis toward countering affordability being 
cast as a problem of increased market supply, rather than the provision of new 
subsidised rental housing for the vulnerable. It should therefore be stressed that a shift 
toward marketisation was already well under way prior to the financial crisis and post-
2010 austerity policies, evident throughout the decades since the 1980s. This was 
reflected in a steady liberalisation of the regulatory regime governing associations, as 
shown in the timeline in Figure 6.1 below. 
Figure 6.1. Key regulatory and policy events affecting housing associations, 
1988 - 2012  
Year Event Impact 
 
1988 Housing Act 1988 Establishment of mixed public-private finance 
model. 
 
1988 “Large Scale Voluntary 
Transfer” (LSVT) of housing 
stock begins 
 
Widespread transfers of stock from local 
authorities to housing associations. 
1990 Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990 
 
Current framework set for planning gain 
obligations as a source of social housing 
supply. 
 
1997 
 
New Labour government 
elected 
 
Expansion of stock transfer and public-private 
partnerships as formal government policy. 
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1999 
 
Derivatives liberalisation Housing associations permitted general 
consent to use free-standing derivatives to 
manage interest-rate risk. 
 
2000 
 
Decent Homes programme Major funding programme for social housing 
repair announced. Extra funds for council 
housing conditional on acceptance of LSVT, 
PFI, or ALMO transfer. 
 
2001 
 
Rent convergence 
implemented 
Rent increases limited by formula, although 
set above inflation. 
 
2004 Housing Act 2004 For-profit entities legally able to become 
registered social housing providers.  
 
2004 
 
Commercial diversification 
undergoes greater regulatory 
liberalisation 
 
Registered Social Landlords no longer must 
inform the regulator or conduct diversity 
review if commercial income exceeds 5% of 
income. At least 51% of income is still 
expected to come from core social housing 
activity. 
 
2007 
 
Cave Review Recommends abolition of HC and division of 
subsidy functions into HCA and regulatory 
functions into  TSA. 
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2008 Housing Corporation abolished 
 
Functions split between newly established 
Homes and Communities Agency (funding) 
and Tenant Services Authority (regulation). 
 
2007 - 2009 Financial crisis Developments come under pressure. 
 
2010 Coalition government elected Imposition of austerity policies; abolition of 
TSA announced. 
 
2012 TSA abolished New regulatory framework announced, 
regulatory functions incorporated within HCA 
under a “regulation committee”.   
 
The diversification of associations into more market-oriented developments such as 
shared ownership were reflected by changes in the technologies of regulation used to 
govern a more commercial sector, moving from a prescriptive system laying out 
detailed guidance for associations toward a “risk based” system based on ongoing 
audit and self-reporting  (Housing Corporation 2007b). These reforms enabled greater 
engagement in commercial activity, with housing associations from 2004 for example 
no longer having an obligation to notify the regulator if diversified activity exceeded 
5% of turnover. At least 51% of housing association activities nonetheless still had to 
focus on the delivery of core social housing functions (Housing Corporation 2004). 
Profit-making entities have also been legally able to become registered providers since 
the Housing Act 2004, although the actual take-up of this by private businesses has 
as of yet been minimal. Marketisation throughout this period therefore occurred 
through multiple strands: the acceptance of greater risk by providers in the shift to 
private finance, as shown in Chapter 5, a greater dependence on developers for 
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affordable housing contributions, and a growing diversification of associations into 
more commercialised products such as shared ownership.  
My research indicates that this should not be conceptualised as a straightforward 
retreat of the state in favour of the market. Rather, a number of significant regulatory 
measures were put in place in order to ensure that the risks taken on by associations 
in this more marketized framework were managed effectively. One form this took was 
straightforward restrictions imposed by the regulator on the types of collateral that 
could be used for commercial development, with providers first having to look to use 
non-housing stock as loan security, then existing surpluses, and only then social 
housing stock in “exceptional” circumstances (Devonshires 2004). Other measures 
show a deeper shift within the form of regulation, away from prescription and toward 
an attempt to resubjectivise associations by rescaling responsibility onto them to show 
they could be competent market actors, for example through a new requirement to 
satisfy the regulator that they had a “robust” business plan for commercial 
diversification, rather than simply reporting their ongoing activity (Housing Corporation 
2004). Throughout this period the auditing requirements of the sector also moved to a 
more commercial footing, adopting accounting standards comparable to that of the 
private sector and “resource accounting” techniques that encouraged them to think of 
their stock as potentially commercialisable assets (Cowan and McDermont 2006). 
The growing private management of risks such as exposure to interest rates is also, I 
argue, evidence of associations being expected to be made responsible for managing 
their risks through private tools such as the purchase of derivatives. Following the 
Housing Act 1988, associations started to make use of derivatives, financial 
instruments whose value depends on the movement of a third, underlying asset (Bryan 
and Rafferty 2007). In an interest rate swap for example, two counterparties will make 
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an agreement to exchange respective interest rate payments on the same underlying 
loan, often involving one party paying a fixed rate and the other a variable rate. Once 
the swap contract is agreed to, the party that now pays a fixed rate instead of a 
carriable rate will benefit if interest rates rise, while the counterparty paying a variable 
rate instead of a fixed rate will benefit if they rise.   
The use of financial instruments in treasury management underwent a degree of 
liberalisation in 1999, when associations were generally permitted to make use of “free 
standing” derivatives to manage their interest rates (Housing Corporation 2002). The 
logic of this was that associations would have the greater freedom to ‘swap’ the 
variable rate interest payments on their loans for fixed rate payments with a 
counterparty, enabling them to build greater certainty into their long term business 
plans by knowing what their debt payments would be in advance. Unlike embedded 
derivatives which form part of a broader loan agreement, freestanding derivatives can 
be entered into directly with a financial counterparty, introducing associations to wider 
chains of financial intermediaries. Housing associations were still expected to use 
derivatives only for risk management purposes, rather than the hope of speculative 
gain. Their discretion was nonetheless widened in 2007 when approved providers 
were permitted their use to hedge non-interest rate exposures, such as inflation rates, 
while selected associations were also permitted to borrow in foreign currencies such 
as euros, yen, or the dollar (Housing Corporation 2007c). Greater regulatory 
liberalisation has therefore seen an expansion of the capacity for associations to 
access new markets while also taking on new risks, creating an issue for the regulator 
in how to effectively govern this process. 
 A key tool for the regulator in governing this system has been the use of the “consents 
regime” in governing permission for how registered providers can dispose of their 
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property, which can range from sales of stock to using their assets as collateral for a 
loan (Homes and Communities Agency 2015d). Regulatory control of specific assets 
over time has become loosened, with the introduction of “Category 6” general 
consents given for certain types of commercial transaction, though this permission 
could be rescinded by the regulator (Housing Corporation 2008). As commercial 
developments have become more common, often conducted under subsidiaries in 
complex group structures, the regulator has also attempted to minimise the risk that 
non-regulated subsidiaries could pose toward core social housing stock (Manzi and 
Morrison 2017).  
While the regulator has attempted to limit risks to social housing stock, it should be 
stressed that these risks cannot be eliminated altogether. As analysed in chapter 5, 
this is because the private finance model used by the sector depends on the transfer 
of exposure to the risks of development from the state and on to providers and tenants. 
As argued in the following quote from a solicitor advising the sector in the context of 
associations with larger development arms receiving credit downgrades, this therefore 
creates a policy dilemma for the sector in that provider must take on levels of systemic 
risk if the social housing system is to function: 
For obvious reasons, the HCA is saying you need to manage your risk very, 
very carefully. But on the other hand, there is an expectation that these 
organisations are going to innovate. And I think there is possibly a bit of a 
danger that the risk becomes too, almost that associations start to say, “Well 
we're not going to take any risk whatsoever”. Which then doesn't, that doesn't 
help the other side of the balance, which is innovation. 
 Solicitor, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
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The regulator’s role in governing this system should therefore be seen as not simply 
preventing risk to social housing assets, but rather as an attempt to shape providers 
as competent market actors, enabling them to take on risks while attempting to 
minimise the risk faced by social housing stock. The ongoing role of legal as well as 
regulatory frameworks is even more apparent in the next section, in which I examine 
the bank-led private finance regime that emerged through this era more closely. 
6.2. State-backed finance: regulation and the stability of the bank-led finance 
model 
As shown in chapter five, this period from the 1980s up to the financial crisis saw the 
growing use of private finance by associations as they were encouraged to take on 
debt through cuts to the grant regime. During the initial lending period from the early 
1990s up to the 2007 – 2009 financial crash, lending to the sector was concentrated 
among a small number of high street banks. As will be shown in Chapter 7, this bank-
dominated lending regime was to change in the post-crisis period with the shift to the 
bond markets in the tighter credit conditions following 2008. Housing associations are 
long-term borrowers, often seeking loans of up to 30 years in length in a reflection of 
the equally long-term nature of social rented housing management. Banks were willing 
to lend to associations on relatively affordable terms throughout this period, reassured 
by the relative stability offered by the regulator (Heywood 2016). Loans were typically 
set at a rate benchmarked to an index such as the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), a standard measure based on the rate on which London-based banks state 
they are willing to lend to one another (Wainwright and Manville 2017)11. As shown in 
                                                          
11 While a standard measure, the LIBOR rate was hit by scandal in the aftermath of the financial crisis when 
some City traders were alleged to have manipulated the index by falsifying the rates at which they would be 
prepared to lend to one another (Ashton and Wainwright, 2015).   
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Figure 6.2 below, the majority of the sector’s debt up the crash was accounted for by 
£49.8bn held by just five high street banks and building societies, though this was 
substantially higher than the £37bn in drawn finance reported by the regulator (Tenant 
Services Authority 2011). 
Figure 6.2. Largest five lenders to the housing association sector in December 
2008 
Bank 
 
Loan facilities 
Lloyds Group (including HBoS) £13.6 billion 
Barclays £10.7 billion 
Nationwide £9.3 billion 
Santander (Abbey) £8.2 billion 
Royal Bank of Scotland £8.0 billion 
Total 
 
£49.8 billion 
Source: Tenant Services Authority (2009b) pp 2, cited from Social Housing 
Magazine, March 2009. 
Throughout the pre-crash lending era, banks made additional money by selling 
derivatives to associations to manage their treasury functions. A derivative is a 
financial security whose value is based on an underlying asset, which could be take 
the form of another security, an index, a commodity or any range of items (Bryan and 
Rafferty 2007). The most common of these used within the sector took the form of 
“interest rate swaps”, by which an association could exchange its variable interest rate 
payments for a fixed rate payment with a bank or other counterparty. Paying a fixed 
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instead of a variable rate on debt can be preferable to associations as this enables 
them to build in certainty to their business plans, although the reverse of this is they 
miss out on lower payments if interest rates fall over a sustained period, with fixed rate 
debt accounted for 69% of the sector’s borrowing (Homes and Communities Agency 
2016a). As such, even though this financial model was still dominated by relatively 
familiar bank lending, the finances of the sector was growing in complexity as 
providers sought private tools such as derivatives in an attempt to manage their 
exposures to financial risk.  
A major factor in inducing banks to make long-term loans on relatively affordable rates 
for associations throughout this period was the stability offered by the regulatory and 
funding system for associations. Housing benefit payments made directly to landlords 
rather than tenants played a major role in de-risking the rental streams of providers, 
with the security of cash flows this offered acting as a substantial assurance to lenders 
that providers were unlikely to go into default (Heywood 2016). The stability offered by 
the regulatory system has also acted as an encouragement for lenders, with reporting 
and monitoring requirements and powers by the regulator to intervene in the 
management of a struggling association further insulating creditors from a potential 
default (Arasaratnam, Massimo, and Benisek 2013). The state has therefore played a 
major role in structuring the attractiveness of associations for lenders, who although 
may have only offered low returns were also a reliable producer of income streams for 
the financial sector. 
In addition to these overt regulatory protections, data gathered during my fieldwork 
revealed that the state also played a less formal, implicit role in de-risking the sector 
for lenders. During my interview with a consultant to the sector and a previous 
employee of the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML), a representative body for 
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housing finance institutions, it became clear that an additional factor lowering the cost 
of borrowing was the perception by lenders that the government would intervene in 
order to protect lenders if an association become insolvent: 
The other thing of course is they are seen as pretty safe, partly because they're 
seen as there being some kind of implicit government guarantee, that if a large 
housing association went belly up, it would be sorted out without loss to 
investors. And although of course government would deny that, because 
otherwise of course you're effectively saying these are on the government 
balance sheet. 
 Housing consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
A provider entering a default would likely have serious consequences for both tenants, 
the invested public grant that could be lost through a bankruptcy, and for the credit 
ratings of the sector as a whole, the costs of which make it highly likely that the 
government would stage an intervention. As shown by this quote however, this can 
only be an implicit, not an explicit, guarantee. When the mixed public-private funding 
model for the sector was established with the Housing Act 1988, a major consideration 
for the Treasury was for housing association debts not to appear on the government’s 
balance sheet, even as social landlords continued to be heavily subsidised by the 
government (Malpass 2000). Avoiding the potential for an increase in recorded 
government debt has therefore been a consistent policy priority, with Chapter 8 
discussing ‘deregulatory’ reforms implemented through the Housing and Planning Act 
2016 in order to ensure that the liabilities of associations can be classed as being part 
of the private sector. A key element of government protection for the sector has 
therefore remained within the scope of policy discretion, rather than being made 
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accountable as an explicit guarantee through the legal and regulatory frameworks 
governing a potential insolvency.  
Recent changes to these insolvency powers will be more fully considered in Chapter 
9 of this thesis. What is important for the analysis in this chapter is how this has shaped 
the power relations within the sector between lenders, the regulator, and providers. As 
shown in Chapter 5 through the critique by Froud (2003) of the distinction between risk 
and uncertainty, a major concern for private sector actors in areas such as outsourcing 
contracts is the ability to use legal and regulatory frameworks in order to provide some 
certainty over what actions they can take in order to minimise their costs. This dynamic 
can also be seen in the use of private finance by housing associations, with a key 
element being the minimisation of uncertainty for lenders through the legal protection 
of their right to take possession of loan collateral in the event of a default. Legally, in 
such an event, a social housing tenant would still retain their tenancy agreement, 
which in the case of the standard Assured Tenancies used throughout the housing 
association sector would still offer formal long-term security. However, one of my 
interview respondents made it clear that if social housing stock were to be 
repossessed, this would have serious consequences for the tenant’s protection of rent 
increases, leading to potentially serious consequences: 
The biggest risk to a consumer is if a lender repossesses. Because if a lender 
repossesses, at that point it ceases to be social housing. So all of the 
protections of being in a regulated sector disappear at a stroke. While they'll 
have the protection of their tenancy, in most cases that does not confer 
protection as to the rent level. So on the next anniversary of the rent increase, 
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in principle a mortgagee in possession could put that up to commercial market 
level. And if the tenant can't pay, the tenant can't pay. 
 Senior housing policymaker, PhD fieldwork data, Summer 2015. 
The impact of this may be lessened if a provider was operating within an area in which 
social rents were near or at market rate, or if housing benefit payments would cover 
the extra costs. Social housing stock that has previously been under public ownership, 
for example those that have undergone a stock transfer, until very recently used to 
hold an additional statutory protection in the form of section 133 of the Housing Act 
1988, which until its repeal in the Housing and Planning Act 2016 required formal 
approval from the relevant Secretary of State before it could be sold from the sector. 
An unmanaged default would still nonetheless represent a nightmare scenario for the 
regulator and tenants, particularly in areas of high land values such as central urban 
areas which could see the expulsion of tenants or soaring welfare bills paid to 
landlords. The protection of rents through regulation, rather than statutory rent 
control12,  can therefore be seen as a major factor enabling the shift to private finance, 
protecting lenders from the uncertainty of not being able to recover their losses, while 
exposing tenants and the public sector to the risks of losing social housing stock from 
the sector.  
It should be stressed that the need to prevent this situation has led to constraints on 
how the sector can be regulated, with lenders as shown in Chapter 5 being willing to 
take active measures up to and including a capital strike to defend against 
infringements on their ability to take possession. The housing policymaker quote 
                                                          
12 Except in cases such as any remaining pre-1988 tenancies that would still be covered under the 
Fair Rent system. 
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above can be seen to highlight one major aspect of the constitutive “obscurity” 
analysed by Cowan and McDermont (2008) by which the aims and norms of housing 
associations have been reshaped throughout the neoliberal era. Here, lenders can be 
seen to be constructed as a major interest group within the sector, with failure to satisfy 
lenders risking the loss of social housing stock altogether and placing tenants at grave 
risk.  
In addition to the obscurity of aims and norms explored by Cowan and McDermont, 
the necessarily implicit nature of the government’s guarantee of protection for a 
provider against insolvency shows the need to develop this analysis to incorporate an 
obscurity over the nature of the state’s guarantee of the sector’s stability. The use of 
private finance by associations has been able to develop to the extent it has in part 
because of this guarantee, with the implied stability enabling associations to borrow at 
lower rates than they would be able to otherwise. The government is unable to make 
this an explicit guarantee however, as directly infringing on the right of lenders to take 
possession could lead to a drying up of credit, while explicitly assuming responsibility 
for the solvency of providers would likely see their debts being reclassed as part of the 
government’s balance sheet. This would further undermine the official status of 
associations as independent, risk-taking organisations, undermining the official 
justification for private finance.  
As a result, this creates obscurity not just in the aims and norms of the sector, but also 
in the power relations that govern the sector’s regulatory framework. Lenders are key 
power brokers in that their money is needed in order for the system to work, but by the 
same token this private power cannot be made formally explicit and therefore 
potentially accountable within the regulatory framework itself. As a result, I argue that 
this means that power relations between lenders, tenants and providers have been 
198 
 
necessarily obscured, with public accountability therefore subordinated to private 
interests in order for the private finance model to be maintained. The underpinning 
role of private money for the sector has been recognised by Cowan and McDermont 
(2006), who have highlighted the regulator’s need to keep lenders satisfied in order 
for the flow of credit to continue that enables the social housing sector to function. This 
finding as to the blurred lines of responsibility between lenders and the state extends 
this insight, showing that the ability of lenders to take possession of collateral has also 
played a major role in obscuring the accountability of the financial sector due to the 
need to insulate lenders from uncertainty, as well as risk, an issue that is becoming 
more pertinent since the onset of the financial crisis. 
In the relatively benign years of stable subsidy, albeit lower in comparison to the pre-
1988 system of grants and government loans that largely covered development costs, 
low inflation and loosening credit from the late 1990s up to the eve of the financial 
crisis, what would occur in the eventuality of an unmanaged provider default may have 
been a somewhat moot question. The lending system following the Housing Act 1988 
initially developed with relatively few financial upsets on the part of housing 
associations, though not without incident. Deficits incurred by West Hampstead 
Housing Association due to over-extended temporary housing accommodation in 
2002 required a rescue via the Guinness Trust taking on the distressed assets (Inside 
Housing 2002). This implicit guarantee was nonetheless effective through the years 
up to the financial crisis, insulating lenders from uncertainty in an era when the sector 
was effectively considered of minimal risk. Growing commercialisation, rising debt and 
the increased need to satisfy the interests of lenders within the social housing sector 
all combine to raises the issue of the extent to which housing associations were 
undergoing financialisation in the run up to the financial crisis. The next section 
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examines this through analysing further the question of risk within the sector, focusing 
in particular on how collateral has been used to make financial interests legible in the 
urban landscape, and how this has changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
6.3. The creation of a “financial terrain” through the use of social housing as 
collateral 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, one key definition of financialisation used 
within the housing literature has been the tendency for land to become treated as a 
pure financial asset (Harvey 2007a). As argued by Massey and Catalano (1978), the 
simple presence of lending to a development company such as an association does 
not necessarily indicate a specific relationship between the financial sector and land. 
Commercialisation in housing associations could indicate this, if providers were to 
increasingly treat their land and housing as assets from which monetary value should 
be extracted. Conversely, the use of private finance in social housing could equally be 
argued to represent a financialisation of the welfare state, with a “co-imbrication” 
between lenders and the government (Dowling 2017) arising to the extent that the 
latter relies on finance to meet public policy goals, while the former gains the 
opportunity to accumulate profits through long streams of interest payments. The 
weight placed by lenders on the safety of housing association debt indicates the 
importance of welfare state financialisation to this process, with creditors attracted 
more by their stability than the promise of returns arising from land values. Such a 
view may see the role of land as incidental to financialisation, important only to the 
extent that they act as a form of monetizable social infrastructure guaranteed by their 
insulation from risk by the state.  
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As housing associations have taken on debt however, the sector and lenders have 
had to find technologies of valuation for their social housing stock that can enable it to 
be used as collateral for loans, in a way that is mutually intelligible between providers 
and the financial sector. In doing so, as seen in chapter 4, law acts to produce a “grid” 
through which a “territory” of property assets can be defined, mapped and identified in 
the urban landscape, creating rights of access for some actors while excluding others 
(Blomley 2003a). The identifiability of property assets as a means of territorialising the 
sector’s regulatory governance has previously been identified by McDermont (2007), 
who has highlighted the key role played by the regulatory consents regime governing 
the disposal of social housing stock. A key argument of this section is that this analysis 
should also be extended to the role played by the valuation processes used by lenders 
within social housing finance. The need to create valuations for social housing is 
necessary if financial actors are to be able to transcend the fixity of real estate, 
enabling liquidity to be extracted from housing stock through rendering it calculable 
and in-principle exchangeable (Gotham 2009; D. Fields 2015). Achieving this for social 
housing is no straightforward task however, due to the complexity if the regulatory 
framework and the strength of tenancy occupants have over their homes. As seen 
below, the creation of a private finance model for housing associations should be 
viewed of not simply as a matter of deregulation in the sense of minimising the estate, 
but of “regulated deregulation” in which the state plays an active and ongoing role in 
setting and regulating the contours of markets that enables ongoing accumulation (M. 
Aalbers 2017).  
In creating valuations for social housing finance, the housing association sector and 
its surrounding web of professional business service providers rest on two primary 
techniques, Existing Use Value – Social Housing (EUV-SH); and Market Value – 
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Tenanted  (MV - T), both calculated on the assumption that a property could be sold, 
for example if stock were to be taken into possession by a lender (Petty 2016). The 
former EUV-SH technique rests on the assumption that housing assets would continue 
to be social housing in perpetuity, based on a discounted cash flow technique 
effectively calculated through the value of the rental stream over a long-term period13 
minus the cost of operations (Jones 2007, 4). While not the only legal form of valuation 
that could be applied, this is the standard method as set according to guidance from 
the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), showing the importance of 
regulation by private as well as public actors in providing standardised measurement 
techniques that enable social housing sector to function (Scott 2002).  
While in some areas of low land values this could be little different to market rate, in 
expensive areas such as inner London this could be as low as 20% the value of a 
vacant property (Petty 2016, 1). As such, this highlights the importance of the role of 
the uneven development of space for the borrowing capacity of housing associations, 
with providers located in central urban and other ‘high value’ areas being able to use 
their stock to access far higher levels of credit than social landlords based in areas 
such as deindustrialised towns where values are much lower.  
A major impetus for the creation of EUV-SH was to enable stock transfers to occur via 
access to private finance, with section 133 of the Housing Act 1988 acting as an 
effective statutory barrier to repossessed stock from being sold from the registered 
social housing sector without the consent of the relevant secretary of state (Ibid.). As 
previously highlighted in this chapter, the repeal of s133 through the Housing and 
Planning Act 2016 could potentially increase the borrowing capacity of stock transfer 
                                                          
13 Fieldwork interviews with social housing policy officers indicate this is done over a 30-year period. 
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associations, placing them on a level footing with traditional housing associations 
through enabling them to value their stock according to the second technique, MV-T, 
which measures the value of stock as being able to generate rents at market rate, 
subject to the expectation that the occupant would keep the strength of their social 
housing tenancy and thus restricting it from being sold for its maximum value as an 
unencumbered vacant property (Ibid., 2). As one interviewee in my fieldwork 
suggested when commenting on s133 reform while the Housing and Planning Act was 
in the process of being drafted however, the difficulty of extracting liquidity from social 
housing assets meant that the impacts of this in terms of borrowing capacity could be 
limited: 
There’s some degree of excitement among stock transfer associations that 
suddenly their properties are going to be worth a lot more and they’re going 
to go out and borrow a lot more. I think they forget that what actually supports 
borrowing is cash flow. Just because the valuation techniques have changed 
and made their properties worth that much more, it’s not going to – they can’t 
necessarily support a lot more debt. 
Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016 
This limited ability to extract value is partly reflective of the uneven economic 
geography providers operate within, with stock in many ‘low value’ areas incapable of 
generating high absolute levels of rent, a situation reflective of the low incomes of 
renters in many areas of the country (Reynolds 2011). However, this also reflects the 
limited ability of social housing stock to extract value in comparison with that in the 
private market, being subject to rent control, extensive regulatory frameworks, and 
close integration with welfare services such as the rehousing of homeless people. The 
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uses of social housing qua social housing therefore still acts as a barrier to the 
extraction of exchange value.  
An interview with one policy officer nonetheless highlighted one way in which the 
creation of a financial territory, through making space amenable to governance by 
financial actors via the regime for identifying and valuing collateral, could be used to 
shape behaviour in the sector. Many associations with large development 
programmes may face restrictions on their borrowing capacity, due to already reaching 
the limits by which they are able to secure loans on their stock. Conversely, many 
stock transfer associations may have weak cash flow but unencumbered assets, 
providing incentives for merger: 
If you were an association that has got development ambitions and you’re 
producing enough surpluses to service your debt, but you haven’t got enough 
assets to draw down new loans, and your neighbourhood association perhaps 
doesn’t have lots and lots of cash but lots of unencumbered assets, well, isn’t 
that a match made in heaven? 
 Policy officer A. PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
As such, the use of private finance by associations shapes how they use their land 
assets as resources, shaping their behaviour and the composition of the sector as a 
whole through providing incentives for merger14. Although this is still mediated by 
relatively traditional forms of bank lending to (social) landlords, it nonetheless still 
represents one form in which lender interests are territorialised in the urban landscape. 
                                                          
14 There is no suggestion here that these incentives for merger happen in a linear fashion, with Wainwright and 
Manville (2017) highlighting how concerns about the potential negative impact on credit ratings can also 
discincentivise mergers. 
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While the prospect of a lender insolvency may have been relatively hypothetical in the 
years of stable subsidy and economic growth prior to the financial crisis, more recent 
years have seen growing cases of instability as housing associations have entered 
difficulties in expanding their development arms, the implications of which will be 
analysed fully in Chapter 9. Returning to the question of obscured accountability and 
the state guarantee raised earlier in this chapter, there is also the issue of how lenders 
themselves would judge the costs and benefits of repossession of the assets of a 
provider in default. Repossession of social housing stock would not be risk free, acting 
as an unprecedented measure for lenders. There is no guarantee that taking 
possession of the assets of an insolvent housing association would recoup the money 
lent to it, though unencumbered land assets may result in higher returns in high-value 
areas such as London. Such an act could also entail serious reputational risk due to 
the potential adverse consequences for affected tenants. Rather than lenders being 
unaffected, they too would therefore experience risks in the event of repossession. A 
property market consultant I interviewed offered  the following hypothetical depiction 
of the dilemmas of such a process : 
Do I want you and 10,000 unhappy tenants damaging my brand name? I'm 
Barclays bank, does Barclays bank want to be saddled with your crap housing 
association? No it doesn't. So the last thing I want to do is take possession of 
your association. 
 Property market consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Spring, 2015. 
Interestingly, this suggests that the risk of reputational damage for lenders could be 
one potential source of leverage for tenant campaigns in the event of the collapse of 
their landlord, though with extremely high stakes for people’s homes. This could 
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therefore provide one opening, in such a desperate situation, to enter financial terrain 
(D. Fields 2015) via contesting the use of social housing stock as an asset that could 
simply be repossessed at will. Nonetheless, lenders have actively defended  this right 
to call in the collateral since the financial crisis, with the greater volatility of housing 
markets raising a greater possibility of a housing association entering financial 
distress: 
I mean it's a bit of bluff on both sides, but basically the associations realised 
that the lenders will have no choice ultimately. They won't like it, they don't 
want it, they don't wish to go there, but actually if they don't you're in this 
position where it's like any loan. If you don't enforce your security you 
undermine the whole basis of lending. 
 Property market consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
This makes it clear that lenders will not hesitate to repossess stock if the 
consequences of doing otherwise would be a loss of faith by providers in their ability 
to enforce their rights. Lenders therefore have substantial soft power within a social 
housing system whose existence depends on the smooth circulation of private finance 
(McDermont 2007). Although the ability to use social housing stock throughout this 
period as direct collateral for commercial developments was limited, creditors have 
nonetheless been keen to prevent any infringement of their ability to take possession 
of social housing stock in duress, due to the vital role this power brings them as a 
hedge not just against risk but, even more crucially, against uncertainty.  
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the fundamentals of the bank-led private finance model 
established by the Housing Act 1988. In doing so I have focused primarily on the period 
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from the late 1980s up to the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, though also taking into 
account more recent measures in the Housing and Planning Act 2016 that have 
repealed restrictions in s133 of the 1988 Act that prevented stock previously belonging 
to the public sector from being on-sold out of the social housing sector. Throughout 
this period the regulatory system underwent a progressive liberalisation, loosening 
borrowing restrictions and from 2004 in particular enabling far greater degrees of 
commercial diversification in the sector than would previously had been permitted. 
This greater permissiveness nonetheless was associated with measures by the 
regulator to retain governance at a distance (Cowan and McDermont 2006), with 
audits and monitoring obligations requiring more commercialised associations to 
demonstrate their competence as risk-taking, entrepreneurial enterprises. 
Associations also used this period to purchase derivatives and take on more debt, 
although lending until the financial crisis was dominated by a small number of high 
street banks. Private finance was key to underpinning this model, though derivatives 
and a limited number of bond issues aside this primarily took the form of bank loans, 
mediated by traditional property development by social landlords.  
Greater levels of commercialisation in the sector should not be considered as 
deregulation, in the sense of the minimisation of the role of the state in favour of the 
market. Rather, this was a process of neoliberal “regulated deregulation” (Aalbers 
2017) in which providers were empowered by the state to take advantage of 
commercial opportunities in a market whose contours and practices were deeply 
shaped by the state. In doing so, the need to satisfy lenders became a major regulatory 
priority in order to maintain the flow of credit to the sector, while the norms and aims 
of associations began to be obscured by the extension of ‘economic’ rationalities as 
associations began to take on more exposure to commercial risk (Cowan and 
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McDermont 2008). Although providers were expected to take on risks as part of the 
private finance model, the regulator attempted to limit the exposure of social housing 
stock to commercial risks, for example by restricting the ability of providers through 
the consents regime to use social assets as collateral for non-social housing 
development unless all other options were exhausted. While this reflected a desire to 
minimise risk to social housing stock, it should also be stressed that the rise of a more 
market-oriented, commercialised system dependent on the use of private finance has 
also systematically expected associations to take on risks as part of the cost of 
development. The role of the regulator has therefore not just been to minimise risks to 
social housing stock, but also to attempt to mould associations into organisations 
capable of managing these risks more effectively.  
The evidence uncovered within this chapter nonetheless suggest the need to advance 
the theorisation by Cowan and McDermont (2008) of obscurity over aims and norms 
as part of the growth of a more commercialised and entrepreneurial housing 
association sector. Although risk management has been a central regulatory aim, the 
need to govern the inherent risks of the shift to private has also entailed a constitutive 
“obscurity” in the accountability of power relations within the sector, in particular that 
of lenders. A key finding here has been of the importance of the ability of creditors to 
take possession of social housing stock used as collateral if a provider defaults, with 
lenders placing a high value on their right to exercise this capacity as a key basis of 
lending, even though repossession would still entail downsides such as reputational 
risk. This ability has been prized because it protects lenders from the uncertainty of 
not being able to recoup losses in the event of default (Froud 2003), but I have argued 
that this has also created a constitutive obscurity in both the accountability of lenders 
within social housing, and of the government’s ability to act in a crisis where a provider 
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may become insolvent. Despite this, a major factor in enabling associations to borrow 
has been the implicit perception by lenders that the government would stand behind 
the risks of the sector in the event of default, effectively de-risking housing 
associations for creditors. This guarantee cannot be made explicit however because 
it would risk the re-classification of association debt onto the government balance 
sheet, meaning that a key element of protection for social housing cannot be subject 
to formal public accountability, obscuring the power relations between lenders and the 
regulator.  
Finally, I have considered the question of whether the private finance model analysed 
in this chapter raises specific issues linking the financial sector to interests in the urban 
landscape via borrowing by associations. While it could be argued that lenders through 
this period valued associations for their implicit backing by the state, providing a 
regular payment stream at very little risk, I have nonetheless argued that the creation 
of a financial “territory” through the governance of space has been a key feature of this 
private finance model. Finance in this model up to the crisis was largely though not 
exclusively meditated through this period largely by traditional bank lending, and 
property development by associations themselves. The use of social housing stock to 
secure loans by providers nonetheless created a financial terrain for the identification 
and valuation of this collateral by lenders, intersecting with the “regulatory space” that 
has previously been explored by McDermont (2007), and therefore contributing to a 
legal geographic analysis of the sector. 
Although legal powers of repossession have so far not been actualised by lenders, the 
“shadow of the law” (Rose and Valverde 1998) can be seen in how collateral limits 
have shaped the actions of providers, for example in pursuing mergers to gain 
increased borrowing capacity. Although this financial terrain is an attempt to extract 
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liquidity from the fixity of social housing assets however, rather than a purely abstract 
and “distant” process (Clapp 2014; D. Fields 2017), this is still one grounded in the 
material social housing assets used as homes by tenants. Lenders are potentially wary 
of repossession due to factors such as reputational risk if they pursued evictions 
through hiking rents, potentially creating an opening for tenants in such a desperate 
situation to enter financial terrain and contest these rights over their homes, though 
this would still represent a desperate strategy for tenants (D. Fields 2015). Lenders 
would still be likely to defend their ability to access collateral however, particularly 
given the heightened financial uncertainty in the years since the crisis, which the next 
chapter will now explore.   
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Chapter seven – Housing associations and the turn to the 
capital markets: new opportunities, and new risks 
 
7.0. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which the private lending model 
used by housing associations underwent a transformation in the immediate aftermath 
of the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis in the UK. As credit tightened during the crisis, banks 
scaled back their long-term lending to the housing association sector as their own 
costs of funding rose, leaving associations in need of alternate finance. The exit of the 
banks was compensated for by the entry of institutional lenders such as pension funds 
and insurance companies, enabling associations to access finance through issuing 
bonds to financial organisations seeking long-term, relatively secure debt with which 
they could offset their own liabilities. Although this prevented credit from drying up for 
the sector, it nonetheless raises questions as to whether their relationship to finance 
has changed, and if so, the extent to which this can shape an understanding of 
financialisation as a dynamic and evolving process as the relation of associations to 
finance and the capital markets evolves. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the major initial impact of the financial crisis was to 
see banks scale back their lending, leading housing associations to shift toward the 
bond markets to access new finance. A bond is a type of debt instrument in which the 
issuer, such as a housing association, agrees to pay an interest rate coupon over a 
period of time plus the original principal raised through the bond issue. Once issued, 
bonds can also be sold on and traded independently through secondary markets, 
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enabling the original debt instrument to be profitably traded on or, in Marxist terms, 
circulate as fictitious capital (Fine 2013), although secondary trades appear to have 
so far been limited in terms of housing association bonds15. Unlike equity, bonds as 
debt instruments based on either a fixed rate or linked to an underlying index provide 
a relatively stable rate of return over their existence, providing a relatively less risky 
asset so long as the issuer is able to honour repayments. The relatively stable and 
state-backed debt profile of housing associations, who are typically interested in 
borrowing over the course of 25 years, has been attractive to institutional lenders, 
leading to a significant expansion of the sector’s creditors (Heywood 2016). 
Institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies that pool and 
mediate the savings of others in order to purchase assets have been key actors in this 
process, with some studies exploring the scope for attracting it into social housing 
provision as government subsidies are cut through austerity programmes (Oxley et al. 
2015). For housing associations themselves however, direct institutional investment 
has been limited. While some limited equity finance has taken place within the social 
housing sector, the perceived stability and state-regulated nature of housing 
associations has enabled them to borrow long-term at relatively low rates, reducing 
their need to attract institutional investment (Tang, Oxley, and Mekic 2017). A key 
finding of this chapter is that some investors seeking higher returns in exchange for 
higher risk have nonetheless expressed significant interest in housing associations as 
an asset class, exploring equity models such as sale and leaseback that would give 
them a foothold in the sector. Interest in these models has so far been limited due to 
their reliance on index-linked finance models in which repayments are linked to a 
                                                          
15 PhD fieldwork interview with housing treasury consultant, Spring 2016. 
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measure such as inflation, creating the potential for high long-term costs. Tendencies 
generated with the financialisation of housing associations such as providers reaching 
the limits of their secured borrowing capacity, and the need to attract finance for shared 
ownership developments with higher commercial risks, may lead to greater exploration 
of equity finance in the future if and when interest rates rise.  
To explore these issues, this chapter draws on empirical evidence including financial 
industry and academic research reports, data gleaned from databases within trade 
journals such as Social Housing Magazine, and anonymised fieldwork elite interviews 
with housing association executives and financial stakeholders. Interview respondents 
quoted in this chapter include real estate valuers, a housing association chief 
executive, policy officers, solicitors, financial consultants and an investment fund 
manager. In the first section I examine the immediate impacts of the financial crisis, 
showing how the credit crunch led to banks withdrawing from long term lending, 
causing associations to turn to the capital markets for new finance, in particular bond 
lending. The second section examines how associations have navigated the capital 
markets, with some finding opportunities to refinance their debt on more flexible terms, 
though there are also questions over how effectively providers have been able to 
access the markets. The third section examines how associations have used this 
flexibility, for example through engaging in more complex deals such as derivatives 
trading with other providers, suggesting a direct way in which financial accumulation 
may be spreading through the sector. The fourth section examines the question of 
institutional investment directly, arguing that the financial sector has so far struggled 
to develop profitable models that can be deployed at scale into residential rented real 
estate. While interest has therefore so far been limited, the fifth section nonetheless 
finds that investors seeking higher returns have nonetheless been developing 
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experimental investment models that could be deployed at scale in the future, though 
these are likely to be on less favourable terms to associations than the debt they can 
currently access through the bond markets.  
7.1. The financial crisis and the turn to the bond markets 
As shown in Chapter 6, lending to housing associations was initially concentrated 
among a small number of high street banks, from the advent of formalised lending with 
the Housing Act 1988 up to the eve of the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis. The crash 
represented a severe disruption to this model however, with banks seeing their own 
funding costs skyrocket during the worst of the credit crunch. When a bank makes a 
loan, it relies on the ability to borrow funds on an ongoing basis in order to clear 
payments requested by account holders, making a profit if the interest rates on its 
loans to customers are higher over time than the rates on its own costs of borrowing. 
As financial markets seized up during the worst of the crisis, lenders to housing 
associations began to argue that significant parts of the £50bn in loans they had 
previously made to social housing providers had now become lossmaking, a claim 
repeated by the head of the HCA’s regulation committee to MPs within  Parliament’s 
Communities and Local Government select committee (House of Commons 2013, Ev 
1). This claim was also made in the course of my fieldwork by a policy officer advising 
the housing association sector, who went on to explain that this increase in costs for 
banks led to a sharp rise in the costs of new borrowing for providers themselves in 
comparison to LIBOR, a standard financial industry benchmark index: 
Prior to the credit crunch, banks would lend housing associations 30 year 
money for 25 basis points above LIBOR…After the credit crunch banks 
obviously struggled to get hold of cash themselves. They got short term cash, 
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and they were only lending short term, and the margins went from 25 basis 
points to something like 350 basis points at one point, so a huge change in 
interest costs.16 
 Policy officer A, PhD fieldwork data, spring 2015. 
Although loans were still available, the sharp rise in costs for long-term debt that would 
meet the 30-year periods at which associations prefer to borrow at meant that 
providers struggled to access credit from banks as they scaled back their lending. This 
represents one direct form in which the risks generated by the financial crisis were 
hierarchically redistributed, with lenders passing their own higher costs downward onto 
housing associations. 
In addition to charging more for new borrowing, banks also began to seek 
opportunities to reprice existing debt. One potential area where this could be done was 
through banks searching for breaches in the “covenants” attached to loans, 
agreements that specify that borrowers keep to certain behaviours as a condition of 
lending, with a breach legally treated as a form of loan default. Common restrictions 
include the “gearing ratio” that associations can operate under, i.e. limiting the amount 
of debt they can hold compared to their existing equity, the level of turnover they 
maintain in order to cover their interest payments, and their ability to on-lend debt to 
subsidiaries, for example those carrying out development programmes (National 
Housing Federation 2014). Compliance with these agreements are closely monitored 
by banks, though they do not necessarily have to take action in the event of a breach17. 
It should be noted that this also suggests a form of private regulation (Scott 2002) 
                                                          
16 One basis point = 00.1%. 
17 Interview with Auditors, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016. 
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operated by banks themselves, who may wish to limit the ability of an association to 
raise cheap finance against their reliable social housing assets, and use it to invest in 
riskier commercial developments for a higher return.  
Early reports issued during the credit crunch from organisations such as the National 
Housing Federation (NHF) claimed that some lenders were pro-actively searching 
through covenant agreements in order to find excuses to declare a breach, leading to 
the opportunity to reprice existing loan agreements (National Housing Federation, 
n.d.). In one fieldwork interview, a housing association chief executive for an 
association based in a non-Manchester city in the north of England nonetheless 
explained that initial fears that banks would adopt such tactics had not materialised: 
What they’re not doing is to really crawl over your financial returns, your 
annual accounts, to see whether there’s a breach there to trip you up. We did 
think they might do that and I think [Building Society X] had a go at it, and the 
solicitors got back to them in robust terms and they backed off. And other 
lenders haven’t tried that. But when we go to them and say can we have some 
new money, they say yeah, and how about renegotiating this lot then? 
 Housing association chief executive, PhD fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
As revealed by the above quote however, banks instead sought opportunities to 
reprice the existing debt held by associations when they needed access to new 
borrowing, charging far higher rates that could risk pricing associations out of the 
market. The financial crisis therefore risked bringing down the lending model built up 
over the previous two decades, leading provides in search of new creditors.  
Access to credit quickly revived for associations however as providers were successful 
in sourcing new debt through the bond markets, chiefly from institutional lenders such 
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as pension funds or insurance companies (Heywood 2016). Institutional investors had 
previously invested in commercial property in the UK from the 1950s onward, with less 
restrictive rent controls and planning requirements, the post-war construction boom, 
the need to offset inflation, and demand for credit from developers otherwise cut off 
from bank debt due to capital controls all combining to attract financial companies into 
land ownership (D. B. Massey and Catalano 1978). Institutional investment in rental 
housing nonetheless tailed off through the 1970s, with financial industry sources 
quoted in government reviews alleging that continuing rent controls in residential 
rented property led them to exit the market (Montague 2012). Under the financial 
model established by the Housing Act 1988, housing associations had also seen a 
small level of bond activity, with the NHF and the regulator jointly establishing The 
Housing Finance Corporation (THFC) as a bond “aggregator” in 1987, acting as a not-
for-profit company through which associations could club together joint issues in order 
to access finance from the financial markets. This remained marginal up to the 
financial crisis however, with providers continuing to access relatively traditional bank 
finance for much of the period from the late 1980s.  
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Figure 7.1. Number of public bond issues by housing associations with value 
above £100m, 1992 – 2016 
 
Source: Social Housing Magazine (2016), Housing Association Public Issues Over 
£100bn. Data cited from Markit, Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets, and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland. 
Bond issues were nonetheless to return as a major source of new finance for social 
landlords in the years following the financial crisis. As demonstrated by Figure 7.1 
above, based on data on public bond issues compiled by Social Housing Magazine, 
the level of bond issues nonetheless began a sustained rise with the onset of the 
financial crisis. The data shown by these figures are limited, showing only bonds over 
£100m that are publicly listed on an exchange such as the London Stock Exchange, 
excluding smaller issues and bonds that may be privately placed directly with a specific 
set of investors. Private placements can be preferred by smaller providers as they do 
not have the same procedural requirements as public placements, such as obtaining 
a credit rating, receiving formal legal advice and making payments for administrators 
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and trustees to oversee the process of bond  issuance (Dale and Sait 2013). Smaller 
associations could also access bond debt through aggregators, such as either THFC, 
or for-profit vehicles such as GB Social Housing (Heywood 2016).  
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 nonetheless are useful in that they provide a strong indication of 
the growing interest in open bond placements, with the number of issues soaring in 
particular from 2011. While the majority of the sector’s existing debt is still held by 
banks, who still account for 68% of the sector’s historical loan book, bond markets 
have nonetheless become the single most important source of new credit, with 
providers raising £1.6bn out of a total of £2.2bn in debt borrowed in 2016 (Homes and 
Communities Agency 2017a, 5). As shown below in Figure 7.2, the period since the 
financial crisis has seen a significant increase in the nominal values raised by the 
sector via the public bond route, peaking at over £2.6bn in 2012 and 2013. 
Figure 7.2. Nominal amount of finance issued to housing associations per year 
for public bond issues over £100m, 1992 – 2016 
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Source: Social Housing Magazine (2016), Housing Association Public Issues Over 
£100bn. Data cited from Markit, Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets, and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland. 
By 2014, rating agencies reported that housing associations had limited refinancing 
needs, meaning that most new debt raised would be for new developments, although 
borrowing need was expected to increase again between 2017 and 2019 as existing 
debt matured (Arasaratnam, Massimo, and Benisek 2013, 13). This may indicate why 
bond issues decreased in 2014 and 2015, though the unexpected Conservative victory 
in the general election of 2015 led to a number of increased uncertainties for the 
sector, which shall be analysed in Chapter 9.  
As Figure 7.3 below demonstrates, housing associations were nonetheless able to 
successfully exploit the bond markets as a source of new credit at scale in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis and the tightening of available long-term bank debt. As 
shown in Chapter 6, although housing associations may not offer high returns, their 
stable, state-guaranteed nature and heavy amounts of public subsidy make them 
highly reliable borrowers, offering the promise of safe and stable returns at a time of 
weak economy growth and a dearth of quality investment opportunities (P. Williams, 
Salisbury, and Caven 2011). This can make associations an attractive option for 
organisations such as pension funds or insurance companies, enabling them long-
term, safe assets to match their liabilities in a global economic environment dominated 
by low yield, the return an investor earns on a bond.  
  
220 
 
Figure 7.3. Drawn down finance against public grant levels as a share of the 
gross book value of the English housing association sector’s stock, 2005 - 
2015 
 
Source: Regulatory global accounts of housing providers (Homes and Communities 
Agency 2017a, 2016a, 2015a, 2014a, 2013a; Tenant Services Authority 2011, 2009a). 
By 2016, the total amount of bond finance raised was reported as being roughly £19bn 
(Heywood 2016, 6), a substantial portion of the sector’s £62bn in total drawn finance 
facilities in 2015. As shown by Figure 7.3, this enabled the continuation of rising levels 
of drawn finance even throughout the years of the financial crisis and post-2010 
austerity policies were to substantially cut Social Housing Grant available for new 
developments, the impacts of which will be analysed in chapter 8. From 2005, debt 
levels continued to rise ahead of subsidy even with the increase in spending 
authorised in New Labour’s final years under Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2007 – 
2010) under the National Affordable Housing Programme (2008 – 2011), which initially 
set out £3bn in extra investment (Housing Corporation 2007a, 1). As these figures 
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collate the accounts reported by group parents, it is also possible that this graph 
understates the debt held by housing association subsidiaries, but they are used here 
in order to highlight the overall historical trend of the sector.  
The period following the financial crisis also saw additional state-sponsored schemes 
to boost lending to the sector, with the Affordable Homes Guarantee Programme 2013 
– 2015 lowering the cost of borrowing for associations by underwriting £10bn in 
housing association debt used to participate in the government’s Affordable Homes 
housebuilding programme (Department for Communities and Local Government 
2013). Additional support came from the European Investment Bank, which financed 
over £4bn in social and affordable housing and regeneration programmes in the 
decade prior to 2017, with an additional £1.2bn in loans planned to still go ahead 
despite fears of the consequences of a UK exist from the European Union (Cross 
2017b). Further support also came from the announced inclusion in 2016 of housing 
associations in an additional £10bn bond buying scheme as part of the Bank of 
England’s quantitative easing programmes (Kollewe 2017). Housing association 
borrowing has therefore received significant ongoing support from public agencies 
since the crisis, easing the sector’s inability to secure favourable long-term debt from 
banks.  
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Figure 7.4. Mean issue value per year of public bond issues by housing 
associations with value above £100m, 1992- 2016 
 
Source: Social Housing Magazine (2016), Housing Association Public Issues Over 
£100bn. Data cited from Markit, Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets, and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland. 
As shown by Figure 7.4, single issues of public bonds are frequently over £200m. The 
amount of debt raised per issue is likely to be influenced by the demands of the 
financial sector itself, with Wainwright and Manville (2017) finding that bond issues of 
over £250m can attract passive investment funds that attempt to track market indexes, 
raising the demand for lending (Ibid., 830). While 90% of housing association bonds 
purchased between 2008 and 2013 were purchased by just 13 companies (Dale and 
Sait 2013), by early 2016 up to 40 investors were reported to be active in the market 
by one interview respondent in my fieldwork, although the trading of bonds in 
“secondary markets” was still reported to be minimal by the same respondent18. 
                                                          
18 Housing finance consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
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The chart in figure 7.5 below compares the average spread per year of bond issuance 
rates against the government bonds they were benchmarked against at the time of 
issue gives an indication of the change in borrowing costs relative to government debt 
of the sector in the bond markets over time, although this data should be treated with 
caution. A ‘spread’ in this sense is the difference in basis points between the housing 
association bond and its reference ‘gilt’, or UK government bond. In representing the 
extra margin of housing association bonds over their associated reference gilts, this 
chart suffers from the same omissions in figure 7.3 of not including private placements 
and public issues under £100m as the previous chart. In calculating this figure, the 
average interest rate for the bonds of different associations issued in the same year 
have been compared against their associated government reference bonds. These 
figures will therefore be affected by significant variation among associations, and 
fluctuations in government bond issues at the time that will in turn be affected by 
multiple economic factors.  
Figure 7.5. Mean spread over gilts of housing association public bond issues 
over £100m, 1992 - 2016 
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Source: Social Housing Magazine (2016), Housing Association Public Issues Over 
£100bn. Data cited from Markit, Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets, and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland. 
Although these are serious caveats, the data here have been included as they give 
some indication of the relative expense of borrowing for associations in comparison to 
government borrowing when issued. In particular, initial high prices during the 2007 – 
2009 financial crisis and decline in its aftermath, before rising again in 2012, a year in 
which gilt rates fell to record lows amid financial crisis in the Eurozone and concerns 
over UK economic growth, both of which would increase the demand for UK 
government debt as a relatively risk-free asset (Inman 2012). Although returning to 
lower margins in 2013, these began to slowly rise again over the course of the 
following years, possibly reflecting factors likely to harm the sector’s credit rating such 
as the onset of welfare cuts, higher levels of commercialisation, and greater policy 
hostility with the re-election of the Conservatives with a full governing majority in the 
summer of 2015. 
As with bank lending, bond finance was typically secured on housing association 
assets. Bonds also have the capacity to offer fixed rate debt at relatively affordable 
rates (Tang, Oxley, and Mekic 2017), a favourable scenario for housing associations 
who seek long term fixed rate debt in order to build certainty into their business plans, 
as seen in Chapter 6. The next section analyses these new features of bond in 
comparison to bank debt for associations, exploring in particular how these may shape 
the investment strategies pursued by associations.  
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7.2. Access to the bond markets: a ‘flexible’ form of finance? 
Direct access to bond markets can be somewhat daunting for associations, requiring 
negotiation with new legal requirements such as the need to comply with insider 
trading disclosures, and engagement with multiple actors who may be less flexible 
than banks in meeting the needs of a specific provider (Taylor 2011; Oxley et al. 2015). 
Bond finance nonetheless holds certain attractions for associations, offering fixed rate 
debt free from more restrictive bank covenants, while also offering the opportunity to 
raise a single sum for use across the entire organisation’s strategies, rather than 
specific development projects (Wainwright and Manville 2017). In addition, the ability 
of housing associations to refinance their existing debt through the bond markets 
meant that many were able to free themselves from their existing bank covenants, 
which as the following quote indicates could provide organisations with a much greater 
freedom in terms of determining their individual borrowing strategies: 
It’s a real constraint on associations’ ability to borrow, if you’re bumping your 
head up against your gearing ratio. The ability to on-lend to subsidiaries. I 
mean the interest cover ratio, maybe, maybe something that somebody would 
want to do away with. I mean a lot of the big associations now, one of the 
reasons they’re going for big bond funding issues and paying down the debt is 
that they just don’t want to have those covenants there at all. 
 Housing association chief executive, PhD fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
Although bond agreements can also have loan covenants attached, such as the 
maintenance of reserves to service debt (Stothart 2016a), the shift to the bond markets 
offered an opportunity for associations to renegotiate their existing agreements 
through refinancing, giving them the potential for greater operational flexibility. As the 
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above quote suggests, this entails a changing relation to finance, with associations 
seeking greater borrowing capacity and the ability to support subsidiaries carrying out 
diversified activities, such as care provision or commercial developments. In doing so, 
this can potentially entail leveraging the stability and credibility of their social housing 
stock to support other, potentially riskier activities, although the regulator has 
previously attempted to govern this practice through requiring that social housing 
assets are not placed at undue risk (Homes and Communities Agency 2013b).  
In contrast to the initial period of private finance from the late 1980s onward, more 
recent financial activity by associations in this new lending environment can entail a 
decoupling of activities from specific, government grant funded projects, although this 
too entails new risks that have to be managed. As shown in the previous chapter, the 
shift toward private finance saw a gradual process of regulatory liberalisation prior to 
the financial crisis. As explained by a solicitor advising the sector, this process has 
continued in the years following the financial crisis, with associations seeking greater 
flexibility to engage in commercial activity:  
[The government has] freed them, but they've given them the responsibility to 
deliver within their hands. So a lot of housing associations want some financial 
backing that's giving them flexibility…If you look back as well when 
[associations] first began to borrow financial money, it was very often because 
they wanted to supplement their public money to develop. If you look at what 
housing associations are doing now to get finance, what they want is they want 
a financial facility that they can draw down in a variety of different ways to 
deliver their business plans. 
 Solicitor, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
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While cast in terms of offering greater financial freedom, as highlighted by the 
reference to responsibility in the above quote this also entails a responsibilisation of 
associations into effective financial subjects, able to judge risks and rewards in such 
a way as to enable the ongoing circulation of capital. In managing these risks, the 
changing borrowing practices of the sector also provide opportunities for a deepening 
of financialisation as understood in terms of the spread of financial calculus in order to 
generate a competitive return (Bryan, Martin, and Rafferty 2009), even if bond finance 
may have fewer strings attached than the previous bank-dominated model for 
accessing new finance.  
While this new lending context may provide associations with the greater capacity to 
engage in opportunistic financial accumulation, there remain questions over the extent 
to which social landlords have the ability to successfully navigate the risks of this 
environment. Although access to the bond markets has generally been considered to 
provide relatively affordable finance for associations (Heywood 2016), some 
participants in this study have expressed scepticism over the capacity of providers to 
adequately negotiate effective deals within the capital markets. In arranging deals, 
banks have been key intermediaries between associations and bond buyers, working 
as “bookrunners” that oversee and piece together bond issues. As argued by one 
financial consultant in my interviews however, this creates a potential conflict of 
interest, with banks who work as bookrunners potentially being more concerned to 
maintain favourable relations with the institutional investors they work with on a regular 
basis: 
Housing associations, even the biggest ones, will go to the market once every 
three years…The bookrunner, the arranger, appears to be your friend acting 
for you to get the best deal but actually, they’re in the bond market every day, 
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selling bonds, trying to sell bonds to the same investors, and actually the 
people they most want to keep on their side are the bond buyers, the investors. 
And if they piss off a housing association from time to time that’s no skin off 
their nose. 
 Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016. 
While this allegation cannot be directly confirmed within the scope of this thesis, at 
least some corroborating evidence can be found reported in a study into investment 
and corporate banking practices by the financial regulator, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). In an analysis of the determinants of fees paid to banks in areas such 
as the arrangement of debt capital, the report uncovered that “one housing association 
stated that the fact that banks and advisers are paid a success fee meant that clients 
may be put under pressure to complete [debt capital market] transactions irrespective 
of whether it was in their interests” (Financial Conduct Authority 2016, 149). An 
analysis of the practices of banks in facilitating the use of the bond markets by 
associations should therefore be an urgent area for further study, in order to ascertain 
the extent to which this may be a systematic problem.  
7.3. Derivatives and financial accumulation 
This use of their financial capacity by associations can include not just funding non-
grant supported developments, but also opportunities for direct participation in 
financial accumulation, for example through housing associations taking advantage of 
bond agreements to arrange derivative trades with one another, cutting out banks as 
direct counterparties. As shown in Chapter 6, a derivative agreement is a financial 
transaction whose value rests on another, underlying asset, with housing associations 
often entering into interest rate swaps with counterparties in order to exchange 
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variable for fixed rate payments. Although this provides associations with certainty 
over what their long term 25-year loan repayments will be, it also exposes an 
association to the risk of higher payments than they would otherwise have to make if 
interest rates are lower than anticipated. Bond issues can often result in large amounts 
of finance at fixed rates of debt that are not immediately required however, providing 
an opportunity for financial arbitrage if a use can be found for the spare funds.  
In 2013 for example, a large, London-based provider, Notting Hill Housing Trust, 
swapped £30m of its fixed rate debt with Aster Group, a smaller, Oxfordshire and south 
west-based association. Notting Hill was able to do this because it had previously 
issued a £250m fixed rate bond, leaving it the spare capacity to swap with £30m of 
Astor’s floating rate existing debt payments, enabling the smaller association to fix 
their debt at cheaper rates than they were being otherwise offered by banks in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis (Hollander 2013a). Following this, Notting Hill carried 
out an additional deal with a second association, Octavia Housing, later that year 
(Cross 2013). In return, Notting Hill was able to hedge their own exposure to fixed rate 
payments at a time when ultra-low interest rates would have seen them paying higher 
amounts than they otherwise would have done if their debt was linked to the current 
market rate. In doing so, both associations were able to benefit from this transaction, 
with each estimating they would save £1m over the lifetime of their 25-year debt, 
although consultants such as Cannacord Genuity expected that the appetite for such 
deals would be limited as most associations would prefer to fix their debts in order to 
reduce exposure to uncertainty (Hollander 2013a).  
There was nonetheless a distributional implication of the deal due to their different 
exposures to the underlying interest rate, with Notting Hill benefitting more if rates 
remained low and Astor benefitting if rates were higher than the level to which they 
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were fixed. Furthermore, although derivatives were used in this case as insurance 
against risks, benchmarked against interest rates rather than the profitability of their 
housing assets, the opportunities provided for arbitrage can also lead to incentives for 
associations to increase their cash flows to further support such activities, providing 
opportunities for further financial innovation in the future. This suggests the potential 
for greater instability if derivatives are used as an opportunity for speculative 
investment in their own right, with the largest housing association in the Netherlands, 
Vestia, nearly undergoing bankruptcy as a result of its senior management attempting 
and failing to profit from wrongly anticipated interest rate rises (M. B. Aalbers, Loon, 
and Fernandez 2017). As such, financialisation can be seen to be at work, offering 
housing providers opportunities to seek out ways for disaggregating and commodifying 
their risk exposures into an object that can be profitably traded (Bryan and Rafferty 
2014a). 
7.4. Housing associations and institutional investment 
This section now turns to analyse the extent to which the years since the crisis have 
seen the entry of institutional investment into the housing association sector, alongside 
the increase in bond lending. As pointed out by Massey and Catalano (1978) in their 
classic study Land Ownership by Capital, the relation between the financial sector and 
urban space is also one involving multiple strategies, rather than following a single 
institutional logic. Equity investment for example, such as ownership by a private 
equity company or a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), involves the creation of a 
property interest in which income streams relate directly to the performance of an 
underlying asset, such as a residential block of flats. Bank loans or bond lending by 
contrast offer either a fixed stream of payments or a variable rate attached to an 
underlying index but not the asset itself, with lower returns justified by the lower risk of 
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strategies. Institutional investment should therefore not be seen as a homogenous 
block, but rather as being comprised of a range of actors pursing different strategies. 
These can include private equity companies that raise capital from institutional 
investors and then leverage it to exploit tight profit margins by borrowing heavily from 
banks, or REITs that take a longer-term outlook and enable pooled investment into 
housing, often incentivised by tax breaks (Rutland 2010; Beswick et al. 2016).  
Strategies for financial accumulation within housing associations have not just been 
found within the bond markets, but are also reflected in the growing interest in 
institutional investment within the sector. As shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this 
thesis, academic attention has increasingly been drawn toward the potential for 
housing to act as a major asset class for a “wall of money” seeking high quality returns, 
with housing often attractive to investors due to its ability to capture ground rents and 
provide standardised and easily accessible forms of collateral valuation (Fernandez 
and Aalbers 2016, 74). Direct institutional investment in residential rented housing in 
the UK has so far been limited however, with government-sponsored reviews such as 
the Montague Report (2012) concluding that significant barriers still remained for 
attracting equity into residential real estate. The report found for example that although 
investors were reassured by a stable regulatory framework with no rent controls, high 
land prices in areas such as central London meant that rental yields, the annual rental 
income as a percentage of a property’s capital value, were still relatively low. It 
nonetheless also found that an average 9.6% return on residential property over the 
past 10 years left room for growth (Ibid., 12), while warning policymakers that this 
potential could be limited by a lack of existing expertise in developing and managing 
large-scale private rented properties in the UK. 
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Reflecting this policy interest in attracting institutional investment, some researchers 
working within academia and the financial industry have turned attention to exploring 
the prospects for attracting institutional investment into social housing. Often 
undertaking comparative studies with other national contexts such as Australia or the 
Netherlands, where social housing landlords similar to associations have engaged 
with or are seeking to expand the use of finance (Blessing and Gilmour 2011; Milligan 
et al. 2015; Lawson 2013), this is often presented as a method for increasing housing 
supply at a time of declining government subsidy due to austerity (Oxley et al. 2015). 
In making their arguments, these reports frequently draw on a “housing crisis” policy 
and media narrative that has blamed growing housing need and stalling home 
ownership on restrictions to new housing supply, with the implication that policy 
solutions should aim at boosting construction through public or private supply 
increases (Morton 2010; Elphicke 2010; C. Walker 2014; Alakeson 2011; Jefferys et 
al. 2015). Although this reflects a long-standing policy concern in which “affordability” 
has been problematised in terms of first time buyers being locked out of the market by 
rising prices relative to wages (Cowan and McDermont 2006), the identification of the 
housing crisis in terms of a supply shortfall is likely to be over-simplistic in a market 
where the majority of sales come from trades in second-hand stock (Barker 2004). 
Institutional investment has nonetheless been proposed as a means of increasing 
housing association construction output, although prospects have been seen as 
limited outside certain specialist areas such as student or care accommodation with a 
predictable client base even at a time of austerity policies where subsidies are being 
undermined (Williams, Salisbury, and Caven 2011; Montague 2012).  
At the time of fieldwork for this thesis in 2015 – 2016, institutional investment had yet 
to be deployed at scale for residential rented housing in the UK. Sustained high land 
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prices in prime areas of real estate such as London have so far been perceived as a 
barrier to the entry of institutional investment into residential rented housing (P. 
Williams, Salisbury, and Caven 2011). In comparison with the UK, other national 
contexts such as the US have far greater experience with investors in residential real 
estate through vehicles such as REITs, a legal vehicle operating like a mutual fund 
within which investors can pool resources and extract dividends (Ibid). As explained 
by one valuer working within the real estate industry, one major barrier was a lack of 
existing evidence of successful models within the UK that could provide evidence as 
to successful profitable strategies, a concern for investors due to the difficulty in 
extracting rental yield in a market characterised by high land values: 
It’s across the sector that you’re not just creating assets here, you’re creating 
an entire asset class, an entire base that includes advisors getting up to speed, 
that includes all of the design, that includes all the management platforms, all 
the funding models getting comfortable with something that doesn’t exist in 
reality in the UK. It’s an on-paper, it’s an in-theory concept. 
Valuer C, PhD fieldwork data, Spring, 2015. 
That is, the development of a successful model for institutional investment in housing 
would not just require start-up capital but also management, operational strategies, 
access to land, and an awareness of where to geographically focus profitable 
strategies. In comparison to these risks in developing a successful equity finance 
model, a property market consultant interviewed as part of my fieldwork argued that 
bond purchases represented a simple and predictable way for pension funds and 
insurance companies to increase their exposure to real estate markets in the UK, for 
example through lending to a housing association: 
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It's just about tradable…it's got known characteristics, I don't need to know 
anything about Places for People, I just buy Places for People paper. And it's a 
tradable paper in the market. And it's quoted, we've got a history in it, and we 
know what its characteristics are. It's a bond. And we deal with bonds all the 
time. And it's got a nice long 25 years, and we might do 10 years of that and 
then we can sell it and move on. 
 Property market consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
As already demonstrated in Chapter 6, an additional attractive feature for housing 
association bonds would be their stability and predictability of cash flows, providing a 
safe form of assets for the sector. In comparison to equity finance however, the lower 
risks of bond finance reflects lower rewards for investors, with returns pegged to a 
fixed rate or an underlying index rather than the performance of the underlying asset.  
7.5. New investors, and new financial risks 
While bond lending has so far been the dominant form of interaction between housing 
associations and institutional investors, there have nonetheless been explorations of 
the potential for direct equity investment within the sector, involving the direct transfer 
of a property interest to investors. Although this could theoretically expose institutions 
to higher risk than bond lending, in that they would have an ownership interest in social 
or affordable housing assets, this could also provide them with the opportunity to 
extract higher returns. As argued by one interview respondent working for a valuation 
firm, investors interested in affordable housing can therefore classed into a least two 
types - those seeking safe investments, and those looking to extract a higher return in 
exchange for riskier financial deals: 
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I think we’re seeing the evolution of two streams of thought. The annuity style 
funds that want very low rates of return but absolute assurance that those are 
the returns they’re going to get, and those investors who are in the main, from 
a property perspective, are competing [sic] against the capital markets where 
it’s probably the same business, just a different part of the business, with the 
bond market and property team 
 Valuer B, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
Interestingly, as shown in the above quote, these two different types of investor can 
often be found working for different branches of the same firm, for example if an 
investment fund wished to buy in to a broad range of asset classes in order to diversify 
its own risk exposures. The treatment of land as a financial asset should therefore not 
be seen as a process that follows a single logic, but rather one that operates through 
multiple strategies according to the particular desires of financial investors (Rutland 
2010; Beswick et al. 2016). 
While direct institutional investment into English housing associations is still relatively 
marginal, given the relatively affordable debt providers can already access (P. 
Williams, Salisbury, and Caven 2011), there has nonetheless been a growing interest 
in equity investment into the sector. One method in particular has been through sale 
and leaseback models, the experience of which as shown below have been 
controversial within the sector. Under a sale and leaseback arrangement, an 
association would transfer ownership of existing assets to an investor in exchange for 
a lump sum called a purchase price, freeing up finance which they could then use for 
other purposes such as a development. Models that have been used within the sector 
would then see the association lease back the assets for a specified time, typically for 
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35 to 45 years, with properties reverting back to the association at the end of the term 
for a specified sum. Lease payments, effectively a form of interest, would usually be 
index-based in that they would be linked to a measure such as inflation over the course 
of the term, for example the Consumer Price Index (CPI) + 0.5%, reducing exposure 
to fluctuations in inflation but potentially exposing the provider to rising long term costs. 
These can offer an alternate form of finance to bonds, though interest payments can 
be volatile if the inflation rate fluctuates, bringing additional risk exposures (TradeRisks 
2014). 
Figure 7.6. Model index-linked finance repayment structure, initial coupon of 
4%, linked to Consumer Price Index +0.5% and assuming Retail Price Index 
increases of 3.55% 
 
Source: reproduced from TradeRisks briefing note (2014, 1). 
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Experience with sale and leaseback has been controversial within the sector given 
higher potential risks however, with the HCA explicitly withholding consent for 
associations from using social housing stock as collateral in index-linked finance in 
2013 due to concerns over hidden costs (Homes and Communities Agency 2013b). 
Analysis by the consultancy firm TradeRisks suggests that while initial payments can 
appear cheap, the total costs of finance can be as high as 6.1% over the course of a 
term, a very high rate of debt for a 35 to 45 year period given the cheap rates 
elsewhere at which associations can currently borrow (TradeRisks 2014, 2). These 
can rise cumulatively over the long term, as shown in the projection in Figure 7.6 of a 
model sale and leaseback deal reproduced here from the consultancy firm 
TradeRisks, assuming an initial coupon of 4%, linked to CPI+0.5 and assuming an 
Retail Price Index (RPI) increase of 3.55%, linked to an RPI-CPI “wedge” of 0.9% 
(Ibid., 1). Commenting on the dangers of long term price increases, the firm also 
warned that  “many housing associations do not realise this feature as they cannot 
price inflation linked debt correctly” (Ibid., 4). Again, asymmetries of knowledge can 
be seen to be a barrier for associations being able to effectively navigate financial 
markets. 
Despite this, one advantage of sale and leaseback is that these can require 
associations to provide lower rates of collateral to access finance, with some offers 
reported to be as low as 70% as the asset cover required for secured lending through 
bank loans or a bond issue (TradeRisks 2014, 3). As demonstrated in Chapter 6, 
valuation models for loan collateral for associations are necessarily conservative and 
lower than market value due to the security of tenure and regulated nature of social 
housing, meaning that providers who wish to develop can come under constraints in 
their ability to access finance. As explained by a policy officer working in relation to the 
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sector, this can therefore lead sale and leaseback models to become tempting for 
some providers who might otherwise struggle to attract additional finance: 
Sale and leasebacks tend to be a bit more flexible, or they just have different 
ways of getting access or using your property as loan collateral. Some of them 
don’t use the value of the property, or they don’t use a unique property, they’ll 
look at income stream generated and give you the loan based on the income 
stream. Sometimes that means you can use your property more efficiently for 
loan collateral purposes. 
Policy officer, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
In addition, as also found by Wainwright and Manville (2017), housing associations 
can also find it more difficult to attract finance for more commercialised developments 
such as shared ownership products, with bond lenders often wary of the exposure to 
market risks that might otherwise undermine the perceived reliability of association as 
borrowers. This was also reflected in the course of my fieldwork, with one valuer 
explaining that difficulty in attracting finance for shared ownership could lead some 
providers to explore equity finance as an alternative source of capital lending, provided 
they could retain the “staircasing” proceeds earned from the sales of tranches of equity 
in a shared ownership property to its existing tenant: 
More housing associations are alive to the fact that actually it’s much more 
difficult to fund the shared ownership, and if they can find a solution where 
they’re funding it at a relatively low rate of return, but they’re not also giving 
away the staircasing which ultimately they really enjoy in terms of getting 
those capital receipts in, then they will do it. 
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 Valuer B, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
As a result, the shift of housing associations toward the capital markets should not be 
seen as a static process in which they are passive recipients of bond finance. Rather, 
these findings suggest a process of institutional learning, in which some housing 
associations are growing both their commercial capacity and willingness to explore 
such deals. As argued by another respondent working for the same valuations 
company as the one quoted above, associations with large development programmes 
themselves at a senior level are building their skills capacity to engage in real estate 
markets, suggesting a possible change in the subjectivity of providers as they come 
to place a higher premium on earning a return: 
I think increasingly they’re informed by people outside, and increasingly 
they’re aligned with the way in which the commercial sector would think and 
behave. Whereas if you go back 10 to 15 years, you’d find [registered 
providers] would be taking relatively naïve decisions or accepting much lower 
levels of return. Now they’re much cuter about what financial stakeholders 
expect. 
 Valuer A, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
In doing so, this increased skills capacity could reduce the risk that providers would 
be stung by unfavourable deals, such as some forms of sale and leaseback that have 
previously been agreed to in the sector. To the extent that this would involve 
associations learning to treat their land and housing stock as financial assets whose 
value should be maximised, this could also be evidence of increased financialisation 
within the sector, an issue that will be explored in more depth in Chapter 8 of this 
thesis. 
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7.6. The uneven geography of institutional investment 
While equity investment models are therefore still yet to be deployed at scale, recent 
years have seen a growing number of investors begin to directly enter the affordable 
housing sector, with the organisations and amount of planned investment summarised 
below in Figure 7.7. The methods adopted by these equity funds are still in 
development and are therefore difficult to comprehensively assess at the time of 
writing in summer 2017, but one primary strategy announced by Cheyne, the largest 
investor, takes the form of leaseback funding with housing associations and local 
authorities acting as housing providers. The types of properties announced at this 
early stage by Cheyne include general needs lets rented by Luton Council with 
nomination rights for homelessness rehousing, in addition to planned extra care and 
dementia housing (Cross 2015). An additional announced project has been in 
Sheffield with a locally-based housing association to deliver a £25m scheme from 
2018 for 219 houses, with 65% at market rate and 35% at “sub market” rate, potentially 
classed as affordable rent (Cross 2016; Apps 2016). Under the scheme, Cheyne 
would finance the scheme, buy land and oversee development, while the association 
would be contracted to collect rents and provide management services, paying the 
fund an index-linked rent (Apps 2016). These models are nonetheless at a very early 
stage, with one fund, Octopus QSH, having already been disbanded at the time of 
writing (Johnstone 2017). 
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Figure 7.7. UK affordable housing equity investment funds 
Organisation Type of investor Launch 
 
 
Planned funding 
Cheyne 
 
Hedge fund 2014 £900m 
Salamanca (FAH) 
 
Merchant bank 
 
2015 £500m 
Civitas Social 
Housing  
 
REIT 2016 £350m 
Residential Secured 
Income  
 
REIT 2017 £300m 
Octopus QSH 
 
Private equity 2015 Disbanded 2017 
 
Source: Sheil (n.d.), Cross (2017a), Bury (2017), Williams (2017). 
 
This is a new emerging model of affordable housing investment, limiting the definitive 
conclusions that can be drawn at this stage. Some surprising findings are nonetheless 
indicated at this stage, with many of the developments financed by the companies in 
Figure 7.7 taking place in regional towns and cities such as Sheffield or Luton, where 
both land values and market rent levels would be lower than areas of high market 
activity such as London or central Manchester. When conducting fieldwork, one fund 
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manager explained that despite the safe and long term nature of affordable housing, 
the limit on the rents that could be charged made it difficult to extract yield in 
comparison to the private rented sector19. As a result, the fund manager argued that 
one strategy that investors could pursue would be to hold down capital costs by 
targeting areas where land was cheaper and affordable housing rents were close to 
market levels. This combines some of the stability of affordable rents with a higher 
yield than could otherwise be achieved in an area where affordable rents were far 
below market rate:  
Either you try and build less and build worse quality housing, buy the land for 
less and effectively bring the costs down, and keep the rents the same, or you 
can go into areas where affordable rents being 80% of market are actually 
quite decent and you get a good deal on the land, and the odd people are 
targeting that.  
  Fund manager, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016.  
As the fund manager went on to explain however, lower land costs would only result 
in a higher relative return on investment. The low absolute level of market and 
affordable rents that can be extracted from de-industrialised areas, given low wages 
and insecure employment, meant yields would still fall short of the target yields which 
investors would wish to achieve:  
There’s a need for affordable housing, but affordable in [de-industrialised 
town X] is really, really, really low rents. And there is a cost, because [it] 
doesn’t cost that much less to build…the building costs are what they are, 
                                                          
19 Interview with fund manager ,PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016. 
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same…as it would be in the centre of Manchester. So the yields are really, 
really low.  
  Fund manager, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016.  
One solution could be to target towns such as Luton where residents may commute 
to higher wage jobs in cities such as London, meaning that higher rent levels could be 
charged. As one housing finance consultant in my fieldwork also argued, another 
model which could see higher levels of profit could be more specialised areas such as 
care accommodation for vulnerable adults who would be exempt from wider welfare 
cuts, meaning that they would provide a more secure rental stream:  
The deals that have been done as far as I can tell involve very niche types of 
property. So there are perhaps areas where you’re providing special types of 
housing where you’re not subject to the local housing allowance caps and 
therefore the rents are higher.  
  Housing finance consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016.  
As argued by the fund manager however, the low absolute returns would still mean 
that the ability to deploy at scale would be an important prerequisite for their own 
attempt to recover an adequate level of profit:  
It’s not going to make us much money or get us very interested if we’re doing 
three or four ten million pound sites, we need to do £100m a year already, 
1000 units a year at least, to build up scale.  
  Fund manager, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016.  
This is relevant to recent analysis within the housing financialisation literature, which 
has argued that the affordable housing system could be one entry point for corporate 
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landlords, attracted by the prospect of acquiring areas such as inner London social 
housing estates where land is relatively cheaper, and therefore enables higher yields 
to be extracted (Beswick et al. 2016). In contrast to this, a key finding to emerge from 
this section is that one strategy pursued by equity investors seeking to gain a toehold 
in the affordable housing sector is to target opportunities in regional towns and cities, 
where land costs are lower but affordable rents are close to market rate, increasing 
the relative yield available. This means that a key area for future research into housing 
financialisation should therefore be the need to look beyond major cities such as 
London, exploring how the uneven development of the UK’s economic geography can 
itself be exploited as a resource by investors.  
To do so successfully however, equity investors as shown above are still confronted 
with the need to convert relative gains into absolute returns, meaning that scale is as 
important a factor as the ability to exploit the spatial differentials between the capital 
and deindustrialised regional areas. This is predicated on the need to extract a high 
rate of return, however. The next section now turns to analyse the potential costs of 
equity investment for affordable housing, before the chapter concludes.  
7.7. Institutional investment and accumulation through dispossession  
Although the models briefly summarised in the previous section do not necessarily 
reflect previous experience of equity investment in the sector such as sale and 
leaseback, the typical rate targeted by an institutional investor in property will often be 
as high as 8%, something difficult to achieve in affordable rented housing (Montague 
2012). One interview respondent, a financial consultant, therefore expressed 
scepticism that such models could be deployed at scale without the use of index linked 
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financing that could involve large hidden costs in the long run, if housing providers do 
not effectively price in inflation:  
They say that they’re looking for returns between 7 and 8%. Well, affordable 
housing doesn’t give those returns. The only way you can get that type of 
return is if you are offering some kind of index linked structure…On the face 
of it they appear very cheap. But they’re very cheap because index deals are 
very low, but also because they’re not certain, they’re not fixed rate, there’s 
inherently a risk they’ll be a lot higher.  
Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016.  
In doing so, the extraction of such returns raises the potential of “accumulation through 
dispossession” (Harvey 2005), in which the provision of affordable housing and 
specialist temporary accommodation becomes dependent on the need to extract high 
rates of return. A significant area for future research uncovered by this chapter is that 
institutional investment should therefore not be considered a panacea for affordable 
housing, but rather one that may contain high long term costs whose impact should 
be closely scrutinised.  
As already seen in this chapter, housing associations have been able to access 
relatively cheap debt since the financial crisis through the bond markets, reducing their 
need to rely on equity investment. This could change if borrowing costs rise, however. 
While interest rates since the financial crisis have been held down to ultra-low levels 
(Bowman et al. 2013), when rates eventually rise this could see higher lending costs 
for associations and more interest in equity investment. As shown by another fieldwork 
interview with a fund manager connected to the sector, rising rates could lead to new 
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opportunities for funds which are well placed to take advantage if they can find a model 
capable of producing a high enough return:   
One of the real key challenges are returns, we’re in a macro unusual place but 
it’s a steady state unusual place in terms of low interest rates, low yield 
environment. Investors are getting very, very used to that now and it’ll be a 
big shock when that changes.  
  Fund manager, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016.  
As such, it should be stressed that the shift to the capital markets within housing 
association should not be seen as a one-time switch from bank lending to bond 
lending, but a dynamic and still-evolving process in which housing associations have 
been able to access cheap finance due in part to ultra-low interest rates in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. If this situation changes, then associations could begin 
to be faced with deals that may be less favourable than those they have thus far 
experienced. Rather than a static state of affairs, financialisation should therefore be 
seen as a path dependent and temporally bounded process, with reliance on the 
capital markets giving rise to the entry of new actors who may further intervene to 
shape the sector in the future if associations begin to experience stormier economic 
conditions.  
7.8 Conclusion   
This chapter has analysed the shift to the bond markets within English housing 
association finance in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In doing so, the term ‘post 
crisis’ has been used here not to refer to a return to normality following the crash, but 
a new period of weak economic growth and financial volatility over much of the course 
of the last decade. The immediate impact of the credit crunch was to raise the cost of 
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bank finance, with banks responding by scaling back their lending to the sector. 
Associations were nonetheless able to maintain their access to credit by issuing bonds 
to institutional lenders such as pension funds and insurance companies, who were 
seeking access to long-term, reliable assets in order to offset their own liabilities. 
Although policy and academic attention in these years has explored the potential for 
equity investment in social and private rented housing as a means of boosting output, 
facilitated by a wider “housing crisis” discourse that has problematised the housing 
market in terms of suffering a supply shortfall, bonds have nonetheless been the 
predominant form of widespread capital market finance in this period. For financial 
institutions in the UK, a lack of data over successful residential models, sustained high 
land costs that pressure yields, and an unfamiliarity in categorising residential rented 
housing as an asset class has led to bonds being currently preferred as a widespread 
form of capital finance, due to their ability to provide a standardised and easily 
recognisable measure of value.   
For housing associations, the bond markets have been favoured as a source of fixed 
rate, long term debt, with larger providers able to issue their own securities either 
publicly or through private placements, and smaller landlords able to club together 
through bond aggregators in order to maintain their access to finance. Recent 
research into the use of bond markets by associations has been somewhat mixed, 
with Tang et al (2017) arguing that this has provided a relatively unproblematic and 
flexible source of finance. In contrast, Wainwright and Manville (2017) found that the 
process of bond issuance has involved indirect governance by lenders, to the extent 
that associations would organise their activities prior to issues in accordance with what 
would achieve a good credit rating. The latter also found the rigid metrics used by 
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credit rating agencies to be a process that, perhaps ironically, mitigated against 
providers pursuing complex commercial strategies due to the higher perceived risk.  
This led these authors to conclude that associations were “acceding to established 
practices of financialisation...as opposed to reshaping the established practices of 
private real-estate financialisation” (Wainwright and Manville 2017, 832). Although the 
data gathered in this thesis does not cover the process of bond issuance or credit 
rating agency practices directly, the interviews analysed here suggest that 
financialisation has been a more complex process. Whereas the rating of association 
debt can be negatively impacted by commercial development activity, an important 
change in how associations access debt has been a shift toward accessing a financial 
facility they can use across their whole operations rather than for specific development 
projects. In providing them an opportunity to renegotiate previously restrictive lending 
covenants with their existing bank debt, associations have therefore been able to 
access a more flexible long-term source of debt. While a trade-off may be the prospect 
of a possible credit rating downgrade, this has enabled some providers to engage in 
financial innovation themselves, including in at least one case derivatives trading on 
their own account, such as the case of Notting Hill housing association. This greater 
organisational capacity then suggests that a more thoroughgoing adoption of financial 
values, logics, and more entrepreneurial approaches to risk can be adopted with the 
shift to the bond markets if the greater risks can be offset elsewhere. Within the context 
of austerity cuts to government support, these can take the forms for example through 
more commercial practices of asset and tenant management that increase the cash 
flows able to support borrowing, further increasing the potential for associations to 
adopt a more directly commercial ethos and raising the potential for a full privatisation 
of large providers (Ginsburg 2005; Manzi and Morrison 2017). 
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As such, although financialisation may not necessarily involve bond lenders changing 
their practices to suit associations, it can still be viewed as a two-way and contradictory 
process in which providers gain the additional capacity for financialised activities that 
may have the potential for unintended consequences, for example if derivatives 
activity leads to greater levels of counterparty risk. Other evidence reviewed in this 
chapter indicates that there have nonetheless been systematic disadvantages for 
associations in navigating these risks, with providers operating in an unfamiliar 
financial context where bond arrangers such as banks may have conflicting interests 
and objectives. The need to examine how these risks are managed then becomes 
important, particularly in an austerity context where government support is being 
scaled back, with likely consequences for both providers and the security of their 
tenants.  
In addition, this chapter has identified at least two types of institutional investor; annuity 
investors seeking a safe return, and those who are seeking higher returns through the 
property markets. The dynamics of financialisation can be seen in the relation of 
associations to these two classes of investors, particularly through explorations of 
forms of equity finance such as sale or leaseback. These can have high hidden costs 
and have therefore not yet been widely used by associations, who currently have been 
able to access cheaper debt through the bond markets. This should not be seen as a 
stable situation however, with two incentives for exploring equity finance by 
associations having been found in this chapter to be fewer collateral restrictions on the 
amounts associations can borrow, and difficulties in attracting finance for shared 
ownership developments given the higher commercial risk this presents to bond 
buyers. Conditions may change in the future if interest rates rise however, making debt 
harder to access and creating opportunities for investment funds.   
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This still-evolving nature of the relation of associations to the capital markets therefore 
suggests that financialisation should not be viewed as a linear shift, but a temporally 
bounded and dynamic process as associations become more oriented to and 
dependent on the market to survive (Montgomerie and Büdenbender 2015). In 
contrast to an emphasis on the stability of the current ability of associations to attract 
capital market finance (Tang, Oxley, and Mekic 2017), my analysis suggests that 
dynamics internal to financialisation such as the need to overcome secured lending 
constraints and attract finance for commercial development suggests the scope for 
greater exploration of equity models as a means of securing new debt. This is 
particularly the case given post-2010 austerity cuts to the sector, which have  cut back 
significantly on subsidies to associations and led them to seek new sources of 
commercial income. The implications of this will now be analysed in Chapters 8 and 
9, examining respectively the shift to commercialisation and financialisation in the 
sector, and the consequences of these agendas for growing levels of risk experienced 
by providers and their tenants. 
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Chapter eight – Ambitions to deliver? Housing 
associations and the treatment of land as a pure financial 
asset 
8.0. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the consequences for housing associations of the 
austerity policies from 2010 in the aftermath of the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, for the 
sector’s development activity. These years have seen significant reductions in the 
grant levels available for the construction of subsidised rental housing, weaker legal 
protections for security of tenure through the Localism Act 2011, and the introduction 
of new and more market-oriented tenures such as the “affordable rent” model capable 
of being let at up to 80% of market rent. As a result, I argue this has led to a growing 
exploration by housing associations of commercial income as a source of income, 
leading to higher numbers of associations diversifying into areas such as private sales 
of housing, and to a lesser extent the provision of market rent. Although these have 
become a growing proportion of new income for the sector, expansion of this activity 
at scale has nonetheless been geographically concentrated among a small number 
providers, most of which are based within London or its hinterlands in the South East 
of England. Austerity therefore has the potential to deepen the shift toward more 
commercialisation in the sector that has been underway since the late 1980s, further 
removing many associations from the provision of traditional social housing.  
As shown in Chapter 5, a growing strand within housing studies has questioned the 
extent to which commercialisation is generating tensions between the “social” and 
252 
 
“market” logics of housing associations (Tang, Oxley, and Mekic 2017; Manzi and 
Morrison 2017). While austerity has the potential to drive commercialisation within the 
sector however, this also raises the question of the extent to which housing 
associations have also been incentivised to treat their land and housing as a pure 
financial asset whose value should be maximised. To the extent this is occurring, a 
key argument in this chapter is that these changes to housing associations should be 
analysed not just as commercialisation, but as part of a process of urban 
financialisation. As part of this process, I argue that the use of housing is being 
subordinated to the requirements of speculative capital accumulation. Recent 
deregulatory measures implemented through the Housing and Planning Act 2016 that 
remove regulatory powers in directly limiting how associations can use their stock have 
the potential to deepen this process, incentivising providers to engage in more 
commercial asset management. This could further intensify the ongoing dispossession 
of social housing and low income residents from central urban areas, raising the urgent 
need for academic research to specifically conceptualise the needs of spatial justice 
when examining the social goals of housing associations, such as where the provision 
of affordable housing is located.  
In analysing these questions, I draw on my documentary analysis of regulatory and 
housing association sector documents, and fieldwork data in the form of qualitative 
interviews with national social housing stakeholders. In the seventh section, I also 
include original data from semi-structured interviews with a housing association chief 
executive and a governing chair, and housing practitioners working within the northern 
English city of Manchester, in order to explore the extent to which these processes are 
occurring outside of the capital. This examination of Manchester’s specific housing 
geography is an important contribution, both in nuancing a geographic understanding 
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of financialisation, and through generating initial empirical data as to how these 
processes operate outside the capital. In doing so, this shows how the geography of 
financialisation does not operate as a single top-down logic, but one that must account 
for local context and difference in how capital is enabled to flow smoothly through the 
urban landscape via the restructuring of housing associations. 
While I find that commercialisation is evident within the sector, my data also shows 
complexities in how practitioners interpret financialisation in relation to their 
understanding of the social goals of housing associations, such as the provision of 
low-cost, subsidised rental housing, while the spread of financialisation has been 
highly uneven within the sector. I also find reasons to doubt that financialisation will 
attract sufficient income to replace lost social housing grant, with the costs and risks 
of commercial development reducing the levels of cross-subsidy housing associations 
are likely to spare for the development of new housing for low income tenants. As 
such, I conclude by arguing that future research should take a critical assessment of 
financialisation, which has the potential to contribute to wider processes of 
accumulation through dispossession as people are displaced from the ability to access 
secure social housing. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I examine the 
affordable rent model, arguing that it is likely to drive further processes of marketisation 
within the sector while being unlikely to provide a sustainable way of funding new 
subsidised rental housing. In the second section I examine data on commercial 
diversification within the sector in an attempt to compensate for lost grant levels, 
finding an expansion in building housing for direct sale and low cost home ownership, 
though this has been concentrated among a small number of providers, most based 
in London and the South East. In the third section I argue this should be considered 
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as a move toward financialisation within the sector, in the sense of associations being 
incentivised to extract value from their land and housing assets. In the fourth section I 
argue this is unlikely to lead to new affordable housing, with the risks of development 
leading some associations likely to reduce the share of traditional social housing in the 
future in order to protect their cash flows. In the fifth section I examine the scope this 
has for increasing dispossession through recent deregulatory measures in the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016, while in the sixth section I examine tensions within 
how associations and actors connected to the social housing sector have interpreted 
this. The seventh section then turns to an analysis of the regional nuances of 
financialisation through an examination of associations in the context of Manchester’s 
specific housing geographies, while the final section concludes.  
8.1. The affordable rent model  
The use of private finance and more commercial products such as shared ownership 
by associations is not new, with chapters 5 and 6 demonstrating how this has been 
ongoing on a formalised, widespread basis in combination with public subsidy since 
the Housing Act 1988. While housing association grant subsidy declined from the early 
1990s, the late New Labour government under Gordon Brown (2007 – 2010) saw 
additional investment in new housebuilding with the £8bn National Affordable Housing 
Programme 2008 – 2011 (Housing Corporation 2007a). The planning system also 
provided an additional and substantial source of new housing through s106 planning 
gain agreements in which developers would provide discounted housing to 
associations, with precise figures difficult to determine but accounting for up to half of 
additional social housing in the boom years of the 2000s, concentrated in areas of high 
market activity such as the South East (Brownill et al. 2015). As shown in Figure 8.1. 
below, social housing providers also expanded “intermediate” tenures such as shared 
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ownership or shared equity housing throughout this period. Output followed a counter-
cyclical trend, rising as private housebuilders struggled in periods of housing market 
collapse such as the early 1990s and the aftermath of the financial crisis, although by 
the late 2000s the amount of intermediate housing produced had come to outnumber 
traditional social housing.  
Figure 8.1. Social and affordable housing output 1991/92 – 2015/16 
 
Source: ONS Live Table 1000. 
While the above chart does not distinguish by the type of social housing provider, 
ongoing restrictions on local authority housebuilding means that the bulk of this output 
is highly likely to be accounted for by housing associations. As such, it shows that 
associations entered the crisis as a sector whose collective development activity had 
become oriented toward more commercial products, with new social housing 
construction falling to minimal levels in the highly financialised overall housing context 
of the 2000s. The National Affordable Housing Programme instituted by the Gordon 
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Brown government and running between 2008 – 2011 into the early years of the 
Coalition mitigated this only slightly, falling well short of the activity in the relatively 
higher grant regime of the early 1990s. The election of the Coalition was to radically 
change this existing system however, introducing the new Affordable Housing 
Programme 2011- 2015, cutting grants and containing several new and highly 
significant measures intended to increase the reliance of housing associations on the 
market as a source of their ongoing funding (Homes and Communities Agency 2011).  
The most significant of these changes has been the end of grant funding for traditional 
social housing except in exceptional circumstances, basing the majority of ongoing 
rental housing subsidy on the new “Affordable Rent” tenure introduced by the Localism 
Act 2011. Deliberately intended to increase the reliance of associations on their rental 
streams rather than grant funding to support borrowing and development activity, 
affordable rents could be charged at up to 80% of the going market rate compared to 
the roughly 50% paid by social tenants, with providers also able to switch their existing 
social housing to affordable rented housing at the end of a tenancy agreement (Wilson 
and Bate 2015). The rents actually charged by associations have been subject to 
variation however. Existing rents diverge from market rents much more widely in 
expensive areas such as London and the South East in comparison to de-
industrialised areas of the North and Midlands, leading to providers in the capital letting 
an average of 65% due to concerns over what their tenants could afford (National 
Audit Office 2012, 25). While affordable rented housing could have the same security 
of tenure in traditional social housing lets, the Localism Act 2011 also introduced a 
new “flexible tenancy” agreement with a minimal security of two years rather than the 
potential lifetime security of an Assured Tenancy, further enabling a more commercial 
relationship between tenant and landlord. 
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The ministerial forward to the Affordable Homes Programme set out the new tenure 
and its associated development grant policy in terms of freeing housing associations, 
characterising it as a “new localist approach…giving control to local people, local 
authorities, housing associations and developers” (Homes and Communities Agency 
2011, 3). In light of my argument in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the structure of the policy 
shows how reliance on private money can be a used as a tool of governance, 
attempting to shape association behaviour by forcing providers to rely on market 
structures in order to generate capital. In addition to the new tenure, the programme 
contained a number of other measures intended to reduce the use of grant funding by 
associations. Bids for grant were no longer to be evaluated on a scheme by scheme 
basis, with providers instead asked to set out a four-year programme covering their 
plans to use their existing assets and capacity, attempting to incentivise associations 
to view themselves on an organisational level as how to support the government’s 
agenda of increasing housing supply (Ibid., 11). Such additional capacity could come 
from existing assets including their surpluses, additional borrowing, and alternative 
subsidies such as public land granted by local authorities, with grant used only to make 
a scheme viable (Ibid., 8). In doing so, the centring of responsibility at the level of an 
individual provider through manipulation of subsidies can be seen to be a crucial 
element of financialisation in this case, attempting to shape the priorities of 
associations in order to foreground their role as market developers, oriented toward 
the goal of increasing supply while potentially downgrading other, more welfare-
oriented functions.  
While framed in terms of increasing supply in order to alleviate growing unaffordability, 
greater reliance on market mechanisms to achieve this was a core component of the 
programme. Although the headline grant figures for the programme were £4.5bn, a 
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breakdown of the programme’s spending reveals that this includes £2.28bn from the 
previous National Affordable Housing Programme in addition to other commitments, 
leaving additional funding consisted of just £1.8bn (Ibid., 60). Grant per home was 
£20,000 for the new programme compared to £61,000 for Labour’s previous scheme, 
supported by higher borrowing for each house built at £75,000 compared to £61,000, 
and “other funding” such as rents and surpluses of £46,000 compared to £34,000 
(National Audit Office 2012, 34). Despite this higher cost the scheme was expected in 
official reviews to deliver 80,000 new properties (Ibid., 4). Critics however have 
questioned the extent to which consistently higher output is sustainable, with Smyth 
(2018) characterising the policy as a short-term fix reliant on higher debt levels and 
the one-off consumption of existing assets, predicated on the dispossession of tenants 
through higher rents and weaker security. 
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Figure 8.2. The end of a social housing policy: grant levels 2008 – 2017 
Funding programme Headline grant available Grant p.a. Target output 
National Affordable 
Housing Programme 
2008 - 2011 
£8.0bn £2.66bn 155,000 
Affordable Homes 
Programme 2011 -
2015 
£4.5bn £1.13bn 80,000 
Affordable Homes 
Programme 2015 – 
2018 
£2.9bn £0.97bn  
Shared Ownership 
and Affordable 
Homes Programme 
2016 - 2021 
£4.7bn £0.94bn  
£6.1bn (+ £1.4bn Jan 2017) £1.22bn  
£8.1bn (+ £2.0bn Oct 2017) £1.62bn  
Source: Housing Corporation (2007a); Homes and Communities Agency (2011, 
2015b, 2016b, 2016c), Booth (2017). 
As shown in Figure 8.2 above, the subsequent funding programme for 2015 – 2018 
further reduced overall funding to £2.9bn, available for both affordable rent and shared 
ownership properties. Whereas the previous programmes has mandated design and 
quality standards as developed by the Housing Corporation and the HCA, analysis of 
prospectus documents reveals that these were absent from the 2015- 2018 onward, 
indicating a downgrading of housing regulations in favour of expanding out supply 
(Homes and Communities Agency 2015b, 21). Following the election, the 
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Conservative majority government removed subsidies for affordable rented housing 
altogether, with the majority of the available £4.7bn intended for shared ownership 
alongside a small amount of older people’s and supported housing accommodation, 
and a new “rent to buy” product that tenants could purchase after a period of time. The 
resignation of David Cameron and his replacement by Theresa May has seen a slightly 
more conciliatory approach however, with an additional £1.4bn offered for affordable 
rented housing in January 2017.  
The rising popularity of a Labour party with a left-wing leadership committed to 
increasing housing subsidy in the wake of the 2017 general election has seen yet 
further concessions from the Conservatives with an extra £2bn pledged in October 
2017, although the available funds for subsidised rented housing remain well below 
that of the previous Labour government’s housing programme. Although direct capital 
grants have declined, overall subsidies remain a crucial part of the housing market 
however, with the government spending £28bn on housing in 2016/16, £20.9bn of 
which was accounted for by housing benefit (National Audit Office 2017, 4). With 
around 60% of housing association rents paid for through housing benefit subsidy, the 
welfare system therefore still plays a crucial role in the development of the sector even 
as direct supply subsidies have been sharply reduced throughout the past 30 years 
(National Audit Office 2012, 14).  
While grant funding has been cut, the government therefore still plays an active role 
in actively shaping the sector, with the subsidy for rents underpinned through housing 
benefit a crucial factor in ensuring the affordability of housing for the sector’s tenant 
base. Although associations are operating within a more commercial context, this 
should therefore be seen not as a minimisation of the state’s role, but one in which 
subsidy regimes are actively trying to shape providers as entrepreneurial 
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organisations, oriented toward development activity and unlocking market supply. The 
next section examines the consequences of this for the sector, and the implications 
for how we can conceptualise the role of financialisation in this process as housing 
associations have undergone rapid commercialisation. 
8.2. Austerity as a driver for more commercial income 
As the government has cut back on subsidies through austerity measures, 
commercialisation has become an increasingly significant source of income for the 
housing association sector as a whole. As shown in Chapter 6 of this thesis, 
commercial activity by social landlords is not itself new, with the shift to private 
borrowing and regulatory liberalisation since the late 1980s encouraging associations 
to view themselves in more competitive, entrepreneurial terms while enabling them 
the greater freedom to engage in marketized developments. Far from bringing this to 
an end, the years since the financial crisis have seen an expansion of commercial 
activity by housing associations, with providers establishing subsidiary companies in 
order to develop properties for market sale and rent, in addition to other products such 
as trading services with one another (Homes and Communities Agency 2016a). Ultra-
low interest rates in the aftermath of the financial crisis and readily available credit in 
the form of the bond markets have also brought down the costs of servicing additional 
debt for providers, enabling a better shift toward commercial activity (Arasaratnam, 
Massimo, and Benisek 2013). Rather than ending neoliberalisation in housing 
associations, the post-crisis period has therefore seen an intensification of the sector’s 
reliance on the market.  
As a result, the sector has become increasingly oriented toward market activity that 
can provide it with new income opportunities, though this also raises the question of 
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the extent to which it is exposed to greater risk as public funding is scaled back. One 
interviewee in the course of my fieldwork who worked as a policy officer in a body 
linked to the sector, explained that a major driver of commercialisation for the housing 
association sector had been the need to find additional sources of income to offset the 
impacts of funding cuts under austerity: 
Housing associations were getting 40 - 50% grant for each development, that 
went down to less than 20%, 15 - 20%, and there was a gap that needed to be 
filled… So they started to do more commercial stuff, they started to a large 
extent building for sale, more shared ownership programmes, some have 
started to do private rented schemes, so although you’re not getting a big hit 
from day one, the idea is that you’re getting revenue surpluses which can be 
used to cross-subsidise. 
 Policy Officer A, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015.  
Reflecting this pressure to generate additional income, revenues from commercial 
activities have become an increasingly significant source of income for the sector in 
recent years, even as grants have been reduced and providers have faced welfare 
cuts and other measures that may be expected to raise their levels of operating risk. 
Although figures from the regulator suggest 84% of the sector’s turnover was still 
accounted for by “core” social housing rents in 2015 (Homes and Communities Agency 
2016a, 3), more recent figures have now revealed this be as low as 74.9% (Homes 
and Communities Agency 2017b, 8), meaning that a quarter of income received by 
providers now comes from outside their traditional provision of subsidised rental 
housing. In contrast to the sector’s pre-crisis activities, commercialisation therefore 
has the potential to become a major source of income for the sector, downgrading the 
263 
 
relative importance of its traditional provision of subsidised rental housing while 
increasing its exposure to property market risk.  
 Figure 8.3. Development activity by housing associations 
 
Source: reproduced from HCA (2017b, 18). 
The breakdown of development activity in Figure 8.3, reproduced here from regulatory 
documents, reveals the extent to which sales are coming to overtake subsidised rental 
housing as a share of development activity. While this has so far formed the majority 
of the sector’s ongoing development programmes, this level is predicted to shrink 
toward the end of the decade, with the decline likely to be affected by the decrease in 
affordable housing grant. Low cost home ownership products such as shared 
ownership have formed the next most significant share of developments, reflecting the 
sector’s longstanding experience in this area and the ongoing availability of subsidies, 
and is forecast to expand significantly over the next few years. Although expected to 
increase in absolute terms, private rented housing has been a marginal product 
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throughout this time period, with the majority of private activity occurring in sales. The 
construction of housing for market sale has been a small but growing share of the 
sector’s income however, with completions expected to increase over the next two 
years to 2019. While relatively small in number, these have formed a disproportionate 
amount of the sector’s income, accounting for 7.8% of its entire turnover in 2016, with 
first tranche sales of shared ownership housing close behind at 6% (Homes and 
Communities Agency 2017b, 8). This growing reliance on sales activity indicates the 
extent to which the sector has used the economic conditions of the post-crisis period 
to increase its exposure to the property market, aiming to increase its overall housing 
output even as grant levels have been cut back overall since 2010.  
As shown by the data in Figure 8.3, the majority of outright private development activity 
has been accounted for by market sales, with associations building only a small 
number of properties for private rent. This is perhaps a surprising finding, given that 
housing associations are, after all, landlords experienced in providing homes for rent 
at a scale that is otherwise unknown in the UK, outside of a handful of large-scale 
private companies. As argued by one interviewee in my fieldwork however, 
associations interested in private rents would be providing for a different tenant base 
than their social housing tenants, requiring a different investment strategy: 
The units you put in are going to need to be higher spec because it will be not 
housing the most vulnerable in society, it’s going to perhaps be young 
professionals and they’re going to want, if you’re going to attract them you’re 
competing against the Graingers and other providers who produce a bit more 
luxury. So you’re going to have to do the same thing and all of that has an 
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impact on what you’re going to get out the other end. Okay, you can charge 
more rent, but… 
 Policy officer A, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
Offering more “luxury” to attract young professionals who, unlike most people living in 
social housing, have the market power to go elsewhere, can be seen in this quote to 
require additional levels of ongoing investment to maintain standards. Although rents 
could rise in order to repay that cost, this increases the time with which providers would 
have to wait for a return on their investment, decreasing its attractiveness for the sector 
in comparisons to market sales activity, where houses can be built and sold on without 
tying capital up in land for long periods of time. 
Rather than being spread evenly across the sector, the majority of this activity has so 
far been geographically concentrated among a small number of London and South 
East housing associations, with regulatory figures revealing that 75% of the surplus 
made from sales accounted for by just ten providers (Homes and Communities Agency 
2017a, 14). This finding is unsurprising, with rising land values make it easier for 
strategically located associations to generate a return on sales, although exceptions 
to this exist such as the large provider Gentoo based in the North East of England 
(Homes and Communities Agency 2016a, 3; G. Whitfield 2017). Global sectoral 
accounts collated by the regulator reveal similar concentration among shared 
ownership sales, with 18 providers accounting for over half the sector’s total generated 
turnover (Homes and Communities Agency 2016a, 2). There are also divisions 
generated internally by the sector’s institutional development, with associations 
originating through Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) policies seeing lower levels 
of development due to the high levels of debt they initially take on, although the 
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regulator expects rising activity as these are gradually paid down (Homes and 
Communities Agency 2017a). Commercialisation on a large scale has therefore been 
limited to a minority of providers, casting doubt on the ability of diversification into 
market-oriented products being able to compensate for lost public funding.  
Exact figures on the profits made by associations through developing housing for 
market sale are difficult to calculate, with the global collective accounts for the sector 
compiled by the regulator excluding non-registered subsidiary companies, under 
which private development is likely to take place. An indication of the profits made 
through this activity can be used through monitoring the payment of “gift aid”, however, 
a clever form of income tax relief in which money can be transferred from profit-making 
subsidiaries to their group parents without jeopardising their charitable status, and the 
favourable tax treatment this brings. Gift aid payments in charity returns have been 
found by the regulator to be closely correlated with surpluses on profits in unregistered 
subsidiaries, returning £308m to the sector in 2016 and providing an interesting 
commentary on the extent to which ‘social’ values can be used to further commercial 
activity (Homes and Communities Agency 2017a, 15; Nicky Morrison 2016). Overall 
levels of money transferred this way remain relatively small compared to the sector’s 
total turnover of £20bn and 5.6% of the operating surplus of £5.5bn that year however 
(Homes and Communities Agency 2017a, 10), indicating the limited benefit most 
providers have so far received from cross-subsidy.  
Revenues from development activity are predicted to form a significant proportion of 
funding for the sector’s development activity in future years. Recent assessments by 
the regulator predict that over half of funding for development activity over the next 
five years will be bankrolled by commercial activity, accounting for £31bn of the 
sector’s £55bn in planned development activity, with the remainder consisting of a 
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mixture of grant funding and debt (Homes and Communities Agency 2017b, 20). While 
this could be interpreted as associations becoming less dependent on grant in order 
to develop, the recycling of revenues back into development also suggests a growing 
structural reliance of associations on treating their land and housing stock as financial 
assets. This greater reliance on asset maximisation has given rise to concern over the 
extent to which housing associations are becoming financialised, a question the next 
section will now consider. 
8.3. From commercialisation to financialisation 
As the structural reliance of associations on commercial developments as a means of 
subsidy grows in response to austerity, this raises the question of the extent to which 
the funding of associations is becoming reliant on them treating their land and housing 
stock as financial assets whose value should be maximised for a return. In other 
words, in addition to commercialisation, providers within the sector may also be 
undergoing financialisation. While housing associations are still not-for-profit entities 
in that they do not distribute dividends to shareholders, and although the majority of 
their interactions with the capital markets have come through bond lending rather than 
equity investment, funding cuts have created incentives for social landlords to act as 
capitalist developers with the need to maximise their returns. Commercial activities 
have a long history in the sector, such as the example in Chapter 5 of the Guinness 
Trust in the 1950s arguing in court that investments in stocks and shares helped them 
to fulfil their charitable objectives. As argued in Part Two of this thesis however, the 
past 40 years of neoliberalisation have made urban development far more reliant on 
processes of urban speculation, with consequences for the sector. To the extent that 
housing associations become reliant on rising land values to survive, they risk gaining 
a structural dependence on speculative urban developments that themselves increase 
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unaffordability, while driving displacement and dispossession for tenants who are 
seeing their incomes and legal protections eroded under austerity.  
In their depictions of the commercial activities of housing associations, official voices 
within the sector have continued to stress the not-for-profit, social enterprise nature of 
associations, working in partnership, though at a distance, from the government. The 
chief executive of the National Housing Federation (NHF), David Orr, characterising 
providers as distinct from but working closely with the government as  “the most 
successful public-private partnership in the history of our economy” (Ebrahimi 2015). 
A prospectus by the National Housing Federation (NHF) entitled “Ambition to Deliver”, 
issued in 2013 with an updated edition in 2016, sets out this view. Rather than 
characterise providers as straightforwardly commercial entities, the pamphlet places 
repeated stress on the not-for-profit nature of the sector, presenting it as one capable 
of delivering “where the private sector won’t and the public sector can’t” (National 
Housing Federation 2016, 3). The pamphlet sets out the desire to build 120,000 
houses per year, half for sale and half for rent, though two thirds of the total is intended 
for affordable sale and rent, and one third for commercial sale. In doing so, 
financialisation can therefore be seen to have so far built on rather than closed down 
the discursive balancing act previously identified by McDermont (2010) in which the 
sector stresses its independent from government, while also claiming this brings it the 
expertise necessary to fulfil policy goals, such as the development of new housing. 
Others have adopted a far more ruthlessly commercial approach, however. Taking the 
logic of treating the housing and land of social landlords as a pure financial asset to 
its extreme, right wing think tanks close to the Conservative party such as Policy 
Exchange have used this to advocate a wholesale liberalisation of the housing 
association sector altogether, freeing up their ability to work their stock as fully 
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commercialisable assets. One recent paper by the think tank has argued in favour of 
removing the ability of local authorities to nominate homeless people to be rehoused 
within the sector to enable more profitable use of stock, claiming this would result in 
“sweeping away the old, inefficient, byzantine system that creates a gridlock in new 
affordable supply” (C. Walker 2014, 9). The sector’s official trade body has not fully 
embraced this rhetoric, emphasising the aim of helping both “homes and communities” 
(National Housing Federation 2016). The Ambition to Deliver prospectus nonetheless 
attempts a balancing act of pitching their need for partnerships with central and local 
government, especially in the need to gain access to land. Reflecting their desire to 
stress the entrepreneurialism of associations, it nonetheless also pleads the need for 
housing associations to have greater “business freedom” in using those assets in a 
commercial manner (Ibid., 18). 
Recent research in housing studies has sounded the alarm over commercialisation 
displacing the sector’s “social values”, transforming the ethos of housing associations 
(Manzi and Morrison 2017). The extent to which associations may be being 
restructured in order to enable the circulation of capital suggests the need to go further 
in analysing the specific urban political economy of housing, and the social relations 
underpinning it, that is shaping the financialised context associations operate under. 
Thus, there is a need to explore not just how associations are becoming 
commercialised, but the extent to which this is occurring in a context in which the 
shaping of urban space is undergoing financialisation, subordinating the uses and 
provision of housing to the need to maximise financial yield. In doing so however, there 
are also strong reasons for doubting the new affordable housing that can be produced 
through commercialisation, the reasons for which will now be analysed.  
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8.4. Financialisation and the limits to cross-subsidy 
Even where funds are available to conduct development on a wider scale, there 
remains the question as to whether it is legitimate to characterise financialisation as 
likely to provide cross-subsidy for new social housing. Although the majority of 
interview respondents presented commercialisation as a potential alternative to 
funding cuts, one financial consultant argued for the need to be sceptical that this 
would generate large amounts of revenue that could be used to subsidise affordable 
housing: 
Market rent or build for sale, they’re all pretty capital intensive. Build for sale, 
you can revolver20 quite quickly but if things stop selling, they can have a 
really dramatic quick negative impact. Market rent, you have to be very 
patient to get a return. The yields are not exciting…So building and owning 
market rented property, it’s not a great return. It’s not going to subsidise an 
awful lot of social housing. 
 Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
In other words, revenues from commercial development should not be considered an 
unproblematic substitute for lost social or affordable housing grant. Whereas grant is 
virtually risk-free money, so long as providers stick to the funding and project criteria 
set for them by the government, commercial income is inherently connected to higher 
degrees of market risk. Commercial development typically carries with it high costs in 
terms of land assembly, labour and materials, particularly in areas such as London 
where values are high enough to permit an association to build at scale.  
                                                          
20 A revolver credit facility is senior debt that companies can use to refinance their loans on an ongoing basis. 
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Moreover, both building for sale and for rent carry different risks, with the former 
exposing associations to the risks of a collapse in property values, while the latter ties 
up capital for long periods of time, decreasing the likelihood of strong returns that could 
fund large affordable housing developments. These differing strategies carry distinct 
risks, meaning that any withdrawal of funds to pay for additional social housing would 
be a deduction of revenues that could be used to ensure against risks and extra 
development costs, exposing a provider to potential losses. This is particularly the 
case when grant has been replaced by a greater reliance on private debt from lenders, 
who whether they come from the banks or the bond markets will need paying back, 
with dire consequences otherwise for housing association stock, as revealed in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this thesis. As explained by the above financial consultant, 
the need to make a profit from development means that commercial income is unlikely 
to provide a high enough return to subside new social housing without government 
support: 
Social housing needs subsidy. Subsidised housing needs subsidy. Somebody’s 
got to subsidise it, and it’s not going to be the private sector. 
 Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter, 2016. 
The ultimate reliance of new social housing on government grant was also confirmed 
by the chair of a London-based housing association engaged in development activity. 
In the interview, they explained that even though housing associations do not need to 
distribute profits to shareholders, the costs of development remain a severe constraint 
on the amount that can be used as cross-subsidy for standard, “general needs” social 
housing lets: 
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Somehow the numbers have got to add up, and they won't add up if, they won’t 
be likely to add up if we were just doing general needs housing. Unless there 
was a big slug of social housing grant, and we know there isn't going to be a 
large slug. But also if we're substituting external finance for social housing 
grant we've still got to earn a return on that. 
 Housing association chair, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
If commercial activity requires continual reinvestment to cover risks and repay 
creditors, then this indicates that developer housing associations are gaining a 
structural dependency on treating their land and housing as a pure financial asset. The 
need to earn a return on their commercial investments can therefore be seen to be a 
powerful driver of financialisation, creating a structural dependency for associations 
on the ability to secure profits from wider speculative processes of urban 
accumulation.  
In addition to building property for the private market, another key aspect of 
commercialisation cited by interviewees was management of existing social and 
affordable housing stock in a more commercial manner. As explained by one chief 
executive of a mid-sized housing association operating in the north of England, one 
way in which this could take place would be through associations selling housing for 
market value once tenancies expired, in order to put funds into development: 
So what you’re looking at when you’re looking at a particular property, if it 
becomes vacant, somebody moves out, so you’re then saying what is the best 
way for us to take that property forward? Should we sell it, realise the capital 
from it, pay down the grant – I mean probably the amount of money we’d get 
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for it now is quite a lot more than we originally paid for it in the first place, so 
extract the value out of it, and put that into new supply. 
 Housing association chief executive, PhD fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
Despite the emphasis placed on commercialisation as a means of providing new 
housing, so far only a minority of associations have been able to set up large 
development arms, with providers in many regional areas outside of London lacking 
the rising land values that would enable them to develop new housing at scale. As this 
chief executive went on to explain, relatively low land values are a major barrier to the 
ability to develop a substantial development arm that can generate income: 
It’s much more difficult for us to do because the amount of money we get when 
we churn our assets is limited. I mean, we probably sell about 25 homes a year 
to do this with. If you’re down in London and you sell 25 properties a year and 
their average value is half a million pounds each, you can do some serious 
development.  
 Housing association chief executive, PhD fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
A key finding to stress from this quote is the importance of being able to scale up 
development. Although a London-based developer association may not have 
absolutely high levels of output, the land values these can attract offer a far easier way 
of scaling up development through the normal turnover of social housing stock, easing 
entry into a highly competitive real estate market.  
On the other hand, the presence of high land values in areas such as London can also 
act as a barrier to commercialisation, meaning that successful development still 
requires forms of additional subsidy, such as the sale or donation of public land for 
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associations to build on. One chair of a London-based provider that engaged in 
development activity argued that these low-cost acquisitions from the public sector 
were a major factor in enabling them to develop housing on their own account, as 
opposed to being restricted to investment and refurbishment of existing stock and 
commercial sites: 
I think quite a lot of our land comes to us from local authorities…if we were totally 
dependent on acquiring sites at market values we wouldn't be in the game, I'd 
suspect. What we'd be in the game of was focusing on our existing stock only and not 
developing, or maybe redeveloping some of our business sites. 
 Housing association chair. PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
Except for a minority of cases of strategically-placed associations able to operate at 
scale, this suggests that financialisation is unlikely to directly result in the production 
of large amounts of affordable housing without support from either central or local 
government. As such, despite rhetoric stressing that commercial activity is a result of 
freeing the sector from state interference, subsidy and government support is still 
necessary for many associations to engage in development activity at scale, either in 
the form of grant or the release of land. 
As revealed in the following quote from an auditor to the sector, for some providers 
with strategically located land banks, rising land values in the London market due to 
high demand from overseas investors and other buyers have enabled engagement in 
large-scale development programmes: 
A lot of [housing associations] are quite big land bankers as well. They’ve got 
huge stretches of London which they’ve been sitting on for a while. They could 
basically put together a development programme, take it off to Malaysia, Hong 
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Kong or Singapore, and just tell them this is what we’re going to build. 70% - 
in a weekend, 70% will be sold, straight off-plan. Nothing even built, just a site. 
 Auditor A, PhD fieldwork data, Spring, 2016. 
Here, financialisation can be seen to be at work through shaping behaviours and 
creating new incentives for how social landlords view land and housing stock, with 
housing associations behaving as though their land is a financial asset whose value 
should be maximised according to the increase in future rents and sales revenues it 
could bring (Harvey 2007a). In doing so, the ability to build social housing that could 
enable people on low incomes to live somewhere that would be otherwise unaffordable 
is diminished, with the potential scope of uses of the land narrowing to what could be 
enabled by extracting the highest monetary value from it.  
In selling land, or developing homes for market sale directly on it, the housing 
association sector argues that the revenues could be reinvested into new housing, 
either directly for commercial development, sub-market rent, or shared ownership. It 
should be stressed that although media and popular discourses often do not 
distinguish between social rent and affordable rent, as seen earlier in this chapter in 
Figure 8.1 it is the latter with its higher rents and often weaker security that has 
dominated recent new supply. As the auditor quoted above went on to explain, any 
additional new housing is also likely to be built in cheaper and more peripheral 
locations, in order to maximise the potential extraction of value: 
The good thing is that [housing associations] were selling and making money. 
Sadly…the housing they were building [that] was social was then outside of 
London. Because any site in London was worth so much that they were just – 
there was no point. 
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RG: No point? 
Well, you could say there is a point, because otherwise you’re ending up with 
these concentric circles of everyone just being pushed out, it’s a little bit like 
Paris, people were saying – the donuts in Paris. 
 Auditor A, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016. 
Even to the extent that financialisation does produce new affordable housing, this 
additional supply can be seen to rest on a process of rising land values that themselves 
displace affordable housing from central areas. This research has therefore revealed 
the troubling finding that austerity has created incentives for housing associations to 
become structurally more reliant on the financialisation of urban space in order to 
sustain themselves. To that extent, housing associations are being brought in to the 
circulation of capital through the urban landscape. This raises the troubling prospect 
that the social housing sector is becoming structurally integrated into broader 
processes of what was theorised in Chapter 4 as a process of accumulation through 
dispossession (Harvey 2007a). Further deregulatory powers over commercial asset 
management under the Housing and Planning Act 2016 may intensify this process, 
the implications of which will now be analysed in the following section. 
8.5. Deregulation and the Housing and Planning Act 2016 
Greater commercial freedom over the use of housing association assets is a live issue. 
In the aftermath of the 2015 general election the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
officially reclassified housing associations as public sector bodies for accounting 
bodies, meaning that the sector’s debt would formally be classed as public borrowing 
from that point onward and adding billions onto the government’s books. This decision 
was based upon an analysis of regulatory powers over board membership and 
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borrowing powers contained within the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 (Office for 
National Statistics 2015), although press speculation at the time linked this to the 
ongoing row between associations and the government over the proposed expansion 
of the right to buy to cover their stock (Wiles 2015). The decision itself is a public 
accounting change that has no power to either take associations into state ownership, 
or materially affect their charitable status or borrowing powers. It did however provide 
a government officially committed to bringing down the public deficit with the 
motivation to subsequently impose a wholesale liberalisation of the sector’s ability to 
commercialise its stock through the Housing and Planning Act 2016, representing a 
major new step in the sector’s financialisation.  
A major piece of enabling legislation, the 2016 Act removed altogether the powers of 
the regulator to withhold consent for housing associations to sell their stock or use it 
as collateral for a loan, representing a major departure from the historical structure of 
the regulatory system in which registered providers become eligible for grant in 
exchange for surrendering power over their stock. Additional statutory protections 
under section 133 of the Housing Act 1988 in which former local authority stock would 
require ministerial approval before being sold on from the social housing sector were 
also removed. This frees up LSVT organisations to use their stock in a more 
commercial manner, bringing them into convergence with the traditional housing 
association sector (Trowers and Hamlins 2015).  
Deregulation means that associations will face fewer restrictions in undertaking a more 
commercial approach to stock management. This was welcomed by the NHF, who 
argued this would “be positive for housing associations, putting boards back in control 
of decision-making” (National Housing Federation 2017). These are far-reaching 
changes however, with a housing association now technically having the ability to use 
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social housing stock as collateral for complex financial deals to fund private 
developments, or greater freedom to churn assets and sell of stock as they become 
vacant. Another consequence is that a housing association could even potentially sell 
the homes of housing association tenants out from the sector, a major threat to the 
security of the homes of tenants. 
These measures came into force in April 2017, meaning that their full implications have 
not yet been tested at the time of writing. The ONS did however announce a reversal 
of the classification of housing associations as public bodies in early November 2017, 
meaning that their debt would be removed from the government’s balance sheet once 
more (Pickard and Williams 2017). Although marking a significant departure from the 
previous system, the regulator still retains less direct levers of governance over the 
sector which it can use to shape the behaviour of housing associations, however. As 
argued in chapters 6 and 7, a major component of the attractiveness of associations 
for lenders is the regulated and state-backed nature of the sector. Housing 
associations are still subject to regular monitoring by the HCA, and are graded 
according to the extent to which they meet regulatory standards according to set 
criteria with titles such as Governance and Financial Viability or Tenant Involvement 
and Empowerment (Homes and Communities Agency 2017b). While standards 
referring to the direct welfare of tenants were watered down significantly in 2012, 
lenders and other stakeholders still monitor the gradings given by the Governance and 
Viability Standard when dealing with associations, meaning that regulation should not 
be viewed as a complete removal of power over the sector.  
As explained in the following interview with a solicitor advising housing associations, 
failure to achieve the highest “G1” governance rating with the regulator can hurt the 
credit ratings of associations and make it much harder for them to conduct business: 
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G1 is really, really important to an organisation. You don't want to dip below 
a G1. The reason why you don't want to dip below a G1 is it then makes it more 
difficult to do business with your financial institutions, your local authorities. 
It all comes back to your reputational-type risk, which is so important. 
 Solicitor, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
In an example of how significant regulatory gradings can be in relation to lenders, the 
regulator was directly reprimanded by MPs on the Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee in 2013 when it was found to have been reluctant to 
downgrade financial viability ratings for associations, on the grounds that this could 
trigger loan reprices by lenders and threaten their financial stability (House of 
Commons 2013). When disposing of land, associations still have a duty to inform the 
regulator prior to sale, and must show that they have taken tenant interests into 
consideration, including a consultation where their homes may be sold, or risk a 
governance downgrade (Homes and Communities Agency 2017b, 36). A housing 
association that is a registered charity will also come under legal restrictions through 
the Charities Act 2011 in which it must show the Charity Commission that it satisfies 
its charitable objectives (Charity Commission 2012). 
Deregulation also does not give housing associations the power to raise rents directly, 
with these being governed by the regulatory framework of registered providers and the 
relevant legislation (Homes and Communities Agency 2017b, 33). Yet although the 
regulator still holds indirect powers, it should nonetheless still be stressed that this 
represents a further erosion of its powers to take pro-active measures such as the 
direct prevention of the sale of social housing stock from the sector. The attempt to 
influence lender perspectives through a threatened downgrade are also an indication 
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of the extent to which financialisation is further displacing the regulator from the centre 
of the sector’s governance, with creditors assuming increased power over the 
“regulatory space” (McDermont 2007), theorised in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
The erosion of regulatory powers also increases the likelihood that social housing 
stock could be more easily sold by associations to private sector entities, raising 
troubling implications for the extent to which tenants may be dispossessed from central 
urban areas. A similar scenario has in fact already taken place with the threatened 
sale of the New Era estate in 2014 in the London borough of Hackney to a private 
equity firm named Westbrook Partners and more than doubling rents, although the 
deal fell through after tenant protests and was ultimately bought by a charitable 
foundation (Beswick et al. 2016, 336). Given the strategically-located placement of 
many social housing estates in central urban areas undergoing gentrification-led 
restructuring (Watt 2009), the homes of tenants could become more vulnerable to 
speculative investors seeking cheap land from buying stock and hiking rents to market 
rent. To the extent that the sector is becoming reliant on treating its land and housing 
as financial assets whose value should be maximised, this raises troubling questions 
over the extent to which the ongoing financial viability of the sector is becoming reliant 
on speculative land markets and the erosion of tenant security.   
As the next section reveals, exploring how housing associations themselves have 
navigated financialisation, this remains an uneven and variegated process, with 
different housing practitioners adopting different means of interpreting the tension 
between their commercial and social roles. 
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8.6 Urban financialisation and dispossession 
For some associations, a commercial rationale is seen as enabling greater freedom 
for providers to meet social goals, including in areas such as London where rising 
property values can enable highly profitable development activity. One interviewee 
who chaired the board of a London-based association with an active development arm 
argued that the greater flexibility of associations in being able to offer tenants weaker 
security of tenure was a positive change, enabling the organisation to better refurbish 
or redevelop its existing assets: 
Tenure models are really important, because it's one way of helping us to 
develop more by having mixed tenure developments which, if you want, 
reduce our dependence on housing benefit-based tenants to make the things 
more viable. 
 Housing association chair, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
For this association, the powers gained by associations to issued fixed term tenancies 
were an important part of enabling them to commercialise their stock, even if this 
meant weaker security of tenure for tenants: 
I think the ability to have turnover in our tenants must be a good thing, 
because it frees up units for us to do things with them, like we just did a major 
refurbishment or whatever. And I think if the policy is designed towards 
breaking up ghettoisation of housing, it's my personal view, and it's my 
personal view very much, is that's the right thing to do. I don't think people 
enjoy feeling that they're, you know, the rich or the poor in a sense, you don't 
necessarily want to be in your own ghetto. 
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 Housing association chair, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
Here, the value to the organisation of being able to better develop its real estate is 
presented as outweighing the value to the tenants of the security of their tenure. This 
is not presented in outright commercial terms, with the requirements of developing 
commercial housing justified in the creation of “mixed communities”, rather than 
holding estates purely consisting of social housing. The costs of this are revealed in 
terms of weaker security of tenure for tenants and a structural reduction of tenants on 
welfare support in particular, showing one form in which the financialisation of housing 
associations is contributing to accumulation through dispossession (Harvey 2007a) by 
the greater exclusion of people from secure housing. The alleged benefits of “mixed 
communities” have been criticised for lack of evidence within academia, however 
(Bridge, Butler, and Lees 2012), and the stigmatised depiction of working class areas 
as “ghettoisation” indicates the extent to which financialisation can contribute to 
ongoing processes of gentrification and class displacement.  
A logic of class displacement was more directly expressed among some interviewees 
with links to property and real estate finance. One clear example of this is given in the 
following quote from a property market consultant who depicts social housing tenants 
in “expensive” areas as receiving an unfair subsidy that could otherwise be used to 
fund new affordable housing supply through the market: 
They're sitting on huge assets which are only housing small numbers of people. In 
theory at least they can cash that in and replace five homes with 15 homes. They 
won't be in central areas, they will be further out, and of course that raises another 
hugely interesting question, completely unresolved by anybody, which is the 
morality or otherwise of retaining social housing stock in expensive areas for a few, 
or supplying more social housing stock in cheaper areas for many…I understand 
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entirely the arguments about gentrification and cleansing as it were, but on the other 
side is the question of how many more people could you home? Really tricky 
question. 
 Property market consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
Here, the treatment of housing stock as a pure financial asset is depicted in moral 
terms as an ethical way to meet the needs of tenants, where the displacement of 
existing social housing residents is justified in terms of the number of extra housing 
units it could hypothetically provide. Here, housing need is expressed solely in terms 
of market affordability as defined through the economic rationality of supply and 
demand. Although the argument in favour of a more commercial approach to social 
housing assets in the above quote is rhetorically phrased in objective terms, it should 
be stressed that the quote above implies a specific normative view of housing. Instead 
of its use as a means to social reproduction that is collectively shaped by its 
inhabitants, for example through how people’s experience of housing may relate to 
their neighbours or their city, the value of social housing here depends directly on its 
treatment as an individualised, private, and exchangeable commodity, erasing the 
harms caused by spatial displacement, gentrification and dispossession.  
Much recent research has focused on the implications of these financialised processes 
for London, both in terms of the changing commercial and social goals of housing 
associations (Manzi and Morrison 2017), and accumulation through dispossession in 
the broader housing system (Edwards 2016; Elmer and Dening 2016; Beswick et al. 
2016). Given the uneven development of social and affordable housing financialisation 
charted in Chapter 7 however, with corporate investors found to be targeting areas 
beyond London due to high land values making it difficult to earn sufficient yield, there 
remains a need to analyse how housing association financialisation operates outside 
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the capital. To bring regional divergencies in financialisation back into our 
understanding of these processes, the next section therefore turns to analyse data as 
to how these processes relate to housing associations in the regional city of 
Manchester. In doing so, I examine in particular the extent to which this emerging 
picture either shows a quantitative change, with Manchester replicating London’s 
experience on a smaller scale, or whether financialisation’s uneven development is 
bringing about qualitatively new features and characteristics between the two cities.  
8.7. Housing association financialisation in Manchester 
As argued in Part Two of this thesis, housing financialisation is a spatial and urban 
process (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011), and so there is a need to analyse 
the extent to which financialisation shapes and is reshaped by the particular contexts 
through Manchester’s particular urban context. As shown in Figure 8.4 below, 
Manchester City Council’s district boundaries cut a lateral slice through the Greater 
Manchester conurbation, from Blackley in the north to the outlying low income suburb 
of Wythenshawe in the south, ensuring it accounts for much of the inner-urban area 
of the city-region, in addition to its central core and leafier suburbs in the south of the 
city near the major universities. This creates a complex housing landscape, marked 
by the contrast between an ongoing speculative city centre apartment boom over the 
past two decades, and large social housing estates as a consequence of extensive 
slum clearance programmes in the post-war decades, though these have undergone 
residualisation and privatisation since the Thatcher era (Peck and Ward 2010). Areas 
fringing the centre such as Ancoats, Hulme, or West Gorton, or the neighbouring city 
of Salford, have also seen significant demolitions and the unlocking of land to new 
private developments as part of successive urban regeneration programmes since the 
1990s, including textbook neoliberal urban policies such as Housing Market Renewal 
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and other state-led gentrification policies (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Hatherley 
2011; Minton 2012). 
Figure 8.4. Manchester City Council’s district boundaries within Greater 
Manchester 
 
In common with other large UK cities, Manchester’s city centre population grew 
significantly in the 2000s, adding 20,000 residents at a growth rate of 83% as the city 
underwent a major apartment boom (Swinney 2016). Figure 8.5 below shows the 
overall pattern of housing supply within the city, contrasted with the capital city of 
London and the national average for England. Within Manchester, in common with the 
national picture, the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis and its co-constituted property market 
crash led to a collapse in the number of net additional dwellings. The collapse in 
Manchester went far further than either London or England however, falling back to an 
extremely low base of activity, and with a weaker recovery with the exception of a 
doubling of activity in 2012/13. This weak and volatile supply response may reflect the 
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spatial polarisation of the Manchester housing market within the Greater Manchester 
conurbation, with development concentrated into either a speculative boom in the city 
centre, or outlying housing developments around the M60 orbital motorway with good 
car transport access (Folkman et al. 2017). Of the total housing completions in 
Manchester from 2007 -2010, 94.4% were private and 74.2% were accounted for by 
apartments, demonstrating the importance of speculative flat construction at the peak 
of the housing bubble (Arc4 2010, 38). Net increases in housing have begun to recover 
since 2013/14, a shift that has begun to attract in institutional investors seeking 
opportunities in the private rental market (Silver 2018),  though levels still remain well 
below the peak of the pre-crisis boom.  
Figure 8.5. Net additions to dwelling stock, 2001/02 – 2016/17 
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Source: Office for National Statistics Live Table 122: Net additional dwellings by local 
authority district, England.  
A breakdown of the gross dwelling completions of housing in Manchester gives a more 
detailed analysis of the contribution of each tenure to the net additions analysed 
above, including how Manchester compares to both London and the national average 
for England. As shown below in the breakdown of gross dwelling completions by 
tenure between 1980/81 and 2014/15 in Figure 8.6, Manchester has distinct 
characteristics, highlighting the importance of an analysis of the specific urban 
conditions through which housing association financialisation is co-constituted. Here, 
the very high number of housing association completions in London relative to the 
private market is clearly demonstrated. Providers in London develop in a counter-
cyclical fashion relative to the market, increasing provision during the two property 
market crashes of the early 1990s and the late 2000s and benefitting from government 
grant programmes. The share of association provision in the capital is much higher 
compared to either England or Manchester, with association development also 
reaching private sector levels in 2010/11 and 2011/12, although this is due to private 
sector collapse as much as increased activity by associations. Housing association 
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development is far weaker in Manchester, showing little sign of additional housing 
output in the years following the crash of the late 2000s, though previously briefly 
overtaking the private sector from a very low base level of activity in the relatively 
higher grant environment of the mid-1990s. While publicly available data for 
Manchester between 2004/05 and 2006/07 in the government live tables used to 
reproduce these graphs is unfortunately missing, the predominance of private sector 
flat construction in dwelling completions for Manchester at the height of the bubble 
gives reasonable grounds to assume that the absent data does not contradict this 
overall pattern. Housing association development activity in Manchester is therefore 
operating from a very low base, playing a much smaller role in comparison to London.  
Figure 8.6. Dwelling completions by tenure 1980/81 – 2014/14 
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Source: DCLG live table 253, permanent dwellings started and completed, by tenure 
and district. 
Although net additional supply by housing associations in Manchester is low, social 
housing still makes up a significant proportion of total housing in the city. Currently, 
social housing stands at 30% of the city’s total stock levels, the majority provided by 
housing associations and much of it concentrated in the north and east of the city or 
the area immediately south of the city centre, alongside Wythenshawe’s outlying 
suburbs to the south (Manchester City Council 2016a, 6). Private renting has made a 
major comeback, also standing at 30% of the city’s housing stock, with the remainder 
accounted for by home ownership (Ibid.).  
In order to analyse housing association financialisation in Manchester, it is necessary 
to examine the ownership structure of the city’s housing landscape, given the legacy 
stock transfer has left on Manchester’s social landlords, and the consequences this 
has for the developments they can undertake. Figure 8.7 below provides a breakdown 
of the ownership of social housing stock in Manchester, drawing on data collated from 
the city council’s publicly accessible rehousing website, Manchester Move, and 
accessed in January 2015, While the majority of social housing stock originally came 
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under the local authority, this has since undergone successive stock transfer 
programmes that have produced a fragmented system dominated by a number of 
housing associations, the majority of which hold between 4,000 – 6,000 units.  
Figure 8.7. Housing association stock ownership in Manchester by provider 
 
Source: Manchester Move rehousing website (data accessed January 2015). 
As shown above, the largest single provider is Northwards, an ALMO established and 
still owned by Manchester City Council, operating in the north of the city. Manchester 
City Council also directly owns a small amount of remnant stock. Of the stock held by 
housing associations, the majority of providers holding over 1,000 stock units in the 
city are organisations deriving from the transfer of former council stock, with the 
exception of Guinness Northern Counties, Places for People, Great Places Housing 
Group, and Adactus. An additional traditional housing association is MossCare, 
founded 50 years ago and undergoing a merger in 2017 with St Vincent’s, although 
these operate on a smaller scale at 6,000 homes around the North West (MossCare 
St Vincent’s 2017). There are also a large number of diverse associations, co-
operatives and other organisations in operation. As these individually hold small 
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numbers of stock within Manchester, with each holding less than 1,000 units in the 
city, they have been coded as ‘other’ in the above graph. While Manchester’s social 
housing geography has undergone significant fragmentation as a product of stock 
transfer, there have also been more recent trends toward re-consolidation, with 
Eastlands Homes and City South Manchester undergoing a merger in 2015 as One 
Manchester, a new landlord accounting for 12,000 houses. Since April 2013, ParkWay 
Green and Willow Park Housing Trust have operated as Wythenshawe Community 
Housing Group, collectively owning 12,000 properties. Manchester’s social housing 
has therefore seen a striking change through stock transfer since the 1980s, moving 
from the dominance of municipal ownership to a fragmented pattern of smaller 
landlords, some of which are now undergoing re-consolidation.  
Larger, more commercial associations operating in Manchester include the national-
scale Places for People, Guinness, and Adactus, with the latter forming part of the 
Jigsaw Housing Group with 33,000 properties in the North West and the Midlands. 
One significant housing association with local origins and developer ambitions is Great 
Places, a developer association with over 15,000 properties, in addition to 3,200 
shared ownership and leasehold houses held under its commercial subsidiary Plumlife 
(Great Places Housing Group 2017). In 2017, Plumlife sold 193 shared ownership 
properties, generating £13.1m, alongside 32 houses for outright market sale, for a 
nearly £1m surplus. Credit rated by Fitch and Moody’s, Great Places issued a £200m 
bond in 2012 and a subsequent £145m bond in March 2018, used largely to fund new 
development (Hollander 2018). The association also contracted with Manchester City 
Council to manage commercial housing sales through its Matrix Homes joint venture 
with the Greater Manchester Pension Fund, an example of how speculative local 
government-led development can intersect with the institutional development of 
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financialisation in housing associations (Manchester City Council 2016b). 
Financialisation in the sense of greater reliance of associations on capital markets and 
speculative development therefore does occur in some associations in Manchester 
along a similar model to that of London, showing that this is not a phenomenon 
confined to the capital.  
This model is less the case for the majority of significant associations holding more 
than 1,000 properties within Manchester, however, the majority of which have origins 
in LSVT stock transfer programmes. As shown by the following quote from a 
regeneration official, in part this is due to the financial profile of the typical stock 
transfer process, in which associations take on large initial quantities of debt in order 
to finance repairs and renovate council stock that had undergone decades of under-
investment, limiting their borrowing capacity and their ability to develop: 
The other issue for them in developing market PRS or developing market sale 
is that only some of them can do that. Because those that did an LSVT got a 
really good long term facility with the bank at a really good, basis points really 
at quite a low level. And if they start borrowing other money it either breaches 
the covenants or the banks will do a backput reprice on their funding…It was 
so low cost when they got it, they're really scared of doing anything in case it 
messes that up and the whole book gets repriced. 
 Senior Greater Manchester regeneration official, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 
2015. 
This also demonstrates the temporal contingences of financialisation (Montgomerie 
and Büdenbender 2015), in that banks which were willing to lend on favourable terms 
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prior to the financial crisis are currently seeking opportunities to reprice their lending 
in a post-crisis context where the banks’ own funding costs have increased.  
Despite this financial context, providers including LSVT associations are undertaking 
market development programmes in Manchester. One Manchester for example has a 
development programme of 172 market rent homes in the area of Hulme south of 
Manchester’s city centre, alongside 10 shared ownership homes, a further 24 of 
market rent completed in August 2017, and the acquisition of a further 8 market rent 
apartments, in addition to a further 765 planned units across a range of tenures (One 
Manchester 2017, 14). Wythenshawe Community Housing Group has also developed 
451 units for affordable rent, 54 for outright sale, 244 for shared ownership, 48 for 
market rent and 39 for rent to buy (Wythenshawe Community Housing Group 2017, 
4). These examples should not be taken as exhaustive of association development 
activity in Manchester by all providers, but as an indication of the tenure mix that 
associations are targeting in their development plans, including for market sale and 
rent, showing the potential for the different profiles of LSVT and traditional associations 
to take on a common trajectory over time.  
Although associations are engaging in development once more, the following quote 
from a regeneration official nonetheless shows that the land market is likely to create 
barriers for associations in Manchester in their future programmes: 
We do have a number of great RSLs across the city and across GM who actually 
can buy land anywhere and develop but they are competing with the 
commercial sector. The market's on the increase, maybe they should have 
bought when the market was flat, but now the market's getting better 
developers are trying to get in there as well. 
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 Senior Greater Manchester regeneration official, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 
2015. 
That is, a recovery in market activity can still create barriers for associations in that 
they will face competition with commercial developers for access to land. Without the 
rising land values such as that can be found in London to finance development, 
speculative development at scale is unlikely to occur to the same extent. 
While housing associations in Manchester therefore do face pressures to financialise, 
though lacking the same capacity to do so, there is also the issue as to how housing 
practitioners on the ground interpret these changes. For example, greater commercial 
pressures could lead practitioners to see themselves as working for effectively private 
businesses, a normative change from the welfare role that associations have 
traditionally undertaken. Interview data with housing practitioners in south Manchester 
indicate a more nuanced state of affairs however, with housing and neighbourhood 
managers attempting to balance between their welfare functions in an environment 
where they face greater commercial imperatives. During the course of my fieldwork, 
both senior executives and national policy shapers repeatedly argued that 
commercialisation was necessary in order to compensate for lost government 
development grant funding. This was clearly stated at a practitioner level by one 
interviewee working as a neighbourhood manager within South Manchester, who 
argued that this had led to a cultural shift within the sector toward a more commercial 
mindset: 
We housing associations have to get clever now. If you look at our mission, 
we're a commercial organisation now. And that's only come in the last couple 
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of years. We're a housing association but before anything, we're a commercial 
company. 
 
RG: Would you say that's a recent shift? 
 
Oh yeah, yeah. Last two or three years, that's right across the board. Because 
of all the cutbacks, we can't - it's very hard to get any subsidy off the 
government to build any new homes. You've got to look at other ways now. 
 Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager C, PhD 
fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
In their interviews with housing association chief executives operating within London, 
Manzi and Morrison (2017) argued that commercial logics were coming to displace 
social values within the sector. The interview quoted above offers some additional 
supporting evidence, finding that an identification of housing associations as 
businesses first and foremost can also be found at a housing management level, within 
a city such as Manchester that has seen much lower development activity by 
associations. To the extent that the aims of providing housing for need become 
subsumed by the commercial goal of maximising revenue, this also implies a greater 
degree of financialisation through associations.  
Other interview data in my research suggests a more complex relation between social 
and market logics, however. When explaining why their housing association had 
diversified into providing homes for private rent, one neighbourhood manager working 
for a stock transfer association in Manchester argued that this was a necessary evil in 
order to better deliver services for existing social housing tenants: 
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I wouldn’t say it was to subsidise. It’s just to bring in a different arm to the 
organisation and a different funding stream...I think, as a provider, that if we 
have to do that by having market rent so that the people who are working that 
can afford a slightly higher rent can afford to pay that, and that gives some 
income to people in the generic social housing that can’t, for them to have the 
services that we provide, then I’m fine with that. The ends justify the means. 
 Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager A, PhD 
fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
While defending this diversification, providing homes for private rent is presented here 
in terms of what will best meet the needs of existing tenants. Although recognising that 
this means charging private renters more for housing, this is defended by an implicit 
appeal to the needs of people in social housing, arguing that better-off private tenants 
are able to support people who would otherwise be vulnerable. Rather than being 
justified purely in terms of treating their stock as a pure financial asset in order to 
increase housing supply, for this respondent the provision of a welfare service was still 
a core part of the identity of the association. This is perhaps unsurprising however, 
given the limited capacity of the association to engage in commercial development 
due to its location in Manchester and its financial profile as an entity with origins in 
stock transfer. Financialisation therefore does not entail a singular top-down logic, but 
one that must be materialised through practitioners who express diversity as to the 
extent to which they have internalised these processes as shaping the ultimate aims 
of their housing practice. While the data is indicative at this stage, this implies the 
potential for contestation over the normative aspects of financialisation through 
practitioners within associations, and potentially opening up avenues for the 
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contestation and challenge of these imperatives, an important area for future research 
for how financialisation is materialised as an urban process.   
8.8. Conclusion 
Austerity policies in the years since the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis have seen an 
intensification of commercial development by housing associations. These represent 
a new phase in the re-commodification of social housing that has been underway 
throughout the neoliberal period since the early 1980s (Harloe and Lebas 1981), with 
housing associations incentivised to directly act as commercial businesses and 
potentially fulfilling the prediction made by Ginsburg (2005) of a full privatisation of the 
larger housing associations within the sector. Moreover, the evidence gathered here 
suggests this is becoming a financialised process, in which ability of social housing 
tenants to access secure housing is becoming dependent on the structural 
requirement of treating land as a pure financial asset. As argued in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, financialisation can therefore be found to be further spreading financial logics 
and calculus into the social reproduction of low income urban inhabitants through 
subordinating the provision of their housing to the needs of the accumulation of capital 
in land.  
My findings also complicate the understanding of financialisation offered by Bryan and 
Rafferty (2014b) as a transformation of social reproduction through financial logics and 
calculus. This has been found to operate not just at the level of home ownership 
through processes such as mortgage equity withdrawal, but through the homes of 
tenants being potentially treated as such through the financialisation of their social 
landlords. As such, this suggests that future research should go beyond the interviews 
with housing practitioners, stakeholders and policy shapers analysed in this study to 
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explore how tenants themselves reflect on or are affected by these processes, and the 
extent to which this is reshaping their housing experiences and circumstances.  
The claim analysed in this chapter that financialisation can be an effective means of 
providing new social and affordable housing through housing associations treating 
their land as pure financial assets to be maximised can also be seen to advance the 
theorisation by Cowan and McDermont (2008) of the productive “obscurity” of need as 
a legitimating concept in social housing provision. Think tanks, consultants and others 
circling the sector have explicitly argued in favour of commercial asset management 
and spatial displacement in the aftermath of the crisis, indicating that austerity has 
intensified the neoliberal weaponisation of ‘need’ through discursively subordinating it 
to the economic rationality of market supply. This has been found to rest on a 
normative view of housing as an individualised and private commodity. This image 
rests on the production of an objectified, “abstract” space of commodity circulation 
(Lefebvre 1991), materially dominating the relational meanings, narratives and values 
that people may or may not ascribe to the spaces of their home and neighbourhood. 
The potential harms caused by displacement and gentrification-led dispossession are 
erased under this treatment of space, disrupting the ability of tenants to define and 
meet their own needs through the use of their housing as a means of social 
reproduction as it is transformed into a means for the accumulation of capital.  
The analysis of these processes in the context of Manchester in the seventh section 
of this chapter have shown the potential for a more nuanced urban geography of 
financialisation, however. Financialisation in Manchester has been found to have 
qualitative differences to that in the capital, with associations facing similar commercial 
pressures, but with a much weaker capacity to churn their assets due to lower land 
values, the institutional and financial legacy of stock transfer, and restricted access to 
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land relative to their existing resources. While providers in London are likely to face 
similar competition with developers for land, their pre-existing land assets given the 
rising values in the capital enable development to occur at a greater scale, a 
quantitative difference to Manchester, but one that makes it qualitatively easier to 
restructure themselves as market actors. 
While the ethos of associations in Manchester is undergoing a realignment under 
financialisation, with much greater commercial pressures, there is still divergence 
among practitioners as to the extent to which some now see themselves as working 
for predominantly commercial entities, or as welfare providers having to adopt new 
practices in order to meet their social aims. Though this finding is indicative and should 
be subject to future research, the nuances of local policymaking and institutional 
culture within the association sector may have implications for the extent to which 
associations come to prioritise commercial development in the future. This is 
particularly important given the geography of association financialisation, with 
Manchester found to have similar pressures to London but a much weaker opportunity 
structure for providers to engage in private development. Such nuances are also likely 
to be vital in a devolution context where, although powers are currently limited and 
current policy priorities have yet to undergo significant change (Folkman et al. 2017), 
there may be greater future scope for local government to explore alternative city-
regional agendas that aim toward a more progressive housing settlement.  
The theorisation of financialisation as an urban process, drawing associations deeper 
into processes of gentrification-led transformation and displacement within cities, also 
has implications for how tensions between the ‘social’ and ‘commercial’ aims have 
been explored in the wider housing studies literature. To date, an analysis of the 
financialisation of housing associations as inherently involving a transformation of 
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class relations and spatial dispossession through the re-commodification of the urban 
landscape has been relatively under-explored in the published literature specifically 
examining the contemporary restructuring of housing associations (Tang, Oxley, and 
Mekic 2017; Manzi and Morrison 2017). Although Wainwright and Manville (2017) 
have explicitly considered space, this has been conceptualised in terms of the 
subordination of ‘local’ real estate markets to ‘global’ capital markets, rather than 
viewing the class relations transformed by financialisation as capable of having their 
own, active dynamic. While my research too has not covered the experience of 
financialisation by tenants, the spatial implications strongly suggest that future 
research in the financialisation of housing associations should directly incorporate a 
theorisation of spatial justice (Soja 2009) when analysing the ‘social’ goals of these 
changing providers. In doing so, this will aid research into the production of new 
housing geographies through the financialisation of social housing, and the 
development of a better academic response to these ongoing processes of 
accumulation through dispossession. 
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Chapter nine – Creating better capitalists: housing 
associations and the governance of risk 
9.0. Introduction 
As shown in chapters 7 and 8, the years following the financial crisis have enabled a 
qualitative shift in the sector from commercialisation to financialisation, with many 
housing associations increasingly coming to treat their land and housing as pure 
financial assets. Austerity, rather than the bond markets, has been the driver of this 
process, with associations attempting to plug funding gaps through seeking additional 
funding through either shared ownership products or building houses for market sale. 
While commercial income now forms almost a quarter of the sector’s entire turnover, 
this has been a highly uneven process, with only a minority of larger and predominantly 
London-based organisations able to take sufficient advantage of rising land values to 
carry out development on a large scale. This has also been found to be unlikely to 
provide funds that can be used to cross-subsidise the construction of large amounts 
of new social housing, with the level of profits that can be made from this process 
undercut by the needs to cover both the costs and the risks of commercial 
development. In what follows I now extend this analysis, arguing that the 
financialisation of housing associations is generating new risks at a time where the 
HCA has fewer regulatory resources available in order to maintain the stability of the 
sector. 
A key argument in this chapter is that housing associations have benefitted since the 
crisis from a relatively favourable conjuncture (Engelen et al. 2010) of low interest 
rates, low inflation, and stable rental streams, even with welfare cuts that have placed 
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growing pressure on tenants. While the years since the latest crisis have seen a 
“regressive recovery” predicted on weak growth and rising inequality (Green and 
Lavery 2015), the sector as a whole has nonetheless enjoyed rising surpluses that 
have enabled a growing number of providers to engage in commercial development 
(Homes and Communities Agency 2017b). The next decade is likely to see a far less 
favourable environment for providers however, with ongoing economic uncertainty 
including the impending British exit from the EU, and the planned implementation of 
universal credit measures that will see housing benefit paid directly to tenants rather 
than landlords, significantly increasing the chance of widespread rent arrears. 
Conservative divisions over Europe and the loss of Prime Minister Theresa May’s 
governing Parliamentary majority following a snap general election in 2017 have 
raised the serious prospect of the return to power of a Labour party led by left-winger 
Jeremy Corbyn, potentially leading to a reversal of at least some austerity measures 
and a return of grant funding for social housing. Long term economic dangers still exist 
however, with the prospect of a rise in interest rates and ongoing underlying 
vulnerabilities in financial and property markets.  
In particular, building on the discussion of risk in Chapter 5 of this thesis (Froud 2003), 
I argue that these dangers for housing associations are taking on greater significance 
in a post-crisis context characterised not just by heightened risks, but by growing 
uncertainty. Prior to the financial crisis for example, financialisation was often 
discursively legitimised on the grounds that it enabled the accurate pricing and trading 
of exposures to risk for market participants (Shiller 2004), an assumption undermined 
by the credit crunch and the failure to account for systemic risk (Martin, Rafferty, and 
Bryan 2008). The failure of dominant economic models to predict the systemic risks 
that led to future conditions being seemingly much less amenable to prediction, 
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leading to regulators increasing their emphasis on concepts such as ‘resilience’ and 
preparedness for the next crisis among the regulated (Langley 2013). In this chapter I 
argue this process can also be seen within the regulation of housing associations, with 
the regulator attempting to compensate for higher risks in a time of diminished 
resources by emphasising the need for providers to increase their competence as 
business organisations, instituting new requirements such as stress tests and new 
commercial skills requirements on boards. These place much greater emphasis on the 
ability of associations to rely on their own resources for financial survival, further 
rescaling responsibility for managing risk onto the scale of the individual provider, 
training them to become more adept in managing their debts and investments. 
In doing so, this raises the question of the extent to which these reforms are deepening 
a process of “organised irresponsibility” (Veitch 2007), in which the costs of bearing 
the systemic risks generated by speculative real estate processes are being 
reterritorialised onto housing associations. As tenant protections are weakened and 
associations are encouraged to behave as good capitalists capable of efficiently 
managing their bottom lines, this also raises the prospects that risks are passed down 
onto tenants, forcing them to act as “shock absorbers” (Bryan and Rafferty 2014b) in 
incorporating them into the circulation of capital through the urban landscape. To 
explore these issues, in this chapter I draw on analysis of regulatory documents and 
interviews from fieldwork participants, drawing in particular on a senior housing 
policymaker, a solicitor, auditors,, regeneration officers, and a financial consultant. 
Extending the analysis of the geography of housing association financialisation in 
Manchester in section 7 of Chapter 8, I also explore the extent to which these 
processes are being materialised on the ground by neighbourhood managers as 
housing practitioners, identifying emerging trends in the extent to which the 
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governance of the risks of financialisation are enacted through the dispossession of 
tenants.  
In answering these questions, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. 
In the first section I examine the risks that have been built up by the financialisation 
agenda, where despite rising surpluses due to low interest rates there have been 
indications that some associations have struggled to adequately manage the risks of 
commercial development. In the second section I examine the case of the failure of 
Cosmopolitan Housing Group following over-ambitious commercial expansion 
specifically, a near-insolvency that crystallised the concerns of lenders and regulators, 
and led to new rounds of regulatory reform within the sector. In the third section I 
analyse the attempts by the regulator to manage these risks, while the fourth explicitly 
focuses on the implications of the shift in insolvency mechanisms to a court-appointed 
administrator for the sector’s regulatory governance. In the fifth sector I analyse how 
creditors have been explicitly protected through this regime, while in the sixth section 
I explore the likely consequences for tenants of these risks at a national level, with the 
seventh section analysing how this is enacted through Manchester’s urban context. 
The final section concludes. 
9.1. Financialisation and risk in a post-crisis context 
The financialisation of housing associations analysed in Chapter 8 has occurred under 
a relatively favourable economic context for associations. As shown in Figure 9.1 
below, the sector as a whole has seen a striking rise in the level of surpluses made by 
housing associations since 2009 according to the financial accounts collected by the 
regulators of housing associations. Effectively representing the sector’s profits, these 
have not been due to commercial activity by providers that is captured within the group 
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accounts of providers, although it should be noted that global accounts compiled by 
the regulator do not account for many commercial subsidiaries and therefore do not 
account for profits that have not been repatriated to the parent companies within the 
group structure of housing associations. Although such commercial profits may rise in 
the future, the slight dip of profits from asset sales shown below in the period between 
2008 and 2014 is not unexpected, given the weakness of the property market for much 
of that time. Instead, a major factor in the rise of the sector’s surpluses has been the 
presence of ultra-low interest rates imposed by central banks as an emergency 
response to the crisis, cheapening the relative cost of borrowing at a time when the 
rents of social housing tenants were indexed above inflation by the rent convergence 
policy operated by the regulator. As seen in Chapter 8, larger associations have been 
able to use this period to opportunistically financialise, setting up active commercial 
development arms. 
Figure 9.1. Social housing lettings and profits from sales against interest 
payments for the housing association sector (£m) 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Social housing lettings and profits from sales 
against interest payments
Surplus on social housing lettings Net interest payable
Profit on sales of assets
306 
 
Source: Regulatory global accounts of housing providers (Homes and Communities 
Agency 2017a, 2016a, 2015a, 2014a, 2013a; Tenant Services Authority 2009a, 2011). 
To the extent that financialisation has occurred within housing associations however, 
it should be viewed as both a spatially and temporally bounded process, 
geographically concentrated among providers operating in central urban areas such 
as inner London and occurring in a temporary conjuncture (Engelen et al. 2010) of low 
interest rates, low inflation, and speculative demand that has pushed up land prices. 
As shown in Chapter 7, housing associations have been able to borrow at relatively 
affordable long-term rates throughout this period, with bond buyers considering 
housing association debt to be safe, long-run asset due to the stability and regulated 
characteristics of the sector. Associations have also made use of derivatives to swap 
their interest payments from variable rate to fixed rate, with 70% of the sector’s debt 
paid on a fixed-rate basis, helping them build certainty into their business plans 
(Homes and Communities Agency 2017a). With interest rates currently kept at near-
zero levels by central banks as part of their attempt to ameliorate a dearth in global 
growth opportunities (Bowman et al. 2013), the cost of future borrowing is nonetheless 
expected to rise, cutting into the high surpluses currently made by providers. 
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Figure 9.2. Earnings Before Interest, Tax and Amortisation, Major Repairs 
Included (EBITDA MRI) interest cover 
 
Source: Regulatory global accounts of housing providers (Homes and Communities 
Agency 2017a, 2016a, 2015a, 2014a, 2013a; Tenant Services Authority 2009a, 2011). 
It could be argued that this relatively benign environment has helped associations build 
the capacity to develop, gaining experience and helping them become more resilient 
if they face tougher times ahead in the property market. Figure 9.2 above shows the 
change in the Earnings Before Interest, Tax and Amortisation, Major Repairs Included 
(EBITDA MRI) interest cover ratio for housing associations. A figure collected by the 
regulator, this is used as a rough indicator of the operational cash flows generated by 
the sector that could be used to cover debt and other payments where default might 
threaten the solvency of a social housing provider. As revealed here, the overall 
measure rose sharply from 60% in 2009 to 160% in 2015, seemingly indicating good 
financial health.  
Several interviewees in the course of my fieldwork expressed concerns over the ability 
of the housing association sector to collectively manage its commercial risks, however. 
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Since the financial crisis at least one association has neared bankruptcy, with 
Cosmopolitan Housing Group in 2013 becoming virtually insolvent and requiring a 
rescue merger with another, larger association overseen by the HCA. While the 
implications that the collapse of Cosmopolitan raised for the sector’s regulation will be 
analysed below in further detail, the regulator has expressed concern about the cash 
flows of other associations. While the interest cover held by associations has risen 
since 2009, in January 2016 the HCA warned that 20% of providers had an EBITDA 
MRI cover ratio of less than 100%, an indication of possible financial weaknesses. 
Although this could be partly accounted for by stock transfer companies carrying out 
major repairs as part of the transfer process, some associations were suspected by 
the HCA to be selling assets in order to meet their operational cash flows (Stothart 
2016b). This concern that a minority of providers were selling assets to meet their cash 
flow needs was echoed by one of my interviewees, a consultant advising the financial 
and treasury management activities of associations: 
There are some that need to sell properties to cover their interest cost. It’s not 
a comfortable place to be in. 
 Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
Reliance on sales rather than rent to cover interest costs is a potentially dangerous 
situation for a housing association, because it means its ability to cover debts and 
avoid a default and threatened insolvency is dependent on being able to make a profit 
in the property market. This can be seen as another indicator of financialisation, with 
some providers forced to maximise the value of their housing and land as a pure 
financial asset, but there is no guarantee that success at this process is sustainable 
for some or even most social landlords.  
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One policymaker in the course of my fieldwork also suggested that rather than being 
an isolated case, a recurrent pattern identified by a policymaker with in-depth 
knowledge of the regulation of the sector has been for associations to underestimate 
the level of risk that providers may be taking on by engaging in commercialised 
development: 
A lot of that is to do with people looking at the kind of margins that they see in 
private sector developments and just kind of assuming well, that's money for 
old rope. But actually a lot of those high margins are pricing risk…if you 
operate in an area where the normal profit margin is 20% and you think well, 
we can do this on a 10% margin, and it then turns out that 10% covers the risk 
element and only the next 10 is the profit, if the risk crystallises you end up 
making no money at all. And that's been the kind of pattern that we've seen 
quite a number of times. 
 Senior housing policymaker, PhD fieldwork data, Summer 2015. 
As indicated here, although high profit margins can be common for individual 
developments, these correlate to high rates of risk, with the illiquidity of real estate 
leaving it vulnerable to devaluation and crisis, with the need to mitigate these crises 
partly explaining the institutional complexity of favourable tax treatment, planning 
regimes and other legal frameworks that often surround the industry (Gotham 2009). 
Since the financial crisis at least one housing association, Cosmopolitan Housing 
Group, whose case will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter, has neared 
bankruptcy, while the policymaker quoted above revealed that the regulator is 
concerned that these issues underlying these problems are by no means an isolated 
incident. 
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An additional cause for concern can be found for the incomes of housing associations 
outside the capital if they are forced to rely on becoming financialised to survive. As 
found in the last chapter, success at financialisation is also often predicated on being 
able to develop at scale, with London-based associations in areas of high values able 
to churn stock in order to release funds for development. Interviewees outside of the 
capital were more sceptical of the extent to which this could be achieved among the 
sector in general, with one regeneration official working in Manchester explaining that 
many registered providers (RPs) had high overheads relative to commercial 
developers: 
I think they could be more efficient to be honest. I think what happens is 
Taylor Wimpey and volume housebuilders buy bricks at volume. Each of the 
RPs tends to work on their own, so it's like you going to B&Q rather than going 
to Travis Perkins21 or something. They might only be building maybe 100 
units a year, whereas housebuilders work in blocks of 500…The RPs go, "ah, 
but they don't build the quality we build." Fair do’s, that's space standards, but 
you still only need the same amount of operatives to do that. 
 Senior Greater Manchester regeneration official, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 
2015. 
The restricted scale at which housing associations are capable of developing at has 
therefore been a constraint on the sector’s profitability, particularly outside London. 
This quote also indicates that providers could increase their margins by reducing 
quality in areas such as space standards, suggesting that financial pressures would 
                                                          
21 Travis Perkins is a builders’ supplier, whereas B&Q is a well-known retailer in the UK and Ireland that sells 
home improvement and DIY equipment. 
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see further downgrades for tenants. Financialisation therefore should not be seen as 
bringing in an easy return, but as a capital-intensive and risky process, providing 
restricted scope for stable income generation outside of a limited number of providers 
able to exploit strategically located land assets. 
In addition to these geographic limits, there is evidence to suggest that financialisation 
among housing associations is also a temporally bounded process. Although the 
period since the financial crisis as shown in the previous chapter has been one of 
rising surpluses and commercial expansion for associations, the following quote from 
a senior housing policymaker nonetheless reveals that the financial difficulties 
encountered by many associations in this process have been a matter of serious 
concern for the regulator: 
What is worrying is that even in this relatively benign period where welfare 
reform has rolled out slowly, the housing market has been pretty buoyant, and 
interest rates have been at all-time lows [RG: Has that led to higher 
surpluses?], which has led to the higher surpluses, but even in that very 
benign period we've had quite a number of associations getting into trouble. 
Senior housing policymaker, PhD fieldwork data, summer 2015. 
That is, the economic conditions for commercialisation by housing associations have 
been favourable even at a time of austerity, with low interest rates, above inflation rent 
increases, and rising land values. Although welfare cuts have put pressure on the 
income of tenants, the impact on the rental streams of providers have so far been 
limited. These conditions are unlikely to be sustainable however, with ultra-low interest 
rates having nowhere to go but up, and the roll-out of universal credit holding the 
potential for increased arrears risk due to delays in processing and payments being 
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made directly to tenants rather than landlords. This raises the question of how the 
sector’s financialisation may develop under future, far less favourable standards.  
In comparison to the time of the financial crisis, as shown in chapters 7 and 8 of this 
thesis the association sector now has greater exposure to property market risk and a 
more complex financial relations with creditors, while deregulatory measures in the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016 enable social housing stock to be sold with greater 
ease from the registered sector. This raises the question of whether the financialisation 
of the sector experienced since 2009 is sustainable, or whether a more uncertain 
operating environment may lead to potential dangers and sources of crisis in the sector 
at a time when social housing estates in central urban areas such as inner London are 
becoming an object of potential interest by speculative investors (Beswick et al. 2016). 
Recent years have also seen major incidents within the sector, most notably the near-
insolvency of Cosmopolitan Housing Group in 2013 following over-ambitious 
expansion of speculative student housing developments (Underwood, Kane, and 
Appleby 2014). The case of Cosmopolitan raises numerous implications for the use of 
finance and commercial development in the sector, and will now be analysed in more 
detail in the following section.  
9.2. Managing failure: the case of Cosmopolitan Housing Group 
The period since the beginning of the financial crisis has seen two incidents where a 
housing association has neared collapse; the London-based Ujima housing 
association just prior to the credit crunch in 2007, which became insolvent after too-
rapid expansion left it unable to repay its debts out of rental income (Hetherington 
2008), and the Merseyside-based Cosmopolitan Housing Group in 2013. The near-
bankruptcy of the latter has been a major issue for the regulator, with a comprehensive 
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independent review for the government by the consultancy firm Altair finding the 
56,000-property landlord nearly collapsed after over-ambitious developments in its 
5,000-bed student housing arm through a subsidiary led to cash shortages 
(Underwood, Kane, and Appleby 2014). In both cases the regulator resolved the 
situation by arranging a merger with other, larger associations; London and Quadrant 
in the case of Ujima, and Sanctuary Group for Cosmopolitan. For Cosmopolitan this 
resolution did not occur up until the brink of insolvency however, after a previous 
planned merger with the North West-based housing association Riverside fell through 
at a late date due to the latter’s concerns over the scale of the losses in the group’s 
student housing (Hollander 2013b). If it had collapsed then this would have been the 
first bankruptcy to occur following the financial crisis, testing the regulator’s ability to 
satisfy creditors while protecting student housing.  
The use of housing association stock as collateral, as shown in Chapter 6 of this thesis, 
means that this could have had dire consequences for tenants. Although 
Cosmopolitan’s student housing developments were carried out in a separate 
subsidiary, 12 out of 16 leases were found to have parent company guarantees 
against the housing association arm of its wider group structure, placing social housing 
stock at risk of repossession (Underwood, Kane, and Appleby 2014, 19). 
Cosmopolitan was also found to have been using index-linked finance in its borrowing, 
where repayments are connected to an underlying index such as inflation that as 
shown in Chapter 7 can have cheap upfront costs, but long-term hidden liabilities. This 
was further exacerbated by improper accounting treatment that registered these as 
operating rather than financial leases, with the correct treatment leading to a breach 
of bank covenants, further wrecking the finances of the group (Ibid., 3). Routine 
financial monitoring by the regulator had failed to detect warning signs, and despite 
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suspicions that it was not being given proper information by the association the HCA 
was found by Altair to have “little it could do about this except issue strongly worded 
communications” (Ibid., 23). The debacle laid bare several problems facing the 
regulator: inadequate monitoring, over-ambitious developments, financial instruments 
whose risks were not appreciated or properly disclosed, and a dependency on the 
willingness of other associations to resolve problems through merger in order to avoid 
bankruptcy.  
In assessing the causes of the near-disaster, the government-sponsored review by 
Altair avoided consideration of the extent to which Cosmopolitan’s problems had 
systemic roots, arguing instead that poor governance and inability to properly manage 
development programmes lay at the heart of the problem. This view has been echoed 
by many stakeholders within the sector. The following quotes from two auditors 
working with the social housing sector provide a clear example of responsibility being 
located at the level of the individual provider, with both interviewees explaining their 
view of the best way to manage the risks of an incident such as Cosmopolitan: 
Auditor B: It probably wouldn’t hurt if they’d [done] bad business decisions 
if they went into some sort of managed insolvency and somebody else comes 
– it’s a bit like the NHS, you can’t kick people out of houses or a hospital bed 
clearly but you need to work through some sort of turnaround process. 
Auditor A: The business that Cosmopolitan had was broken. Sanctuary got it 
in a bargain and has turned it round and is making money hand over fist. But 
because of the numpty-ish decisions of that group of managers and directors 
and non-execs maybe, they would have ruined that whole business and could 
have seen 20,000 people literally homeless. 
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 Auditors A and B, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
At least two core elements of the individualisation of risk (Veitch 2007) as discussed 
in Chapter 5 can be seen here. The first is the centring of responsibility for the problem 
at the level of the individual provider, with Cosmopolitan’s irresponsible and 
incompetent management identified as the primary cause of the failure. The second 
is the underlying reliance on market mechanisms to resolve problems within the 
sector, though in a process “managed” by the regulator, with a competitor that was 
better able to manage its assets and liabilities effectively in making a profit able to 
come in and turn around its fortunes. Systemic risks that might be generated by 
associations engaging in speculative urban property development (Gotham 2009) are 
displaced in this focus on to the individual provider, and its ability to properly ensure 
the continued circulation of capital through the built environment. 
In the emphasis on merger as a crisis-resolution tool,  a major concern is the reliance 
this places on there being other associations willing and able to take on the liabilities 
of weaker providers, as opposed to a bankrupt social landlord risking having stock 
repossessed by lenders. As shown in this second quote from the auditor above, there 
are suspicions within the sector that a number of providers are financially vulnerable, 
and the regulator has been approaching associations to see who would be prepared 
to act as a potential rescuer: 
The HCA will always step in and there’s loads of people out there that they’ve 
already tapped up and said, would you be the one – and even some of the 
smaller 12,000, 15,000 type housing associations I know have been asked, 
would you be a rescuer? And they’ve all said yes…A lot of people know who 
the crazy horse ones are as well. So people are just waiting, to a certain extent, 
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a bit vulture-like. Because they will fail, but they will be taken over. They won’t 
go back into the private sector. It will be taken over by housing associations. 
 Auditor A, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
The relatively small size of the providers referred to here is a potential indicator of the 
extent to which the regulator is concerned over potential weaknesses in the sector. 
While this is a speculative point, this could also reflect a wariness by the regulator of 
over-reliance on large providers to resolve failures, with the risk that underlying 
weaknesses would be concentrated into a smaller number of too-big-to-fail 
organisations, whose problems could be unresolvable by merger alone and require a 
government bailout to avoid repossession. An example of a similar case of financial 
instability, though occurring in a different national context and for different immediate 
reasons, can be seen in the near-insolvency of the largest Dutch housing association, 
Vestia, after failed speculative trades in derivatives required a €1.9bn government 
rescue package (Aalbers, Loon, and Fernandez 2017). In the event of an analogous 
scenario for an association undergoing default due to failures in a commercial 
subsidiary, one compromise solution suggested by a valuer in my fieldwork was that 
commercial assets would likely be sold, while the regulator intervened to protect social 
housing stock: 
Where commercial pressures come to the fore and perhaps risks crystallise, it 
would be the commercial bits that are dealt with financially to leave the core 
business intact…if you’re going to have to deal with financial failure, it’s going 
to be the commercial bits that get chopped, leaving the core business to get 
picked up by somebody else. 
 Real estate valuer A, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
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Although these quotes make a rhetorical appeal to the market’s ability to resolve failed 
business models and achieve socially optimal outcomes through competition, the 
consequences of the failure of a housing association make it unlikely that the 
government would be willing to simply allow a social landlord to collapse without 
intervention. As shown in the next section this has been a major regulatory concern, 
both in order to prevent the consequences for tenants, and the danger an unmanaged 
insolvency would have for the credibility of the financial model used by associations.  
9.3. Governing risks and uncertainty through the regulatory system 
Ensuring that either another Cosmopolitan does not happen, or that it could be 
managed effectively if it did occur, has been a major priority for the regulator. As shown 
in Chapter 6 of this thesis, a major factor in shaping the borrowing of the sector has 
been the perception by lenders that the government would be willing to intervene to 
prevent the failure of a housing association. As the following quote from a solicitor 
shows, an insolvency in one association would likely have repercussions for the 
housing association sector as a whole, damaging the credibility of providers in the 
eyes of lenders. This is especially salient in the post-crisis context of housing 
association finance, where a new group of creditors in the form of bond lenders have 
recently entered the market at scale: 
Cosmopolitan slightly shocked the world, and I think in a way that's why the 
HCA post-Cosmopolitan have been very, very, very, very, very keen to make 
all their registered providers understand that this was a really serious, a really 
serious thing. And I think almost, because it happened at a time when the 
private investors, the institutional investors were just beginning to go into the 
market, and all of a sudden all the things they feared most were happening. 
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Solicitor, PhD fieldwork data, summer 2015. 
Here, the need to satisfy the interests of lenders in order to maintain access to the 
money available to develop can still be seen to be a major regulatory priority 
(McDermont 2007). It should be stressed that this is now occurring within a very 
different context to the pre-financial crisis period, with the Altair report identifying a key 
concern of the regulator as being that it lacked the strong working relationship with a 
new and more diverse set of bond lenders than it had with the high street banks who 
had formerly dominated lending to the sector (Underwood, Kane, and Appleby 2014, 
21). Knowledge of how to navigate and act in relation to these more complex financial 
processes has therefore been a pressing concern for both associations and the 
regulator.  
In addition, the regulator has had to manage this process under austerity conditions 
that have seen its own resources shrink. As explained by a senior housing policymaker 
in the following quote, cuts to grant levels have significantly restricted the ability of the 
HCA to directly support the development activity of associations in the event of a 
property market crash, further increasing the sector’s exposure to risk: 
In each of the last two property downturns, the HCA in the last one and the 
Housing Corporation in the one before, was able to mitigate some of the worst 
impacts on housing associations by converting sales schemes to rent schemes. 
And it had the grant in its pipeline to be able to do that. The HCA going forward 
is not likely to have nearly as much grant at its disposal for that kind of thing.  
Senior housing policymaker, PhD fieldwork data, summer 2015. 
In particular, it should be stressed here that the limitations of the regulator’s funding 
capacity has implications for the regulator’s ability to engage in crisis management, as 
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it loses the power to directly shield providers from risk. In the wake of Cosmopolitan, 
the HCA consulted on a new regulatory framework, arguing that growing problems 
included a need to tackle “poor governance”, financial complexity, and a poor 
understanding by providers of their assets and liabilities (Homes and Communities 
Agency 2014b). Its eventual response included the imposition of stress-testing 
requirements to check for vulnerabilities, and the creation of a duty for associations to 
hold registers of their assets and liabilities. In addition, the HCA attempted to 
compensate for its limited resources through introducing an “in depth assessment” 
process, occurring on average of once every three or four years for providers with 
stock of over 1,000 and probing for sources of risk (Homes and Communities Agency 
2015c). The regulator withdrew attempts to impose more direct control over the use of 
stock following lobbying by providers and lenders, however, leading it to back down 
from proposals to introduce a mandatory asset ring fence that would have prevented 
associations from using their social housing as collateral for commercial developments 
altogether (Ibid.). An additional measure aiming to directly limit the exposure of social 
housing stock to risk through a withdrawal of ‘consent’ powers in 2014 for providers to 
use their stock as collateral in index-linked finance deals was also frustrated by 
deregulation measures in the Housing and Planning Act 2016, discussed previously 
in Chapter 8. The new framework therefore relies heavily on the ability of providers to 
demonstrate their knowledge of and ability to calculate risk, even as the regulator is 
stripped of direct control over the use of stock by associations. 
The regulator also introduced a new governance requirement, where board members 
were expected to have levels of expertise appropriate to the association, for example 
commercial skills for a developer association (Homes and Communities Agency 
2015c). Although seemingly uncontroversial, this could reduce the ability of tenants to 
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act as board members, reducing levels of organisational accountability. As explained 
by the policymaker with knowledge of the regulatory system, the intention is to build 
the capacity of providers to be aware of potential sources of financial danger: 
Basically what we're saying to associations is you have to model, you have to 
stress your business plan to find out how you can cope with things that can go 
seriously wrong for you. Which could either be a range of different welfare 
reform scenarios, or it could be a range of economic circumstances, but we are 
expecting people to know what it is that breaks their business. 
Senior housing policymaker, PhD fieldwork data, summer 2015. 
In doing so however, it should be stressed that through measures such as stress 
testing and commercial skill requirements for board members, the strategy of the 
regulator is not one of minimising the risks faced by associations. As emphasised 
throughout this thesis, the use of private finance and participation in commercial real 
estate markets inherently requires an assumption of risk that has defined the post-
Housing Act 1988 housing association sector. Rather, this should be seen as the 
regulator attempting to discipline associations into acting as well-behaved capitalists, 
improving their competence in recognising and rationally calculating the risks they 
bear in the course of financialisation and commercial development (Martin 2002). As 
demonstrated by the regulatory measures implemented by the HCA in the aftermath 
of Cosmopolitan, rather than financialisation occurring as an automatic process of 
marketisation through the minimisation of the state, this has been achieved through 
an ongoing and unfinished process of neoliberal reform aimed at cultivating practices 
and attitudes in the sector. As such, rather than deregulation, these measures can be 
better characterised as a form of “regulated deregulation”  in which the contours of the 
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re-commodification and financialisation of social housing have been actively set and 
reshaped by the state and the regulator.  
The nuance of these measures is particularly important in the case of social landlords 
such as housing associations, whose characteristics as borrowers as shown in 
Chapter 6 have historically been shaped by the perception by lenders of their strong 
relationship with the government. Recent legal and policy changes have the potential 
to unsettle that relationship in the context of the rapid changes undergone since the 
2015 general election in the UK, with a number of hostile policy measures imposed on 
the sector whose impact is as yet still uncertain. The next section therefore briefly 
reviews these events, before the remainder of the chapter analyses how risks and 
uncertainties arising from these are reshaping both housing associations and their 
relation with lenders.  
9.4. The erosion of the regulator in crisis management: the role of the court-
appointed insolvency administrator 
Key events since the 2015 general election such as the threatened expansion of Right 
to Buy to housing associations and a 1% mandatory rent cut between 2016 – 2020 
have heightened the sector’s risk, while also introducing new sources of uncertainty. 
Recalling the distinction drawn upon by Froud (2003) in her analysis of PFI, risk can 
be defined as an in-principle knowable and calculable quantity, whereas uncertainty 
reflects the unknowability of the future. As argued in Chapter 6, the lending regime 
that has developed in housing associations since the Housing Act 1988 has been one 
based on the minimisation of risk to lenders and their insulation from uncertainty, with 
providers backed by subsidy and regulatory regimes structuring them as safe and 
reliable borrowers. Crucially, housing associations as borrowers have also benefitted 
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from an implicit perception by lenders that the government would stage an intervention 
in order to prevent a social landlord from going bankrupt due to the political and 
financial costs, while the legal right of lenders to enforce their collateral rights and take 
possession from stock have protected them from uncertainty if all else fails. This need 
to satisfy the interests of lenders has become an imperative for the regulatory 
framework since the late 1980s, though recent events have the potential to threaten 
this existing model, reflected in changes to the legal mechanisms for managing the 
insolvency of a social housing provider. 
Figure 9.3. Impact of the 1% rent cut from 2016 - 2020 
 
Source: reproduced from HCA (2017b, 11). 
As shown in Figure 9.3 above, reproduced from a HCA regulatory analysis of risk in 
the sector (Homes and Communities Agency 2017b), the 1% annual rent cut is 
forecast to have a huge cumulative impact on the sector’s finances, holding down the 
rents of providers at the same time that inflation is expected to rise in upcoming years. 
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This should be seen as undercutting one basis of the high surpluses previously 
experienced by the sector since the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, where rent 
convergence policies ensured guaranteed above-inflation rent rises for associations. 
When interviewed in the months following the 2015 election, one consultant who 
advises housing associations on their financial treasury policies argued that the rent 
cut alongside other measures such as the right to buy expansion had severely 
undermined the trust by lenders in the social housing sector’s stability: 
There’s been a very beneficial willing suspension of disbelief on the part of 
investors, the HCA and the government. There is no guarantee but let’s 
pretend there is, sort of thing, and very right. It’s £60bn of private finance on 
very good terms that’s been arranged on that, and government action has at a 
stroke more or less destroyed that.  
Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
Housing associations have still been able to borrow since the election, with Social 
Housing Magazine reporting an increase in lending through bonds and institutional 
lenders (though excluding bank loans and bonds secured through an aggregator) from 
£1.7bn in 2015/16, to £3.16bn in 2016/17 (Stothart 2017). The government’s 
announcement of a new settlement enabling associations to hike rents by CPI + 1% 
from 2020 (Apps 2017) is likely to reassure lenders, though increases in rent may add 
to the pressures faced by tenants, particularly those living in areas where social rents 
are well below the market rate. The case of Cosmopolitan and the sector’s underlying 
fragilities have nonetheless raised the issue of what may happen in the event of an 
insolvency, particularly if the regulator was unable to arrange a rescue by another 
provider in time.  
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Addressing this, the Housing and Planning Act 2016 introduced a new insolvency 
regime, following recommendations from the Altair report as to the needs for a process 
that could function given the growing complexity of the sector’s creditors (Underwood, 
Kane, and Appleby 2014). Under the previous insolvency regime governed by the 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, the regulator would have to secure the 
agreement of all creditors for a moratorium period of 28 days, with its most likely 
course of action in this time to be to attempt a rescue of social housing stock through 
a merger with another housing association (Trowers and Hamlins 2016; O’Grady and 
Isaacs n.d.). The need to gain rolling approval to extend this period meant that this 
was a process highly dependent on the regulator being able to secure the good will of 
creditors, a scenario more likely when negotiating with a small number of high street 
banks and building societies than the far wider range of lenders active in the bond 
markets. Rectifying this, the 2016 Act set out a new and more robust administration 
process, though closer examination reveals shifting power relations at work between 
lenders and the regulator as part of the new regime. 
Reflecting the growing importance of commercial diversification and the risks this 
could pose if it creates liabilities against social housing stock, the new administration 
regime extended its scope to all assets that might be owned by a housing association. 
A crucial innovation has been provisions enabling the regulator to make an application 
for a court appointed administrator to oversee the process of managing the affairs of 
an insolvent provider (Trowers and Hamlins 2016). This adjudicator would have a 12-
month period to oversee proposals for attempting to rescue the provider as a going 
concern, or else dispose of its assets in an orderly fashion, a far more realistic time 
period with which to work with and providing the process with greater legal clout 
against lenders. 
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The involvement of the courts provoked lobbying by lenders in the process of drafting 
the Bill however, with their ire provoked in particular by the power of the administrator 
to withhold interest rate payments during the moratorium. In order to appease this 
objection, the eventual legislation was explicitly worded so as to explicitly prioritise the 
best interests of creditors over the goal of ensuring that social housing stock remained 
within the sector (O’Grady and Isaacs n.d.). Although the administrator would also 
have the goal of protecting tenants in preventing having their homes from being 
repossessed from underneath them, creditor interests were still explicitly prioritised in 
statute above them. As a financial consultant to the sector explained in the following 
quote, this led lenders to acquiesce to the changes, though the potential power of a 
court-appointed administrator still left some feeling less certain over their ability to 
protect their interests: 
I think the HCA has managed to satisfy most lenders with the wording around 
the primary function of administration would be to protect first charge 
lenders and housing tenants, and that’s given comfort to most lenders, but I 
think there’s still a few that are very concerned about that change and the 
uncertainty that adds to in terms of existing and new lending. 
Financial consultant, PhD fieldwork data, spring 2016. 
By establishing a new formalised resolution process on a more feasible timescale, the 
court-appointed administrator regime may be thought to limit the power of creditors, 
enabling the authorities breathing room to arrange a rescue of social housing stock 
even given the more complex lending environment characterised by an array of bond 
lenders rather than a small group of high street banks. The shift in power from the 
regulator to the courts may reflect the rise of a more adversarial process however, in 
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which creditors are more assertive in staking claim to their rights over distressed 
assets in the event of provider failure. 
9.5. Privileging creditors through the insolvency regime 
As argued in chapters 4 and 5, the insights of critical socio-legal studies into the 
creation of private property relations provide a useful framework for analysing the 
progressive re-commodification of social housing that has been fundamentally 
underpinned by the shift to private finance since the Housing Act 1988. The growing 
role in the courts for settling disputes over collateral may indicate a turning point in the 
claims of lenders on housing association stock that, as seen in Chapter 6, has 
characterised the development of social housing regulation throughout the neoliberal 
period. In acting as a means of conflict resolution, modern legal frameworks act as a 
“justiciable” discourse, translating differing political and social interests into disputes 
“over competing rights claims that can be adjudicated by the courts” (Veitch 2007, 83). 
Here for example, the shift to a court appointed administrator process may be a 
reflection of a declining authority of the regulator to reconcile the interests of creditors, 
particularly given the increased range and complexity of the range of lenders given the 
recent turn to bond markets.  
Reliance on a formalised, court-adjudicated process rather than the previous 
moratorium system based on ongoing informal negotiation between creditors and the 
regulator is therefore likely to reflect the waning influence of the latter against the 
power of lenders when it comes to resolving crises in the sector. The statutory duty of 
the administrator to place the interests of lenders above that of tenants also indicates 
one way in which law is used to protect the rights of lenders over collateral, 
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underpinning the basis of the lending regime upon which the provision of social 
housing now depends.  
A key finding of this research that augments the existing literature is that law therefore 
plays a critical role in embedding financialisation through the creation of property 
claims, not only through the direct creation of ownership rights (Knuth and Potts 2016; 
Kay 2016), but also through the process of defending claims on the equity of collateral 
in social housing. While other studies have examined collateral in the context of 
eminent domain in US foreclosure law (Christophers and Niedt 2016), this finding 
shows that how this operates through the transformation of regulatory frameworks also 
matters for an analysis of financialisation, mediating power struggles between the two 
and enabling the establishment of a more adversarial, claims-based process. These 
have played a crucial role in satisfying lenders that they would be able to recover their 
assets, even at a time when austerity has made them less certain over the perception 
that the government would stand behind the sector in the event of an insolvency.  
The administration regime’s statutory privileging of the ‘rights claims’ of lenders over 
keeping stock within the social housing sector also has consequences for how the 
harms caused by urban financialisation are made accountable through law. As argued 
in chapter 5, the use of law to assign liabilities and attribute responsibilities for harms 
can itself operate as a form of “organised irresponsibility” (Veitch 2007; Curran 2015), 
acting to immunise collective responsibility for social harms. Here, the continuing 
circulation of capital through the built environment is enabled while the responsibility 
for failing to perform as profitable capital is assigned to the associations. There is also 
a class relation at work throughout this however, in which the ultimate costs are borne 
by tenants, who may lose their home, and the staff of a provider who may lose their 
jobs without sharing responsibility in the failings of management.  
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The minimisation of uncertainty for lenders therefore emerges again as a major 
component of how social housing financialisation has been able to perpetuate itself in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, with the courts and formal statutory system playing 
an enhanced role in ensuring the costs of the process are passed down from lenders, 
to providers, to tenants. The next section now turns to analyse how tenants may bear 
the costs of this process in the future. I argue that although the sector has still 
remained largely stable over the past eight years, the potential for an increased 
crystallisation of risk is likely to see a long-term transformation in the demographics of 
tenants, as housing associations are forced to protect their ever-more precarious 
incomes. 
9.6. The erosion of tenant protections 
A potentially lethal combination of welfare cuts, eroded tenant protections and 
weakened security of tenure have the potential to transform the relations between 
landlords and tenants in future years. As shown in Figure 9.4 below, possession 
actions by social landlords including both housing associations and local authorities 
declined from 2003 to 2010, though with a rise in 2008 during the recession of the 
financial crisis. Numbers rise steeply in 2013, with one probable cause likely to be the 
initial impact of welfare reform as measures such as the bedroom tax and disability 
benefit cuts forced a number of tenants into arrears, though this declined again in 
2015. This could indicate the exit of a first wave of households vulnerable to losing 
their homes, with one quantitative analysis of benefit claimants in Leeds affected by 
housing benefit cuts finding a clear trend for a minority of households to move from 
social housing to the more insecure private rented sector (Hodkinson, Turner, and 
Essen 2016). Overall however, it is striking how possession actions so far have been 
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generally lower than the pre-crisis years prior to 2008 within this series, even in spite 
of the correlating evidence for the immediate impact of benefit cuts.  
Figure 9.4. Social landlord possession actions, 2003 - 2013 
 
Source: Mortgage and Landlord Possession Statistics, ONS, 2016. 
One possible explanation for this could be that prior to housing benefit cuts from 2012, 
associations would have been able to replace evicted tenants with people guaranteed 
to be on housing benefit. With the onset of benefit cuts this dynamic could change 
however, with replacement tenants potentially also unable to reliably pay their rent, 
particularly if subject to delays through Universal Credit. A new flagship welfare benefit 
reform that combines six existing in-work and out-of work benefits, including housing 
benefit for most applications, universal credit is considered to present a significant 
arrears risk. This is due to factors including payments being made in arrears of up to 
five weeks, though this can be partially mitigated by ‘loans’ paid out of future benefits, 
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and payments being made directly to the tenant rather than landlord, significantly 
increasing arrears risk (Kennedy, Keen, and Wilson 2017). 
Interestingly, austerity and financialisation may then create an incentive for 
associations to devote more resources toward their existing tenant base in order to 
better prevent arrears before they arrive22. Such an argument would also confirm 
findings by Tang et al (2017) as to an intensification of providers’ attempts to develop 
a knowledge base of their tenants in order to stave off arrears. This hypothesis was 
reflected among participants in my interview data, with one policy officer arguing that 
welfare cuts had led associations to increase their knowledge of their tenants, in order 
to better prevent arrears before they arose: 
Some of the welfare reform stuff and universal credit has actually had a 
perversely good impact on landlord-tenant relationships, because they’ve had 
to get to know their tenants. Landlords have put huge amounts of effort into 
preparing, finding out which tenants are going to be impacted by the benefit 
cap, finding out who is going to be impacted by the bedroom tax, door-
knocking, talking to people, and they’ve got a huge amount of data and 
relationship building.  
 Policy officer B, PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2015. 
These mitigating features may mask future trends toward a less secure social housing 
system, however. The recovery from the financial crisis has been precarious for many 
on low incomes, and although mass unemployment seen in previous recessions has 
not occurred real wage growth in the UK has been poor and its labour market is 
                                                          
22 I am grateful to Stuart Hodkinson for this insight. 
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increasingly characterised by ‘flexible’, precarious and temporary work (Green and 
Lavery 2015). As a result, welfare reform has the potential to impact a broad range of 
tenants who move in and out of employment, resulting in the potential for more 
associations to explicitly include affordability criteria when deciding who to house, as 
indicated by the quote below from a housing association executive in a non-
Manchester northern city: 
The thing is most of the people we rehouse are on zero hours contracts or 
part-time employment, fairly insecure employment, so even when you house 
people and they are in employment, chances are a few months later they’re 
not going to be. So will we therefore start to vet our tenants based on incomes 
and ability to pay, whereas in the past it’s been, our lettings policies have been 
based on need pretty much. It’s a big change.  
Housing association chief executive, PhD fieldwork data, autumn 2015. 
As implied in this quote the extent to which associations adopt affordability criteria 
remains the matter of debate within the housing association sector itself, given the 
significance of moving from a needs-based lettings system to once where ability to 
pay takes a greater role. This indicates attitudinal and cultural shifts play a role in the 
extent to which associations adopt commercial values and metrics, indicating that 
financialisation is not a mechanical process but one that has to be actively negotiated 
and internalised through the organisational identity of associations (cf Manzi and 
Morrison 2017).  
In managing the risks of financialisation, the regulator’s role has been crucial in 
enabling associations to adopt a more exclusionary approach to lettings than in the 
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past. As revealed by the following quote from a solicitor, regulatory changes mean that 
associations are now more likely to be able to undertake evictions for rent arrears: 
Until relatively recently the HCA's policy was that they shouldn't evict people 
just on the basis of rent arrears. There normally had to be some other 
compelling reason why. But I think now housing associations are saying they 
have committed to a business plan, we cannot - I mean, don't get me wrong, 
they will do all they possibly can to help somebody, but at the end of the day 
they cannot risk too great arrears. 
Solicitor, PhD fieldwork data, summer 2015. 
In addition to a greater chance of evictions there is also the possibility of a changing 
tenant profile, as social housing becomes more exclusionary for people impacted by 
welfare reform. Cuts to housing benefit and other support, alongside the planned move 
toward universal credit paid directly to the tenant rather than the social landlord, are 
likely to make rental streams less secure. This has led to the regulatory management 
of these risks through a greater permissiveness of the regulator toward evictions and 
the exclusion of a greater number of prospective tenants, as indicated by the 
highlighted portion of this quote from a senior housing policymaker in regards to 
greater commercial pressures driving associations in an “upmarket” direction:  
There will be I guess some pressures that could be construed as driving 
housing associations upmarket. But equally they're very alive to that risk and 
they have to, that's one for them to balance rather than for us to balance. 
We don't tell associations what business model they ought to have, but we are 
conscious that they would be faced with those kinds of dilemma. And it's their 
job to work out how they best their usually charitable objectives. 
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Senior housing policymaker, PhD fieldwork data, summer 2015. 
Here can be seen how the enactment of financialisation has resulted in a transference 
of risk onto tenants as mediated by the regulatory framework, with a greater 
permissiveness toward commercialisation as a means of negotiating a more 
precarious housing context. Although the regulator may not directly prescribe these 
measures, it nonetheless can enable these attitudinal reforms within the sector 
through taking a less proscriptive stance toward evictions for arrears. The cost of this 
is likely to be greater precarity for people unable to access social housing, as more 
find themselves excluded from lettings in the future as associations are pressured in 
a more commercial direction.  
Recalling the distinction by Froud (2003) between risk and uncertainty however, the 
contingencies and uncertainties of future events means that the state still bears some 
of the risks of this transition. A genuine unmanaged insolvency and the collapse of a 
provider with its stock repossessed by lenders would likely be politically disastrous to 
a government that still requires housing associations in order to meet housing policy 
criteria. Pushing associations too far in a commercial direction if they are perceived as 
unready to meet these risks may result in lenders ultimately withdrawing from the 
sector, leaving the government with the possibility of having to take responsibility for 
both the sector’s £60bn debts and the £40bn in public grant the government has 
historically invested. The ambiguities of this are indicated in the following quote from 
an auditor in reference to the contestation between lenders and the Conservative 
finance minister of the time, George Osborne: 
The funders are saying that if you push too far we’ll see it as more risky, and 
then the government’s got to think about where that funding will come from. 
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The worst thing they want is that funding comes back onto them, into public, 
and [unclear] they’ll ease off them. He does not want all that debt, does he, 
George Osborne, does he? Coming back onto public books. 
Auditor A, PhD fieldwork data spring 2016. 
The continuation of financialisation in the more uncertain context since the financial 
crisis therefore indicates the continued need state intervention and support if the 
welfare state is to continue to be a source of profitable accumulation for financial 
actors. Financialisation can therefore be seen here to not be a matter of deregulation 
or the retreat of the state provision in favour of the market (Aalbers 2017), but a 
process that requires the ongoing mediation of legal and regulatory frameworks to 
manage risks and uncertainties within a more precarious housing context.  
There remains the question however of how the nuances of this process are being 
materialised on the ground however, as risk is managed and mediated by housing 
practitioners in their relation with tenants. The importance of the nuances of this 
process is particularly the case for associations outside of London such as 
Manchester, where, as found in Chapter 8, associations are facing pressures to 
financialise while having less access to the asset wealth necessary for being able to 
commercially develop at scale. The next and final substantive section of this data 
chapter therefore turns to analyse the initial tendencies of this process within 
Manchester’s geographic context, drawing on data gathered at the time these trends 
were emerging in 2015 and early 2016.  
9.7. Governing the risks of financialisation in Manchester 
This section concludes the analysis of the governance of financialisation in this chapter 
by analysing initial emerging trends as to how housing association practitioners are 
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mediating the risks it generates with respect to the urban context of Manchester. In 
keeping with the theorisation of housing financialisation as an urban process, this 
section draws on qualitative data from housing practitioners in Manchester, alongside 
publicly available quantitative data that provides a contextual indication of housing 
pressures within the city. In doing so, it builds on the analysis of the drivers of 
Manchester’s housing association financialisation in the seventh section of Chapter 8 
of this thesis, generating initial data as to how these are materialised on the ground 
by practitioners. The conclusions drawn through this section are necessarily tentative, 
given that fieldwork was undertaken at a time when housing associations were still 
reviewing policies and strategies for reacting to policies such as welfare cuts or the 
2016 – 2020 annual 1% rent cut. This nonetheless still provides a valuable insight into 
the initial reactions of housing practitioners to these processes, with the capacity to 
inform future research into how these trends develop in the longer term. 
How tenants are exposed to risk in the governance of housing association 
financialisation is likely to depend on the specific nature of housing needs in their area, 
for example in terms of housing availability or the impact of welfare reforms. This 
section therefore begins with an analysis of housing need with respect to social 
housing in Manchester. As shown in Figure 9.5 below, as measured by the ratio of 
lower quartile house prices to lower quartile earnings, prices in Manchester have risen 
over time. Unaffordability become greater over the course of the boom years 
immediately preceding the financial crisis, then stagnating at a level above the pre-
crisis norm in the post-crisis period up toward 2013, in accordance with the national 
seizing up of the housing market as people ceased buying and selling properties after 
the crash (Hay 2011). Though this is likely to have increased housing pressure, the 
graph below also shows distinct features to Manchester’s housing geography in 
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comparison to both the capital city of London and the England national average, with 
the northern city having far cheaper properties at the lower quartile end of the market. 
This is also true even in comparison to Greater Manchester, with Manchester’s 
housing being less unaffordable than the mean for the wider city region, although this 
gap has become much narrower since the onset of the financial crisis.  
Figure 9.5. Ratio of lower quartile house price to lower quartile earnings, 1997 
– 201323 
 
Source: DCLG Live Table 57, Ratio of lower quartile house price to lower quartile 
earnings by district. 
Recalling the analysis of Manchester’s housing geography in Chapter 8, one 
explanation for this could be that Manchester’s housing market has grown since the 
1990s from a very low post-industrial base in an urban context where growth has been 
concentrated to a large extent within the city centre, reflecting the city’s spatial 
polarisation (Folkman et al. 2017; cf Allen 2007). Nonetheless, given the relative 
                                                          
23 Figures not available for inner and outer London prior to 2004. 
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weakness of the overall housing market, local policymakers have been sceptical of 
substantial increases in social rented stock. The council has recently implemented an 
affordable housing programme that aims to maintain existing stock levels through 
replacing homes lost to demolition or the right to buy, though replacements are a 
combination of affordable rent and low cost home ownership rather than traditional 
social housing for general needs lets (Manchester City Council 2018a). This policy 
stance is reflected in council reports on housing affordability, which in 2016 highlighted 
the presence of over 11,700 live applicants on the city’s housing register, 4,700 of 
whom had a legal claim to “reasonable preference” in being rehoused by the council. 
As the turnover rates of Manchester’s social rented stock are roughly 4,000 per year, 
the report asserts that “this could be interpreted as virtually all of [sic] applicants with 
a need to move are being met through the number of lets per year” (Manchester City 
Council 2016a, 11). While conceding that in reality not all available lets will match the 
property type and location needed by applicants, the implication is that the level of 
available social housing stock is near sufficient to requirements.  
Even with the caveat as to the need to match stock with specific needs, this is a 
dubious inference to draw. Reasonable preference is a term used, since 1924, by the 
government to set rehousing priorities for certain groups of people, currently statutorily 
defined in the Housing Act 1996 (Cowan and Marsh 2005). It is not an objective 
measure of housing need, forming part of a hierarchy of allocations in rationing social 
housing stock that is inevitably normative and subject to administrative and policy 
imperatives, even if circumscribed by law (Cowan and Marsh 2005; Cowan, Halliday, 
and Hunter 2006). An alternative interpretation could be that the local authority is 
unable to rehouse into secure, social rented accommodation even the people it has a 
statutory obligation to prioritise. Furthermore, as shown by the rising figures for 
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households in temporary accommodation in Figure 9.6 below, the weakness of 
Manchester’s housing market may “conceal” hidden indicators of housing crisis 
(Hodkinson, Beswick, and Goulding 2015) within the city, 
Figure 9.6. Total number of households in temporary accommodation 2004/05 
– 2015/16, Manchester 
 
Source: DCLG Live Table 784: Local Authorities’ action under the homelessness 
provisions of the Housing Acts 
This rise in households in temporary accommodation suggests rising pressure within 
Manchester’s available social and affordable housing stock, including high levels of 
‘hidden’ homelessness. As shown above, this figure has begun to increase once more 
from 2009/10 after a falling from a high level in the 2000s, in common with national 
trends (Fitzpatrick et al. 2017). Although dropping between 2011/12 and 2013/14, the 
number has since undergone a sharp rise, potentially due to the impact of welfare cuts 
implemented via the Welfare Reform Act 2012, with the “bedroom tax” found to be 
associated with rising insecurity in other cities such as Leeds (Hodkinson, Turner, and 
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Essen 2016). This rise clearly indicates a growing number of people in Manchester 
who are unable to be securely housed.  
This precariousness is further reflected in the analysis of local government policy 
researchers working for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, who have 
identified in the city region over 16,000 “concealed” households unable to move out 
from their existing accommodation with friends or relatives at the time of the last 
census in 2011 (GMCA Research and Strategy Team 2017, 31). In addition, the 
following quote from a senior policymaker in Manchester City Council revealed that 
turnover within social housing lets is falling to low levels in Manchester, in common 
with a declining vacancy rate for all tenures in the city as a whole. This indicates 
significant pent up demand for social housing, as overcrowding increases and people 
are unable to secure properties of their own: 
Densities are going up in the existing population. Our vacancy rate, for the 
whole of the city of Manchester, is now 2.2%. Which is a dysfunctional housing 
market, almost. I think the rule of thumb is around about 4%, is a functioning 
housing market. 2.2%. 
RG: Because there's pressure?  
People are not moving. Yeah, Someone was saying yesterday, [a registered 
provider] said they've seen their turnover drop 20% on the year before. So 
people are not moving, people are filling up rooms. 
Manchester City Council senior official. PhD fieldwork data, Spring 2016. 
The issue of high rehousing demand in Manchester was also raised by housing 
association practitioners in the course of my fieldwork, who perceived this as a 
340 
 
significant change from earlier stages of their careers in the 1990s. As shown by the 
following quote from a neighbourhood manager operating in the city, this has led to a 
drying up of available properties, including “hard to let” properties that would have 
previously stood empty due to a lack of demand: 
The demand for re-housing is so high. Years ago, 20 years ago, when I started 
in housing we used to have what we called hard to let schemes, you didn’t have 
to go off the rehousing queue, if you knew someone on the estate…we don’t 
need to do that now, because the demand is so high. Maybe once in a blue 
moon we might have one property where maybe there’s been some anti-social 
behaviour, it’s not decorated very - or it’s a bit dated, that people will be like, 
“Oh I don’t really want to go there”. But it’s very, very rare. 
Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager A, PhD 
fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
In addition to turnover grinding to a halt, practitioners within associations spoken to in 
Manchester were also dealing with organisational responses to the impacts of welfare 
reform analysed in the previous section of this chapter. In addition to offers of support 
to tenants in areas such as mediation or budget managing, practitioners in the course 
of my fieldwork in Manchester emphasised that they had undertaken a significant 
amount of work in attempting to mitigate the impact of previous rounds of welfare cuts 
in particular the bedroom tax introduced in 2013 under the Welfare Reform Act 2012. 
The following quote from a housing manager in a neighbouring area of Manchester to 
that of the officer above demonstrates attempts to avoid the eviction of tenants through 
means such as downsizing and homes exchanges, while avoiding evictions as a result 
of the bedroom tax even in the event of arrears. As also shown in the below quote 
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however, this pattern is likely to change given the severity of future impending welfare 
cuts, in particular universal credit:  
We've done it, an exchange scheme, home swap, people have voluntarily 
downsized. We've not had any evictions though, we've not evicted people 
because they owe money because of the spare bedroom subsidy… Universal 
credit, we've only had a couple of cases, but we expect that somewhere in the 
region of 60% of our occupants will come under universal credit. And just with 
the evidence that we've got from the wider group, from [housing association 
group], 50% of those people won't pay their rent. 
Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager C, PhD 
fieldwork data, Winter 2016. 
Universal credit first began to be rolled out in Manchester in 2014, initially for single 
people and couples, and then followed by families, with most eligible applications 
limited at first to those who are newly unemployed, and therefore most likely to re-
enter the labour market. While this applied at first to a limited number of people, 
between October 2017 and November 2018 the full service was to be phased in across 
the majority of Manchester for fresh claimants, with the majority of existing claimants 
to be moved over at a later date (Manchester City Council 2018). As shown in the 
above quote, this has the potential for a major future change in relation between social 
landlords and their tenants due to the increased risk of future arrears.  
In addition, strategies such as downsizing can have consequences for the 
displacement of both prospective tenants who may be excluded, and current tenants 
who cannot afford their rent. As demonstrated in the following quote  from a housing 
officer colleague of Neighbourhood Manager A, the impact of the bedroom tax in 
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forcing people to downsize has already had an impact in that some tenants have had 
to move area, displacing them from their existing support networks: 
It has changed people’s lives in that they’ve moved area as well. I’ve known 
lots of people who’ve lived in an area all their lives, kind-of middle aged, 50, 
and they’ve had to, not had to but felt they had to because of their own 
circumstances, take the first available smaller property which might not be us, 
it could be with another housing association…so they’ve moved from a 
geographical area where they know everybody, they’ve lived there all their 
lives, and they’ll move across the city because that’s their one bedroom and 
it’s saving them fifteen, twenty pound a week. 
 Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager B, PhD 
fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
Practitioners spoken to within Manchester revealed that a range of different strategies 
were being used to account for welfare cuts. One neighbourhood manager 
emphasised that their association increasing its support team for tenants, while also 
offering to sell their support services to other associations. Interestingly, this also 
indicates how the trade of support capacity could also be a source of 
commercialisation in the sector, as associations seek to earn income through traded 
services: 
Now we’ve got one support officer for [over 10,000] properties, we’re going 
to have four. We’re going to look at growing that team, getting additional 
funding, and also providing services to other providers that maybe they’re so 
small, or they haven’t got the money to do that etc, and selling the services. 
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You can have, like, we buy in mediation, we pay so much and we have ten cases 
we can send a year. A similar thing to that. 
 Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager A, PhD 
fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
While the above practitioner said they would provide tenants with increased support, 
as the following quote shows, this was combined with the implementation of 
affordability criteria for new tenants who are offered rehousing within their properties. 
Done with the intention of managing arrears risk, this assesses the income of 
prospective tenants in order to calculate whether or not they would be capable of 
paying their rent: 
We do affordability tests now, so everybody that’s offered a property gets sent 
an affordability assessment sheet, and then they have to fill it in and bring it 
back and then we go through it and everything. And I’ve had to say to people 
that I’m going to withdraw offers because you can’t afford to make those 
payments and it’s just setting you up to fail. If it’s five or ten pounds and it’s 
something you’ve got arrears on that’s going to be cleared in twelve months 
then that’s different, but we’ve had people coming in who’re sort of, like, a 
hundred pounds a month short of what they need. 
Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager A, PhD 
fieldwork data, Autumn 2015. 
In addition to a greater chance of evictions, there is therefore also the possibility of a 
changing tenant profile, as social housing becomes more exclusionary for people 
impacted by welfare reform, likely affecting people who are substantially reliant on 
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work-replacing benefits for all or part of their income. As well as universal credit, a 
further driver of this process is likely to be an expected rent rise from 2020, as 
providers seek to recoup the losses from the Osborne-imposed 2016–2020 1% rental 
cut: 
Housing associations, there's no question about it. They're going to jack the 
rents up after 4 or 5 years to recoup the money aren't they, unless the 
government brings something else in. I think it'll just be the survival of the 
fittest in those four or five years. 
 Manchester-based housing association neighbourhood manager C, PhD 
fieldwork data, Winter 2016.  
Finally, the identified need for housing associations to recoup money through their 
rental streams points to the intersection of the austerity and financialisation agendas. 
Although the immediate driver of the changed relation between landlords and tenants 
explored in this section have been austerity cuts driven by welfare reform, as shown 
throughout chapters 6, 7, and 8, this is occurring in a wider context in which housing 
associations are being driven to financialise in order to survive. As such, welfare cuts 
and regulatory liberalisation play a key role in restructuring the financialisation of 
housing associations, at once undermining the secure income streams that 
constructed them as safe assets, while giving housing associations powers to counter 
the risks of this process by redefining who can and cannot access their stock. In 
Manchester this then risks displacement pressures as fewer people are able to remain 
within the areas they choose to live, such as those with available support networks, 
even in a housing market where land values are far lower than that of the capital city 
of London. This chapter has shown that while this is a nuanced process, with 
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associations offering support to tenants as well as a more commercial attitude to 
arrears, the structural context associations operate within means that the need to meet 
financial bottom lines in rent collection are still taking on a driving role in their goals 
and aims. Financialisation is therefore a process mediated through the transfer of risk 
from providers to tenants, with the consequence of the greater dispossession of new 
groups of people from the security of social housing.  
9.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the consequences of the financialisation agenda in social 
housing for English housing associations, identifying key risks that have emerged, and 
how the regulatory governance of the sector has been reshaped in an attempt to 
manage these risks. A key finding is that the post-crisis context of low inflation, low 
interest rates that cheapen the cost of borrowing and gradually extended welfare 
reforms have been, unexpectedly, a benign period for housing associations engaged 
in development programmes, even as tenants have come under greater pressure. It 
should be stressed that these favourable conditions are likely to be fleeting however, 
while underlying risks are building up within the housing association sector as they 
become more exposed to commercial development risk. While the level of surpluses 
made by associations are currently high, this is due in large part to a combination of 
low interest rates and rent rises that until 2016 were indexed to rise above inflation. 
As found in Chapter 7, if and when interest rates do rise, many associations are likely 
to face tighter cash flows. The growing exposure of associations in correctly judging 
development risk, with a minority likely relying on asset sales to cover their operational 
costs, suggests that a market downturn would see probable changes to the current 
direction of the sector’s development model as some providers began to find it harder 
to sustain cash flows, coming into greater risk of insolvency. If these risks were to 
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crystallise, development would be unlikely to be sustainable, with one possible 
consequence being a Dutch “Vestia” scenario of botched financialisation and 
emergency state bailouts (Nieboer and Gruis 2014; Aalbers, Loon, and Fernandez 
2017). 
As a result, the insight of Montgomerie and Büdenbender (2015) that financialisation 
is a temporally and spatially bounded process should be extended from the private 
housing market to social housing. As with chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, 
financialisation has been found to be spatially bounded in that it is concentrated among 
a minority of predominantly London-based providers, and temporally bounded reliant 
on a highly favourable economic conjuncture whose sustainability should not be 
assumed. An outright collapse would be a worst case scenario, with the Cosmopolitan 
incident of 2013 encapsulating many of the most fatal elements of housing association 
financialisation: index-linked financial deals with hidden liabilities against social 
housing stock, and over-ambitious developments incompetently overseen by a board 
whose flaws were not picked up by the regulator until too late. While some interview 
respondents have portrayed this in terms of individual board incompetence, data 
analysed in this chapter has suggested that there are also structural problems of 
providers being unable to match the efficiencies of the commercial sector, in part 
because of their limited scale, leaving them vulnerable in the event of a structural 
market downturn. Although not all providers would be affected, and as seen in Chapter 
6, the political cost of a provider default would still likely see government intervention 
to prevent social housing being lost to the sector, one outcome of default could 
potentially be a fire sale of commercial subsidiaries held by associations if risks 
crystallise. The likely poor consequences for the credit ratings of the sector as a whole 
due to lost confidence in their no-default record may then lead to a fresh “conjuncture” 
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(Engelen et al. 2010) of social housing finance, dominated by highly commercialised 
large landlords and opening fresh opportunities for the new breed of equity investors 
analysed in Chapter 7. 
While new regulatory requirements such as stress testing have been introduced in an 
attempt to quip associations to manage these risks, this chapter has argued these can 
equally be viewed as a further individualisation of responsibility onto providers, 
diverting policy focus away from countering the “organised irresponsibility” (Veitch 
2007) of the systemic risk generated by financialised urban property markets. As such, 
the governance of housing associations as an asset class can be deepened via efforts 
to resubjectivise providers as efficient, competent capitalists, actively shaping their 
daily operations so as to enable the smooth circulation of capital through the built 
environment. While Manzi and Morrison (2017) have drawn attention to these risks, 
this chapter contributes to the literature by demonstrating the value of a socio-legal 
perspective through the analysis of the new insolvency regime instituted for the sector. 
While the appointment of a court-appointed administrator may help resolve the 
“obscurity” highlighted in Chapter 6 of this thesis as to the respective formal roles of 
creditors in the lending system, I have argued that the shift in power to the courts also 
reflects a weakening in the regulator’s influence. As disputes are formally passed over 
to the courts to be regulated through competing rights claims in the legal system, under 
which the claims of creditors are statutorily privileged over tenants, the regulator’s soft 
influence with lenders may be further diminished, extending the reach of the “financial 
terrain” analysed in Chapter 6. 
Finally, echoing the analysis of Bryan and Rafferty (2014b) of households as “risk 
absorbers” for financialisation, the costs of this process are likely to be passed 
downward onto tenants through the potential for more exclusionary allocations policies 
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that would do more to exclude tenants at risk of lost income due to welfare reform. As 
shown by the analysis of the Manchester data, this is likely to have a wider impact 
than cuts that have been made so far, with many social housing tenants in precarious 
work that may see them cycle in and out of employment, widening the number of 
people who may be caught by these changes. There are also nuances within this 
process however, with the uncertainty of housing benefit cuts also leading providers 
to put resources into gaining better knowledge of their tenants in order to better 
anticipate and counter the impact of benefit cuts. Nonetheless, even in cases such as 
Manchester where there are limited opportunities for associations to monetise their 
assets, this is subordinated to the need to make people pay their rent in the context of 
deep welfare reforms that threaten provider rental streams. As also shown by the 
Manchester data, this has the potential to exclude new groups of people from control 
over living within certain areas, dispossessing more tenants from place-based support 
networks. The contradictions of how the processes work through the daily lives of 
tenants and their relationships with landlords should therefore be an urgent research 
agenda in the financialisation of social housing.  
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Chapter 10 – conclusion: the “organised irresponsibility” 
of housing association financialisation 
10.0. Introduction 
In conducting this research, my primary focus has been to make the financialisation of 
English housing associations a ‘knowable’ entity, connecting the abstract processes 
of social housing finance with the concrete practices through which this is embedded 
within the urban landscape (D. Fields 2015). A major specific objective has been to 
trace how financialisation has not been an automatic process, but one that has 
required an active and ongoing attempt to govern associations as an asset class, 
shaping them into more competitive, risk-taking enterprises capable of judging 
commercial opportunities in the built environment. Though an in-depth analysis of the 
narratives and practices used by associations and stakeholders in shaping 
financialisation, I have attempted to answer calls in the literature to analyse 
financialisation as process whose existence requires explanation, while retaining an 
analysis of how this coheres into wider patterns of accumulation through 
dispossession. My aim in doing so is to contribute to wider knowledge of 
financialisation not as a rigid, top-down logic, but as a precarious and high-risk 
strategy, in order to assist explorations of interrupting and contesting the ongoing 
neoliberalisation of urban space and dispossession of social housing tenants 
(Hodkinson 2011a).   
In this concluding chapter, I pull together my findings and the threads of my argument 
to demonstrate how my thesis has contributed as a piece of knowledge production to 
these ends. To briefly summarise my key findings, the spread of financial logics within 
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housing associations has been a long-term historical process, with the 
neoliberalisation and de-municipalisation of social housing since the 1980s leading to 
a bank-led model of mixed public and private finance. Though banks scaled back their 
long-term lending following the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, associations were able to 
maintain access to credit through the bond markets, with pension funds and insurance 
companies attracted by the prospects of reliable, long-dated assets with which they 
could offset their liabilities. With the onset of post-2010 austerity policies, funding cuts 
led associations to diversify into more commercialised activity, building homes for 
market sale and shared ownership in order to find new sources of revenue for cross 
subsidy through which they could compensate for lost government grant. Though new 
in its scale and complexity of finance, this construction of housing associations as a 
profitable asset class was a path-dependent of regulatory liberalisation and 
commercialisation that had been underway throughout the years of neoliberal 
ascendency.  
It should nonetheless be stressed that my findings strongly indicate that this is not a 
sustainable model for the English housing association sector. In accessing debt, 
associations have been able to benefit from a favourable post-crisis conjuncture of 
ultra-low interest rates, rising land values, and a slow roll-out of welfare reform that 
has piled pressure on tenants but not yet eaten into rental streams. Although austerity 
has driven associations more toward treating their land and housing as pure financial 
assets, the sector remains diverse and the bulk of commercial development activity 
has remained concentrated among a smaller number of large, predominantly London-
based providers who are able to generate the revenues to develop at scale. These 
spatial limits to financialisation are intertwined with temporal limits, in that these 
hitherto favourable economic conditions are unlikely to persist if and when interest 
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rates rise and universal credit removes the guaranteed rental payments of housing 
benefit, which as demonstrated in Chapter 9 leads to the enhanced likelihood of a 
crystallisation of risk for a minority of providers. If this were to occur, one possible 
outcome could be a new round of mergers overseen by the regulator in order to ensure 
that no social housing stock was lost from the sector, intensifying consolidation within 
the sector. 
As shown in Chapter 7 however, the post-crisis period has also been one where 
institutional investors have expressed greater interest in the affordable housing sector, 
searching for higher yields than the low-risk, low-return assets sought for in the social 
housing bond markets. While inherently offering a lower yield, the relative stability of 
affordable housing rents coupled with cheaper land costs has attracted investors into 
the sector. While Beswick et al (2016) have flagged up the potential for would-be 
corporate landlords to buy their way in to former social housing estates in London, this 
research suggests that regional towns and cities where lower land costs have the 
potential to offer a higher relative yield has also been a strategic focus for equity 
investors. Low absolute returns offered by the low rents in such areas have meant that 
such investors would have to deploy at scale in order to earn a substantial return, 
however. The prospect of regional housing associations struggling to access credit or 
support development programmes in a less favourable conjuncture could then create 
new opportunities for institutional investors to enter the sector. As such, 
financialisation could mean that the privatisation of social housing could occur not just 
through larger associations becoming fully commercial entities (Ginsburg 2005; Manzi 
and Morrison 2017), but from corporate investors taking advantage of distressed 
markets to move in on affordable housing provision.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I reflect on 
my research questions and methodology, examining how my research design has 
helped me fulfil the aims of this thesis. In the second section I consider how my findings 
have helped me answer my first research question as to the extent financialisation has 
entailed a new form of governance, theorising this as a process of “organised 
irresponsibility” (Veitch 2007) in which responsibility for managing the systemic risks 
of urban financialisation are displaced onto providers and, ultimately, tenants. In the 
third section I take the second question as to the limits of housing association 
financialisation, arguing this to be a spatially and temporally bounded process, with 
commercialisation at scale limited to a relatively small number of providers, largely 
though not exclusively geographically concentrated in London and the South East, 
and able to exploit a relatively favourable economic conjuncture of low interest rates. 
As such, financialisation should not be considered a sustainable solution for the sector. 
In the fourth section I consider my third research question, analysing the risks built up 
by the financialisation agenda and how the regulatory framework is managing these 
risks, while the fifth section concludes with brief reflections on what these trends entail 
for urban housing inequalities.  
10.1. Reflections on research questions and methodology 
This thesis has been a process of knowledge production with the goal of overcoming 
the “distancing” (Clapp 2014) of abstract financial systems from the urban relations 
and practices within which they are inherently embedded. In doing so, this thesis is 
presented as an engaged, political inquiry, with my goal being to explore the 
financialisation of English housing associations not as an iron, mechanical logic, but 
as a precarious and risky accomplishment (Hodkinson 2011a) that has required an 
active and ongoing process of governance by lenders, associations, the regulator, 
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professional business service providers and other stakeholders. I have shown this to 
be the case throughout my thesis, conducting an in-depth analysis of the changing 
regulatory and policy environment under austerity and neoliberalisation, drawing on 
interviews with social housing sector stakeholders and practitioners and an extensive 
documentary analysis of government, housing, and financial industry reports. In Part 
Two of this research in particular I focused on how financialisation has rested on the 
governance of associations as entrepreneurial, risk-taking enterprises through the 
regulatory framework, advancing the insights of Cowan and McDermont (2008) by 
analysing this process within a ‘post crisis’ context of heightened economic 
uncertainty.  
In formulating my research design and strategy, I have been informed throughout this 
thesis by an epistemological framework grounded in the critical social sciences that 
views knowledge production as an inherently situated, political and practical activity 
(Harding 1987; Haraway 1988). As a researcher, my contributions have not been 
made from a neutral or disembodied standpoint, but as part of a wider historical power 
relations in which housing associations are increasingly coming to be depicted in elite 
and social housing sector discourses as entrepreneurial social enterprises and a 
potential asset class for financial investors. This research has therefore been intended 
as a critical assessment of the financialisation of housing associations, analysing how 
the risks generated by the process have been distributed and shared across lenders, 
providers, tenants and the public sector. In analysing this, I have stressed throughout 
that financialisation should not be seen as a neutral or technical process of helping 
providers to increase housing supply, or as the result of the retreat of the state in 
favour of the expansion of an anonymous market ‘logic’. Instead, financialisation has 
been shown to require an active and ongoing process of governance by state and 
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private actors that has seen the risks of the process systematically displaced through 
legal and regulatory frameworks onto providers, the public sector, and ultimately 
tenants. Financialisation is therefore a deeply social and political process, implicated 
in broader tendencies of accumulation through dispossession as social housing assets 
are reshaped to enable the circulation of capital through the built environment.  
As my research has focused on the social underpinnings of financialisation, throughout 
the thesis I have therefore adopted a primarily qualitative methodology in my research 
design, though also featuring the  use of charts and graphs in order to provide a 
quantitative context for my analysis. In order to make visible the connections between 
social housing and finance, I have drawn on empirical fieldwork data gathered through 
semi-structured interviews with social housing stakeholders, including members of the 
private and public sectors, and senior officials within housing associations, in order to 
analyse and uncover data about the practices and narratives by which associations 
have been constructed as an asset class. This data has been complemented with a 
smaller sample of interviews drawing on housing and regeneration practitioners within 
the northern English city of Manchester in order to enable an initial exploration of how 
financialisation is materialised on the ground. Though findings arising from this are 
indicative, they have nonetheless shown important nuances, such as a desire by 
associations to increase awareness of their tenant base as they become subject to the 
greater threat of future rent arrears under reforms such as universal credit. The subject 
of how financialisation is experienced, in particular through the practices of tenants 
and low income urban inhabitants, remains a subject in need of urgent further study.  
In analysing the risks generated by financialisation, and how these are materialised in 
the changing relations between lenders, providers, the regulator and tenants, I have 
been guided by the following questions:  
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1. To what extent does financialisation entail a new form of governance in 
housing associations? What are the features of this governance? 
2. To what extent have housing associations adopted financialisation? Are 
there any bounds or limits on this process? 
3. What are the likely risks this process generates, and how are housing 
associations and the regulatory framework adapting to these risks?  
In answering these, throughout the thesis I have combined original interview data with 
an extensive documentary analysis of social housing sector and financial industry 
reports, regulatory documents, legal briefings, media reports, policy and think tank 
papers and financial data gathered from the collated accounts of housing associations. 
This has strengthened the robustness of my findings, enabling me to corroborate the 
inherently partial and selective nature of the accounts given to me by interview 
respondents, while uncovering trends that point toward the growing risks of 
financialisation of providers. The interview data has also given me an invaluable 
account of how senior social housing representatives, investors, policy-shapers, 
providers of professional business services and practitioners narrate and represent 
financialisation, for example the extent to which respondents represent it as furthering 
the social goals of associations through providing cross subsidy for the provision of 
new housing. As such, a key contribution of this research has been through the 
insights a critical analysis of this in-depth data has given to the strategies pursued by 
actors within this process, aiding attempts to theorise financialisation and housing 
neoliberalisation as not just a structural process, but one that has to be made by 
participants, and hence may be vulnerable to being disrupted or contested 
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(Hodkinson, Watt, and Mooney 2013). This chapter now turns to a summary of the 
findings of this thesis in answering each of these questions in turn.  
10.2. The “organised irresponsibility” of housing association governance under 
financialisation 
In this section I focus primarily on my first research question. In exploring the 
governance of associations, I have situated my analysis of housing association 
financialisation within a theoretical framework grounded in historical materialism, 
through one that views capital as a social relation rather than a mechanical structure. 
I defined financialisation at first approximation as the extensive and intensive 
accumulation of interest-bearing capital (Fine 2013). Furthermore, the analysis by 
Harvey (2007a) of the tendency of land to be treated as a pure financial asset suggests 
that the ownership of land by capital can then come to play the same functional role 
as the accumulation of interest bearing capital, due to its functional equivalence to a 
financial security. This implies that an analysis of financialisation should be extended 
to incorporate its urban aspects (French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011). 
My theoretical framework developed through Part Two of this thesis has also 
emphasised the need to analyse financialisation as a process whose existence has to 
be explained. In doing so, I have attempted to heed warnings by key voices within the 
literature that too unreflective a use of financialisation reifies the social and economic 
processes the concept attempts to describe, with finance depicted as a determining 
force that acts on society, rather than itself being a socially constructed phenomenon 
(Christophers 2015; Ouma 2016). Instead, I have argued for the usefulness of 
analysing financialisation as operating through the spread of a risk calculus through 
society in which class relations and social production are becoming subsumed under 
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the need to provide a competitive return for capital (Martin, Rafferty, and Bryan 2008; 
Bryan and Rafferty 2014b). Given housing’s dual role as a means of social 
reproduction and a potentially lucrative asset class, my conceptualisation of 
financialisation as a form of governance has enabled me to contribute to the literature 
by analysing associations as active participants in financialisation, without losing sight 
of how this relates to wider transformations in urban political economy.  
In particular, I have argued that the need to cultivate subjectivities and organisational 
rationalities capable of calculating exposure to the risks and reward of investment has 
been a key enabler of financialisation (Martin 2002). Chapter 4 built on this analysis 
by showing how capital becomes spatialised in the built environment, drawing on the 
analysis by Harvey (2007a) of the tendency for land to become treated as a pure 
financial asset, a theoretical analysis that has taken empirical form under neoliberalism 
as urban space has undergone an extensive re-commodification. This has been an 
inherently political process, necessitating the state-imposed rolling out (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002) of market relations and the transformation of 
urban land into an object of profitable accumulation. In turn, this has also been argued 
to generate crisis dynamics that require mediation through ongoing institutional 
reinvention in order for liquidity to be reliably extracted from the fixity of real estate 
assets (Gotham 2009). A fundamental component of this has been the enforcement 
of property relations through urban space, including the expulsion or dispossession of 
those who might disturb or interrupt the ability to extract value from housing and the 
built environment, a process well-charted in the literature analysing gentrification 
(Slater 2006; Lees 2010; Watt 2013). As a modality through which the production of 
urban space is subject to the needs to extract value, I have argued that housing 
financialisation should be viewed as an inherently urban set of practices. In particular, 
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it should be stressed that the dispossession of others who may threaten accumulation 
is at the core of financial governance, for example through housing associations 
controlling risks through excluding prospective tenants from their social housing who 
may be likely to fall into arrears.  
My thesis has contributed to these debates by drawing on the literature within critical 
socio-legal studies, in particular that of the territorialisation of property rights (Blomley 
2003a, 2011) and their regulatory governance (Cowan and McDermont 2006, 2008), 
in order to conduct an in-depth analysis of how housing association financialisation is 
mediated through legal and regulatory frameworks. This was achieved in Chapter 5 
through my theorisation of the need to govern risk as a fundamental attribute of 
housing association regulation in the context of urban neoliberalisation and 
financialisation. In particular, my argument stressed that the regulatory governance of 
housing associations by bodies such as the Housing Corporation, the TSA, and the 
HCA has not only been a matter of preventing risk. Rather, through a historical analysis 
of the formalisation of borrowing by associations under the Housing Act 1988, I argued 
that the shift to the use of private finance by associations has systematically relied on 
the transfer of the risks of development to providers and tenants as a means of 
installing market discipline. With the ability to produce new social housing dependent 
on the need to satisfy lenders, this has been shown to introduce a commercial logic 
into the fundamental operations of social housing, with the result that the 
financialisation of housing associations should not be seen as a wholly new 
phenomenon, but as a historical process that has been long in the making.  
Rather than law and regulation being conceived of as a set of rules in a book that are 
then applied to society, I have applied the insights of critical socio-legal analysis of law 
and regulation as a discourse to the enactment of private property rights in the social 
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housing stock of associations (Blandy and Sibley 2010; Blomley 2011). In particular, I 
have applied these analyses to the regulation of housing associations in the post-
1980s era of private finance. Drawing on Cowan and McDermont (2006), I argued that 
the defining features of this regulatory governance has been a shift to de-centred 
governance at-a-distance and self-regulation (Black 2001) that embedded commercial 
and competitive logics in the sector, within a wider framework of “new public 
management” techniques that prioritise audit, monitoring and performance targets 
(Hoggett 1996; Walker 2001; McKee 2009). Although formal performance indicators 
for “consumer” tenant standards were scrapped with the abolition of the TSA in 2012, 
economic monitoring and audit has continued to be essential for the HCA’s regulation 
of the sector (Homes and Communities Agency 2012). A key contribution of my thesis 
has been to develop these insights by applying them to the analysis of financialisation 
within a post-crisis context of greater uncertainty and volatility, shaping new relations 
between lenders, providers, tenants and the regulator.  
Specifically, in theorising the regulatory governance of housing associations under 
financialisation, I drew in Chapter 5 on the analysis by Veitch (2007) of the role law 
can play in the construction of a system of “organised irresponsibility”. That is, by 
assigning liabilities and responsibilities to individualised actors, the collective 
responsibility for social harms can be obscured, such as the inequalities and 
dispossession generated in the urban landscape through speculative real estate 
development (Curran 2013, 2015). I then applied this analysis in Chapter 6, showing 
how legal and regulatory frameworks in the development of a bank-led financial model 
following the Housing Act 1988 up to the financial crisis worked to shield lenders while 
passing risks onto providers and tenants. In conducting this analysis, I drew on the 
exploration by Froud (2003) of the distinction between risk and uncertainty in the 
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context of welfare state outsourcing, with risk being a calculable and probabilistic 
entity, while uncertainty refers to the radical unknowability of the future. In the 
development of the post-1988 public-private finance model, my analysis demonstrated 
how the use of social housing stock as collateral has been essential for associations 
being permitted to borrow from private markets, acting to insulate lenders from the 
uncertainty of being able to recover their losses if a provider defaults. While this power 
has not yet been activated, my analysis has shown it to be a fundamental component 
underpinning the sector’s development model, with lenders taking active steps through 
the history of their relation to the sector to protect this right, including the threat of 
capital strike that would deprive associations of any future access to credit.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, relations between associations and the financial sector 
in the pre-crisis era were mediated through relatively traditional bank lending, though 
this was also a period where regulatory liberalisation enabled the sale of over the 
counter derivatives to associations, primarily in the form of interest rate swaps in order 
to pay fixed rates on their long-term loans. I have nonetheless argued that the use of 
housing association stock as collateral nonetheless enabled the construction of a 
“financial terrain” (D. Fields 2015), providing creditors with latent claims to assets that 
have limited the policy space of the government and the regulator in governing housing 
associations. Although the necessity of private money for social housing development 
has been previously explored (Cowan and McDermont 2006; McDermont 2007), my 
research advances this literature by analysing the direct role the use of housing 
association stock as collateral has played by territorialising financial interests within 
the social housing sector. A key finding of this is chapter is that the governance of 
stock acts as a key point of intersection between this financial terrain and the sector’s 
“regulatory space” (McDermont 2007), with banks in addition to the regulator also 
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emerging as key actors who shape the behaviour of associations, for example through 
restricting their ability to borrow via loan covenants and conservative valuation 
techniques. These directly shape the organisational strategy of providers, for example 
through restrictive covenants creating pressures toward mergers to free up borrowing 
capacity, with my research demonstrating the importance of regulatory governance by 
private actors such as lenders and valuers to the financialisation of social housing 
(Scott 2002; Black 2001).  
Faced with the dilemma of wishing to safeguard social housing stock while also 
overseeing a development model fundamentally based on the assumption of a level 
of risk by providers, the regulator has therefore attempted to introduce monitoring and 
audit procedures in an attempt to self-responsibilise associations as efficient 
developers. A crucial additional power has been found to be the operation of the 
consents regime by which the regulator could minimise the ability to use stock as 
collateral for commercial developments, although regulatory proposals to introduce an 
absolute ringfence were dropped in the face of lobbying by providers and lenders 
(Homes and Communities Agency 2014b). In chapters 8 and 9 I analysed the 
contradictions of this process in a post-crisis context through the deregulatory 
measures introduced to reverse a classification of housing association debt as 
belonging to the public sector, the ramifications of which will be discussed further later 
in this chapter. As opposed to being the result of the erosion of the state, I have 
therefore argued that financialisation in housing associations has been the product of 
“regulated deregulation” (Aalbers 2017), in which the government via legal frameworks 
and the regulator has actively set the contours of market activity, demonstrating the 
importance of the state to the commodification of social housing.  
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My focus on the use of housing association assets as collateral in Chapter 6 has  also 
enabled me to advance the theorisation of a constitutive “obscurity” as a core 
component of social housing governance, previously developed by Cowan and 
McDermont (Cowan and McDermont 2008) with respect to the shifting normative 
definitions of social ‘need’ as a legitimating ideal for the aims and goals of the sector. 
A key finding in my chapter was that a major element enabling associations to borrow 
long term at relatively affordable rates has been the sector’s regulated and subsidised 
nature, enabling associations to borrow long term at cheaper rates than they would 
otherwise be able to because lenders have considered them safe and reliable 
borrowers. The threat to tenants in terms of losing their rent protections, though not 
their tenancies, and to the government in losing the public investment safeguarded in 
social housing stock, has been sufficient to create the implicit expectation among 
lenders that the government would ultimately stand behind the sector to prevent 
repossession. As I have argued, this can never be an explicit feature of the sector’s 
regulation under the current private finance model however, as an outright backing of 
the sector by the government would then likely see the £60bn debts of the sector 
permanently classified onto the government’s own balance sheet. The respective 
power relations between lenders and the government in an insolvency situation have 
therefore been obscured, with the government unable to make this power explicit and 
thus subject to formal accountability. Obscurity, then, has been found in my analysis 
to also be a key feature of how housing association financialisation has operated as a 
mode of governance.  
As a result of this obscurity, I have argued that financialisation has operated as a form 
of governance that has rescaled reasonability for risk management on to the scale of 
the individual provider through measures such as the use of housing stock as 
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collateral. This has been crucial in ensuring associations perform their role in the 
circulation of capital through the build environment that underpins housing 
financialisation. To this extent, I therefore argue that the governance of housing 
associations under financialisation can be categorised as a form of “organised 
irresponsibility” (Veitch 2007; Beck 1992), adding to the observation by Curran (2015) 
that the collective risks of speculative urban development are being systematically 
transferred down from lenders, to providers, and ultimately tenants who bear the brunt 
of housing insecurity.  
Additionally, I have argued that this form of governance possesses new features in the 
post-crisis period of heightened uncertainty and weak economic growth. Prior to the 
crash, the question of default was less immediately salient due to the apparent health 
of the financial sector and steady, guaranteed subsidies from the government. The 
sector therefore operated in the “shadow of the law” (Rose and Valverde 1998), with 
the right to invoke repossession operating as an untested, latent power. The financial 
crisis has raised the serious question of what would happen in the event of creditors 
repossessing stock, with a key finding of Chapter 6 being that even though this course 
of action would still hold risks for lenders, they would still carry out this threat in order 
to prevent the basis of their power from being undermined. As shown in Chapter 9, 
discussed later in this conclusion, this uncertainty has led to the establishment of new 
insolvency regimes that have statutorily privileged the interests of creditors over the 
need to keep social housing stock within the social housing sector. An additional key 
finding of Chapter 6 however is that tenants themselves remain a factor in this 
situation, with lenders such as high street banks concerned over the potential 
reputational risk if they repossess stock. Another contribution of my thesis is therefore 
to show one possible opening in which tenants may “enter” financial terrain through 
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contesting the ability of lenders to take possession of their stock (D. Fields 2015), 
echoing similar protests in the takeover of the New Era estate in London by private 
interests after is sale by a charity (Beswick et al. 2016). Such contestation would 
nonetheless happen under desperate circumstances given the threat to the homes of 
tenants, demonstrating the urgent need to gain knowledge of the risks that are 
currently developing through the sector.  
10.3. The contradictions of housing association financialisation 
In this section I consider my second research question on the extent to which 
associations have adopted financialisation, and whether this process has bounds or 
limits. In Chapter 7 I analysed how the financial crisis and its aftermath have 
transformed social housing finance, focusing on the shift to the capital markets in the 
form of bond lending, and the nascent equity market offered by institutional investors 
that is a marginal but growing feature of the sector. I found the immediate impact of 
the crisis was for banks who themselves faced higher funding cuts to pull back their 
lending to the sector, claiming that many of the loans they had previously made to 
providers were now loss-making (House of Commons 2013). The perceived stability 
and state-backed nature of housing associations nonetheless made them attractive to 
bond lenders such as pension funds and insurance companies, who were seeking 
long-dated assets to offset their own liabilities. While banks still hold the majority of 
the sector’s historical debt, and still provide some funding for the sector, the majority 
of new loans have since come to be accounted for by the bond markets. The relation 
of associations to the state has therefore been a crucial factor in their construction as 
an asset class for bond lenders, enabling the continuation of the private finance model 
previously dominated by banks from the Housing Act 1988 up until the onset of the 
2007 – 2009 financial crisis.  
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As seen in Chapter 7, much policy and financial services industry analysis over the 
past decade, with the collaboration of some academic researchers, has explored the 
potential for attracting new institutional investment into the social housing sector, as 
part of a wider exploration of corporate investment in residential rented housing 
(Williams, Salisbury, and Caven 2011; Oxley et al. 2015; Montague 2012). Although 
corporate investment at scale has been limited in the UK compared to other national 
contexts such as the US, a key finding of my chapter was that at least two types of 
investor can be distinguished; those seeking long-term safe returns, and those actively 
targeting higher yields and the potential for equity investments such as sale and 
leaseback arrangements. Interest in these within the social housing sector itself has 
nonetheless been relatively limited, due to the ready availability of long-term, 
affordable fixed rate debt through the bond markets. From the point of more 
conservative investors, bonds are also preferable in offering a readily identifiable and 
exchangeable asset, which in the case of a public issue will have received a grading 
from a credit rating agency. This can also enable them to be sold on and traded at a 
future point in time, although interview data with participants indicates that secondary 
trades of association debt are currently still rare.  
This turn toward the bond markets has also attracted attention within the academic 
literature, though there is not yet a consensus over its impacts within the few papers 
that have been published on this specific area to date. Tang et al (2017) have claimed 
that bond finance presents a flexible source of finance in comparison to equity 
investment, while Wainwright and Manville (2017) have argued that the process of 
bond issuance involves associations having to submit to inflexible procedures such as 
rigid credit checks in order to access credit. Interestingly, credit downgrades as 
providers become more exposed to the market limits the ability of associations to 
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engage in commercial developments, with bond buyers wary of anything that may 
threaten the perceived safety and stability of association debt. Both analyse access to 
finance in terms of enabling associations to meet social goals such as the 
development of below-market housing, though for Wainwright and Manville (2017) 
financialisation is very much something that associations acquiesce to, rather than 
playing an active role in reshaping the process. 
While one limitation of this research is a lack of direct interview data on the process of 
bond issuance, including the role of credit rating agencies, one contribution of my 
thesis to these debates is that I have found the relation of associations to the capital 
markets to be a more complex process. Although the process of bond issuance can 
be rigid in comparison to bank lending, one key finding of my chapter was that the 
purposes by which associations borrow is changing, with providers engaged in 
developing seeking to access lending facilitates that can be used across the whole of 
their operational requirements, rather than for specific projects. In doing so, although 
bonds can themselves entail restrictive covenants, they can also provide an 
opportunity for some associations to refinance their existing debt if they have existing 
covenants restricting them from exploiting their assets to engage in development. The 
ability to access large bond facilities with fixed rate payments has also seen a small 
number of cases where associations have directly engaged in financial accumulation 
themselves, such as the case of Notting Hill housing association  offering interest rate 
swaps with other providers. While financialisation may not involve bond buyers 
changing their practices to suit associations, it can still therefore be seen to be a two-
way process in which associations are gaining the capacity to engage in trading in 
financial instruments themselves. The consequences of this are an urgent area for 
future research given, the demonstrable volatility of derivates in cases such as the 
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near bankruptcy of the Dutch housing association Vestia after its engagement in 
derivatives speculation (Aalbers, Loon, and Fernandez 2017). 
Additional findings in Chapter 7 further complicate this picture of financialisation. It 
should be stressed that I have found financialisation to be a dynamic and contradictory 
process. While bond lending has so far been relatively favourable for associations, the 
ability to attract debt on the capital markets has been occurring within a post-crisis 
conjuncture (Engelen et al. 2010) of low interest rates and a search for safe assets in 
an economic context characterised by weak growth and a death of investment 
opportunities. Furthermore, one finding of my chapter is that even within this context, 
associations have encountered difficulties in borrowing. My findings, corroborated by 
my interview data and financial regulator reports (Financial Conduct Authority 2016), 
have indicated that banks working as bond arrangers may have a conflict of interest 
in securing deals that are favourable to bond buyers, rather than associations. The 
need to explore the extent to which these conflicts of interest in the process of bond 
issuance are widespread is therefore an important area for future research that has 
been identified by my thesis.  
Additionally, in my exploration of the distinction between two classes of prospective 
lenders and investors in Chapter 7, I have argued that the dynamic nature of 
financialisation can be seen in the exploration of equity investment by fund managers 
seeking higher returns on their capital. Forms of equity investment such as sale and 
leaseback using index-linked finance have been found to so far be marginal within the 
sector, with interview respondents and consultants such as TradeRisks (2014) 
warning of high hidden costs, which can be difficult to predict unless aspects such as 
inflation are adequately priced in. A minority of housing associations have nonetheless 
been attracted into equity finance via their reaching the limits of the current borrowing 
370 
 
opportunities available to them, for example by exhausting their capacity to use stock 
as collateral, or encountering difficulties in attracting bond finance for more commercial 
developments such as shared ownership. As housing associations reach the limits of 
their current borrowing capacity, with lenders wary of their exposure to greater risk, 
these barriers may be overcome through a turn to the equity markets, particularly if 
interest rates rise and make borrowing more difficult. This cautions against viewing 
financialisation as a static end point or a sustainable solution for the housing sector 
(Oxley et al. 2015), pointing to the need for critical assessments of the potential 
negative consequences of institutional investment for social housing. 
Most recently, there has been critical analysis of the scope for transnational corporate 
landlords attempting to enter the affordable housing market, with speculation that Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) or private equity firms such as Blackstone may 
attempt to enter the affordable housing market via social housing estates in London, 
to evade higher land prices elsewhere in the capital. My findings in Chapter 7 have 
contributed to this emerging research area by demonstrating the need to look beyond 
London, with institutional funds such as Cheyne and others piloting developments in 
regional towns and cities such as Sheffield or Luton. Although this is still an emerging 
market, interview data suggests that one strategy pursued by these organisations is 
to target affordable housing in areas where affordable rents are close to market rate, 
or alternately, specialised property such as temporary accommodation where housing 
benefit payments would be more secure. My fieldwork data suggests that low land 
costs in such areas combined with the stability of affordable housing enables the 
chance for higher relative yields to be extracted, though such developments would 
need to be deployed at scale in order for such a strategy to bring higher absolute 
returns (D. Fields 2017). An alternate strategy identified has been to target 
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developments in areas such as Luton that could be capable of capturing commuters 
based in high-wage areas such as London, enabling higher rents to be charged for 
lower land costs. As such, the UK’s highly uneven economic geography therefore 
emerges as a resource for institutional investors, who are able to exploit land 
differentials and inter-city rent gaps in the search for yield.  
The exploitation of spatial strategies to take advantage of rising land values, in a 
temporal conjuncture of low interest rates, can also be seen in the development activity 
of housing associations themselves. In Chapter 8, I analysed the impact of post-2010 
austerity cuts on the development activity of associations, in particular the growing 
dependence on more commercialised developments among larger, often London-
based providers. I have argued that the expansion of commercial activity in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis acts as the next iteration of a path-dependent process 
of privatisation and re-commodification (Harloe and Lebas 1981; Ginsburg 2005) that 
has been underway throughout the neoliberalisation of social housing policy over the 
past 40 years. With Manzi and Morrison (2017), I have argued that this has the 
potential to lead to some associations adopting a fully commercial perspective, fulfilling 
the warnings by Ginsburg (2005) of a genuine privatisation of social landlords.  
Some analyses within the housing studies literature have suggested that de-
municipalisation and greater commercialisation can be interpreted as a “migration” of 
social housing toward the private sector, driven by a structural “modernisation” of the 
housing system through a path-dependent drift to the market (Malpass and Victory 
2010; Pawson and Sosenko 2012; Malpass 2005; Pawson and Mullins 2010). 
Contrasting with this, my research indicates that associations are undergoing a more 
far-reaching process of financialisation as associations are incentivised to treat their 
land and housing as pure financial assets, within which the political economy of social 
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housing is becoming more dependent on being able to facilitate the circulation of 
capital through the built environment (Aalbers and Christophers 2014). Furthermore, 
in my research I have contributed to a housing political economy by extending the 
analysis of Montgomerie and Büdenbender (2015) by showing housing financialisation 
to be a spatially and temporally bounded process. The successful commercialisation 
of housing associations on a large scale has been shown in Chapter 8 to be 
geographically concentrated among a relatively small number of larger providers, 
while this has relied on an unusually beneficial temporal conjuncture of low interest 
rates and welfare reforms whose worst impact has not yet been felt. Beyond these 
limits, financialisation appears as a risky and precarious phenomenon, as shown in 
the next section of this conclusion.  
10.4. The risks of financialisation 
In considering my third research question, financialisation has potentially serious 
consequences for tenants, with the provision of future affordable housing found to be 
becoming dependent on the ability of associations to participate in speculative 
processes of land development which themselves produce unaffordability and 
dispossession. One key finding of my research in Chapter 8 for example is that in 
funding development, some London-based associations have sold land assets in inner 
London to overseas investors. Although this may release money for cross-subsidy, 
any new affordable housing would not be built within the same area, contributing to 
the gradual expulsion of affordable housing from central areas of the capital. 
Furthermore, an additional finding of the chapter is that in order to extract a return 
sufficient to cover the costs of development, associations have diversified the tenancy 
mixture of the housing they develop, reducing the proportional amount of affordable 
housing they build and casting doubt on the claim that cross-subsidy can provide new 
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social housing without government subsidy. Although commercial developments are 
coming to account for a higher share of the sector’s income, with one quarter of the 
sector’s turnover now accounted for by income from sources other than social housing 
(Homes and Communities Agency 2017b), financialisation has also been seen to be 
a geographically concentrated process, with the bulk of revenue accounted for by a 
small number of predominantly London-based providers (Homes and Communities 
Agency 2017a). Financialisation should therefore not be considered as a sustainable 
income model for the sector as a whole.  
In addition, Chapter 8 showed how the response of the government to the recent re-
classification of housing association debt as belonging to the public sector has been 
a wide-ranging deregulation of regulatory powers, including the scrapping of the 
consents regime through which the regulator has historically been able to restrict sales 
of stock from the sector or its use as collateral. The deregulatory measures appear to 
have had the desired effect, with the Office for National Statistics at the time of writing 
having re-classified association debt as private sector once more. The temporary 
classification of housing association borrowing as public debt did not have any impact 
on the operational activities of associations, and as indicated by Macleod, R (on the 
application of) v The Governors of the Peabody Trust [2016] EWHC 737, in which a 
transfer was declared a private act, the statistical reclassification of associations’ debt 
has not had an impact on the public or private status of associations in case law. The 
removal of association debt from the public books is nonetheless significant in that it 
may free up the government’s capacity to borrow against its self-imposed limits. 
Whether this is spent on social or affordable housing is a discretionary matter for the 
Treasury however, with the latest budget announcement in November 2017 not 
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containing significant levels of new capital spending for affordable rented housing that 
had not already been announced (Barratt 2017).  
Though the regulator still has indirect levers to influence association behaviour, such 
as the use of Governance and Viability ratings monitored by lenders, in Chapter 8 I 
argued that this nonetheless represents a significant long-term change within the 
sector, enabling the more commercial churning of assets and raising the possibility 
that social housing stock could be sold from the sector. As such, tenants are likely to 
bear the costs of financialisation through a continued expulsion of social and 
affordable housing from central urban areas, as the provision of their housing as a 
shelter becomes dependent on the ability of associations to extract value through 
treating land and housing as a pure financial asset. This finding can be seen to 
contribute to the literature by adding nuance to the theorisation by Bryan and Rafferty 
(2014b) of financialisation as a transformation of social reproduction. My research has 
found this to operate not just at the level of home ownership, but through the homes 
of social housing tenants being treated as assets for the purposes of value extraction. 
For future research agendas, this strongly suggests the need for an exploration of 
financialisation that moves beyond the interviews with social housing stakeholders and 
practitioners contained in this study, moving instead to inquire as to how social housing 
tenants themselves experience, narrate and reflect on these processes, including the 
extent to which it shapes their own practices of social reproduction within a wider 
context of austerity and insecurity.   
In addition, my research also contributes to the financialisation and housing studies 
literatures by undertaking a critical assessment of the claim that financialisation can 
be used in the pursuit of progressive political ends. Recalling the analysis by Cowan 
and McDermont (2008) of a constitutive obscurity in the aims and norms of social 
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housing, a key finding in Chapter 8 was the claim by think tanks and private sector-
adjacent consultants that financialisation, in the sense of the treatment of land and 
housing as a pure financial asset, can also be a means of fulfilling social goals (Walker 
2014). The expulsion of people on low incomes from central urban areas, within this 
view, can be justified through it unlocking the market in order to build more houses. 
Critiquing the conceptual assumptions underlying this claim, I have argued this rests 
on a normative and depoliticised depiction of housing as a privatised and individuated 
commodity, a view that excludes the relationships and collective practices by which 
people may shape their homes and the neighbourhoods and cities in which they live.  
This claim also rests on the denial of the importance of the relational spaces through 
which we associate with one another as human beings, erasing the harms caused by 
displacement through an implicit assumption of housing as belonging to the abstract 
space of commodity circulation (Lefebvre 1991). My analysis as to how this view of 
space is weaponised to justify dispossession within social housing financialisation is 
relevant to the housing studies literature that analyses changes to social housing as a 
process of ‘hybridity’ between commercial and social goals (Kickert 2001; Pawson 
2006; Czischke 2009; Mullins, Czischke, and Bortel 2012; Sacranie 2012; Manzi and 
Morrison 2017). Even where these adopt an explicitly critical analysis of these changes 
to housing associations (Manzi and Morrison 2017), my research contributes to this 
literature by showing the need for an explicit conceptualisation of the notion of spatial 
justice as part of the aims and norms of social housing (Soja 2009), in order to account 
for these processes of displacement and dispossession. 
While the above critiques of dispossession apply to when financialisation is working 
‘well’, in a scenario where associations are able to successfully reform themselves as 
large commercial developers, my findings in Chapter 9 strongly suggest that the 
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financialisation agenda is building up serious risks for both providers and tenants. A 
key finding of my research is that even under the favourable environment for 
financialisation experienced since the crisis, the HCA has expressed concerns over 
the build-up of risks within the sector, for example through a minority of associations 
selling assets in order to cover their operations costs. Although the surpluses 
collectively made by the sector are high, I have argued that these are a reflection of 
current low interest rates rather than evidence of underlying financial health. The case 
of Cosmopolitan Housing Group (Underwood, Kane, and Appleby 2014) in particular 
has raised concerns over the possibility of an association undergoing default, putting 
social housing assets and the homes of tenants at risk, while bringing down the current 
development model by destroying the sector’s collective credit rating.  
With the regulator facing limited resources, I have argued in Chapter 9 that the focus 
of attempts to counter these emerging risks has been a deepening of the 
individualisation of risk management by associations, further entrenching the process 
of “organised irresponsibility” (Veitch 2007) analysed above by entrenching 
commercial subjectivities in the sector. An additional contribution of my analysis of 
how financialisation operates through the governance of associations is therefore the 
attention this draws to the importance of disciplining associations into effective 
capitalist behaviour, while obscuring the systemic aspects of crisis in the urban 
landscape. I have also shown the value of a socio-legal perspective by analysing the 
new insolvency regime created for the sector in an attempt to formalise procedures for 
dealing with a provider in administration. Although this may appear to give some clarity 
to the ‘obscurity’ of the relation between lenders and the government in the event of a 
default, I have shown how this turn to the powers of the courts through a court-
appointed administrator may reflect a weakening of the regulator’s power, as disputes 
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become subject to formal legal arbitration. The explicit statutory privileging of the rights 
of lenders over that of tenants within this system through the Housing and Planning 
Act 2016  may then deepen the reach of the “financial terrain” analysed in Chapter 6, 
entrenching the commodification of housing associations.  
If an outright collapse were to happen it would be a nightmare scenario, at best 
requiring a large-scale government bailout to protect the homes of affected tenants 
comparable to the Vestia incident (Aalbers, Loon, and Fernandez 2017), and at worst 
leaving potentially thousands of people at the risk of rent hikes or homelessness. As 
in the Netherlands, financialisation within English housing associations could end in 
disaster, leading to providers withdrawing from the commercial market (Manzi and 
Morrison 2017). A common theme emerging from interview respondents within the 
social housing sector was a desire to characterise cases such as Cosmopolitan as a 
case of bad governance by boards and senior executives, with proposed solutions 
including the need to recruit people with commercial development experience. My 
analysis in Chapter 9, building on my thesis as a whole, suggests that this 
individualised focus is misplaced, obscuring the systemic risks of financialisation 
generated by the reliance of associations on speculative and volatile private property 
markets to earn income.  
While not all providers would be affected by a downturn, one possible outcome of a 
collapse could be the sale of assets held under commercial development arms by 
associations, displacing housing associations with outright private actors. Given my 
findings in Chapter 7 of new investors looking for opportunities, a provider collapse 
could give rise to the worst case scenario highlighted above, enabling the creation of 
a new frontier of accumulation through dispossession as private actors snap up 
valuable assets, at a cost to tenants who would likely face higher rental costs and 
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worse services as associations enter financial distress. The practices and strategies 
of the financial investors analysed in Chapter 7 should therefore be an urgent area for 
future research, with critical academics analysing the extent to which this represents 
a nascent class of corporate landlords at work.  
If these scenarios were to be avoided, then I have endeavoured throughout this thesis 
to show how tenants would still bear the costs of financialisation within an age of 
austerity. One finding of this research is that associations at the time of fieldwork were 
considering introducing affordability criteria in deciding who they let to, potentially 
leading to the future exclusion of a class of people who are either out of work and 
vulnerable to benefit cuts, or who cycle in and out through unpaid work. To that extent, 
financialisation even in its ‘best’ case scenario can be seen to operate as a process of 
accumulation through dispossession, with people excluded from future affordable 
housing, particularly in central urban areas. My research has also indicated that there 
are likely to be nuances and contradictions in this approach however, with indications 
that some associations may be devoting more resources to tenant management and 
assessment in order to take preventative action against the chance they may fall into 
arrears. How this works to transform the daily lives of tenants and their relations with 
their landlords should therefore be an urgent area for future research.  
10.5. Finance and the welfare state: creating better capitalists out of social 
landlords 
This section concludes by bringing together the theoretical implications of the findings 
of my thesis for the study of financialisation. To briefly recap, leading voices within the 
current academic literature in the wake of the financial crisis have attempted to nuance 
the concept, calling for more attention to the specific practices and agencies that 
enable financial capital to circulate, while warning against conflations of the concept 
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with an mechanical imposition of market forces (Christophers 2015). At an empirical 
level, post-crisis studies into the financialisation of rental housing have sought to bring 
geographical nuance into how entities such as private equity funds and institutional 
investors are brought into contact with residential struggles across urban space (Fields 
and Uffer 2016; Beswick et al. 2016). In order to better theorise financialisation, there 
has been a strong tendency to draw upon Marxian and cultural political economy to 
differing degrees to historicise the concept while treating it as an outcome to be 
explained rather than as a determining, pre-social force (Christophers 2014; Ouma 
2016; Fields 2017). In other words, the wake of the crisis has seen an attempt to grasp 
the practices that in Marxist vocabulary lead from M to M’, examining the accumulation 
of finance capital through real estate as a practical accomplishment that has to be 
made, and therefore is potentially open to being unmade.  
The findings of my thesis as analysed through my theoretical framework have 
implications for the nuances of these debates, and the questions that critical housing 
researchers should be asking in the study of financialisation. As often observed in the 
housing studies literature, housing associations have contradictory roles as both 
welfare state providers and large landlords operating within a substantially 
commodified system of land markets governed by private property rights. As shown 
throughout my data chapters, austerity policies in a post-crisis environment of low 
growth and ultra-low interest rates have driven a greater reliance on commercial 
income and a turn to the capital markets to secure development finance by providers. 
While Chapter 6 showed how regulatory liberalism and neoliberal reform from the 
1980s generated a long-term commercialisation of the sector, the post-crisis period 
has seen a qualitative shift toward financialisation as providers have come to treat 
their stock as financial assets whose monetary value should be maximised. Unlike 
380 
 
fully private corporate landlords however, as shown in Chapter 7 the specific nature of 
housing associations as an asset class has been constructed by their role as welfare 
providers, in particular the stability that lenders have come to expect through the 
anticipation of government regulatory support. Even given the impact of austerity 
measures analysed in Chapter 8, the need to maintain that stability has been a crucial 
task for the regulator in maintaining their appeal as long-term secure borrowers for 
entities such as pension funds. Chapter 9 found that legal and regulatory measures 
have still remained vital in reassuring lenders of their security through means such as 
the introduction of a court-appointed administrator in the event of insolvency. This 
demonstrates the continuing relevance of state frameworks in how associations are 
treated as an asset class, even with the weakened powers of the regulator with respect 
to lenders, due to the negative consequence of a provider failure given their continued 
welfare provider role as social landlords.  
Crucially, the ongoing regulatory effort to shape associations as reliable clients of 
financial investors highlights the iterative nature of constructing social landlords as 
investor-subjects in the wake of the financial crisis. This demonstrates the need for the 
financialisation to take seriously what Emma Dowling (2017) has called the co-
imbrication of the state and the financial sector in delivering welfare services, with the 
latter gaining opportunities for profitable accumulation through the outsourcing of 
services such as social housing by the former. The analysis in this thesis has 
advanced this understanding through extending the insights of the socio-legal 
literature as to the regulatory space of social housing (McDermont 2007), showing how 
this operates in a financialised, austerity context. As shown in particular in Chapter 7 
and Chapter 9, providers reaching their borrowing limits for example have been shown 
as a spur toward consolidation and the seeking out of new sources of finance for more 
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commercial products such as shared ownership. In doing so, I have further advanced 
the theoretical analysis of the crucial role of legal and regulatory frameworks that have 
sought to gain a better understanding of how financial agents use law to entrench 
commodification and investor power (Knuth and Potts 2016). Law has already been 
shown in the crossover literature between socio-legal analysis and financialisation to 
be crucial in areas such as the creation of new markets through means such as the 
direct creation of new regimes of property rights (Kay 2016), My analysis extends this 
by showing the need to be attuned to the latent aspects of investor power, with lenders 
to housing associations actively defending their rights over housing association loan 
security even though this is a power that has not been actualised in practice given the 
reputational risk of repossessing the homes of sitting tenants. Financialisation in social 
housing therefore has a strong performative aspect, in terms of the regulator needing 
to maintain confidence in the ongoing commercial viability of the social housing sector 
in the face of fragile and crisis-prone real estate markets.  
Finally, the question of lender and investor power gives rise to further theoretical 
considerations for the governance of housing associations as an asset class to which 
this thesis has contributed. My analysis has shown the governance of risk to be a key 
technology of financialisation, with legal and regulatory frameworks in the historical 
vulnerabilities of the post-crisis financial context passing down insecurity from lenders, 
to providers, and on to tenants in a process of organised irresponsibility. This 
extension of financial technologies of risk management through the housing system 
extends the theoretical analysis of Bryan and Rafferty (2014b), showing how this 
occurs not only in the context of homeowners acting as investor-subjects, but through 
the provision of social housing becoming dependent on the successful navigation of 
financial logics by housing associations. The analysis of Manchester’s urban context 
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in chapters 8 and 9 shows the nuances of this however, with housing practitioners 
both attempting to focus support on existing tenants in order to prevent arrears risk, 
while introducing new exclusionary letting policies likely to exclude new classes of 
benefit-dependent tenants to protect their income streams. As such, the maintenance 
of financialisation has been shown to entail providers to engage in an intensification 
of knowledge-gathering with respect to tenants, while attempting to focus resources 
on preventing some tenants from presenting an arrears risk.  
Financialisation can therefore be enacted through multiple techniques, operating 
through welfare provider governance strategies rather than a replication of outright 
private sector relations between landlords and tenants. Despite this nuance however, 
it should be emphasised that the current regime of financialisation in social housing 
provision via housing associations necessitates that lenders and investors be ensured 
of a profitable return. The need to show a return for lenders, therefore, still 
predominates in the last instance, with financialisation subordinating the ultimate 
social objectives of housing associations to ensuring the continued circulation of 
capital for the ends of profitable accumulation. As such, the transformation of housing 
associations as an asset class analysed in this thesis should be understood as 
fundamentally reliant on the privatisation of gains at the cost of rescaling risks onto 
providers and tenants, actively governed through state regulatory frameworks, and 
fuelling dispossession and the exclusion of new classes of people from the security of 
social housing in the urban landscape.  
10.6. Postscript: social housing and the market 
Forty-five years ago at the time of writing, the Housing Act 1972 brought forth mass 
grass-roots opposition against the attempt by Ted Heath’s government (1970 – 1974) 
to link council housing rents to market values. The Act ultimately failed, but in hindsight 
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was the overture to an era of neoliberalisation in which the compromises of social 
democracy have been steadily rolled back. Housing has formed the leading edge of 
this process, from the Right to Buy of the 1980s, the demonization of council estates 
and the people living on them of the 1990s, the de-municipalisation and state-led 
gentrification of the New Labour era, and the revanchist class war conservatism that 
has been so typical of the Conservative Party’s current term in office. For many, the 
disaster of Grenfell Tower, with a horrific fire killing at least 71 people, set within the 
gross urban inequalities of Kensington and Chelsea, seemed to summarise an era of 
profiteering, social cleansing and dispossession at the hands of authorities across too 
many areas of urban life throughout the neoliberal period. 
The future implications social housing within the UK at the time of writing are subject 
to deep uncertainty. While an increasingly authoritarian political centre and the re-
emergence of the far right until recently appeared to dominate politics, the unexpected 
prospect of a future Labour government led from the left under Jeremy Corbyn has 
raised the possibility of an attempted revival of the social democratic compact. Such 
a project remains precarious and limited, however. As social tensions and inequality 
within cities continues to grow, with landlords incorporated into racist regimes of border 
policing through means such as “Right to Rent” citizenship checks, the need to provide 
better, decent, secure housing is an urgent and pressing priority.  
In analysing social housing financialisation as a process fundamentally intertwined 
with dispossession, I have sought to show with this thesis the necessity of finding an 
alternative to the market. Even if funding was returned to build new social housing, I 
have attempted to show that for this to be meaningful it must break with the reliance 
for new supply on the treatment of land and housing as assets whose value should be 
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maximised. Only if this break is made can we start to find new ways of living with one 
another within cities that are not determined by the requirements of profit.  
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